Politics
in Central Europe

Europeanisation Processes in Central Europe

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ESSAYS

Evaluation of the 2009 European Parliament Elections in Hungary[1]

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Abstract: *The 2009 elections for the European Union have been special for several reasons: on the one hand the world has been struggling with an economic crisis; on the other hand the Hungarian government has been in crisis since 2006.[2] As for the second one, the opposition "converted" the elections to a referendum held on the recent work of the government. The predictions of the public opinion polls proved to be adequate: after sending nine representatives five years ago[3], the Socialist Party this year could only get four places. Nevertheless the predictions of the opinion polls proved to be unpunctual, because only one-two places were expected to be taken by the far right party Jobbik. It succeeded in getting even three places though. (Only 31,36 % of the citizens voted, which also 'deformed' somewhat the situation.) The biggest opposition party Fidesz (56,36 %) received fourteen mandates, which could have been awaited because of the weakness of the government. The question remains though, how can Fidesz handle the far right voters, because Jobbik doesn't want to belong to a big right-wing conglomerate.*

The tendencies mentioned above predict the rearrangement of the current Hungarian party system, namely the potential appearance of the far right powers. Although the Socialist party sustained a defeat at the elections and parallel to this the right wing could improve their strength, the elections did not turn to a domestic referendum[4]: Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai was not forced to resign, moreover

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[1] I would like to thank to Ágnes Szerencsi, Júlia Laktos for helping.

[2] In 2006, former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted in a speech held behind closed doors – which later became public – that the socialists won the elections with lies. This started the spiral which led to their fall during which time the air became thin around the social democratic-liberal government. The opposition kept the prime minister constantly under pressure, in 2008 they initiated a referendum against the government reforms. Following the failure of the referendum and the political emptiness, the liberals left the coalition. The socialists have been governing from a minority government since spring 2008. All together, these led to the resignation of Ferenc Gyurcsány in March 2009, whose position was taken over by Gordon Bajnai and a government of experts led by him. The opposition has been constantly calling for early elections. The support of the socialist party in the polls dropped to a historic low which projected/projects the results of the EP elections, moreover the parliamentary elections to be held in 2010 (or earlier)

[3] This result was seen as a failure already in 2004, in part, this contributed to the resignation of former Prime Minister, Peter Medgyessy.

[4] There was no short term consequence of the loss in internal politics. Naturally it had long term consequences concerning the party system.

the minority governing Socialist fraction approved (with the votes of their former coalition partner) the laws most important for handling the crises after the defeat.

   Keywords: *European elections, Hungary, political parties, Fidesz, Jobbik, Hungarian party system*

Table 1: The names and abbreviations of Hungarian parties in the study

The Hungarian name of the party	The English name of the party	The political attitude	Status in 2009[5] (participation in the Hungarian legislation)	Abbreviations in the study
Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség – KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt)[6]	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Union – Christian Democratic People's Party	centre-right party	big party (political group in the Hungarian parliament)	Fidesz-KDNP
Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom	Movement for a Better Hungary	extreme right party	it can be a medium party	Jobbik
Lehet Más a Politika – Humanista Párt	Politics Can Be Different – Humanist Party	green party	small party	LMP-HP
Magyar Demokrata Fórum	Hungarian Democratic Forum	conservative party (but it is questionable)	small party (members of the Hungarian parliament, without a fraction)	MDF
MCF Roma Összefogás	MCF Gipsy Alliance	minority party	small party	MCF
Magyar Szocialista Párt	Hungarian Socialist Party	centre left, social democratic party	medium party and governing party (political group in the Hungarian parliament)	MSZP
Magyar Kommunista Munkáspárt	Hungarian Communist Workers' Party	extreme left party	small party	Munkáspárt
Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége	Alliance of Free Democrats	liberal party	small party, it is disintegrating (political group in the Hungarian parliament)	SZDSZ

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[5]   According to the results of the 2009 European Elections.
[6]   In my study I consider the KDNP as the part of the Fidesz.

Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja	Hungarian Truth and Life Party	extreme right party	disintegrated	MIÉP
Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség	Hungarian National Union	party alliance, right character	disintegrated	Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség
Szociáldemokrata Párt	Social Democratic Party	social demo-cratic party	small party, with small importance	Szociál-demokrata Párt

The European programs of the parties[7]

Before introducing the programs[8] in detail some conclusions should be made. Just like five years ago the attitudes of the parties to the elections and to creating programs was quite different: as for the bigger parties only Fidesz, as for smaller ones Jobbik and LMP-HP had real coherent programs, the other parties introduced only thesis, promises before the European Elections. Handling the common policies of the EU is also different: as a general tendency EU is mentioned in a domestic political context, all of the programs handle European topics, but only the election prospects of the parties Fidesz, LMP-HP and SZDSZ are arranged according to the European professional politics. Differences can be also observed by comparing programs with the European party families: Fidesz, SZDSZ, LMP-HP[9] to a smaller extent Jobbik followed the policy laid down by the European parties in their pro-grammes; others were mainly focused on the domestic content of their programs for the elections.

Fidesz – Preparing for Reigning

In the centre of the European program of Fidesz (*Yes, Hungary is able to achieve more! – European Elections program for Fidesz*)[10], the biggest opposition party, stood the activity of the governments reigning since 2002. The challenge was quite big, as the citizens of a eurosceptic, disappointed country were to be taken to elect. For this purpose Fidesz drew a thick line between the opportunities given by being part of the EU and the failed government policy. Fidesz has positioned itself as

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[7]   In the 2009 Hungarian European Elections 8 parties ran a list, out of these 4 parties received man-dates. In the following, we would like to introduce the programs and theses of the parties which started a list. (Fidesz, MSZP, Jobbik, MDF, LMP-HP, SZDSZ, Hungarian Communist Workers' Party, MCF Gipsy Alliance)

[8]   From here on I refer to the parties' collection of ideas concerning their European policies as "pro-grams" without distinction to their form. Where necessary I differentiate between the following expressions: programs, program-booklets, theses and manifests.

[9]   Though LMP's membership in the European Green party family is questionable as another (stronger) platform, the Green Left vindicated the right to join the party family for itself.

[10]   Available at http://fidesz.hu/download/program2009_magyar.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

a party able to govern, and tried to send the most possible representatives to the fraction of the European People's Party, because as they mentioned many times, without governmental position this is the way to look after their values and carry out their interests. Therefore it can be stated that this program is more than a program for the European elections: this is the European program for a party preparing for the next domestic elections. This statement is reinforced by the party itself as saying that the number and rate of the received votes is going to influence, whether the Hungarian interests are represented on a governmental level. The European elections were thus a 'pre-contest' for Fidesz, which gives the opportunity to act as the representatives of the Hungarian interests, the extension of which can be the triumph on the domestic elections. The elements of the professional politics – except of a few Hungarian cruises – were based on the program of the European People's Party (Strong *for the People*[11]). Values determining a strong Europe stood in the centre of the program of Fidesz with real problems of the European citizens. Fidesz wants a more effective European democracy, cooperation in the most important fields, like energy- and climate policy, food security, research and development, demography, immigration. The party outlines the importance of united action in the fields of foreign-, defence and security politics, and of the value based enlargement. Though these fields are in accordance with the EPP's program, some differences can be found. Outlined Hungarian topics in the program are: representing the freedom rights of the citizens, the minority rights, supporting the autonomy targets (because of the Hungarians living outside the borders, can be realized with the Lisbon Treaty), integration of the Roma population (the program refers to the pre-works of the European Roma Strategy), and facing the heritage of the totalitarian communist dictatorship of the 20.th century. Fidesz is interested in an active Europe-politics, which is based on the recognition that the decisions of the European institutes are not dictates, and Hungary takes part in the decision-making. Fidesz wants Hungarian interests appear as European in the EPP. The program states that the party's task is the representation of the Hungarian people inside and outside of our borders along the fundamental values and principles of the EPP, when the representation of the Hungarian interests is always regarded as a priority. This means that the party accepts the policy-forming role and ability of the European Union, but wants to enhance the national side of the decision making as well. Though the program and the professional political line of the Fidesz follow those of the EPP, it often does not handle topics of professional politics in a frame of professional politics (e. g. the European institution system).

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[11]   Adopted by the EPP Congress, Warsaw, 29–30 April 2009. Source: http://www.epp.eu/dbimages/pdf/EN-ELECTION-DOC-FINAL_copy_2.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

Table 2: The main policy and European politics elements of the Fidesz's European programm

The main policy and European politics elements of the Fidesz's European programme	
Population and Family Policy;	Energy Policy;
Social and Health Policy;	Science, Research, Development and Innovation
European Roma Policy;	Policy;
Education, Culture, Media and Youth	Environment and Climate Policy;
Policy;	Agriculture and Rural Development Policy;
Employment Policy;	Common Foreign and Security Policy;
Transport Policy;	External Economic Policy;
Tax Policy;	Enlargement Policy;

SZDSZ – Liberal Thesis

The program of SZDSZ (*What Hungarian liberals do for you in the European Parliament in the next five years?*[12]) summarize principal thesis in 14 points. These thesis refer to the 15-point proclamation[13] accepted in Stockholm on the 31. October 2008. of the European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR). Both documents can be regarded as a manifesto rather than a comprehensive program. The above mentioned Fidesz created an election program, ELDR and SZDSZ summarized short leading principles. As for the content, the manifesto of SZDSZ concentrates almost only on the common topics of the EP, so on freedom and opportunity, tolerance, competitiveness, security, sustainable development, stability, transparency, effectiveness, but the program lacks on domestic references. The party does not seem to try to bind the European elections with the Hungarian political mass, though it didn't held it in its campaign: the thesis and the campaign of SZDSZ were not in accordance. The manifesto of the party – like that of the ELDR – begins with the declaration of the values of liberty. Interesting difference is that European liberals again outline the traditional freedom rights (media, thoughts, mass, religion), these keep back in the program of SZDSZ and instead of them outrage the question of freedom of employees, ensuring of the freedom of services, and – what ELDR apostrophes as the fifth freedom – the freedom of knowledge. As stated by mother-party, SZDSZ only declares its targets in questions of European politics, it reinforces its interest in funding the European minority policy, the integration of roma communities, the comprehensive reform of the common agricultural policy, forming of the common European energy policy, fighting against climate change, creating a more transparent and understandable common policy. SZDSZ proposes that European Union has a seat only in Brussels instead of the present three.

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12   Source: http://www.szent-ivanyi.hu/reflektor.php?id=319 (15. 7. 2009).
13   Source: http://www.eldr.org/pdf/manifeste/eldr-manifeste-electoral-en.pdf (25. 10. 2009).

Table 3: The policy proposals of the SZDS

The policy proposals of the SZDSZ (by topics)	
Freedom and opportunity Free movement of services The cohesion and regional development funds availability after 2013 (Closing up);	**Security, sustainable development, stability** To fulfil the requirements of the introduction of the euro; The construction of the Nabucco gas pipeline; Combating climate change; EU enlargement (Croatia, Serbia);
Diversity, tolerance Common European Minority Policy;	
Competitiveness Reloading of the Lisbon Process; Student, teacher and research scholarships, exchange programs; The comprehensive reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; The liberalization of the railway passenger transport and the postal services;	**More transparent, more efficient, more democratic European Union** A more transparent and clear EU legislation; The rationalization of EP session;

MSZP – European Targets in a Hungarian Form

The 15-point "pledge" of MSZP[14] contains requirements for the European delegation. Therefore it is not a classical program; this is the structural assignment of the socialist promises. Although the document begins with the phrase "*In Europe for the Hungarian interests, in Hungary for the European values*", the pledges don't tackle the representation of the European values within the borders, the party only enumerates, along which targets is recommended the representation of Hungary in the EU. The document tries to bind the interests of the individuals with the European Elections, because among the pledges each citizen can find ones respected by them. The pledges can be divided along three fundamental organizing principles: 1. pure Hungarian interests 2. general European interests and values 3. EU, as a political actor.

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[14]   Source: http://mszp.hu/public/downloads/pdf/mszpvallalasok_a_kovetkezo_ciklusra.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

Table 4: The proposals of the MSZP's European programme

The proposals of the MSZP's European programme		
Pure Hungarian interests	**General Europeans interests and values**	**The EU, as a political actor**
Declaring the representation of the Hungarian national interests; To preserve the workplaces, Hungarian small and medium-sized enterprises; Against the crisis with Europe; Appropriate EU funds after 2013; The Hungarian countryside and farmers' interests; Successful Hungarian presidency;	Social Europe; The protection of consumers; Viable natural environment; Europe of the young people;	A strong and effective Europe; People close to the EU;
European energy security (the Hungarian aspect is more dominant); Europe is sensitive to minorities statues (the strong position of Hungarian minorities); EU enlargement (the Hungary regional role in stabilizing);		

The elections document of MSZP placed Hungary and the Hungarian interests on the European playfield, outlined that it wants to create politics along the priority of the Hungarian interests. The document however did not place neither Europe in the world, nor Hungary in the European Union: the pledges are for the Hungarian citizens, not for the European citizens. The pledges only partly follow the statements laid down in the manifesto[15] of the European Socialist Party in 2009, typically the questions concerning the European public policy are carried out from the national aspect.

MDF – List Leaders, Review without Alternatives

The program[16] of MDF is a drafted program-booklet that is built up – choosing a quite puritan form - in a question-answer format introducing the most important European topics of MDF (and first of all its list leaders), the importance of the elections and some technical questions. The new element of the booklet is that it focuses on the current crises and on determined politicians. The crises as an economical-socializing fact became a program-building element, MDF became the only party that can find the way out of it with its competence and its program. Other elements of the booklet are Lajos Bokros and György Habsburg[17], who as authentic professionals support

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[15] Source: http://elections2009.pes.org/files/u1/ManifestoBook_EN_Online.pdf (15. 7. 2009).
[16] Why YES to the list of MDF on 7th June? Source: http://eu.mdf.hu/index.php?mid=70&parent=39 (15. 7. 2009).
[17] Lajos Bokros and György Habsburg are MDF's two EP list leaders. Lajos Bokros was the minister of finance of the socialist party between 1995 and 1996 (his appearance on the list of the conservative MDF was a surprise in this sense and caused a further split in the party). The so-called Bokros-package can be associated with him which was the heavily debated economic-financial stabilizing package of the mid 90's. György Habsburg is Otto Habsburgs son.

the program of the party. Special topics can be bound to them: Lajos Bokros wanted to play an active role on solving the crises, supported the redesign of the Common Agricultural Policy, the reform of the European budget, the enlargement, Common Energy- and Environmental Policy. György Habsburg is the person wanting to act for the sake of all the Hungarians using his connections. His special topics were the Hungarian presidency of the EU, effective crime hunting and crime prevention in the EU. Both candidates found the question of the enlargement important, especially as Croatia. The drafted parts of the programs, the personal topics did not form a whole program, and did not determine the program of MDF, they remained topics/proposals of the list leaders. The other specialty of the program booklet is that it placed domestic policy in the centre. MDF did not get out of the old frameworks[18], it made itself a centre in the political sphere, and criticized its competitors, but its criticism remained within the frames of domestic policy. Some exceptions in the booklet: *"…the fame and international recognition of Hungary have been by the failed governmental policy of the recent seven years, headed by the bad answers given to the economic crises. Every Hungarian person shares the interest to re-establish the authority and fame of the country by well known professionals."* By formulating the message of the party for the European elections MDF took domestic conflicts as a basis, since it wants to demonstrate the taxpayers being fed up with lying, selfish tension funding, restricting without reforms and populist clichés. Moreover is the division of the election groups typical. MDF addresses citizens holding foreign currency loans, entrepreneurs, pensioners, students, farmers and those believing in market. Its message has only few European contents: MDF tries to get closer to election groups through the criticism of other parties, but without having proposals instead. In summary the program booklet of MDF is a technical preparation with the crises, the two list leaders and the criticism of the Hungarian parties in its centre. The booklet does not follow the policy made by European People's Party, the topics are loaded with a strong hint of domestic policy.

Outside of the Hungarian Parliament – Jobbik, Munkáspárt, LMP-HP, MCF

Four parties outside of the Hungarian Parliament have made a European Elections list, the right (Jobbik) and left (Munkáspárt) radical wings demonstrate a eurosceptical line in contrary to the above mentioned ones. The Jobbik and the Munkáspárt[19] redefined Hungary's place in the European dimension, as they did the same with the

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[18] For ages, the MDF made itself a centre in the political sphere for between the MSZP and the Fidesz.

[19] The Munkáspárt actually didn't have a specific European manifest, it simply summarized its political theses for the EP-elections.

European dimension itself. In the program of Jobbik[20] (which is a united, written, coherent program) EU is a money-eating, bureaucratic, evil empire, which national interests, while in the program of the Munkáspárt[21] (rather a manifesto) EU – along with the global capital – is against the small citizens. Munkáspárt which takes disappointment from the capitalism as a basis, is bound to the *European United Left* (EUL) by its political orientation, the EUL is also quite divided. In the manifestos of the EUL[22] and the Munkáspárt only the left wing orientation and the denial of the European structure is in common. The ideas of Jobbik are similar to those of the *British National Party*, at a European level to those of the *Union for the Nations of Europe*. As for Jobbik and Munkáspárt the radical ideology overwrites the public side, the programs are far from the EP: Munkáspárt outlines the new opening of the Hungarian coal mines, the "payroll moratorium" made by the government in case of private companies, workplaces and flats for the young, Jobbik outlines a new constitution based on the Saint Crown, the energy trade with international renegade states and the Kazakh brothers, and the defence of the Hungarian land. Jobbik provides an alternative opposite the current institution system of the EU: it states it is not EU, but European cooperation that has no alternative and this alternative can be summarized in the circle of nations of Europe. The circle of the nations of Europe does not mean the restriction of sovereignty, there's no democratic deficit and the European Social Model is working. The program of Jobbik – just like that of Fidesz – is more than a European program, it is the first professional introduction of the party for the citizens. That is why the program contains so few relations to European politics, European policies are mentioned only for reasons of the criticism of the system, and proposals for the solution did not show in the program.

Table 5: The policy and European politics elements of Jobbi

The policy and European politics elements of Jobbik	
Alternatives to the current system of the EU; Economic policy; Agriculture; Environment;	Food safety; Energy; Employment Law;

In contrary LMP[23] and MCF do not target the destruction of the current frames, but the use of the opportunities given by the EU in their programs. The features of LMP

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20   Source: http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/Jobbik-program2009EP.pdf (15. 7. 2009).
21   Source: http://www.munkaspart.hu (15. 7. 2009).
22   Source: http://www.european-left.org/fileadmin/downloads/Electoral_Platform/Platform_en.pdf (15. 7. 2009).
23   Source: http://lehetmas.hu/img/lmp+ep+program.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

reflect in every sense those of *European Greens* (*A Green New Deal for Europe*[24]). MCF is a special case, since there is no fraction in the EU organized on an ethnical basis, so their leaders would have formed coalitions with the Hungarian minority parties. MCF does not have a united program, its thoughts are based on the feeling of being threatened and the solidarity of the roma. In their pronouncement made within the media there are only general things mentioned as the anti-discrimination measures, more effectiveness in the aid system. As for the platforms outside the parliament both from the political and the visual view is the program of the LMP the most powerful, this is the only program that contains concrete plans, concepts, arrangement plans. The program outlines five fields: global finances, nation policy, agricultural reforms, food and consumer insurance, climate change and energy. The proposals of the party are integrated in these fields. This party emphasized that only proposals are placed that really belong to the competence of the EU, so the review of the Basel II. financial system, the introduction of the Tobin-tax in the field of finances, supporting the cultural autonomy regarding minorities, rearranging the Common Agricultural Policy forcing bio production on small and medium sized environ-friendly farms, or the selection of the genetic manipulated seed corn.

Table 6: The policy and European Politics proposals of the LM

The policy and European Politics proposals of the LMP (by topics)	
Global finance The financial re-regulation in the EU and globally;	**Food safety and consumer protection** Environment and climate friendly production; Secure, high-quality food; Controlled food-trade; Consumer protection;
Nation policy Autonomy in the EU; Neighbourhood policy;	**Climate protection and energy** Climate act; Energy efficiency, energy saving; Renewable energy sources; Green jobs; EU-taxes on transport; The representation of the special Hungarian interest in the EU
Rural Development Common Agricultural Policy; The restructuring of agricultural-support system; Environmental protection policy; The accessible countryside;	

Summary – Evaluation of the European Programs

The programs made for the European Elections by Hungarian parties show a really varied picture. A real elections program was only performed by Fidesz, Jobbik and LMP-HP, their programs are special in the sense that they function not

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[24]   Source: http://europeangreens.eu/fileadmin/logos/pdf/manifesto_EUROPEAN_GREENS.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

only as a European program, Fidesz wanted to demonstrate its ability for governing, the two young parties had the first opportunity to introduce their conceptions. SZDSZ, MSZP and MDF – to less extent also the MDF – made program booklets, manifestos, which cannot seen as a comprehensive program. For SZDSZ the dimension of the European profession policies, for MDF the domestic political aspect was dominated, MSZP laid itself between the two categories. The majority of the programs used just a few European topics: real European program was made only by Fidesz, SZDSZ (in a form of theses), and LMP-HP, to a less extent by the MSZP. Fidesz, LMP-HP, SZDSZ reflect the most on the documents of the European party families. The most important political and European topics (as a common minimum) in the programs are: Energy Policy, Environmental Policy, minority policy (a common European Minority Policy to be awaited), agriculture, rural development and the enlargement of the EU.

Table 7: The classification of the Hungarian EP programme

European dimension/contact with the European political groups	Real programs		Program-booklet, thesis, manifests			Hungarian dimensions
The European aspect is dominant and real content with the European political groups	Fidesz		SZDSZ			**The Hungarian aspect is dominant**
	LMP-HP		MSZP	MSZP	MDF	
	Jobbik	Jobbik	Munkáspárt		MCF	

European Lists and Campaigns

Preparations

The Hungarian parties began with the preparations and connection making for the elections already in 2008. During the preparation period Fidesz and MSZP gained foreign experiences. In February 2009 the members of MSZP Electorate together with the presidents of the counties took part on a preparation course in Brussels, where Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the European Socialist Party called the crises handling of the Hungarian government exemplary, and made clear he supports the government and Ferenc Gyurcsány Prime Minister[25]. Viktor Orbán, President of Fidesz also started his tour in February 2009: he visited Vienna and Berlin, in the German capital he met leading politicians of CDU-CSU fraction and Chancellor Angela Merkel, with whom he discussed the answers of the Eastern

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[25]   He was the former Prime Minister, he resigned in March 2009.

European countries to be given to the economic crises. The smaller parties began to build out their foreign relations, too. The delegation of the Foreign Department of Jobbik met on 16th May 2008 the leader of the British Nationalist Party, Mark Griffin in London, they discussed the potential cooperation between the two of them and the questions of the European elections. LMP made connections to the European Green Party.

Compilation of the European Lists

The compilation of the EP lists[26] has already begun in 2008, and the parties took the opportunity to campaign. The Jobbik named its list leaders, Krisztina Morvai at first (even in September 2008), who had a big role in the campaign. The Fidesz made its EP list public in January 2009, the other parties only in February (MSZP, SZDSZ), respectively in March (LMP-HP, MDF). In the compilation of the list the parties were independent; they did not follow any line from abroad. In the compilation of the list the only pressure was European reality (the fact that Hungary now has 22 MEPs in the European Parliament) and the internal politics reality (the positions of lists leaders are formed in the parties' battle). The strategic compilation of the EP lists was typical, since the conservative MDF made Lajos Bokros to list leader[27], a former socialist Minister of Finance in the 1990s. The EP list can be characterized by medium *fluctuation*[28] compares the lists in 2004. It is true by itself that the fluctuation was high according to the candidates, but it is not correct to the elected MEPs. From the 24 elected Hungarian MEPs in 2004 12 came back again to the EP (9 Fidesz and 3 MSZP MEPs), so there are 10 new Hungarian MEPs (5 Fidesz, 1 MSZP, 1 MDF and 3 Jobbik MEPs). If we analyse the lists, we can recognize that the MDF's list suffered the biggest fluctuation[29] (it means 20 new candidates); the fluctuation is medium by the MSZP (13 new candidates) and the SZDSZ (12 new candidates); and the fluctuation is low by the Fidesz (9 new candidates).[30] But the fluctuation at the number of elected candidates is the biggest exactly at the Fidesz's case: since from the 9 new Fidesz's candidates 5 have been elected (while at the MSZP's and MDF's case only 1 new

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[26] It is a tendency that every election year the parties nominate more people than the maximum number of mandates that can be won. In the following calculations I always started out for each year (2004, 2009) from the list complied of the maximum number of EP mandates (24 in 2004, 22 in 2009).

[27] The sudden change of direction had its effects: though the decision of the leader of the party, Ibolya Dávid turned out to be correct since the head of the list got in to the EP, nevertheless after the elections the conservative parties dissolution continued (expulsions and stepping out of the party).

[28] According to the fluctuation it is very important that Hungary had 24 MEP mandate in 2004, and it has only 22 in 2009.

[29] It is important to mention in all cases that the real picture of the fluctuation is distorted by the fact taht in 2004 there were 24, while in 2009 there were 22 mandates to be taken into account.

[30] Naturally we do not examine the fluctuation of the newly formed Jobbik, LMP-HP. The Munkáspárt does not count as a considerable force.

candidate got seat in the EP). Latter can be explained by result of the elections (the Fidesz had biggest chance to get new MEP mandate), and the phenomenon that the parties took the new candidates fore-part of the lists.

Table 8: The fluctuation of the EP lists

The fluctuation of the EP lists[31]								
The party/party alliance set up the list	Fidesz-KDNP	Fidesz	SZDSZ		MSZP		MDF	
Year	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004	2009	2004
The whole number of the candidates	66	72	22	24	66	72	66	66
The maximum number of MEPs elected by the Hungarian citizens in this year	22	24	22	24	22	24	22	24
The number of MEPs, who were elected from this list	14	12	0	2	4	9	1	1
The number of new candidates on this list (compared to 2004)[32]	9	/	12	/	13	/	20	/
The number of new candidates, who were elected in 2009 (new elected candidates)[33]	5	/	0	/	1	/	1	/

Continuous Campaign and Identity

The Fidesz's, the LMP-HP's campaign were connected with not only European, but other aspects as well. The intensified domestic battle since 2006 resulted a slightly strange campaign situation: it is said that Fidesz has been campaign for 3 years. The Fidesz's »continuing campaign« turned into a campaign to getting the government position (to demonstrate its ability for governing): since the spring of 2009 the party issued a number of important documents, proving the ability of making resolutions of economic and financial crisis. From the Fidesz's view the campaign was is not a special EP campaign, but a continuous campaign preparing for the governance. For the small parties (Jobbik and LMP-HP) the campaign was an identity-campaign: it was the first occasion to promoting their programmes. This specific situation (preparing for governance, identity promoting) explained

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[31] In the analysis I started out from those parties which received an EP-mandate in 2004, as a result Jobbik which at that time didn't even stand a list is not represented.

[32] The numbers of new candidates are compared to the maximum number of Hungarian MEPs.

[33] I compared the number of new representatives to the maximum number of mandates which could be handed out in 2009 (22 mandates), thus I did not analyse the total list of the party (since only the maximum number of representatives in the given year has relevance).

that it was exactly the Fidesz and the LMP-HP who made real programmes, and most of these programs focused on the European (policy) issues.

Negative Campaign – Threatening with Extremist

The characteristic of the European campaigns in Hungary is the threatening with extremists. Both the MSZP (government party) and the SZDSZ (the former coalition partner with the MSZP) have proposed the message that it is very important to action against the extremists, indeed, this was extended to the largest opposition party, Fidesz was reported as working together with the extreme right-wing forces. The socialist party was trying to broadcast other messages (personal messages to the voters by using list leaders), but the SZDSZ's campaign was based on only the threatening with extremist. The political tactic of the MSZP and the SZDSZ – as the results will be shown – was proved to be wrongly.

Separation European Programmes: The Dominance of Domestic Issues

The European campaign launched relatively late, at the beginning of May 2009. There were formerly rural campaign events, but from May the billboards appeared on the streets and started a series of electoral events. The campaign's main themes were primarily domestic politics: mainly the Fidesz (which preparing the government role) expressed – with its "Enough" slogan – that the socialists' government should have to go. The campaigns were generally characterized by the lack of European content, the key themes were the economic crisis, the government's failure and incompetence, the roma-issue, the relationship of the extremists. Even if the programs (Fidesz, LMP-HP, SZDSZ, MSZP) carried European or policy content, the campaigns "success" were above it: the European essence of the campaigns missed. This was particularly surprising at the Fidesz's and the SZDSZ's case, since both parties (though in another form in a coherent program, as well as in a manifesto) put forward an important European content, however, failed integrating this European content to its campaigns. The MSZP communicated personalized (policy) massages by the list leaders, but was not able to come out from the domestic arena. The only exception is the LMP-HP's campaign based on policy elements; however this is a new party, so the identity making was very important in this case. The MDF's campaign based on the MDF's list leaders, as the party's program, the campaign had not plenty of European content. Overall, it was not develop a special European campaign-environment, which would have led the independence European campaign.[34]

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[34] In this context, it is also important that since 2006 a sharp change of the government mood has been dominating in the country, and Fidesz's has been appearing each elections occasion (mid-term elections, referendum) as a sentence on the government and the socialists.

Impact of Abroad

The aid from the European political groups was typical Hungarian EP-campaign. It has been said that the parties also used foreign assistance in the preparation, and this was not differently in the campaign. Immediately prior to the campaign came to Hungary Paul Nyrup Rasmussen, President of the European Socialist Party, who had discussions with the Head of the Government (Gordon Bajnai), and the President of the MSZP and the MSZP's list leaders. Even in May 2009 Wilfried Martens (the President of the European People's Party) has established the Fidesz's campaign overture, who proposed solution to the crisis, that the Fidesz' program should be carried out. The example of the cooperation beyond borders is the jointly congress held is Slovakia by the Fidesz and the Slovak Hungarian Coalition (MKP), which has caused domestic and foreign politics storm. At the jointly congress Viktor Orbán (President of the Fidesz) said that the European Parliament Elections will show that how many MEPs will represent the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. According to this statement the Slovak Parliament adopted a decision, which condemned the Orban' speech. The Fidesz said that this decision was »tragicomic« and represent Slovak government's intentions getting votes at the EP Elections. European People's Party intervened in this debate: Wilfried Martens has issued a statement in which he welcomed the cross-border cooperation, and worried about the animosity by some parties and governments. To assisting the LMP-HP's campaign Daniel Cohn-Bendit (President of the parliament group European Greens) and Philippe Lamberts (spokespersons of the European Green Party) went to Hungary.

Surfaces, Campaign Techniques

The party traditionally used billboards and advertisements (television, radio, press). The utilization of the Internet (advertising panels, as well as the interactive pages, blogs) is average, however, almost all parties (according to the European samples) had EP Election website. The media surfaces were traditionally used by the parliamentary parties (MSZP, Fidesz, MDF, SZDSZ), and the Jobbik did the campaign by its own "media empire". A special event of the campaign was that in May 2009, a liberal political analyst institute[35] published an analysis[36] on the rank of the MEPs of the 2004-2009 period, it represented the activity of the MEPs. The analysis indicated that Hungarian left-wing and liberal MEPs were slightly more active, such as the right-wing MEPs. Immediately before the elections (2nd June 2009)

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[35] Republikon Institute
[36] *The „24" – The ranging list evaluation of the Hungarian MEPs according to their Source:* http://intezet.republikon.hu/pdfs/32/Republikon_-_a_24ek.pdf (15. 7. 2009).

a right-wing institute[37] also published a ranking analysis[38] – not surprisingly – with better right-wing's results. Another interesting point was the debate of the list leaders (5th June 2009), with a small media coverage.[39]

The Result of the European Elections

The results of the European Parliament Election were not unexpectedly: all public opinion researcher institutes had took into account the pushing forward of the right-wing. However the MSZP and the SZDSZ were confronted with the failed government politics by the final result of the elections. Two surprises have happened: the MDF (which was told to fail its European mandate) was able to turn, and the Jobbik got three seats in the EP.

The Formation of the Participation by Temporal Aspect

In Hungary at the 2009 European Parliament Elections 2 920 948 votes were given (from the 8 073 713 registered voters[40]) and the number of the valid votes is 2 896 179. This means that the 36.31% of the registered voters voted. This participation falls short with 2% of the 2004 European Parliament Election in Hungary (when the 38.50% of registered persons voted[41]). The both Hungarian participation results fall short of the overall results European Elections, which was 45.47% in 2004 and 43% in 2009.

Figure 1: The turnout of the 2009 European Elections[42]

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
37   Perspective Institution
38   The ranging list of the Hungarian MEPs; Source: http://www.nezopontintezet.hu/olvass_politikai. php?cid=120 (15. 7. 2009).
39   The list leader of Fidesz and MCF did not go to the debate.
40   1 652 voters were not Hungarian EP citizen.
41   8 015 366 Hungarian and 1 956 non Hungarian citizen were registered in 2004.
42   Source: TNS opinion in collaboration with the EP. *Source:* http://www.elections2009-results.eu/ en/hungary_en.html (15. 7. 2009).

Both the European Elections details in 2004, as well in 2009 are below of the participation in Hungarian Parliamentary Elections. The participation rate of the last Parliamentary Elections (in 2006) is 67.83% in the first round and 64.36% in the second round (among the registered voters).

The Formation of the Participation by Electoral Districts[43]

On the occasion of the 2009 European Parliament Elections the most people (traditionally) went vote in the environs of Budapest. Furthermore the participation rate was high in the western border area and the Northern-Hungary. In the latter region the Jobbik has pushed forward, which can be explained by the deterioration of the Hungarian public security and the high number of roma population (see Figure 4).

The Evaluation of the Results Compared with the Previous Elections

The best result of the 2009 European Elections in Hungary was reached by the largest opposition party, the Fidesz. Instead the former 12 MEPs the party can delegate 14 ones, the Fidesz got the 56.36% of votes (is means the first place in Europe). The MSZP as the government party (its former 9 MEPs position reduced 4) and the SZDSZ (the party dropped out from the EP) suffered the biggest defeat. The extremist Jobbik gained the biggest victory, because the party had similar result like the socialists (the Jobbik has 3 MEPs). The other big surprise was the MDF, because this party contrary to all expectations got European mandate (this result thanks to the list leader, Lajos Bokros). The LMP-HP configuration (the LMP was founded just in 2009) was able to reach a very good result at the first elections of this party. Overall, the small parties (MDF, LMP-HP and the Jobbik) with the exception of the SZDSZ have achieved good results, eves the 400 000 voters of Jobbik and weakness of the MSZP and the SZDSZ show the transformation of the Hungarian party system.

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[43] The country territory is divided into electoral districts. Each electoral district has a polling station where the eligible voters living in the territory of the electoral district may cast their votes.

The results of the 2009 European Elections (Hungary) I.

Table 9: The results of the 2009 European Elections (Hungary) I.[44]

The name of the party/ parties setting up a list	Number of list votes	Percentage of votes	Total number of seats	Percentage of seats
Fidesz-KDNP	1 632 309	56,36%	14	63,64%
MSZP	503 140	17,37%	4	18,18%
Jobbik	427 773	14,77%	3	13,64%
MDF	153 660	5,31%	1	4,55%
LMP-HP	75 522	2,61 %	0	
SZDSZ	62 527	2,16 %	0	
Munkáspárt	27 817	0,96 %	0	
MCF	13 431	0,46 %	0	
Total	2 896 179	100,00%	22	100,00%

The results of the 2009 European Elections (Hungary) II.

Figure 2: The results of the 2009 European Elections (Hungary) II.[45]

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
[44]   Source: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ep2009/291/291_0_index.html (15. 7. 2009) and http://www. visionconsulting.hu/cgi-bin/cikk.php?id=249 (15. 7. 2009).

[45]   *Source:* TNS opinion in collaboration with the EP http://www.elections2009-results.eu/en/hungary_en.html (15. 7. 2009).

The 2009 European Elections strengthened the status of the Fidesz: the party has got more 174 559 votes in 2009 compared with 2004. The MSZP has lost 551 781 votes compared with the 2004 European Elections, and 1 833 565 votes compared with the Hungarian Parliamentary Elections in 2006 (the latter figure is not suitable for a real comparison, because the image is distorted by different participation rates, but it could be warning). The SZDSZ lost 175 381 votes compared with the last European Elections, so the party dropped out from the EP. The support of the MDF (compared with 2004 European Elections) have not substantially changed (the decrease of 10 365 votes), thus the party has maintained the representation in the EP. It is very interesting that the Jobbik was able to fill the position of the weak MIÉP (the former extreme right party), and has multiplied votes of the extreme right.

The results of the 2004 European Elections (Hungary)

Table 10: The results of the 2004 European Elections (Hungary)[46]

The name of the party/parties setting up a list	Number of list votes	Percentage of votes	Total number of seats	Percentage of seats
Fidesz	1 457 750	47,40 %	12	50%
MSZP	1 054 921	34,30 %	9	37,50%
SZDSZ	237 908	7,74 %	2	8,33%
MDF	164 025	5,33 %	1	4,17%
MIÉP[47]	72 203	2,35 %	0	
Munkáspárt	56 221	1,83 %	0	
Magyar Nemzeti Szövetség	20 226	0,66 %	0	
Szociáldemokrata Párt	12 196	0,40 %	0	
Total	2 896 179	100,00%	24	100,00%

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[46] *Source:* http://www.valasztas.hu/ep2004/04/en/10/10_0.html (15. 7. 2009) and http://www.visionconsulting.hu/cgi-bin/cikk.php?id=249 (15. 7. 2009).

[47] The MIÉP was the former extreme right party, which set up a list with the Jobbik at 2006 Hungarian Parliamentary Elections. Nowadays the MIÉP has disintegrated and the Jobbik fulfil the MIÉP's position.

The results of the 2006 Hungarian Parliament Elections[48]

Table 11: The results of the 2006 Hungarian Parliament Election

The name of the party/parties setting up a list	Number of list votes	Percentage of list votes	SMC[49] seat	Territorial list seat	National list seats	Total number of seats	Percentage of seats
MSZP	2 336 705	43,21	102	71	17	190	49,22
Fidesz-KDNP	2 272 979	42,03	68	69	27	164	42,49
SZDSZ	351 612	6,5	5	4	11	20	5,18
MDF	272 831	5,04	0	2	9	11	2,85
MIÉP-Jobbik	119 007	2,2					
Munkáspárt	21 955	0,41					

Changes of support of the Hungarian parties at the European Elections

Table 12: Changes of support of the Hungarian parties at the European Election

The name of the party/parties setting up a list	The change of the number of list votes by 2009	The change of the total number of seats by 2009	The change of the percentage of seats by 2009
Fidesz	+174 599	+ 3	+10,64%
MSZP	-551 781	-5	-19,32%
SZDSZ	-175 381	-2	-8,33%
MDF	-10 365	0	+0,38%
Jobbik		+3	+13,64

The Hungarian MEPs in the European Party Families

The Hungarian MEPs joined to EP fractions according to their political party. The socialist MEPs joined to the new *Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats*, while the Fidesz's MEPs to the Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats). The MDF's MEP, Lajos Bokros did not participate in the Group of the European People's Party (the former MDF's MEP worked in this fraction), instead he joined to the *European Conservatives and Reformists Group*. There was no trouble about the extreme rights and eurosceptical forces' discussions

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[48] *Source:* http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ep2009/291/291_0_index.html (15. 7. 2009) and http://www. visionconsulting.hu/valasztas/valasztas-parl.htm (15. 7. 2009).
[49] SMC: Single Member Constituency

forming EP fraction, therefore the Jobbik's 3 MEPs have started to work in the EP as independent MEPs.

Hungarian MEPs in 2009

Figure 3: Hungarian MEPs in 2009[50]

EPP : Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)

S&D : Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament

ALDE : Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

GREENS/ EFA : Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

ECR : European Conservatives and Reformists Group

GUE/ NGL : Confederal Group of the European United Left - Nordic Green Left

EFD : Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group

NA : Non-attached

The European Elections and the Party System

From the results of the 2009 European Election we cannot reach far-reaching conclusions, since the participation of this election was not comparable with the turnout of the Parliamentary Elections in Hungary. However, we can say that the Hungarian party system is in transition. The former ("frozen") two-party structure (the status of the MSZP and the Fidesz) and the structure of the small parties (MDF, SZDSZ) have come to an end. This was caused by on the one hand the weakness of the socialists

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[50] Source: TNS opinion in collaboration with the EP http://www.elections2009results.eu/en/hungary_en.html (15. 7. 2009).

and the SZDSZ, and on the other hand the strengthening of the Fidesz. The MSZP and the liberal party have largely abraded during the last 7 years, and they have again a weak European representation (after 2004) in the EP. The MSZP has almost become a medium party, however the national elections may change this situation. The European Elections have provisionally eased the tensions (exclusions, the fragmentation of the party between the socialists and the Fidesz) in the MDF, but the status of President of the party (who took the successful initiative nominating Lajos Bokros) is far from stable. The elections were the final steps in the disintegration of the SZDSZ, now the party can be characterized by internal struggles and finding new deal. The winners are the Fidesz, but rather as the Jobbik and the LMP-HP. The good result of forces outside the Hungarian Parliament gives signals about the needs of the voters to change, and the rearrangement of the Hungarian party system. The success of the two small parties reflects the most important problems of Hungarian society: the disillusionment of the Hungarian transition's elite; the problems of the coexistence with roma society; the relationship to global capital. These problems are very actually by pushing forward of the extreme right-wing Jobbik. The problem about the extreme right is not just the MSZP's case, because the Fidesz has to answer to that challenge which Jobbik means. Therefore we have to take the Jobbik into consideration as a potential party of the Hungarian Parliament. This case raises the revaluation of the earlier cleavages[51] (economic and cultural left-right) in Hungarian party system. The moderate-radical (or extreme) cleavage and the redefinition of the meaning of leftist and rightist attitude will be the main points of the next decades.

Table 13: The consequences of the 2009 European Elections in Hungar

Consequence, phenomenon	Appearances in the party system
The "frozen" two-party structure has changed	The weakening of the MSZP and the SZDSZ; the strengthening of the Jobbik and the LMP-HP
The disintegration of parties	The agony of the SZDSZ
Disillusionment of the earlier structures; the need of new parties (which are sensitive to the real problems of the society)	The strengthening of the Fidesz, the Jobbik and the LMP-HP
Decomposition of the basis of the parties; the transformation of voter preferences	The Jobbik got MSZP's and Fidesz's voters
The strengthening of the extreme right	The revaluation of the earlier cleavages (economic and cultural left-right) in Hungarian party system; the strengthening of the moderate-radical (or extreme) cleavage
Searching new party-identity	The redefinition of the traditional meaning of leftist and rightist attitude

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[51] (Bartolini 2000); (Marks – Wilson 2000); (Bayer – Jensen 2007)

Insert I: Exhibit on Computing Seats (d'Hondt Matrix) at the EP Elections in Hungary[52]

Drawn sequence number	1	5	6	8
List	FIDESZ-KDNP	MSZP	JOBBIK	MDF
Seats won	14	4	3	1
Vote / 1	1 632 309,00	503 140,00	427 773,00	153 660,00
Vote / 2	816 154,50	251 570,00	213 886,50	76 830,00
Vote / 3	544 103,00	167 713,33	142 591,00	51 220,00
Vote / 4	408 077,25	125 785,00	106 943,25	38 415,00
Vote / 5	326 461,80	100 628,00	85 554,60	30 732,00
Vote / 6	272 051,50	83 856,67	71 295,50	25 610,00
Vote / 7	233 187,00	71 877,14	61 110,43	21 951,43
Vote / 8	204 038,63	62 892,50	53 471,63	19 207,50
Vote / 9	181 367,67	55 904,44	47 530,33	17 073,33
Vote / 10	163 230,90	50 314,00	42 777,30	15 366,00
Vote / 11	148 391,73	45 740,00	38 888,45	13 969,09
Vote / 12	136 025,75	41 928,33	35 647,75	12 805,00
Vote / 13	125 562,23	38 703,08	32 905,62	11 820,00
Vote / 14	116 593,50	35 938,57	30 555,21	10 975,71
Vote / 15	108 820,60	33 542,67	28 518,20	10 244,00
Vote / 16	102 019,31	31 446,25	26 735,81	9 603,75
Vote / 17	96 018,18	29 596,47	25 163,12	9 038,82
Vote / 18	90 683,83	27 952,22	23 765,17	8 536,67
Vote / 19	85 911,00	26 481,05	22 514,37	8 087,37
Vote / 20	81 615,45	25 157,00	21 388,65	7 683,00
Vote / 21	77 729,00	23 959,05	20 370,14	7 317,14
Vote / 22	74 195,86	22 870,00	19 444,23	6 984,55

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[52]   Source: http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ep2009/291/291_0_index.html (15. 7. 2009)

Table 14: Comparing the programs of the parties set up election lists on the 2009 European Election

	Fidesz-KDNP	SZDSZ	MSZP	MDF	Munkáspárt	Jobbik	LMP-HP	MCF
Nature of the program (written program, thesis booklet, no program)	Written program	Thesis booklet (manifesto)	European pledges	Program booklet	General, not European manifesto	Written program	Written program	No written program, declarations
Attendance of the EU and EP in the programs of the parties	Regular attendance, European policy as one of the leading principles (with returning criticism of the government)	Concentrates on the questions within European frames	European questions within domestic topics, the personality and topics of the list leaders dominate	European questions only oscular exploitation of the small citizens	Eurosceptical attitude, alternative for the current EU construction (nation's Europe)	Eurosceptical attitude, only as an element of a special political question	Coherent view and proposal system	EU appears only as an element of a special political question
Practically integration of the EU to the domestic parts of the program	Accepting the verdicts of the European decision making and the European party, these cannot be overwritten by the national interests	National topics (controls of the employees, minority topics) in European frames	EU is integrated in the program only as the representative of the Hungarian interests not detailed	European topics are negotiated in a domestic context, professional policies are not given	EU-criticism, questions of European professional policies are within domestic frames	Critical handling of the European questions to the domestic topics, European perspective remains	Integrity of European questions to the domestic topics, of the EU is not real	Without a written program, the integrity of the EU is not real
Reference to the European party families	Following the program of the EPP, with Hungarian curiosa	Following ELDR's manifesto	Indirect connection to the proposals of the European Socialist Party	Only a few political proposal is taken from the EPP	Really weak relationship to the proposals made by the EUL	Similarities to the proposals of the Union for the European Nations, on the national level with the British National Party	Strong relationship to the European Greens	No party family

Figure 4: Participation in 2009 European Elections (Hungary)

Részvételi arány
Európai Parlamenti választások, 2009

© GeoX, 2009
www. geox.hu, info@geox.hu

Jelmagyarázat
■ 42,2 – 89,2 % (631)
□ 35,6 – 42,2 % (628)
□ 31,2 – 35,6 % (615)
□ 26,6 – 31,2 % (638)
□ 11,4 – 26,6 % (640)

Source: http://www.geox.hu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=147&Itemid=1
(15. 7. 2009)

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The programmes, thesis of the Hungarian parties

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http://europeangreens.eu/fileadmin/logos/pdf/manifesto_EUROPEAN_GREENS.
pdf (15. 7. 2009)

EL (European Left) –

http://www.european-left.org/fileadmin/downloads/Electoral_Platform/Platform_
en.pdf (15. 7. 2009)

ELDR (European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party) –

http://www.eldr.org/pdf/manifeste/eldr-manifeste-electoral-en.pdf (15.7.2009)

EPP (European People's Party) –

http://www.epp.eu/dbimages/pdf/EN-ELECTION-DOC-FINAL_copy_2.pdf
(15. 7. 2009)

EPP (European People's Party) –

http://www.epp.eu/dbimages/pdf/EN-ELECTION-DOC-FINAL_copy_2.pdf
(15. 7. 2009)

Fidesz-KDNP –

http://fidesz.hu/download/program2009_magyar.pdf (15. 7. 2009)

Jobbik –

http://www.jobbik.hu/sites/jobbik.hu/down/Jobbik-program2009EP.pdf
  (15. 7. 2009)

LMP-HP –

http://lehetmas.hu/img/lmp+ep+program.pdf (15. 7. 2009)

MDF – http://eu.mdf.hu/index.php?mid=70&parent=39 (15. 7. 2009)

MSZP – http://mszp.hu/public/downloads/pdf/mszpvallalasok_a_kovetkezo_cik-
  lusra.pdf (15. 7. 2009)

Munkáspárt – http://www.munkaspart.hu/ (15. 7. 2009)

PES (Party of European Socialists) –

http://elections2009.pes.org/files/u1/ManifestoBook_EN_Online.pdf (15. 7. 2009)

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Party-centrism and gender equality:
a study of European elections in Slovenia

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Abstract: *In 2004 female candidates won a relatively large proportion of Slovenian MEP seats due to effective institutional engineering and despite the: a) persistent dominating political culture (unfavourable to women in politics); b) predominant party-centric electoral system and election campaign; and c) further marginalisation of female candidates compared to male candidates in the printed media during the party-centric election campaign. Research findings support the thesis found in political party literature asserting political parties adapt to new electoral rules without radically changing how they function and without them struggling to change the dominant political culture and media reporting that is unfriendly to gender equality.*

Keywords*: gender representation, institutional engineering, political parties, election campaign, mass media, political culture, European elections, Slovenia*

Introduction

According to academic research (e.g. Sainsbury 1993; Lovenduski and Norris 1993; Leijenaar et al. 1996; Norris, 1997; Saxonberg 2000; Farrell 2001; Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2004; Fink-Hafner 2004), several aspects are relevant to female candidates' electoral success: institutional factors, the level of public welfare and the character of political culture. Many years of European experience show that combining 'bottom-up' and 'top-down' pressures is the most effective way of introducing gender-balanced representation in politics (Lovenduski 1999, 47). This article focuses on the success of just one type of such pressure, namely top-down pressure from the EU. It was external pressure that led parliamentary political parties to adopt national institutional engineering, which is and is declared to be in favour of the success of female candidates at elections. At the same time, the dominant political culture and the mass media's role during electoral campaigns have not been the subject of any particular gender equality policy instruments.

The article's main purpose is to test the limits of the success of a change in national institutional rules brought about externally (by European Union actors) in an environment with a discriminatory political culture. The article focuses on the interweaving effects of a discriminatory political milieu and gender equality institutional engineering. The search for policy alternatives and evaluating them is

beyond the scope of this particular research. However, the findings may underpin: a) the development of a more complex research model that takes a full range of factors supporting gender equality in politics into account; and b) the crafting of a set of policy tools going beyond oversimplified international (including EU) pressure in favour of gender quotas.

The article's main thesis relates to the success of an EU-induced change in national electoral rules. We contend that political parties primarily focus on their electoral success and only adopt a more gender-balanced focus to the extent and in the time-span they are externally forced to. Party-centric institutional rules feed the party-centrism of media coverage. In circumstances where political culture is biased against gender equality, the treatment of women in political and media processes will negatively impact on their electoral success. This relationship can only be limited by specific candidate-centric institutional factors to some extent.

The thesis is tested on the first Slovenian elections to the European Parliament (EP) in 2004. The 2004 European elections offer a good case study for the following reasons. These elections were held for the first time in Slovenia so the country's political parties were facing new electoral rules. It was at these elections that the Slovenian political elite introduced important institutional innovations in support of gender equality. This reflected the external pressure of various European-Union-level political actors but not a changing political culture. In these circumstances, some temporary and limited effects of institutional rules supporting gender equality became apparent.

So far the literature on electoral engineering has shown it is important to distinguish between short-term and long-term impacts of changes in electoral rules (see e.g. Shugart 1992). The main difference lies in the range of political parties' possible responses. While electoral rules can have relatively important immediate effects, in due time after a national institutional innovation political parties may learn how to adapt their functioning by skirting around the new rules without radically changing their behaviour. In this article we only analyse the immediate effects of national institutional innovations introduced for the holding of European elections. Two main theses from the literature stand out. First, an alteration of the norms/rules of the game is not immediately reflected in the core values and principles of the political system, or in the formal and informal patterns of authority structures (Easton 1965). Second, political parties tend to pragmatically adapt how they function to the new rules rather than radically change themselves (Shugart 1992).

Here we first analyse the electoral system for electing deputies to the European Parliament (EP) in terms of previous research findings concerning factors that shape the electoral success of female candidates. The next section re-examines the political party-candidate link and identifies the most significant factors defining

this relationship in the context of European elections. The third section considers the electoral system's impact on presentations of candidates of both genders in relevant[1] articles appearing in printed media (newspapers) during the electoral campaign for the EP in 2004. In the concluding remarks the research results are summarised.

The *political party-candidate* relationship in the context of the electoral system for electing deputies to the EP

Electoral institutions for electing Slovenia's deputies to the EP are complex and internally heterogeneous. They may be arbitrarily classified in two clusters of electoral rules, each with distinct features according to the *political party-candidate* relationship. The party-centric cluster is composed of electoral rules that strengthen a political party's position in the abovementioned relationship, while the candidate-centric cluster comprises rules that promote a candidate's position. From a gender-equality perspective, it is clear that party-centric electoral rules make it harder to overcome presented deficiencies and achieve true gender equality in politics. As previous studies in the field have already indicated (Krašovec and Lajh 2004; Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2004; Lovenduski 1999), political parties pragmatically adapt their operations to the predominant political culture in order to maximise their votes. By monopolising certain key points in the electoral process (e.g. candidacy procedures), political party elites maintain a *modus operandi* based on a masculine political culture. On the contrary, candidate-centric procedures can lead to more egalitarian processes. That is because in some aspects of the electoral process they put an individual candidate on a more equal footing *vis-à-vis* a political party.

a) Party-centric electoral rules in Slovenia

A key feature of the electoral system for electing deputies to the EP in the context of the *political party-candidate* power relationship is the existence of 'party' candidate lists. These lists of candidates are a strong element of the party-centric character of the institutional system (Deželan 2004) due to political parties' control over how these lists are composed. Further confirmation of this is provided by the very nature of the candidate-selection process

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[1]   The relevant articles were determined by two criteria that reflect the topic of elections of MEPs and simultaneously acknowledge the number of readers (the distribution of copies of a periodical among readers) of a particular newspaper. Criteria were therefore the coverage of an individual printed media and the relevance for political science research. The latter restricted the selection of printed media to those dealing with international/internal politics on a daily basis or devoting an entire section to these topics. The criterion of coverage is, on the other hand, based on the Slovenian *'National reading report'* research (Cati d.o.o. 2003).

within Slovenian political parties, which is chiefly in the hands of political parties' central organs, namely the party elites.

The second key party-centric electoral institution for electing deputies to the EP is the provision concerning the order of candidates on the list and its importance. The formulation '… *the remaining deputy posts are distributed according to the order of precedence on the candidate list*' (ZVPEP 2002) determines the way deputy posts are distributed if a candidate does not receive more than $1/14^{th}$ of votes for the list (on a list of seven candidates). This provision, as shown on election day, generates a vast amount of power for political parties vis-à-vis the candidates also due to the political parties' policy of nominating the 'principal' candidate who collects the vast majority of votes in first place on the list.[2]

In addition to these institutional system characteristics, the number of deputy posts for the Slovenian delegation in the EP is relevant. The modest number of seven deputies generates considerable additional authority for the political parties since this small number of candidates is selected from a vast pool of an individual party's nominees at the national level. The somewhat twofold provision that makes Slovenia a single electoral unit regarding the *political party-candidate* relationship diverts the already limited influence of local party organisations to central party organs and consequently empowers party elites. As a result, the candidate-selection methods of an individual party are centralised[3], also because of the modest legislation on determining the method in party statutes. According to Krašovec and Lajh (2004), this practice is evident in virtually all Slovenian parliamentary political parties. Hence, party elites retain full power over the candidate-selection process that would otherwise be more evenly distributed (decentralised) amongst the party membership. As a consequence, this situation reduces the autonomy of potential candidates and their activities.

However, the most influential novelties of the institutional system for EP elections are the provisions that promote gender equality in politics. The two most obvious gender-equality provisions are quotas and the 'zipper' system. The former is set to a 40 percent minimum per gender, which effectively translates into at least three out of seven candidates on a party list. The latter is an unconventional form of the system of zipping candidates of a different gender together.

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[2]   The mentioned policy was evident with most major political parties. The clearest exception was the United List of Social Democrats which put the most far-reaching candidate in the last, seventh place due to unforeseen circumstances.

[3]   The method of selecting candidates lies entirely within the competence of the individual political party, thus central party organs in the form of the party council, presidency, executive committee and not the party congress or local branches, organisational units.

The Slovenian version establishes that at least one candidate of each gender should be placed in the upper half of the candidate list. In effect, the most common practice has been to place the less-represented gender, usually female, in the second, fourth and sixth positions on the list of candidates. As a result, both provisions operate in a party-centric manner since the 'mandatory differentiation' of the gender profiles of candidates gives extra power to political parties.

b) Candidate-centric electoral rules in Slovenia

The other aspect of electoral rules for electing deputies to the EP involves those candidate-centric provisions that empower individual candidates in their relationship with their political party. The arrangement of Slovenia as a single electoral unit which, in addition to what was mentioned before, enables publicly known candidates (as a rule, they are male) to take advantage of their reputation and partly neutralise the exclusive power of political parties. Thus, particularly once they are confirmed as candidates they can counterbalance the imposed party hierarchy on the candidate list due to their nationwide publicity and the institution of the preference vote. The latter enables the electorate to prioritise individual candidates and disregard the imposed party preference.[4] Thus, the preference vote somewhat devalues the party-centric character of the electoral institutions. However, it must be stressed that the abovementioned provision presents an opportunity for political parties to evade the progressive gender-equality electoral provisions. For example, there have been cases of circumventing the gender equality rules by: a) not choosing female candidates who are well known; and b) at the same time nominating two prominent and well-known male candidates on either the top or end of the list. In these circumstances male candidates have won regardless of their position on the list.[5] Taking these empirical experiences into account, the zipper system may well be, and in some cases has been, just an empty shell of gender equality.

c) Party-centric vs. candidate-centric provisions in Slovenia

All in all, the electoral rules for electing deputies to the EP tend to have more party-centric attributes and therefore lean on the side of political parties. The

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[4]   Preferential voting is taken into consideration if the number of votes for an individual candidate exceeds the quotient, which is the number of votes for the candidate list divided by two times the number of candidates on the same list.

[5]   This might be the case when taking the Slovenian political context into consideration, where a political party places a publicly well-known candidate(s), usually a male, at the bottom of the candidate list and at the same time in first place on the list. This was the case of the United List of Social Democrats which delivered its MEP from seventh place on the list.

mentioned structures of interest intermediation are still the most influential feature of the Slovenian political space and are further empowered by certain newly introduced institutional provisions of the electoral system. These provisions are, in addition to the effect of introducing greater equality between genders, prone to favouring political parties *vis-à-vis* individual candidates. The clearest example of such a side-effect is the system of gender quotas since female politicians, who struggle to assert themselves even at the level of individual political parties, are chosen by the party elite.

Table 1: The party-/candidate-centric character of electoral rules for electing deputies to the EP in Slovenia

Features of the electoral system	Party/candidate-centric impact
'party' candidate lists	P
definition of the order of precedence on the candidate list	P
preference vote	C
number of electoral units (publicity)	C
number of deputy posts	P
mode of candidate selection	P
gender quotas and the 'zipper' system	P

Source: Deželan (2004)

The presented features of the electoral system and institutional framework indicate that election reporting in the mass media might be similarly balanced in favour of political parties and not individual candidates, despite certain distinct features of these elections and the EP itself. The investigation of the printed mass media's reporting in the next section examines whether such presumptions are correct.

The party-centric character of media reporting on elections of deputies to the EP and discrimination against female candidates in Slovenia

Given the described features of the system for electing EP deputies we attempted to establish parallels between the institutional rules and the mass media's coverage of the electoral campaign with a special focus on gender issues. The subject of our inquiry was not the various factors that influence media reporting and determine the nature of public discourse in the sphere of politics, but only the patterns of

media coverage. The insight into the printed mass media's reporting is based on data collected as part of an international comparative analysis named 'Mapping an Engendered Media',[6] which collected and analysed published newspaper articles[7] during the 2004 EP election campaign. The data collection referred to was designed as some kind of 'barometer' of equal opportunities policy due to its attention to measuring (in)equality in gender presentations in the media.

To start with, the distribution of individual articles/units of analysis according to topic is likely to reveal some key features of media reporting. In order to examine reflections of the institutional system in the mass media space, the newspaper articles were classified by their topic in party-centric and candidate-centric categories.[8] The following topics were placed in the party-centric group: a) an individual party's manifesto pledges and policy discussion; b) one party's criticism of another/others; c) 'horse-race' comparisons between political parties; and d) a presentation of candidate lists. In the candidate-centric group there are articles involving profiles of interviews with an individual male or female MEP, EP candidate or politician.

The distribution of the primary (main) topic[9] of the articles produces results similar to expectations made on the basis of the institutional system. The party-centric group of articles proved to be more numerous than the candidate-centric one, although not to the expected extent. The share of party-centric articles within all selected articles was 25.6%, while the candidate-centric share of articles was 21.5%. Similar proportions were evident when we examined in detail the pre-election period (13 June 2004) when the shares were 24.1% for the party-centric and 22.5% for the candidate-centric group. In addition, the division of articles in daily and weekly newspapers gave similar results. Thus, in the case of the distribution of articles according to their primary story topic the media space replicates the features of the institutional system only to some extent. However, we must note the importance of the country as a single electoral unit as a very significant party-centric feature.

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[6]   The analysed printed media were selected according to the criteria of coverage and relevancy for political science research, with the timeframe of a 30-day electoral campaign and the post-electoral reflection of results. The method applied was a content analysis of the articles/units on the basis of a previously designed and internationally harmonised codebook.

[7]   The selected printed media (periodicals) were: a) three dailies: Delo, Dnevnik and Večer; b) three political weeklies: Demokracija, Mag and Mladina; and c) two weekend editions: the Saturday edition of Delo and the Saturday edition of Večer.

[8]   The party-centric and candidate-centric groups are composed of categories from the previously designed codebook which refer to either of the two broader sets. As 31% of articles only dealt with the process of the European elections in general, they cannot be ranked in these two categories. That is why they were not included in our analysis.

[9]   The primary story topic denotes the main topic that prevails in individual articles.

Table 2: Shares of party-/candidate-centric primary topics within selected articles

Primary topic group (in %)	total	before 13.6.2004	dailies	weeklies
party-centric	25.6	24.1	25.2	29.6
candidate-centric	21.5	22.5	19.3	28.5

The assumption that the institutional provisions of the electoral system are reflected in media reporting in favour of political parties is further tested by looking at the distribution of articles into party-/candidate-centric groups according to secondary [10] topics. A share of 41.9% of all selected articles according to their secondary topic was classified in the party-centric group, while just 6.9% went into the candidate-centric group. Limiting the examined period to only the preelection period further confirms the vast dissimilarity acknowledged in the case of secondary article topics. Further, the dividing up of newspapers into daily and weekly ones substantiates the observed discrepancy between the shares of articles in the party-centric and candidate-centric groups. The slight deviation between the shares of the candidate-centric group for dailies and weeklies can be ascribed to the tendency of weekly newspapers to deal with the profiles of individual candidates for deputy posts.

Table 3: Shares of party-/candidate-centric secondary topics within selected articles

Secondary topic group (in %)	total	before 13.6.2004	dailies	weeklies
party-centric	41.9	44	44	42.7
candidate-centric	6.9	7	4.6	13.8

The figures presented above indicate a structure/pattern of media reporting in the relevant newspapers as presumed following the analysis of the institutional system. In-depth research into the prevailing topics of the selected articles further established the dominance of political parties, even when reporting on the electoral campaigns of individual candidates. Hence, most articles with a primary focus on candidates and their profiles also described the policy decisions, power, day-to-day politics and chances of their political party, but not *vice versa*. Therefore, media reporting reflected the main features of the institutional system which is clearly, despite some progressive provisions, unfavourable to women, especially female politicians. To reconfirm such statements, we examined the female gender's representation in newspapers with a focus on female politicians.

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[10] The secondary story topic denotes the latent topic of the article which is reported in the background.

According to the newly installed progressive electoral institutions on gender-balanced representation, a 'balanced' state of media reporting should be the ratio of approximately 2:3 of media attention for the more favoured gender based on the gender quota and 'zipper' provisions with a reasonable level of tolerance either way due to the prevailing number of male candidates in the first place of an individual candidate list. The actual ratio between shares of articles focussing on female/male persons[11] was around 1:3 in favour of the male gender to a discriminatory degree that cannot be justified by the abovementioned factors. The ratio demonstrates the wide-ranging and far-reaching limitations of the new, progressive gender-balanced legislative attempts and is corroborated by the observation that the female-focused articles were given less desirable places on newspaper pages (bottom-left and bottom-right corners vs. top-left corners, centre of the page or whole page). It was only in three cases (out of 13 candidate lists) where female candidates headed the list. In terms of personality (*persona*) rather than content-oriented media reporting, the above remark gains additional weight. Beside the quantitative differences in covering candidates of different genders, a substantively biased coverage was obvious. While, on one hand, there were neutral interviews in dailies with two female leaders, on the other hand, the media were openly convinced they would not win seats in the European Parliament. They even made politically incorrect remarks about them. For example, the daily newspaper *Delo* stated that Alenka Paulin had chosen to be a candidate because she wanted to have media attention once more and that Alja Brglez was too ambitious and sublime. Except for two interviews with other female candidates in right-wing weeklies, the media gave more attention to extreme foreign female candidates such as the 'strong attributes' of Czech porn star Dolly Buster and Estonian super model Carmen Kass.

Table 4: Share of articles focussing on male/female candidates

Article gender focus (in %)	total	before 13.6.2004	dailies	weeklies
female	5.3	4.8	4.4	7.1
male	16.2	17.7	15	21.4

Additional information comes from photos included in articles. In fact, non-verbal cues can be much more important than verbal ones (Argyle et al. 1971) in addition to the observation that having fewer images in written media increases the importance of any single image (Lang et al. 1996). Further, earlier research (Barret and Barrington 2006) offers strong evidence of a biased photograph-selection process.

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[11] The two groups' "articles that focus on female/male persons" were generated by compiling the codebook categories profiles and interviews with politicians of male/female gender.

Disregarding the fact that a particular photo may include certain latent information, we only examined photos in a quantitative sense to generate certain descriptive statistics on gender representation within the photos. Overall, the share of photos focusing on the male gender was much bigger than the female share, which is partly ascribed to the already greater share of male-focused articles. Besides that, it was impossible to overlook examples of politically incorrect pictures such as a photo of the female leader of a candidate list (Alenka Paulin) in a friendly hug with her ex-party colleague with the following caption below the photo: 'That's my bunny' (political weekly *Mladina*).

Table 5: Share of photos focussing on females/males

Photo gender focus (in %)	total	dailies	weeklies
female	17.5	14.8	25
male	58.2	58	55.4

This short examination only shows the 'selective mirroring' and not the full 'transposition' of the electoral rules into media reporting. Obviously, the mainly party-centric and male-favouring features of the electoral system overrode the influence of the progressive provisions in the mass media's coverage.

The electoral system's influence on the electoral success of female candidates in Slovenia

a) Positive and negative elements of the electoral system from the gender-balanced representation perspective

Previous research on elections at the national and local levels (i.e. Fink-Hafner and Krašovec 2004) shows that most institutional innovations of the adopted EP Elections Act[12] are unable to fulfil the high expectations and declared goals of the equal representation of genders in the stages of candidate nomination and electoral success due to the political culture being disinclined to women's participation in politics. From the gender equality point of view, the problem is that parties pragmatically subordinate their functioning to the predominant political culture when pursuing the goal to maximise votes.

The 2004 European election rules can be divided into two separate groups according to their effect on the equality of representing genders in politics. The

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[12] The Elections of Deputies of the Republic of Slovenia to the European Parliament Act (ZVPEP) was adopted in October 2002 by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. The Act Amending the Elections of Deputies of the Republic of Slovenia to the European Parliament Act (ZVPEP-A) entered into force on 11 March 2004.

first is composed of provisions expected to induce the equal representation of both genders in Slovenian politics. The main feature of the second set of provisions is preservation of the *status quo. They predominantly include* political mechanisms, which had – as a rule – discriminated against women in Slovenian politics already before 2004.

Mechanisms that should help women's electoral success according to expectations based on pre-2004 research in Slovenia include the: proportional representation principle; definition of Slovenia as a single electoral unit; presence of lists of candidates; minimal 40% gender quota per individual list of candidates; provision on the representation of both genders in the upper half of a list of candidates (positions 1, 2 and 3 on a list of 7 candidates);[13] and the provision on the annulment of any candidate lists that disregard the requirements promoting the equal representation of genders in politics.

By preserving the under-representation of women in politics and the patterns of the predominantly male discriminatory political culture of political (party) elites, the electoral institutions for electing EP deputies that might have the reverse effect include: the candidacy for the position of deputy is proposed by political parties and voters; political parties nominate their candidates according to their internal provisions; the ability of a political party to propose a candidate list if it has gathered the support of at least four deputies of the National Assembly (the minimal threshold for political parties to enter the chamber)[14] or at least 1,000 voters; the ability of two political parties to propose a candidate list if they have gathered the support of at least six deputies of the National Assembly or at least 1,500 voters; the ability of at least 3,000 voters to propose a candidate list; and the institute of the preference vote.

To summarise, the most important institutional provisions of the system for electing deputies to the EP expected to positively affect the level of equality of gender representation in politics in Slovenia are therefore *national candidate lists, the definition of Slovenia as a single electoral unit and the various provisions that promote and define the equality of gender representation on individual lists of candidates*. As experience shows, the most important factors that can discriminate against women in the institutional system despite

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[13]   The number of candidates on an individual list is determined by the number of MEP posts per electoral unit – Slovenia. Thus, the current number of seven Slovenian MEPs determines that candidate lists have a maximum of seven candidates. According to the practice of political parties at the first EP elections in 2004 in Slovenia, the lists are predominantly composed of seven candidates.

[14]   The National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia is composed of 90 deputies, two of whom are representatives of the Hungarian and Italian national minorities. Deputies can express their support for one list of candidates, which is normally the list of the parliamentary party they belong to.

provisions promoting gender-balanced representation in politics[15] are the continuation of the political party monopoly over candidacy procedures and the absence of any formal provisions regarding intra-party nomination and candidate-selection procedures at the national level. In an environment of a political culture discriminating against the female gender, the above observations might be interpreted as an indicator of the unwillingness of Slovenian political parties to reform themselves (Lovenduski, 1999: 48)[16] in spite of the few, already mentioned, individual attempts to experiment made by certain more progressive political parties.[17]

Despite the effects of the newly introduced institutional mechanisms that promote the gender-balanced representation of Slovenian deputies in the EP, Slovenia's political environment maintains a predominantly masculine, discriminatory political culture. The prevailing (self)discriminatory political culture of the male and female electorate is therefore a wider, more complex and long-term social problem that cannot be removed or neutralised by simple institutional engineering. Notwithstanding the clear effects of European institutions'[18] external pressures on the Slovenian political elite – the adopted gender-balanced provisions of institutional engineering have proven to be efficient – such effects seem to be without any impetus when we observe the political culture of political/party elites and the electorate in the domestic environment.

b) **Data on the 2004 European elections in Slovenia** The Slovenian political elite was prepared to experiment with electoral institutions due to the relative insignificance of European elections for (re)distributing political power among the relevant national parties and because the EP was viewed as a second-order arena.[19] In addition, the Slovenian political elite was somewhat

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[15] Various political parties (the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and mainly the United List of Social Democrats) have introduced certain measures of gender-balanced representation in the past on their own initiative. Such a gender-balanced policy backfired with a dreadful result for the most progressive party in the field (the United List of Social Democrats), which eventually 'loosened' its gender-balanced provisions.

[16] According to Lovenduski (1999), political reforms that abolish barriers to the equal representation of genders in politics can only be efficient if such processes of wider political reforms are in harmony with the reform of political parties.

[17] For more on this, see Antič and Gortnar (2004).

[18] As an obvious example of the stated pressures we note the explicit criticism of gender-unbalanced representation in Slovenian political institutions made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which at the beginning of 2004 announced that national delegations composed of representatives of just one gender would no longer be acceptable.

[19] Voters-citizens of the EU tend to pay less attention to the EP elections (EOS Gallup Europe 2005), frequently also presented as '*second-order national elections*' (Reif and Schmitt 1980), since there is 'less at stake' in elections to the second-order (EP) arena.

obliged to introduce the innovations due to external (European) pressures to stimulate greater equality in opportunities for both genders.[20] In practice, most political parties have respected the new rules only formally.

Main features of lists of candidates

Thirteen candidate lists[21] competed at the elections of deputies to the EP in 2004 in Slovenia (Table 6). The candidate lists encompassed 91 candidates, of whom 41 (45%) were female. Most candidate lists included three female and four male candidates (42.9%), with the exception of the progressive ecological movement party SEG and the pro-women party GŽS, which are small extra-parliamentary parties. The latter (GŽS – Voice of Women of Slovenia) tried to put a list of seven female candidates together but was forced by the gender-balanced representation provisions to include three male candidates.

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[20] The Slovenian political elite lacked the impetus to adopt innovations of the Slovenian electoral system which had been on the public agenda for an extended period of time. Gender-sensitive institutional rules were first adopted for the 2004 European elections. External pressures on Slovenian party elites to do so included the specific criticism of the gender structure of Slovenia's formal political institutions (made by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in early 2004), which clearly stated that in the future single-gender national delegations (such as Slovenia's) would no longer be acceptable. Soon after this criticism, one member left the Slovenian delegation to make room for a female colleague. Besides that, Slovenia as a new member state is obliged to implement the common EU policies, including policies ensuring gender equality.

[21] The full names of the candidate lists of political parties are: LDS+DeSUS (Liberalna demokracija Slovenije in Demokratična stranka upokojencev Slovenije; *Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia*), N.Si (Nova Slovenija – Krščansko ljudska stranka; *New Slovenia – Christian People's Party*), SEG (Stranka ekoloških gibanj; *Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia*), SMS+ZS (Stranka mladih Slovenije in Zeleni Slovenije; *Youth Party of Slovenia and Greens United*), SDS (Slovenska demokratska stranka; *Slovenian Democratic Party*), NSD (Nacionalna stranka dela; *National Party of Labour*), SSN (Stranka slovenskega naroda; *Party of the Slovenian Nation*), SJN (Slovenija je naša; Slovenia is Ours), DS (Demokratska stranka Slovenije, Demokrati Slovenije; Democratic Party of Slovenia, Democrats of Slovenia), GŽS (Glas Žensk Slovenije; *Voice of Women of Slovenia*), SNS (Slovenska nacionalna stranka; *Slovenian National Party*), ZLSD (Združena lista socialnih demokratov; *United List of Social Democrats*), SLS (Slovenska ljudska stranka; *Slovenian People's Party*).

Table 6: Number of female candidates and their position on the list of candidates

List of candidates	Female candidates		
	number	*positions 1-4*	*1st position*
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (LDS+DeSUS)	3	1	-
New Slovenia – Christian People's Party (N.Si)	3	2	-
Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia (SEG)	4	3	-
Youth Party of Slovenia and Greens United (SMS+ZS)	3	2	+
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	3	2	-
National Party of Labour (NSD)	3	2	-
Party of the Slovenian Nation (SSN)	3	1	-
Slovenia is Ours (SJN)	3	2	+
Democratic Party of Slovenia, Democrats of Slovenia (DS)	3	2	-
Voice of Women of Slovenia (GŽS)	4	2	+
Slovenian National Party (SNS)	3	1	-
United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)	3	2	-
Slovenian People's Party (SLS)	3	1	-
Total	*41*	*23*	*3*

Source: http://www.rvk.si/volitve200401/vlozene_liste.html, 21. 8. 2004

Three candidate lists (SMS+ZS, SJN and GŽS) introduced a female candidate in first place on the list. The first party mentioned is also the only, albeit the smallest parliamentary party to have nominated a female candidate as the 'leader' of its list due to her strong public image and party relations with the progressive European greens. Other parties placed their first female candidate in second place on the list, with the exception of the SLS and SNS, which are both parliamentary parties. The first has been a continuous member of various government coalitions, while the second is an extreme-right party.

Election results

The inaugural elections of deputies to the EP in Slovenia, held on Sunday 13 June 2004, saw by far the lowest electoral turnout since Slovenia declared its independence in 1991. Such a crushing turnout (28.35% – 461,879 of 1,628,918 voters)

hardly reached the levels of referendum decisions, which are some of the least attended forms of electoral participation in Slovenia. The seats in the EP were distributed to four candidate lists (five parliamentary political parties), two to the N.Si, LDS+DeSUS (joint list) and the SDS, while the ZLSD gathered enough votes for one deputy post. Three female candidates are among the seven elected deputies. All of them occupied 2nd position on the candidate list which was effectively the key to their electoral success. Other female 'frontrunners' experienced a total electoral defeat.

Table 7: 2004 elections of deputies to the EP – results

List of candidates	votes		MEPs
	number	*share (in %)*	
New Slovenia – Christian People's Party (N.Si)	102,753	23.57	2
Liberal Democracy of Slovenia and the Democratic Party of Retired Persons of Slovenia (LDS+DeSUS)	95,489	21.91	2
Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)	76,945	17.65	2
United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD)	61,672	14.15	1
Slovenian People's Party (SLS)	36,662	8.41	-
Slovenian National Party (SNS)	21,883	5.02	-
Slovenia is Ours (SJN)	17,930	4.11	-
Youth Party of Slovenia and Greens United (SMS+ZS)	10,027	2.30	-
Voice of Women of Slovenia (GŽS)	5,249	1.20	-
Party of Ecological Movements of Slovenia (SEG)	2,588	0.59	-
National Party of Labour (NSD)	2,022	0.46	-
Party of the Slovenian Nation (SSN)	1,386	0.32	-
Democratic Party of Slovenia, Democrats of Slovenia (DS)	1,263	0.29	-

Source: http://www.volitve.gov.si/ep2004/index.html, 21. 8. 2004

According to the Elections of Deputies to the EP Act, voters can decide to give priority to an individual candidate on a candidate list by conferring their vote of preference. The Slovenian case is a shining example of the victories of 'list leaders' who gathered large majorities of votes for the list, with the exception of the said case of the ZLSD. Hence, four male candidates exceeded the preferential quotient of an individual candidate list and were elected by application of the preference

vote provision. On the other hand, none of the three elected female candidates exceeded the limit set preferential quotient of an individual candidate list. Table 8 presents the results of the preference vote for each elected candidate. None of the three elected female MEPs exceeded the limit set by the preferential quotient, with Ljudmila Novak (N.Si) only achieving a devastating $1/7^{th}$ (0.99% of votes for the list) of the calculated preferential quotient for the N.Si candidate. Yet from 7th place on the candidate list the least successful elected male MEP collected three times more votes than the elected female MEPs put together. Hence, this experience demonstrates the fragile character of the new gender-balanced provisions in the absence of any wider reforms since parties can manipulate the electoral success of female candidates simply by introducing two prosperous male candidates to the candidate list.

Table 8: Number of preference votes collected per elected candidate

Candidate list	total votes per list	preferential quotient	elected candidate	votes per candidate	
				number	*Share in the List (in %)*
N.Si	102,753	7,339	Lojze Peterle	79,472	77.34
			Ljudmila Novak	1,017	0.99
LDS+DeSUS	95,489	6,820	Jelko Kacin	55,798	58.43
			Mojca Drčar Murko	5,696	5.97
SDS	76,945	5,496	Mihael Brejc	45,992	59.77
			Romana Jordan Cizelj	2,135	2.77
ZLSD	61,672	4,405	Borut Pahor	27,385	44.40

Source: http://www.volitve.gov.si/ep2004/rez_kan.html, 21. 8. 2004

The electoral results therefore reflect two layers. The first, most manifest layer is (but only at first sight) the astonishing success of female candidates and incredible level of gender-balanced representation unfamiliar to all previous electoral races or appointed delegations. Yet, the second is more latent and identifiable after an in-depth analysis of collected votes by gender, which proved to be in favour of male politicians at an alarming level despite a similar number of candidates per gender. Therefore, from the perspective of the final result of the elections and composition of delegations the provisions leading towards the equality of women in politics were only partly effective. The road to having more women in politics appears to be very slippery particularly if parties do not reform themselves and their

predominantly male elites decide to 'evade' the progressive provisions imposed by international organisations.

Concluding remarks

The presented results of the 2004 European elections in Slovenia primarily demonstrate the relatively isolated and limited efficiency of the elite-defined institutional innovations created under external (EU) pressure. Still, it is possible to detect a range of impacts of individual institutional solutions.

A positive institutional factor was the provision on the position of female candidates on candidate lists (with the 'leading' female candidate usually appearing in second place), but only in the case of the big success of a particular party (at least gaining more than one seat). On the contrary, the preference vote was confirmed as being a particularly unfavourable electoral institution for women – something already noted by other research on the prevailing (self)discriminatory political culture of voters in Slovenia. In fact, the preference vote served as a tool for discriminating in favour of well-established (male) politicians for the electorate as well as the enduring and accumulating media exposure of individual (male) candidates. In practice, many aspects of the 'engendered' institutional rules operated as tools in the hands of opportunistic party elites primarily interested in winning votes by counting on already profiled male candidates and being less oriented to the positive profiling of female candidates.

In addition to the media 'heritage' of individual candidates (as a rule, male candidates had advantages here as they were exposed as politicians to the public longer even before the European elections), the mass media's biased character when reporting and commenting on the electoral campaign was obvious. Further, female candidates were additionally damaged by unfriendly biased verbal or non-verbal cues.

To conclude, Slovenia remains trapped halfway towards gender equality in politics since the EU-forced engendering of electoral rules is still accompanied by a persisting political culture that (self)discriminates against women in politics, by the party-centrism of the political environment and the party-centrism of the media. The political parties' opportunistic adaptations to the formally gender-friendly electoral rules without radically changing how they function and without them struggling to change the prevailing political culture and media reporting at the second European elections in 2009 comes as no surprise.

The task of developing a more thorough and valid model of the factors guaranteeing the success of engendered institutional engineering remains with social scientists, while day-to-day practical pressures on party elites to enculturate gender equality in their internal and external politics remains with intraparty and extraparty activists.

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When nation building is at odds with economic reform and EU membership

Lars Johannsen and Karin Hilmer Pedersen

Abstract: *While small state logic and the imperative of a return to Europe by and large explain why the stringent EU requirements were adopted by the candidate countries prior to membership it, is not sufficient to explain why they did so to varying degree and at different speeds. Through a comparative analysis of four countries, it is argued that different choices in nation-building affected the countries' capacity to handle large-scale reforms resulting, in a 'go-go' process in the Czech Republic and Estonia and a 'stop-go' process in Slovakia and Latvia. Consequently, at present, as membership of the European Union is well underway, Slovakia and Latvia have already had their nation building discussions. The pending question is what the political consequences will be in the Czech Republic and Estonia if and when nation building finds its way back to the political arena.*

Keywords: *Economic reform, EU, Nation building, Comparative method, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia*

January 1, 2004 saw the climax of more than ten years of negotiation between the Baltic and Central and East European states and the European Union. The process was neither smooth nor painless. Since 1998 it was closely monitored by the EU Commission, which required adherence to a set of political, economic, legislative and administrative conditions. The question is not why the countries accepted the stringent EU requirements, but why they did so to varying degrees and at different speeds.

Compared to global and regional powers, small states like those examined here, have substantially different options available when responding to the economic and cultural pressures of globalization. While the collapse of the Soviet Union heralded political freedom, it also exposed the economies of these countries to fierce competition from the world economy. Moreover, the opening of their economies was accompanied by price liberalization and transition from state to private ownership, causing an immediate deterioration of living standards and massive unemployment. Faced with these difficulties, membership of the European Union came to be the 'natural' destiny.

The European Union was, however, at first not very keen on welcoming the former communist countries. Although trade agreements were made in the early 1990ies and the rhetoric stressed Europe's moral obligation to 'heal the wound from 1945',

the EU member states were reluctant to admit politically instable and economically poor countries to the community. At the same time, the post-communist countries claimed that the European trade agreements were more in favour of the EU members than their poorer neighbours. Thus, the negotiation process constituted a highly asymmetrical 'take it or leave it' relation, in which the current EU member states set the conditions and the 'outsiders' simply had to comply if they wanted to become full members of the EU (see, for example, Moravscik - Vachaudova 2003).

Why did the countries accept the conditions set by the European Union? First, a 'small state' logic posits that membership of a free trade zone reduces economic uncertainty by expanding the domestic market (Armstrong - Read 1998: 574). Second, participation in a free trade zone as a full member compared to a more loose construction consisting of trade arrangements changes the power relation, giving the smaller states a comparatively stronger voice in setting trade conditions and regulations (Vachaudova 2005). Following this, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) argue that EU membership was considered such powerful magic that domestic costs of the EU requirements were inconsiderable compared to the benefits to be gained by becoming full members. Finally, historical and cultural ties to Europe legitimized the choice of alliance and are often referred to as the main factor for compliance with EU requirements.

The small state logic, the similar exposition to world economic competition and the attractiveness of EU membership are arguments that the EU requirements were accepted. However, neither explanation can tell us why some states had greater difficulties in adopting the EU requirements than others. The Baltic and Central and East European states were challenged not only by political and economic transition. They also faced the necessity of rebuilding the state and reconstructing a nation. However, analyses of post-communist transitions have until recently tended to ignore the impact of nation building as well as the international context (Kuzio 2001). Although they increase the level of complexity, the inclusion of these aspects nevertheless enhances our understanding of the process.

The claim raised here is that the way national elites handled the burning issue of nation building provides additional insight into the process of political and economic change, and thus, the countries\ road to economic recovery and EU membership. This claim will be tested in a comparative study of four countries, Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Our research design is discussed in the next section. Section two looks into the concrete identification of the variables, and thus the application of the research design to our four cases. In section three we look into the dependent variable: economic reform success. As all four countries can be described as successful in in having been accepted as EU member states, we attack the question of economic reform success from different angles and build

up an argument that the four countries in fact took different paths to European integration. Section four analyses how the nation building process in each country is related to these paths. In the concluding section we discuss the possible political consequences of disregarding nation building in the pursuit of economic reform and Europeanization.

The research design

Estonia, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia are selected in what we call a 2+2 comparative research design based on the principles of *a most similar systems design (MSSD)*. Within this design, a series of homogenous independent variables are identified and thus eliminated as possible causes of any given development. This design means that it is possible to neutralize the effect of one set of variables, while simultaneously underlining the importance of others (Landman 2000; Mahoney 2004; Lijphart 1971/1975). For example, the crucial role played by parliamentarism has been used to explain the success of democratic and economic transition in post-communist countries (Nørgaard 2000). By selecting these particular cases, which all adopted parliamentary democracy as their political system, we eliminate the effect of parliamentarism on their road to EU membership and investigate the importance of another factor, namely nation building. Thus, within the 2+2 design we search for explanations by studying parallel variations between the explanatory variable and the dependent variable.

Although the *MSSD* is widely used in political science, applying it is certainly not unproblematic. The first problem is related to the identification of *the explanatory variable* that may affect the outcome, thus eliminating every other possible independent variable. The most common advice here is to build your choice of explanatory variable on theoretical observations (Peters 1998). In our research design we claim that differences in how the political elites handled the minority question is a reasonable candidate in explaining why there were differences in especially the economic transformation. In our case, the theoretical basis builds on Roger Brubaker's (1996) analysis of the re-emergence of nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe. He argues that because post-communist states were re-established in accordance with the Westphalian view of the state, the founding principal was the existence of *one nation*. As the post-communist states constitute a patch-work of nationalities and minorities, anti-discriminatory policies may give rise to dissatisfaction in the 'titular' population because they feel that the state is not sufficiently attentive towards them. Such dissatisfaction provides fertile ground for populism based on nationalism, thus removing political attention from economic hardship.

The second problem is related to variable and case selection and thereby whether make generalizations are possible when claiming that the background variables are

indeed similar. The challenge is to eliminate as many differences as possible by accepting the difference between *similar* and *same*. That is to say, even though the countries are *similar* on a number of parameters, they are not necessarily *identical* or *the same*. The discussion of transitology, area studies and comparative method between Bruce, Schmitter and Karl highlighted exactly this problem when they debated the extent to which transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe were comparable to post-communist transitions (Bunce 1995a/1995b; Schmitter 1994; Karl – Schmitter 1995). But even when looking at post-communist transitions, there are considerable differences in how and to what extent they were integrated in the Soviet political and economic system. Hence, even though the countries are *similar* in terms of a communist political and economic heritage, they are not therefore *the same* in relation to how that heritage will continue to affect their political choices and economic opportunities.

Acceptance of the limitations inherent in *MSSD* makes the careful selection of countries imperative, although comparability difficulties cannot be eliminated entirely. The four countries we gave selected have all been exposed to state ownership and planned economy. However, there are important differences in how closely they were integrated in the Soviet economic system; Estonia and Latvia were fully integrated as Soviet Republics, whereas the Check Republic and Slovakia had independent economies but were integrated through their membership of the Soviet trade organization, COMECON. This difference is the main reason why we talk about a 2+2 design. But even though we try to eliminate differences in economic (and political) heritage the countries within each group are still not the same – only more similar. Thus, if we move one step further in the discussion, Estonia and Latvia may have experienced the same level of integration into the Soviet economy, but Latvia was burdened with a large concentration of heavy industry, the Soviet dinosaurs that proved to be very difficult to reorganize and make competitive in a market economy (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 144). In a similar way, the Czech Republic had an economic advantage over her Slovakian counterpart as most industry was placed in this region, while the Slovakian economy was primarily based on agriculture. These economic parameters most likely affected the potential for success in the reform period and when analyzing the cases, we will keep these differences in mind.

The limitations of *MSSD* are also its strength because a reduction in the number of cases enables a more in-depth examination of causal processes over time and a thorough study of combinations (Mahoney 2004). Thus, narrowing the focus to only four countries allows us to examine the reform processes over time. In addition, the choice of a 2+2 design means we can examine our explanatory variable in varying combinations of national political, economic, and international conditions.

Identifying the variables

The four countries were chosen because they exhibit a variety of comparable background variables (see table 1). First, economically and population wise they are all small, and hence the small state logic of seeking to become a member of larger economic entities should objectively be advantageous. Second, as commented upon earlier, all four introduced democratic parliamentarianism. Third and finally, all four countries faced the challenge of making the transition to democracy and market economy while in the process of reestablishing themselves as sovereign states, making it a triple transition (Offe – Adler 1991). On the one side we have Estonia and Latvia who, in their struggle for independence, contributed heavily to the final collapse of the Soviet Union, and on the other we have the Czech Republic and Slovakia, who decided to disband the Czechoslovakian federation shortly after the Velvet Revolution. The four countries we have chosen share a *similar* point of departure in relation to their Soviet political and economic heritage, that is, they were all communist and had planned economies. But in view of our earlier remarks about *similar* and *same* we have picked four countries that are pair wise the *same*. Unlike Estonia and Latvia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) were not integrated into the Soviet Union itself.

The last parameter that informed our choice of countries is the presence of national minorities. The importance of minorities in the countries examined here is greatest in Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia. A large influx of Russians in the Soviet era has led to massive problems with citizenship and integration, causing great difficulties for Estonia and Latvia in their state building processes. In Slovakia particularly the Hungarian minority played a role. Reinforced by fears of Hungarian irredentism led by conservative and national parties from Budapest, the Slovaks created a national identity as an us/them dichotomy. One may argue that on this parameter the Czech Republic differs from the three other countries as its population is quite homogeneous. However, that did not keep the nationalists at bay in the Czech Republic. The EU requirement that all new members had to comply with EU standards for national minority rights has had the – probably unintentional – effect that the Moravian minority in the Czech Republic has demanded that they be accorded formal status as a 'minority group' and given regional autonomy, and the Romas have demanded recognition as a 'nation' (Tesser 2003: 521).

The tension between state building and minority policy emphasizes the causality in our design. For although the four cases are pair wise *similar* in terms of political and economic legacy from the Soviet Union and the fact that they had to reestablish themselves as sovereign states, the varying political importance accorded to nation building had consequences for their ability to stay the course of economic reform. Our thesis is that the reasons for successful integration into the international

economy are to be found here and their varying political capacity to maintain an Europeanization strategy. This thesis is theoretically supported by two arguments.

First, a number of theoreticians have pointed out that rapid liberalization of economic institutions, the so-called 'Big Bang' method, will in the short term lead to loss of welfare, but also more quickly to economic growth than would occur if a more gradual and protracted approach is adopted (Przeworski 1991; Williamson 1993). Although the 'Big Bang' strategy would entail a steep J curve where reforms would certainly hurt, the economic pain would soon be alleviated. In contrast, the gradual reform process was predicted to cause a less severe economic contraction, but the bottom curve of the J would be extended and the economic downturn therefore severe. Consequently, if the reforms could be implemented fast enough, the electorate – who were most likely to feel the pain – would not have time to change the political agenda through the new democratic institutions (Balcerowicz 1994). The expectation that a 'Big Bang' reform process will lead to strong economic growth has largely proved to be correct even though the J curve turned out to be deeper and longer than anticipated (Firdmuc 2003). In addition, research shows that the choice of reform model is highly contingent on the result of the first free election (Fish 1998; Bunce 1999), where anti-communists who gained power instituted rapid reforms.

Second, it has been asserted that the irreversibility of the reform process and the certainty that changing governments will stay the economic course are essential for investors and the confidence of private business (Frye 2002: 315). Without credible commitment, which may occur if anti-reform forces gain power, uncertainty prevails and it becomes too risky to invest. Furthermore, Crawford and Lijphart (1995: 196) point out that international support for the liberalization entrepreneurs was very important in seeing through economic reforms. Thus, credibility is improved if there is consensus among the various elites who may come to govern to support EU membership as an independent, positive and necessary goal.

The flip side of the coin is that this top-down policy process tends to remove major areas of politics from the political debate. They thus essentially consitute evidence of elite constrictions on democracy (Grabel 2000). Relating this argument to our explanatory variable, nation building problems, and especially minority rights, require adaptation and readjustment processes based on inclusiveness because liberal democracy must be based on a political community and not on ethno-cultural mobilization and polarization (Kuzio 2001). We return to this aspect in the concluding section.

For our four countries the EU is a constant factor and conditions for entry were identical. The causes of differential success must therefore be found within each country. Even though the importance of initial choices neither can nor should be rejected, it does not explain why reforms are put on hold or why reform changes are

put on the agenda. Before we move to internal explanations we will take a closer look at the dependent variable, that is, how the reform process actually played out, and identify differences and similarities between the four countries.

Table 1: MSSD-design for the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Latvia

Control variables:	Czech Republic	Slovakia	Estonia	Latvia
Small economies	Approx. 1% of total EU GDP	Less than 1% of total EU GDP	Less than 1% of total EU GDP	Less than 1% of total EU GDP
Population (2003)	10.3 million	5.4 million	1.4 million	2.3 million
GDP/inhabitant, 2004,	15.880	11.970	11.020	9.530
Form of government	Parliamentary democracy	Parliamentary democracy	Parliamentary democracy	Parliamentary democracy
Communist, political and economic heritage	1948: Coup instigated by the national communist party. Integrated into the Eastern block economy (COMECO). 1968: The Prague spring crushed by armed forces from other communist states		1940: Soviet annexation and occupation. 1945-: Resistance continues, forced collectivization, deportations, immigration and integration into Soviet planned economy	
Reestablishment as sovereign states	1993 Czechoslovakian Velvet Divorce	1993 Czechoslovakian Velvet Divorce	1990 (in fact 1991) Collapse of the Soviet Union	1990 (in fact 1991) Collapse of the Soviet Union
National minorities (pct.)	Moravians: 3.7 Slovaks: 1.9 Others, including Roma: 4	Hungarians: 9.7 Roma: 1.7 Others: 2.8	Russians: 29.7 Others: 2.3	Russians: 37.5 Others: 4.3
Explanatory variable: Choices in nation building	Consensus: among the party elites to exclude ethnicity as a political issue	Politicized: Ethnicity form a political cleavage within the party system	Consensus: among the party elites to exclude ethnicity as a political issue	Politicized: Ethnicity form a political cleavage within the party system.
Dependent variables: Adherence to Europeanization program	Yes	Yes, but two periods: 1993-1998 1999-2004	Yes	Yes, but difficulties in sustaining political efficiency
Degree of economic success	High	Catching up	High	Lower

*Sources: * Eurostat and OECD figures quoted from Hix 2005*

Economic reform – success at varying pace

While membership of the EU can be regarded as the ultimate success criterion, a deeper look into the success of the countries economic reforms and their ability to adapt to a free and global market can be assessed by looking at a number of economic indicators. This section examines variation in the dependent variable by looking at the period between the initiation of reform and EU membership in 2004.

The development in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita provides us with the general view on the economy. Figure 1 shows that after the first few years of contraction, as predicted by economists, the GDP has grown steadily. Economic growth got underway later in Estonia and Latvia than in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which underlines the challenges these countries faced as former republics of the Soviet Union. Estonia soon pulled ahead of Latvia and had by 2004 almost caught up with Slovakia. Latvia has managed since the low point in 1993 to nearly double its GDP, but it is still the poorest of the four countries. Compared to the others the Czech Republic is the wealthiest.

In extension of figure 1, the indexed development in international trade in relation to GDP provides insight into integration in the world economy and also serves as a clear illustration of the differences in economic transition.

Figure 1: GDP per capita, PPP (2000 international, in $ 1000)

Source: World Development Indicators database.

Figure 2: International trade (percent of GDP). Index: 1992=100

Source: World Development Indicators database

For the period 1992-2004, with the possible exception of Estonia, Figure 2 in general showsthe difficulties in adjusting to global competition and trade during the first decade. The east bloc trading system COMECON had fallen apart, and particularly in Latvia and Slovakia the contraction in trade is even greater than that of the overall economy. This is clearly shown in the case of Latvia, where trade relative to GDP drops by more than 40 percent during the first years of tradition. When we simultaneously consider the dramatic Latvian drop in GDP during the first years, it is evident that Latvian trade had almost come to a standstill (see figure 1). Except for the return to the base line by year 2000, Slovak developments are similar to the Latvian experiences. In the Czech Republic changes in GDP and trade are largely parallel until around 1999. After 1999 the index shows a more active trade development. This indicates that the Czech trade in early phase was perhaps not at a complete standstill, but certainly did not fuel the economy. The case of Estonia shows a quite different picture. Here trade was of central importance from the very beginning, and total growth in trade exceeded that of GDP by 40 percent in 2004. In 2004 integration into the international economy through trade was important in three of the countries, albeit at different levels as trade has the most impact on the Estonian economy and the least impact on the Slovakian one. All in all, trade was a less important factor in the Latvian economy in 2004, indicating that country's greater dependence on domestic production.

Developments in and the magnitude of foreign investments give an indication of the openness and attractiveness of an economy and can therefore be used as a measure of the extent to which a country is integrated in the world economy. According to the theoretical argument put forward earlier, it further gives a rough indication of how foreign investors evaluate the reform process. Foreign investment in the countries in relation to GDP for the period 1992–2004, cumulated foreign investments and investments abroad made by each country are listed in Table 2.

Table 2: Incoming FDI (1992-2004) and cumulated FDI (2000)

		Czech Republic	Slovakia	Estonia	Latvia
FDI, Net inflow (% of GDP)	1992	0	0	2.1	0.6
	1993	1.9	1.5	4.2	1
	1994	2.1	1.7	5.4	4.2
	1995	4.6	1.2	4.6	3.4
	1996	2.3	1.7	3.2	6.8
	1997	2.3	0.8	5.4	8.5
	1998	6.1	2.5	10.5	5.4
	1999	10.7	1.7	5.5	4.8
	2000	9	9.5	7.1	5.3
	2001	9.3	7.6	9.1	1.6
	2002	11.5	16.9	4	2.8
	2003	2.2	2	10	2.6
	2004	4.2	2.7	9.3	5.1
Cumulated FDI (% of GDP, year 2000)	Inward	42.6	25.6	53.2	29.5
	Outward	1.5	2	5.2	3.4

Source: World Development Indicators database; UNCTAD WID Country profile: Czech Republic (World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country profile: Slovak Republic (World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country profile: Estonia (World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org); UNCTAD WID Country profile: Latvia (World Investment Directory online, www.unctad.org).

Over the period examined here Estonia and the Czech Republic have been considerably more successful in attracting FDI than Slovakia and Latvia. However, Table 2 also shows that foreign investments in Slovakia increased considerably at the turn of the millennium. Hence, table 2 is ample illustration that Slovakia has had serious difficulties in attracting foreign investments in the 1990s, and that the situation turned around after a new government took office in 1998, which was

accompanied by a more positive evaluation by the EU in relation to membership. In Latvia we find no positive change in attractiveness to foreign investors. Table 2 also shows the positions of the four countries in the European economy as foreign investment is of a much greater magnitude than outward investments by their companies and citizens abroad.

In addition to the general picture of foreign investments it is important to note that the relatively large influx of foreign capital primarily stems from EU countries. There are, however, differences based on historical and geographical contingencies. For instance, the two Baltic countries tend to orient themselves toward Scandinavia, whereas foreign investments in the Czech Republic and Slovakia mostly originate in Austria and Germany (UNCTAD, various countries, 2004). Corresponding to the pattern of FDI, trade relations are also oriented towards the EU with more than 50 percent of all trade going to EU countries (EU Commission 2004). This pattern supports our initial argument that for the small new EU countries, response to globalization pressures is to a large extent equal to Europeanization and EU membership.

Generally the four countries are examples of successful transitions to market economy, and based on indicators such as growth, foreign trade, and direct foreign investments, they handle global competition quite well. But there are major differences between the two groups of countries. First, if we look at trade deficits, the Czech Republic and Slovakia manage to stay right below 3 percent of GDP, while the Estonian and Latvian deficits are about 20 percent of GDP (EU Commission 2004). This difference may be related to each country's level of integration into the Soviet planned economy, giving these countries a less fortunate point of departure. Second, unemployment is also relatively high. The Czech Republic did best with an unemployment rate of only 8.2 percent, followed by Estonia at 9.7, Latvia at 10.3, and Slovakia with the highest rate at 16.5 percent (ibid.). The overall evaluation, then, is that success can be differentiated between the Czech Republic and Estonia as the most successful, Slovakia as less so, and Latvia as the weakest. In relation to our 2+2 design this gives a variation in the dependent variable within each selected subset.

Our point of departure was the expectation that swift implementation of a reform course and close adherence to it contribute to explaining the differences in success criteria, and that cleaving to the course depended on the will and ability to persevere. Figure 3 provides an image of ability to stay the course of economic reform. The figure shows a simple average of the reform process in eight essential areas as evaluated by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The scale goes from 1 to 4+, 1 designating planned economy and 4+ a fully functional market economy. Figure 3 shows that all four countries have applied the 'Big Bang' strategy, in that they all implemented massive reforms in the early 1990s.

However, the figure also reveals the partitioning into two pairs. After the dissolution of Czechoslovakia the Slovakian tempo decreases, nearly grinding to a halt in the years 1994-1998. Already in 1997 Estonia, which implemented reforms over the shortest period of time, thus overtook Slovakia. Like the other countries where reforms were begun with the 'easiest' ones first, Latvia shows a leap in the development in reform processes and a hiatus between 1996 and 1998.

Figure 3: Economic reform course. Average of EBRD indicators. 1989-2005

Source: Own calculations based on EBRD (http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm). The figure shows an unweighted average of the score for 1) large scale privatization, 2) small scale privatization, 3) enterprise restructuring, 4) price liberalization, 5) trade and foreign exchange system, 6) competition policy, 7) banking reform and interest rate liberalization, and 8) securities markets & non-bank financial institutions. The scale is 1.0 (planned economy) to 4+(fully functional market economy)

Similar studies of the development of economic freedom (for instance from the Fraser Institute. See Gwartney - Lawson 2005) show the same picture. Estonia and the Czech Republic have consistently maintained a fast reform pace, while Latvia and Slovakia took a break in the mid-1990s, and then resumed reforms in the last years of the decade. Furthermore, Merlevede (2003) actually identifies reform reversals in Slovakia in 1997 and in Latvia in 1998.

The capacity of the state to formulate and stick to political strategies and to implement reforms ('governance') shows a similar picture. State capacity can be

demonstrated by using the World Bank measure consisting of six different indicators (Kaufmann – Kraay – Mastruzzi 2005). The six indicators include, among other items, assessment of the quality of the rules adopted (ability to regulate), constitutional state (rule of law) and corruption control measures. The interactive module (World Bank 2006) shows that over the period from 1995-2004 the four countries have generally had better state capacity than the regional average. Whereas we expected the countries to have diverged because of the difficulties encountered by the two former Soviet republics, it turned out that by 2004 Estonia scored the highest on all indicators. Latvia, despite remarkable results winds up at the bottom of the pile, barely surpassed by Slovakia and with the Czech Republic as the country that best measures up to Estonia over the period. An interesting difference shows up between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. While the relative position of the Czech Republic has been consolidated, also under pressure from the progress in recent years in the other countries, Slovakian developments clearly demonstrate the problems encountered in the late 1990s, after which positions change, in fact so much that by 2004 Slovakia scores better than the Czech Republic on three of the indicators.

On the face of it, resumption of reforms in Slovakia coincided with their being rejected in 1998 for negotiations over EU membership along with several other countries. The recommencement may be interpreted as a result of increased pressure from the EU because it reinforced the impression that membership was possible only insofar as reforms were completed and the acquis fully implemented (Schimmelfennig - Sedelmaier 2005). Outside pressure may help explain why the pace was stepped up, but not why the reform process in some cases could be characterized as 'stop-go', while in others it was continually 'go-go'. Ability to institute reforms thus oscillates along with the success criteria, indicating that the pauses in the reform process are not due to economic conditions or general state capacity but most likely stem from internal political contexts. Something else must therefore contribute to the explanation. In the following we proceed with our thesis that nation building choices have a causal effect on the ability and determination to stick to an Europeanization strategy.

Europeanization strategy and nation building

At the implosion of the Soviet system not much was known about how a transition could be made and the costs it would entail (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999:107). All countries went through a period of extraordinary politics (Balcerowicz 1994), in which the governments were free to implement almost any reform they wanted, as normal channels of political influence – parties, organizations and parliament – were still not fully developed, and the governments had a mandate for change. As

shown in Figure 3 above, the pace of reforms was very high in all four counties for the first few years, but then they went their separate ways.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia

The Soviet military crackdown in Prague in the spring of 1968 gave rise to an orthodox communist regime in Czechoslovakia. In contrast to Hungary, where they in the 1980s had experimented with private ownership of smaller companies and businesses in the service sector, Czechoslovakia had made absolutely no attempts to liberalize the economic system. The system was finally changed after the huge demonstrations in Prague and Bratislava in 1989 that paved the way to the presidency for Vaclav Havel, co-founder of *Charter 77*, and the first free elections were held in the spring of 1990.

The general view expressed by the Czechoslovakian opposition was that incorporation into the East bloc in 1948 was based on an historical injustice that moved the boundary between Western and Byzantine culture several hundred kilometers west (Mason 1992: 39–40). Czechoslovakian Europeanization policy was therefore begun under the slogan 'Return to Europe', and it precipitated early contacts with international organizations, including membership of the OECD and application for membership of NATO and the EU. Neo-liberal economic reforms were soon set in motion by the Czech Prime Minister, economist Vaclav Klaus.

Although the Czech and Slovakian parts of Czechoslovakia followed the same path of reform, the negative consequences were far less severe in the Czech part (see figure 1). Vladimir Meciar, leader of the Slovakian reform movement, therefore argued that a more gradual economic reform pace was needed. In consequence he proposed a looser federal arrangement with the Czech part. Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus fiercely rejected the proposal, arguing that Slovakia in case of different paces of economic reform would harvest the gains of sheltering behind a thriving Czech economy without sharing the burdens. The consequence was the 'Velvet Divorce' and a split in economic reform policy as well as in Europeanization strategy in which the Czech Republic adhered to a neo-liberal economic reform and Europeanization strategy under the heading 'EU is the only option' (Mudde 2004), while Slovakia changed towards a gradual economic reform and adopted a zigzag course towards the EU (Pridham 2002b: 209).

The dissolution of the Czechoslovak federation meant that in addition to political and economic reform they each had to confront a nation building process. The Czechs soon agreed to base their statehood on citizenship. This implies that all inhabitants of the Czech Republic were automatically accorded citizens' rights, symbolizing the polity. The Slovaks, on the other hand, chose to define their project in terms of nationality, that is, the Slovakian state was to belong to the Slovakian

people, thus emphasizing an ethno-cultural divide. This difference in the principles of state building is rooted in the fact that there was a large Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In addition, the Czechs were loath to revive Czech-Bohemian rivalry, strengthening their resolve to design a citizenship policy that removed the issue of nationality from the debate (Tesser 2003).

The Europeanization strategy in the two new countries also diverged. Even though Klaus found that the Czech Republic was a natural part of the EU, he claimed that the EU is founded on the sovereignty of the members, and that Brussels might learn a great deal from the Czech Republic. Minister of foreign affairs, Jan Zieleniec, clarified the issue by warning the EU against developing a non-transparent bureaucracy along Soviet-communist lines (Fawn 2004: 31–32), and also Klaus has criticized the EU monetary union and its approach to social policy (Pridham 2001: 63). However, that has not changed the consensus over EU membership as the only and necessary foreign policy strategy.

In contrast to the Czech Republic 'Europe as an idea' was less prevalent in Slovakia and the nationality issue became a crucial factor. The first Slovak election in 1992 thus brought Vladimir Meciar to power on a heavily populist and nationalist rhetoric, which was reinforced when the Hungarian elite toyed with irredentism as part of the political agenda (Tesser 2003: 509, 512). In addition, the coalition agreement with a nationalist party meant that the domestic political costs of complying with international standards for minority rights, agreed to when Slovakia was part of Czechoslovakia, were much too high for Meciar's government (Sadurski 2004: 379). Under Meciar, the rights of the Hungarian minority were thus of a formal nature, while the actual conditions for Hungarians deteriorated, in part because of language laws that circumscribed the right of the Hungarian minority to use their own language (Tesser 2003: 513). Meciar's policies came under severe criticism from the international community, including the EU, which in its first report on Slovakia found that the country did not comply with the political criteria of the Copenhagen agreement. In addition, Meciar's political overtures to Russia did anything but mollify the EU and estranged the governing Slovakian elite from their European colleagues (Pridham 2002b).

Structural explanations like growing economic interdependence between EU and Slovakia, criticism by EU and reluctance to grant Slovakia negotiation status were utilized by Mikulas Dzurinda and were probably at least indirect reasons for the election result and change of government in 1998 (Vachudova 2005: 140). The change of government, moreover, also – at least temporarily – closed the nationality because the Hungarian minority party was invited to participate in the governing coalition. Strong political disagreements between the Hungarian minority party and the rest of the governing coalition indicate that the inclusion was a strategic and tactical step by

Dzuinda, and he most likely went to such lengths to convince the EU Commission about the earnestness of Slovakian minority policy (Pridham 2002a: 964).

A comparison of the two countries indicates that a coherent Europeanization strategy and the nationality question go hand in hand with reform process and state capacity. In the Czech Republic the political determination to join EU and a disclosure on the question of minority rights point to the overall determinant 'go-go' policy in the economic area, in contrast to Slovakian indicators.

Estonia and Latvia

Estonia and Latvia were fully integrated in the Soviet economy when they achieved independence in August 1991. They had to set up new institutions and stabilize their economies. The problems seemed insurmountable as illustrated by the fact that money was still printed in Moscow and inflation running rampant.

But both countries had strong resources at hand. There was consensus that a market economy was the solution: market economy not only as a negation of the Soviet system, but also as means to prosperity, developments that had had been halted by the Soviet occupation (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 107). Both countries thus implicitly draw on their historical experience of the 'golden era', that is, independence in the interwar years, when their economic wealth corresponded to that of Finland (Hiden – Salmon 1991). On a similar note, the desire for reunification with Europe was an important political and cultural driving force. In their struggle for independence the European values of the rights of the individual were in stark contrast to the Soviet collective with its Byzantine traditions of authoritarian solutions (Lauristin – Vihalemm 1997).

Here the paths diverged, however. Estonia kept up the pace of reforms, whereas Latvia after 1992 saw a slowdown (see figure 3). Martin Paldam (2002: 170) tries to explain the Latvian stop-and-go policy with the frequent government reshuffles and changes. But Estonia has had about the same number of changes as Latvia, but still managed to keep reforms on track.[1] The explanation of the different reform policies and Latvia's 'stop-and-go' policy was as being due to domestic policies, in that the nationality issue came to dominate far more in Latvia than in Estonia, leading to problems in the reform process.

Estonia and Latvia both experienced massive immigration of Russophones in the Soviet era, and by the census in 1989, Estonians and Latvians constituted

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[1]   Between about 1990 and 2002/2003 Latvia and Estonia have each had 10 different governments and 8 to 9 prime ministers respectfully (Johannsen – Stålfors 2005: 33-36). In fact it is only the Czech Republic where a stable government from 1992 to 1997 has carried out radical, neo-liberal reforms (Hellman 1998: 123). However needless to say that this stable government was forced to step back due to economic scandals.

respectively 61.5 and 52.0 percent of the populations (Nørgaard et al. 1996: 172). In Estonia practically all non-Estonians were immigrants from this period, which made it politically feasible to label them 'colonizers' and deny them citizenship on that basis. Consequently, the Estonians were able to reconstruct the nation and gain legitimacy by 'satisfaction in the titular population' (see above) at a time when the bottom of the J-curve had not yet been reached. In contrast, Soviet era immigrants in Latvia amounted to just half of the non-Latvians. The rest of the Russian-speaking minority were descendants primarily of ethnic Russians and Byelorussians who had citizenship in the interwar republic. They and their descendants were therefore granted citizenship automatically. They used voting rights to form their 'own' parties, which made the citizenship question a potent fault line in the Latvian party system (Smith-Sivertsen 2004). The citizenship question meant that the nation building process continued to occupy the political agenda, and as late as October 1998, the nationalist parties tried in a referendum to repeal a law that, on the behest of the EU, was to simplify the process of granting citizenship (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 84-85).

The Latvian process of defining and building the nation also impacted the unofficial economy and led to the formation of a left wing alternative to the neo-liberal approach to the reform process. Minorities were over-represented among industrial workers and they were hit hard by the economic reforms. But unlike those in Estonia, the Latvian minorities had political clout, and although the reform course could not be veered from, their influence sufficed to delay the process, leading to a legal vacuum for spontaneous privatizations, and a thriving unofficial economy (Nørgaard – Johannsen 1999: 150).[2]

While the ethnic cleavage nurtured (or arose concurrently with) the development of a left-right dimension in Latvia, the Estonian parties sought consensus on the major objectives of economic reform, EU and NATO membership. The national movement in Estonia was based on a network that originated among students at the University of Tartu (Bennich-Björkman 2006). Under Mart Laar's leadership, the young and inexperienced activists of the movement in the guise of the *Pro Patria* party (*Rahvuslik Koonderakond Isamaa*) won the first free election in 1992. They were inspired by neoliberalism and reforms were initiated and maintained despite changing governments. This consensus over reform strategy developed to the point where the concept 'left wing' became a derogatory term used against the Estonian

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[2]   In Latvia the unofficial economy is estimated to comprise 35.3 percent of GDP in 1995, whereas the corresponding figure for Estonia was a modest 11.8 percent (Åslund – Boone – Johnson 2001). This points to yet another layer of explanation such as the one provided by Havrylyshyn - Odling-Smee (2000), who argue that the actors in the informal economy might have an interest in seeing to it that economic reforms are stuck midstream until their profits become large enough that they may be presumed to become more interested in legal protection of their holdings.

Center Party (Bennich–Björkman 2005). A liberal market economy had gained status as a fundamental idea in Estonian society to such an extent that a few liberal members of parliament questioned Estonian membership of the EU because it meant that Estonia, as part of the customs union, was to implement barriers against third countries.

The elites, nation building and the European project

The underlying reason for the reform breaks in Latvia and Slovakia is that the political project and the political agenda came to reflect the problems of nation building, while the elites in Estonia and the Czech Republic managed to keep these issues off the agenda and upheld their consensus about the necessity of Europeanization. The Czech Republic and Estonia thereby exemplify the criticism raised by Grabel (2000) about elite–driven reform projects. The implication is not that Latvia and Slovakia are more democratic. Rather, the specific constellation between four simultaneous transitions spheres – economic and political reforms, state and nation building – politicized the question of minorities and set the stage for debates that has yet to be addressed in the Czech Republic and Estonia.

The Estonian debate has recently revolved around elite democracy and social exclusion in the wake of economic reforms. Estonian researchers from the social sciences have warned that power is now so far from the people that we may speak of two 'Estonias', one comprising a self-centered political elite that was never held accountable, and one consisting of a socio-economically marginalized population, warning that 'the individualism of early capitalism now needs to be tempered by a principle of solidarity (Pettai 2005: 33), a criticism that Prime Minister Mart Laar refuses to accept.

In the Czech Republic the divide in policy on Europe turned out to run between Klaus' party, which finds the EU to be insufficiently liberal, and a left wing – including an unreformed communist party – who thinks the EU is not social enough. In addition, even though the question of nationality was eliminated very early from Czech politics, the Europeanization strategy has forced the Czechs to adopt all international demands for minority rights and to live up to EU standards in that area. The issue resurfaced, in part because the EU has recognized the Roma as a *national* minority and not an *immigrant* population, which is how the Czech government sees them (Tesser 2003). This distinction is essential for the status and rights of Romas in the Czech Republic and has recently resulted in Roma demonstrations in Prague.

The accession process has provided a framework for the political debate in the nation building process. Now the fundamental asymmetry, the right of the EU to

refuse membership if a country fails to comply with the Copenhagen Agreement (Grabbe 2001; Schimmelfennig – Sedelmeier 2005) has disappeared, the pending question is how and if nation building will find its way back to the political arena and what the domestic political consequences may be.

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DISCUSSION

Political culture and its types in the post-Yugoslav Area[1]

Ladislav Cabada

Abstract: *The aim of the article is to apply the concept of traditional, modern, and obmodern society on the development of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area. The post-Yugoslav – and generally post-Communist – societies might be analysed as interesting example of limited modernisation after the 1945, when some spheres were developed similarly in the comparison with the Westerns societies, but in other the development was stopped, retarded or deformed. Next to the traditional dichotomy traditional vs. modern society we apply the interesting model of obmodern society presented by the Slovenian sociologist Ivan Bernik. Based on the analysis we generally construct the "geocultural" dividing line between two groups of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area.*

Keywords: *post-Yugoslav area; political culture; traditional society; modern society; obmodern society; geocultural division*

Introduction

The question of the Balkans as a specific geographical, political and cultural formation reappeared in social science after 1990 in connection with the outbreak of several war conflicts on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. During the Cold War period, the term "Balkan" had again become a mere geographical term[2]; however, after 1990 the Western world returned to a "well-tried" cultural and political definition of the Balkans as a "homogeneous" complex. This complex had existed practically since the 16th century, when the majority of Balkans territory was ruled over by the Ottoman Empire, understood as a European periphery, an "anarchistic and barbarian periphery, from which the West dissociates" (Hösch 1998: 603). As Maria Todorova successfully showed, in this case we have to deal with "indolent assumption", based especially on stereotypes and preconceptions (Todorova 1999). Be that as it may, we cannot ignore

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[2] In the period of bipolar separation of the world and also because of the specific position of Tito's Yugoslavia the southeastern European peninsula was divided into three parts: Soviet, Yugoslav and "Western" (Waisová 2002: 57).

the fact that the Balkans as a region has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate many specific characteristics, which make it a *sui generis* case.

In this article I shall try to (re)define the basic definitions of so-called Balkan political culture. I will focus especially on the evolution in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula – that is, on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. This is a specific area, which was for long periods a part of mutual state units (Ottoman Empire, Yugoslavia). But we may clearly observe that even this long common evolution does not induce similar evolution of the political cultures of individual national-cultural-religious entities. My interpretation will be based above all on some theoretical works which focus on the differences between traditional and modern society, and I shall apply these theories to our concrete knowledge about the evolution in the former Yugoslavia.

Historical development of the Balkans – traditional or modern society

The concept of dividing human societies into traditional and modern arose in the modern social sciences in the latter half of the 19th century. In this sense, Emile Durkheim's *About the societal division of work*, which appeared in 1893, may be considered the seminal work. The author distinguished two types of societies with a different type of solidarity – organic and mechanic. "The organic solidarity of modern society is conditioned with the division of work among specialised subgroups; mechanic solidarity of the traditional non-stratified society is maintained by all members of partial relational mutually homogenous segments" (Budil 2001: 404). We have to deal with a classification in which the main criterion is the functional specialisation of an individual that makes him an independently acting individuality. If this criterion is not fulfilled, we can talk about the observed society as a traditional one.

Examples of modern European societies are undoubtedly the so-called western societies, which underwent a specific historical development from the beginning of the 19th century.[3] The result of this development is a modern, secularised society with a high level of individual independence. On the principle of dichotomy and mutual struggle certain cultural and intellectual phenomena (for example renaissance/reformation, classicism/enlightenment, realism/positivism etc) dynamic energy was created and released. The final consequence of this process was openness and plurality. The eastern part of the European continent practically did not participate in this process of development (Hösch 1998: 605).

In a Europe with such development, an imaginary dividing line was created between West and East, in other words between modern and traditional society[4].

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[3] As the break point we can regard the year 1492 (Cabada 2000).

[4] The German thinker Walter Schamschula states that eastward from this lane there are living Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians and Montenegrins.

It is worth noting that all the societies behind this line display a dominance of orthodox religious denomination, while for example Slovenian and Croatian society with a dominance of popery is affiliated to the West. In my opinion, this – purely bipolar – segmentation is too simplistic and imprecise. Undoubtedly, under Ottoman dominance the Balkan region developed differently in comparison with other European regions. This difference led to the establishment of specific societal and political preconditions, which influenced the development of the political culture of individual ethnical and national communities. This specificity was based especially on the crossbreeding of different impacts – "one quarter Attic, one quarter Turkish, one quarter New Greek, and one quarter Bavarian", said Duke Hermann von Pichler about Athens in the 17th century (Hösch 1998: 616). Indeed, we cannot identify with the ethnocentric view of the Balkans as a territory where "Turkish dominance caused permanent retardation" (Hösch 1998: 611).

Wars in the Balkans – primarily the Austrian-Ottoman rivalry – contributed above all to the ethnical immaturity of the entire Balkans region. This immaturity led to extensive cultural contacts, but it did not induce sharp mixing of cultures. The primary reason was to be found in the geographical preconditions of the internal Balkans where hilly areas dominated, thus limiting operational possibilities. This precondition, together with the influence of component religious denominations, led to the creation of localised society. As Igor Lukšič mentioned, the borders of the community lie at the border of the village. "Moral, political and cultural borders were delineated by the village community. The awareness of authentic, real people with authentic interests and obligations to the community was exercised. Without a state and market system and with totalitarian power of the church it was not possible to develop the space of abstraction of modern (liberal) politics with an abstract citizen – that is, with legal equality and freedom of the individual" (Lukšič 2001: 64).

We may observe that the main difference between the West and the Balkans in the field of political culture[5] is based on the status and rights of the individual as a member of the political community and/or in the largeness and internal structure of this community. While in the West the rights of the individual as a member of society and the political system are continuously being purveyed and deepened, Balkan political culture is based on localism, characterised by membership of the individual in the local (rural) community – this being the primary membership which determines the majority of the political attitudes of the individual. In this sense, the role of the most important authority is played by the local political leader, who is

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[5]   Naturally, if we accept the idea that this comparison is acceptable for our study.

mostly identified with the local religious exponent. K. Zernack speaks in this context about the affinity of Byzantine and Turkish competence (Zernack 1977: 46).

The individual community develops very independently, distinctly isolated from other local communities. This is one of the reasons why for long centuries we can observe in the traditional communities in the Balkans a lack of institutions. Miscellaneous communities with different cultural patterns were living often on very small territory; their political culture based on a reluctance to communicate with neighbouring communities and on sharp self-sufficiency. When we introduce to these "rural communities" (Dorfgemeinschaft) the power approach, we might anticipate tragedy (Hösch 1998: 620).

Another important attribute, which is connected with the detachedness of local communities in the central regions of the Balkans, is the inability to view political matters in an abstract sense. The individual is not able to refer to central institutions, his life is enacted within the clearly defined borders of the community. All relations are based on strictly patrilinear grounds; here the basis is mostly – in the opinion of the Austrian historian Karl Kaser – the time-honoured concept of the whole family (zadruga) (Höschl 1998: 621).

Considering all the presented arguments we may note that on the Balkan peninsula, above all in its hilly area (Dinar mountainous regions), in the period of 16th-19th century, specific communities were created with a specific political culture. These communities could be defined as traditional in the sense of the dichotomy modern vs. traditional society. Specific political culture, based on the local communities and unclear identification with the political centre, is not in itself a source of conflict. This dimension was brought into the political cultures of the central Balkan regions from outside, above all with the wave of nationalism in the 19th century, which is closely connected also with the role of the religious denominations. Particularly important here is the role of the Serbian Orthodox Church and its crystallised Messianism, though other denominations also were creating a strong misalliance with nationalism. For example the role of the Catholic Church in Slovenian and Croat society was, up to the Second World War, markedly higher and "specific" in comparison with the West European countries.

A further important factor is that destabilisation and conflict were reintroduced into Balkan political culture with the process of modernisation. The modernisation supporters – national intelligence in the process of creation – were without doubt supporters of nationalistic ideas, which, similarly as in the western part of Europe, were based on the idea of exclusivity. The national political elite strove for institutionalisation of Balkan communities on national and religious grounds, but the new ideas were not understandable for the local communities. Local communities were not able to participate in the modernisation process, especially because of

their inability of political abstraction. The consequence of this discrepancy was a deepening of the gap between the political elite and the "rest" of society. Local communities became only passive observers who understood the changes only on a symbolic level (a similar model can also be seen in some post-Yugoslav societies in the 1990s).

Political modernisation in the Balkans is connected with the intellectual elite (but not with the development of market and industrialisation), which were established beyond the reach of the local communities. A strong dichotomy between the city and the country[6] was established where the city was understood as something dirty, depraved, and strange, as something which was disturbing the traditional processes. As early as 1902 this discrepancy between the old, traditional world and the new, "modern" epoch was described in *At the hill* (Na klancu) by the famous Slovenian writer Ivan Cankar. Symptomatically, the author lived in a relatively developed and "modernised" part of the Balkans (Cankar 1995).

When we observe the historical development in the Balkans in the 19th century, we can see that the modernisation supporters (intellectuals) strove for modernisation above all in political life – an effort to create a national state – while they downgraded and/or prevented modernisation in the economic, social and cultural spheres. An important and symptomatic attribute is the unwillingness to transfer modern political rights to the national communities thus created. There is no emancipation of the individual as a political subject, having the possibility to participate in the political process. On the contrary, those who could take part in this process were above all the traditional representatives of local communities.

Developments in the first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) also correspond to this interpretation of political modernisation. The political order of this state may be described as very conservative, let us say traditional. Evidence of this may be seen for example in the development of an electoral law which did not correspond to developments in Western Europe, nor even in Central Europe. The active election right was restricted only to men older than 21 years (passive right was a minimum of 30 years); also the educational census was applied – knowledge of the "national" language (Cabada 2000b: 117). If in the 1920s the new state tried to incorporate at least formal liberalisation – and modernisation – of political life, after the proclamation of dictatorship in 1929 the Belgrade leadership gave up on this mission. Moreover, in the unsatisfied traditional communities, which did not possess any influence on the political scene, the traditional representatives – especially churches – started to play the role of warriors against the "centre". The result was authoritarian,

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6   The rural population in the Balkans was substantially more numerous than the urban population. In 1841, 83% of the population in the Balkans worked in agriculture, while in the United Kingdom this figure was only 22%.

fascist political regimes in Slovenia and Croatia in the first half of the 1940s with a strong influence of the Catholic Church, but also the monarchist (četnik) movement in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. When we look closely at the internal segmentation of these political elements, we can see that they gained their support above all in the traditional political structure. For example, the Slovenian Territorial Army, which collaborated with the Italians and later Germans, was based on the principle of the so-called countrified guard. Their main opponents were partisans, mainly communists, bringing political, social and economic modernisation. They offered a programme of participation of the individual in political and economic life, although it was shown that many arrangements were only temporary and many promises were not realised.

Tito's Yugoslavia and its demise

In my opinion, there is no reason to doubt the modernity of the political programme of the Yugoslav partisan movement only because of the predominance of communists. Comparing the measures introduced by the partisans led by Tito with the situation before 1941, we can see important changes in the functioning of society. Introduction of a broadminded election law[7], an effort for quick economic modernisation (above all industrialisation), involvement of a modern concept of multiethnic coexistence and development towards a consensual model of state functioning were basic characteristics of the political system, especially after the quarrel with the Soviet Union. Of course, the above-mentioned principles were only theoretical, even if they became part of the constitution. On a practical level, up to 1953 the Yugoslav model functioned similarly to the models in the Soviet camp; at the beginning Yugoslavia was even Stalin's most painstaking scholar. Later, after redefining the basic principles of "democratic centralism", important changes were brought into the system, but they mostly remained only formal.

A specific role was played by the constitutional changes conducted by Tito's top ideologist Edvard Kardelj. After the quarrel with the Soviet Union, Kardelj started to combine Marxist theory with radical anarchism. The cornerstone of his theory was communes, independent municipal units, which in the future were to take up the role of the "dying" state. The communes were in fact small territorial units, which alongside municipal functions also took up a part of state functions. Undoubtedly, we may observe here certain continuity with the local communities from the "pre-communist" epoch. In the communes almost the whole economic, social and political life of the individual was realised – the rate of individual emancipation

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[7]   Active and passive election rights for every institution were from the age of 18. In the event that the individual started to fight (in time of war) or work before he was 18, he gained the election rights for at least some institutions.

was only as high as the internal conditions in the "traditional" communes were changed. Political modernisation then in many cases only seemed to be modernisation and in the communes (especially the rural) there still ruled the traditional models of linkages, responsibility and decision mechanisms. The modernisation supporter became the city, where a section of the rural population was moving. In a strange environment their main guideline was the ruling ideology and its institutional grounds – the communist organisation with the Union of Communists on the top. Although this organisation was centralised, it still allowed for a more clearly defined political emancipation of the individual in comparison with the traditional rural communities. Yugoslav literature contains descriptions of precisely this "modernisation metamorphosis of the individual" in the process of transition from the rural to the urban environment.[8]

In contrast to western countries, the modernisation jump in Yugoslavia – similarly as in other socialist states –was realised during the 1950s and 1960s. Firstly this jump is shown in the political sphere (emancipation of the individual), later in the economic sphere (industrialisation) and in the 1960s we can then observe the first changes also in the cultural sphere. And precisely at this moment there are also emerging initial doubts about the success of modernisation. It was shown that after the first modernisation jump, the system began with the construction of rigid institutional structures, which limited and deformed subsequent modernisation processes (Adam 1989: 22). The consequence of this deformation was a stopping of the modernisation process, to which some sectors responded with an effort for more independent politics. In fact, active sectors were those with a signficant share of the urban population, where new, "modernised" societal formations were being created. These formations strove for another form of modernisation and to bring Yugoslavia closer to the western societal and political model. The immediate reaction of the political system was suppression of the new formations (Balut, Cabada 2000: 752).

The pressure by some sections of society for the continuation of political and cultural modernisation was averted by the system with the constitutional reform in 1974. Edvard Kardelj again inspired the changes. The new constitution was to be another step on the road to abolishing the state. Elections were cancelled and substituted by a complicated system of delegations; the role of republic, national segments also increased. This led to a provisional reduction of the pressure that was coming above all from Slovenia and Croatia.

The next crisis for the system came sooner than expected – in the 1980s. One reason was the death of the charismatic leader Tito and the ensuing battle for supremacy

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[8] As an example we could name the – in many ways very controversial – book *Knife* (Nož) by Vuk Drašković (Drašković 1995).

among the communist leaders; another reason was the economic situation. The crisis showed that deformation of the modernisation process in the political sphere could strongly influence the personal economic satisfaction of the individual. The masses, who were still depoliticised and whose interest in the functioning of the system was above all economic, ceased to identify with the system. The reaction in the national communities was dual: one part wished to continue with modernisation and bringing Yugoslavia to the western model of society; the second group reverted to traditional values. These persistent values had lain hidden for decades, only to be reactivated in the 1980s (Adam 1989: 20).

The disintegration of Yugoslavia may also be interpreted as a conflict of two sharply differing political cultures, which were formed above all during the 1980s. On one side there was the "heading towards modernity" political culture of national segments, which accepted the majority of modernisation processes (Slovenia, Croatia). On the other side there was a political culture rooted in traditional models of political and societal behaviour with a strong role of the local community and local political elite. These two streams aspired to gain dominance in the common state and to unify political culture as the basis of post-Tito Yugoslavia.

Since the mid-1980s the trend of establishing basic starting-points for aspects of both mentioned political cultures has sharply accelerated. The north-western part of Yugoslavia is rapidly coming to form the basic structures of a civic society. In the dichotomy traditional vs. modern society this means the creation of specialised political and societal structures and functional differentiation. Relatively structured party systems are created, as also are many non-formal associations which have arisen from the strengthening civic society – feministic, pacifistic, ecological etc. (Cabada 2001: 202). All these events are a sign of the next wave of emancipation of the individual as a political subject who is struggling for his share in the decision-making process.

On the other hand, in the southern parts of Yugoslavia in the latter half of the 1980s there was a gradual interconnection of the political culture of traditional societies with the leadership principles. Here the starting point is the mythisation of Serbian history and reference to the old, practically tribal, form of state existence. The political rhetoric misguidedly employs terms associated with the nationalism of the 19th century. The traditional way of thinking is shown above all in the effort of the new political elite to win the support of the rural communities, while the urban units are mostly in opposition. This opposition may be seen especially in internal matters of society and changes in the political system; it is less manifest in foreign policy. Another important traditional characteristic is the role of the Serb Orthodox Church as the holder of traditional models of political culture (messianism, self-sacrifice).

Naturally we cannot claim that the dichotomy indicated here is pure. The Yugoslav modernisation process led to deformations (though less than in the Soviet satellites or even Soviet Union itself) and we may observe here two types of distinctly old-fashioned, non-modern structures: on the one hand those which were generated by the system (the majority of communist structures); then, on the other hand, latent traditional structures which were activated in the 1980s. It was impossible to nullify the post-war modernisation process which had become one of the bases for the future development of Yugoslav societies. The only difference was the rate of acceptance of this process as the basis for future development. Societies in the northern part of Yugoslavia understood modernisation as being unfulfilled and wished to correct this problem (the question of decentralisation of economic and political structures and higher emancipation of individual national sectors). Societies in the southern part of Yugoslavia considered modernisation as sufficient or even too extensive and disturbing the concept of a unified and centralised Yugoslav state formation. If there was some concordance between both approaches, it was without doubt the nationalistic approach. Nationalism provided a basis on which to build the Serbian projection of a centralised Yugoslavia as a "Great Serbian" area. It was also a basis for Slovenian and Croat politics, which understood Slovenes and Croats as exclusive entities with completely different qualities – political culture – as the other Yugoslav nations.

It is evident that in Yugoslavia in the 1980s at the latest, there again loomed latent existing autonomous political cultures, which for the most part could identify with national segments.[9] Especially in the northern parts of Yugoslavia there was hectic activity, whose aim was to demonstrate absolute dissimilarity of local political cultures in comparison with Balkan (Serbian) political culture. The idea of Central Europe has also been reactivated, including Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina (Cabada 2001: 204). Likewise religiously determined positions are revitalised, with some authors contrasting the "cultural" popery and "lesser cultural" Orthodox Church (Jambrek 1988: 154). Cultural stereotypes are resuscitated; again the "picture of the other" is important as a specific part of individual self-identification. Again we can come across expressions which were rejected in the period of the first modernisation jump – "perfidious Jesuits" (Croats), "Byzantine intriguers" (Serbs), "tricky Orientals" (Muslims) (Djilas 1994: 20) or "Southerns" (non-Slovenes) (Cabada 2000a: 249).[10] It is clear that the modernisation effort of Tito's leadership to create a unified political Yugoslav nation has not succeeded.

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[9]   It is difficult to talk about a unified Croat national culture when comparing for example Dalmatia and Slavonia.

[10]   The "picture of the other" in Balkans political culture is described in Mariana Lenkova's book *"Hate Speech" in the Balkans.*

In my opinion, different political cultures are one of the basic preconditions and reasons for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Some "post-Yugoslav" authors suppose that behind the disintegration we have to look above all to the ambitions of political leaders. For the communist leaders, nationalism and war were the only chance to save their positions. I agree with this opinion, but in every successive state the (old)-new political elite was formed on the basis of concrete political culture, which was the basis for their political activities.

Obmodern societies – relativisation of the dichotomy modern vs. traditional society

Hand in hand with the disintegration of the socialist block in the social sciences, research into the internal structure of individual societies has also changed significantly. It has been demonstrated that rejection of the socialist societal model and the formation of different types of post-communist societal models can be accommodated on a modern vs. traditional line only with great difficulty. This linear configuration is too simplistic and unable to perceive the characteristics of post-socialist societies. These societies have undergone a specific modernisation process that does not correspond absolutely to the models familiar in Western Europe where modernisation was realised primarily on the basis of economic and market development. Together with this, there was the pressure of society for extending political rights and greater functional differentiation of the political process. The main specific feature of the modernisation process in the socialist camp was the effort to initiate modernisation from the top, with the dictate of the modernistic intellectually political elite. This combination of modernisation and socialism created a specific type of societies, which we – in the opinion of important Slovenian social scientist Ivan Bernik – could class as obmodern societies, which are for him a historically unique entity (Bernik 1997).

In these obmodern societies the modernisation process was deformed in comparison with the development in Western Europe. As a result, these societies are modernised only partly in some domains, while in others they have remained monodimensional, traditional (Bernik 1997: 25). The main domain where modernisation is lagging behind, is – not only for Bernik – the political sphere. In socialist societies the political system plays an over-dimensioned role, it is trying to interfere in all other spheres. If the political system is not able to hold the same tempo of modernisation as in the economic or social sphere, the result is deformation of the modernisation process and the establishment of a modernity deficit. This deficit is viewed by the modernisation – above all intellectual – elite as a shortcoming, which must be eliminated as soon as possible. The result is conflict between this elite and the political system; if the system feels strong enough, it

reacts with repression. If such repression could disrupt the stability of the political system, there will be some partial modification – reform – which means an extension of the modernisation jump.

Such development leads to a situation in which individual socialist societies need not necessarily be internally similar. Thus it is impossible to set these societies on the continuum modern vs. traditional society. In other words, Bernik is claiming that, just as there is not only one type of modern society, we cannot speak only about one type of obmodern (post-socialist) society. Therefore he suggests setting the individual models into a spacial framework rather than on a line. This could stress the multidimensionality of the societies under examination (Bernik 1997: 24).

Similar ideas to those expressed by Bernik may also be observed in the work of the Polish social scientist Jadwiga Staniszkis. She too defines the modernisation of socialist societies as modernisation from the top. In her opinion, in the process of modernisation the rationality of the political elite and the "rest" of society was deepened. While the elite thinks in terms of lodging institutions, the masses as passive observers (some authors speak directly about the depolitisation of masses – Vajdová 1996: 345) see the development primarily in the prism of the standard of living and symbols (Staniszkis 2001: 62-63).

In obmodern societies modernisation is coming from the top, it is not continuous and consistent and it is oriented to the deformations, but above all to the separation of the societies into distinctly different sectors, which could only communicate with difficulty.[11]

The different power of individual sectors could be one of the points for orientation in the classification of the post-socialist systems. If the traditional sector ruled over the society (in possible combination with the communist sector), a new political system developed in the magic circle of deformed political modernisation. From the point of view of establishing a democratic form of governance, such systems offer few prospects. On the other hand, if the liberal sector prevailed in the society (again in possible combination with the sector established in the communist period), after the fall of socialism the next modernisation jump was started, which could mean the stabilisation of a democratic model of organisation.

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[11] For example Zdenka Vajdová in her analysis of the theoretical concepts and research of political culture shows Schöpflins' model of three communities inside post-communist societies: 1. Traditional (rural) society, whose values survived the communist modernisation. The society is open to populist demagogy, with a low degree of political literacy, non-understandable state and inferiority to etatism; 2. Society established even in the communist period, whose main characteristic is a positive attitude to dependence on the state. A modernistic communist elite accepted the deformed view of modernisation as advantageous. The higher class changed its political power into economic power or converted towards nationalism as a means for preserving political power; 3. Civic segment, liberal society strive for real modernisation and elimination of deformation in the modernisation process (Vajdová 1996: 345-346).

Also in the field of modernisation and change of political culture, the obmodern societies show certain specificity. The main characteristic of innovations in the sphere of political culture is their limitation to small groups of the population, above all to the urban political-economic-educational elite. Precisely this new elite created new values of political orientation and infringed the cultural hegemony of the socialist system (Bernik 2000: 12) and became a bearer of change at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The political culture of the new elite in comparison with the political culture of the traditional sector – in spite of all modern deformations – came into conflict with the dominant political culture, whose supporters were mainly politicians and intellectuals relying on the traditional (rural) segment. One who repeatedly proved himself to be such a politician was S. Milošević – a member of the "modern" communist segment – searching for his political recourse in myth and tradition, based then in the rural regions in southern Yugoslavia. Milošević could also use the modernisation deformations, which strongly influenced the specific character of the Yugoslav political system, the structure of Yugoslav society and above all the political culture. This specific character was designated especially with the fusion of egalitarian and authoritarian values and expectations. Political culture in Yugoslavia "namely had its roots in the tradition, but functionally it was implanted into the socialist society. The socialist system acquired the mass support (incomparable with the support in other socialist countries – L.C.) with fulfilling the egalitarian expectations of the majority of population. Although the fusion of egalitarianism and authoritarianism functioned from the point of view of stability of the political system, it was at the same time quite non-functional in terms of the modernisation of Yugoslav society" (Bernik 1997: 86).

In this sense, it is possible to understand Milošević's behaviour after 1987. He was trying to satisfy the needs of the majority of the population, which for him was represented by Serbs. He was winning support above all in the "peripheral", rural part of Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo. For the satisfaction of "egalitarian claims" there also served the redistribution of financial sources via the so-called "tax on non-developed territories", which was collected especially in Slovenia and Croatia. In this model naturally modernisation was not realised, above all in the sense of economic and political responsibility of individual in the spheres, who were the money-recipients.

In the 1980s the Yugoslav political model fell into deep crisis, which is connected with Tito's death and the absence of a proper successor, economic crisis, emancipation of northern national units (Slovenia, Croatia) and increase of national spitefulness in Yugoslavia. In the sense of political culture studies we cannot ignore the differences between the political cultures of individual societal sectors, which was markedly shown during the time of crisis. It has been shown that some sectors were

not satisfied with the depth of the modernisation of political culture and were striving for future modernisation steps, while others wished to return Yugoslavia to the former, "premodern" or "protomodern" development level. Some authors consider that, for the stability of the political system, above all the long-term correspondence of societal values, norms, models and organisational structure of political system are necessary (Bernik 2000: 9). In other words, the institutional form of the political system must correspond with the political culture. As we have shown, we cannot speak of any dominant political culture in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. After the attempt to create a unified Yugoslav nation in the 1980s, (new) independent national political cultures appeared, often very different. Satisfying the claims of these cultures would be possible only in a very decentralised state; the southern republics and also the Belgrade leadership ruled by Milošević do not agree with such decentralisation. This civilisation incompetence (Sztompka 1994: 89) is the main cultural political starting point for the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Post-Yugoslav political cultures

The dissimilarity of political culture in the different parts of the former Yugoslavia was one of the main reasons for disintegration of this state creation. Nowadays we could find on the territory of the former Yugoslavia five independent states, two protectorates, nine more or less independently developing political systems[12] with their own political cultures and a specific position in the space of European modern, obmodern and traditional societies. It has been shown that the idea of a unified Yugoslav society was unreal and, after the escalation of the conflict among exponents of individual political cultures at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, each of the national societies embarked upon an individual, specific development, which was strongly influenced by the political culture of every society.

Searching for stability of political culture in the post-Yugoslav area, we must necessarily begin from the premise that this has changed in the last twelve years in every post-Yugoslav society. There existed many possibilities of development – from the effort to finish the modernisation process through limited interventions, producing a deformed socialist model of modernisation, to the efforts to return to traditional organisation of the society; all these variations are nowadays represented in the post-Yugoslavia area. Slovenia is classified as a modern consolidated democracy and Croatia is shown as system with prospects in the sense of modernisation and consolidation; while for example Kosovo has changed into a distinctly obmodern society with the superiority of traditional structures on the clan background.

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[12] In spite of political declarations of Western statesmen it is necessary to think about at least two political systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the same situation is also in the case of Montenegro and Kosovo – both are independent societies with own political culture.

Under the international protectorate, attempts are developing to change the political culture in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and partly in Kosovo. The success of these attempts depends substantially on the capability of the societies in question to modernise, especially in the political sphere.[13] As the first studies on political culture in the former Yugoslavia showed, the success of these efforts is very unclear (Dimitrijević 2000). Undoubtedly the process will be quite lengthy, stemming – as the examples showed – primarily from the most low-ranking levels and not from the top (Daskalovski 2000).

After the fall of socialism no one system was oriented directly towards democratic plural model, but to the different modifications of socialism or combinations of the socialist and democratic model. Also nowadays paternalism remains the characteristic sign of post-Yugoslav societies (Bernik 1997: 85). Paternalism is shown above all in the political and partially also economic dependence of a large part of societies on state help and support. The civic sector is developing slowly and the main positions still have external actors. An exception is Slovenia, which practically eschewed wars and embarked upon modernisation changes relatively early.

After the fall of the Milošević regime we may say that the developed western countries became an example for all the political systems in the post-Yugoslav area. Hopefully, the xenophobic hysteria against western, "materialistic" civilisation has disappeared (Draškić 1995): this was something used in political propaganda especially by Milošević. All systems embarked upon the road of political modernisation – economical, political and cultural. To prognosticate the success of this process – or its duration – is almost impossible. Tentatively we could perhaps speculate on the greater or lesser chances of individual societies.

At the moment, it seems that the former Yugoslavia is crossed by an invisible border, which divides two groups of countries (societies) as the basis of a different political culture. The first group is characterised by significant progress in the sphere of economic modernisation, modernisation of the political system, orientation towards political democracy, rule of law and a relatively strong civic society. The second group is characterised by non-adherence to the principles of constitutionalism, a tendency to centralise the governance and to oligarchisation of politics (Szomolányi 1999: 25; Cabada 2001a). The first group, including Slovenia and with reservations also Croatia a Macedonia, is built on an obmodern and modern political culture, although even here we could find some traditional components which could, in the event of a crisis, lead to the deformation of modernisation. The second group includes all other post-Yugoslav systems, where the traditional political culture still predominates (in possible combination with the post-communist

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[13] The protectoral countries are prepared to start economic modernisation with massive financial support only after modernisation of political structure and political culture too.

one, which is seeking out the pre-communist, mainly nationalistic roots), character-ised with an unclear position for the individual in political life, little specialisation of political institutions, superiority of traditional linkages over the modern political linkages etc. In some cases the traditional institutions have pushed back the "mod-ern" political institutions established in the communist period (Kosovo).

Conclusion

In the last half-century, political cultures in the post-Yugoslav area were appreci-ably destabilised in the sense of sharp efforts for change. This destabilisation in the form of a modernisation jump retarded modernisation, and reaction to mod-ernisation manifested itself differently in individual political cultures in Yugoslavia. Destabilisation continued also after the disintegration of the unified state and the establishment of new states on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In Slovenia and also after Tudjman's death in Croatia we could identify this destabilisation with modernisation and an endeavour for transition to a democratic model with a clearly modern character. In the other post-Yugoslav countries destabilisation went mostly in the way of a traditional society with the acceptance of some elements of the communist system, which could be characterised as modernisation deformations. Further destabilisation in the sense of political modernisation remains a distinct possibility, but important changes are still not being realised.

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The Violence of Others: 'Eastern' and 'Western' Press Discourses[1]

Melinda Kovács

Abstract: *This article investigates distinctions in press discourse about violence. It compares 'The Economist' and 'Heti Világgazdaság' (HVG), a Hungarian publication very similar to The Economist. The investigation focuses on the discourses of violence in the coverage of the two publications. To avoid discourses where either publication would be talking about its own milieu, the analysis involves only articles about the Middle East and Africa in January 2008. The method of analysis involves Atlas.ti, a discourse analysis software.*

The findings reveal that The Economist has a professional discourse focused on the politics of Africa and the Middle East, while it also emphasizes that these regions are places of violence and inferiorizes them. HVG has a more respectful construal of Africa and the Middle East and neither inferiorizes nor Others those regions in ways that would be problematic. At the same time, HVG reifies 'the West' in ways that raise questions about its concept of the self. The conclusion is that it is not the journal with the clearer sense of self and clearer professionalism (The Economist) that construes Africa and the Middle East in more just ways, but the journal with the more hesitant and uncertain discourse (HVG).

Keywords: *discourse, violence, press, inferiorization, othering*

Introduction: Dangers and Diagnoses of Discourse

I assume that press discourses are Othering and Orientalist. As Jones has pointed out, summarizing the findings of Paul and Elder: "all major media and press in all countries of the world present events in terms that presuppose or imply the correctness of the ideology … dominant in that country" (Jones 2005: 153). Whether in recent years' sensationalist coverage of Andrea Yates (Barnett 2005) or in the long-ago coverage of political violence in Mexico in 1913 (Hidalgo 2007) or in the coverage of Kosovo (Kozol 2004), press discourses have consistently been shown to actively support the dominant order in every society at every point in time. The dominant order may show slight differences across space and time, but it always maintains a strict binary structure (us vs. them, western vs. non-western, white vs. non-white, sane vs. mentally ill, democratic vs. undemocratic). The

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binary structure necessarily entails Othering, with all its attending inferiorizations and injustices.

Press discourses are not unique in their support of the dominant order. I understand that all institutionalized elite discourses are that way. This comes from the very nature of discourse, because it is always intimately tied to power and domina

Discourse is closes associated with ideology and the reproduction of social hierarchies, and its analysis provides a way to examine ideologies as expressed in written, spoken and visual texts. Discourse is not simply a linguistic practice; it refers to and constructs knowledge about a particular topic. (Meyers 2004:100)

Discourse is the connective tissue between each of power, knowledge, language and dominance.

What interests me in this project is whether there are regional and cultural differences in the ways in which press discourses fulfill those functions. This project ties into the larger body of work that investigates whether there is a cultural or regional specificity to what we are still likely to call post-communism. I examine examples of press discourse from a post-communist location along with examples of press discourses from a non-communist location in search of regional and cultural specificities in Othering and Orientalism.

The commitments and value judgments that bring me to this position and as a consequence to this project, are rooted in my ideas of justice. I believe that it is globally unjust to have Othering and Orientalism in elite and/or consequential discourses. I also believe that in order to combat that injustice, its internal dynamics need to be understood and studied. Moreover, I believe that all unjust things are not created equal: different degrees (or various levels of harshness/violence) of Othering and Orientalism correspond to various degrees of offense against justice.[2]

The diagnostic project that I undertake here is multi-layered: I am interested in the processes of injustice that various press discourses display or reveal, and I am also interested in how those processes fit into the relationships among regions where those discourses are produced. Simply put, I want to find out whether, given a prevalent dominant dynamic of considering some regions more enlightened and just, the press discourses of those regions indicate any justification for that dynamic.[3] The project at hand here may be considered a step or phase in that inquiry. It also responds to the call, form the early 1990s, to be especially mindful of

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[2]   Even if the concept of justice is nebulous, it will certainly not contain, accommodate or license Othering, Orientalism, inferiorization or any other discursively violent practice.
[3]   Significant progress in documenting the global ideological geography of value judgments has especially been made by Larry Wolff and Attila Melegh.

language and meaning when researching what we persist in calling post-communism (Holc 1993). The phenomenon and situation of post-communism makes this focus especially relevant, even though considerations of discursive injustice have been a worldwide concern. One particular example is the globally Western and globally Northern perspective that has been shown to be detrimental in the Pacific – a clear case of how relatively theoretical concerns with global injustice in Othering translate into diagnosing very practical foreign policy problems (Robie 2008). The link between discourses, their understanding and 'uptake', on the one hand, and, on the other, the world of policy decisions has also been referenced by Kozol in her study of Kosovo referenced earlier (Kozol 2004). There are poignantly practical implications in discourse analysis.

Empirical Materials and Where to Diagnose Discourse

My current project involves comparing the discourses of Africa and the Middle East in two publications: The Economist and Heti Világgazdaság (HVG). The latter is a Hungarian publication that seems very similar to The Economist in terms of frequency of publication, type of content and even physical layout. My inquiry includes all articles about Africa and the Middle East in January 2008 in both publications.

The choice of regions and the choice of the time frame deserve justification. The choices were constrained by the time during which I conducted the initial data gathering for the project and by concerns about manageability. I decided to analyze one month to make sure I did not end up with a random snapshot or an overly unruly stream of data. I chose Africa and the Middle East as the regions of analysis because I wanted to focus on the discursive construction of regions other than the one(s) where the journals were produced, to maximize the opportunity to study Othering. The choice of regions was also motivated by my interest in the discourses of violence: discourse is often most revealing around the margins and violence is a good case of revelations around the margins. The marginalized are central to social science analysis precisely because they define boundaries (Meyers 2004). The regions of the Middle East and Africa, sadly, offer large numbers of incidents at the violent margins of their socio-political structures.

These parameters gave me two very comparable bodies of discourse. Each journal had four issues in January 2008, with similar numbers of articles.

	The Economist	HVG
issues	4	4
articles	15	19

There was a certain degree of overlap in contents: some events (e.g. President Bush's tour of the Middle East) were covered in both journals, while some were only mentioned in one of them (only HVG discussed the French citizens who were accused of child abduction).

Thus the two discourses are safely considered similar enough for comparison and yet not totally identical in their contents. The structural similarities of the journals, combined with the differences in their regions of production, make for a promising inquiry.

Note on the Methodology: How to Diagnose Discourse

To arrive at the most meaningful findings possible, I used a hybrid methodology. Some elements of it are reminiscent of content analysis (I use descriptive counts and percentages) while others rely on a philosophy quite foreign to content analysis (I use emergent categories of analysis). My conclusions, just like the normative commitments outlined at the beginning, place me in the camp of those who consider politics and all other aspects of social coexistence to be discursive in nature. This position has its philosophical origins in Wittgenstein's later work (Wittgenstein 1968, Wittgenstein 1972) and finds cognate approaches in works that understand discourse as a specific way of being in the world (Schwandt 2000).

Given this position, my empirical methodology's goal is to work on the discourse's own terms by immersing myself in the texts I analyze. My purpose is to create a well-documented hermeneutic rather than a definite, final, authoritative account. I agree with the position that such an account is in fact impossible in the case of media texts (Deacon et al. 1999). This is mainly due to the nature of mediate texts in general and the contents of newspapers in particular. Far from providing anything that would approximate objectivity, however defined, journalism records and communicates "facts, ideas and beliefs" (Barnett 2005:13).

The hybridity of the methodology comes from the fact that while I rely on emergent categories of analysis in a way that practitioners of grounded theory find congenial (Charmaz 2000), I also rely on very specific source texts, use a computer software and am ready to say that elements that occur in the highest percentage of cases, are the strongest in the discourse. This mixture of positivistic descriptive statistics and social constructivist language philosophy results from the nature of the endeavor: Investigating meaning is indeed like solving a riddle (Alasuutari 1996). In the course of trying to solve the riddles presented here, I used whatever tools appeared promising and I was more than happy to be a methodological poacher.

The actual analytical process started by loading all of the articles into Atlas.ti, a discourse analysis software. Once the articles were loaded into the software, I repeatedly read the ones from The Economist to identify regularly occurring patterns

of meaning. The phase of repeated readings yielded codes because the patterns of meaning were used as codes. These were emergent categories of analysis that did not exist prior to coding. This process gave me 21 codes. In the next phase, I used this code list to code the articles from HVG.[4] The analysis of the Hungarian articles yielded two additional codes that were not present in The Economist. In the spirit of keeping the hermeneutic well-documented, Appendix 1 contains the full code list, along with the detailed descriptions of the codes as used within Atlas during the coding process.

Whereas the codes themselves did not exist prior to the process of coding, there were two considerations that informed my multiple iterative readings. In a way, these were my two biases that constrained how codes would emerge, or, to put it bluntly, I knew I was looking for two types of things. I knew I was looking for mentions of violence and I knew I was looking for signs of the distinction I have come to refer to as 'self-region vs. other-region'. The former was a consideration of my subject matter; the latter, and attempt to capture the differences in the journals' portrayals of the regions they come from as opposed to the regions of Africa and the Middle East.

Findings: The Difference

Rather than present the findings form one journal and then the next, I prefer to provide an overview of the findings from both side by side. Table 1 summarizes the findings both from The Economist and HVG. The codes are identical except for the fact that only HVG has the 'Hungary' and the 'self-region perpetrator' codes. The first of those occurs because HVG is produced in Hungary and so the country is a frame of reference, the second because HVG reported on the French citizens who were charged with child abduction in Chad, while The Economist did not. The numbers of occurrences for each code are calculated as percentages of the total occurrences in each journal (1094 for The Economist and 696 for HVG).

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[4]   The HVG articles were loaded into Atlas.ti in their original Hungarian version. They were not translated for this study. I simply relied on my native speaker status to code Hungarian articles with English codes.

Table 1: Summary of findings

code name	Economist number of occurrences	Economist percent of total (1094)	HVG number of occurrences	HVG percent of total (696)
across-region co-op	5	0.46	5	0.72
actual violence - other region	84	7.68	41	5.89
difference in self-region	11	1.01	10	1.44
difference in other region	58	5.3	61	8.76
EU	8	0.73	2	0.29
geography	185	16.91	135	19.4
help to other region	13	1.19	12	1.72
Hungary	0	0	3	0.43
irony	50	4.57	20	2.87
nuke	2	0.18	1	0.14
other region - self-region political differences	33	3.02	17	2.44
peace efforts	13	1.19	7	1.006
person: other region	203	18.56	88	12.64
person: self-region	42	3.84	36	5.17
politics - other region	218	19.93	118	16.95
possible violence	31	2.83	9	1.29
religion	53	4.84	50	7.18
self-region perpetrator	0	0	5	0.72
the West	6	0.55	9	1.29
UN	5	0.46	1	0.14
uncertainty	35	3.2	29	4.17
US politics	35	3.2	35	5.03
western failure	4	0.37	2	0.29

It is useful to distill from these numbers the trends that are stronger in one journal or the other. On the basis of higher percentages for codes, HVG and The Economist have discourses with different emphases. These differences get at the core of the

differences in how these two journals construe Africa and the Middle East, the violence in those regions and the relationships between these regions and the ones where the journals are produced. These differences are reviewed next.

Codes with higher percentages in HVG:
- across-region co-op
- difference in self-region
- difference in other region
- geography
- help to other region
- person: self-region
- religion
- the West
- uncertainty
- US politics

These codes reveal discursive strategies focused on differences (both in the self-region of eastern Europe and in the other-region of Africa and the Middle East). Acknowledging and respecting these differences means that the conceptualizations of Africa and the Middle East in HVG are not monolithic and therefore not Othering. Within-region differences make this a discourse of respect.

At the same time, HVG also had a discursive strategy that promotes the most monolithic conceptualization of the entire corpus: mentions of 'the West' as one monolithic and mythical entity, irrespective of actual lived differences, are significantly more prevalent here than in The Economist. The way 'the West' is used in HVG, is related to large-scale patterns of inferiorization and self-inferiorization in relation to eastern Europe (Böröcz – Kovács 2001, Engel di Mauro 2006, Kovács – Leipnik 2008). The discourse of respect for diversity does not cover the very region where HVG is produced.

The tension between these two discursive strategies joins the tension between idealism and hierarchy to complete a picture of hesitation and uncertainty in the HVG discourse. The codes of across-region cooperation and help to other-region contribute the idealism – hierarchy tension. Cooperation across regions is a hopeful, optimistic or idealistic construal, one that navigates as far away from realpolitik as possible. Nonetheless, helping the regions in question taps into the problematic dynamic of assistance: helping in this context means that the strong are reaching out to the weak and vulnerable, which implies the exact same

hierarchy that makes Othering possible. Thus, the overall diagnosis of the HVG discourse is one of uncertainty. This will be contrasted to the strategies in The Economist's discourse.

Codes with higher percentages in The Economist
- actual violence – other region
- EU
- irony
- nuke
- other region – self-region political differences
- peace efforts
- person: other region
- politics – other region
- possible violence
- UN
- western failure

The over-arching discursive strategy in The Economist is one of specificity: this publication is higher on the codes for violence (both actual and potential) in the regions of Africa and the Middle East, for politics in those regions, and for actual persons in those regions. This strategy of specificity is in keeping with what may be a professional ethos and may well be what could be expected in a journal like this.

However, the professional-specific discursive strategy in The Economist is in tension with the treatment of differences. While HVG focused on differences **within** the regions of Africa and the Middle East (and ignored the ones within 'the West', which most likely includes Europe), The Economist places more emphasis on political differences between the self-region and the regions of Africa and the Middle East. A valid point could be made that if there were no obvious political differences among these regions, studies like this one would be impossible. The point, however, is that by focusing on these differences more than HVG does, The Economist is revealed as the journal (more) intent on inferiorizing Africa and the Middle East. That is a noteworthy finding.

To integrate the insights about the respective discursive strategies of the two publications, the following may be said: The Economist highlights differences of interest and strategy between the regions of interest and the journal-producing region whereas HVG highlights cooperation among them. HVG also is more likely

than The Economist to emphasize that neither the journal-producing region nor the regions of interest are monolithic and that there are distinctions and differences among countries in all regions. On the basis of these codes and these trends, HVG seems to have a more empathic, more respectful discourse about Africa and the Middle East. However, it is The Economist that focuses more on the actual political detail of the regions of interest: The Economist has higher percentages of occurrences about the politics and the persons in Africa and the Middle East than HVG. While HVG displays cultural sensitivity, The Economist reports on political processes.

While placing more emphasis on political processes than HVG does, The Economist also focuses on violence in Africa and the Middle East more than HVG. It has higher percentages for codes on actual as well as potential violence. It also has higher incidences of codes on nuclear arms as well as peace efforts. These codes and trends in the discourse support the claim that The Economist is more intent than HVG on construing Africa and the Middle East as inferior.

Related to the issue of inferiorization is the discursive strategy of reification – understood here as the tendency to mask distinctions and differences in order to create a mythically monolithic conceptualization. Given the commitments outlined at the beginning of this article, reification and justice are inversely proportionate. However, these two journals do not present a neat distribution where one is high on reification and the other one low. It is more true that these two publications present different issues of reification. Because of its emphasis on differences both in the self-region and the other-region, the HVG discourse cannot be said to reify these regions. However, HVG relies more heavily on the use of 'the West' than The Economist does, and 'the West' is certainly a staple of reification. Its focus is not on Africa and the Middle East. Its relationship to the region that produces HVG, is unclear. The discourse in HVG focuses on persons from the globally northern and globally western regions – if focuses on US politics and persons from the self-region more than The Economist does. The explanation for that may be that the 'self-ness' of the self-region is not really assumed and that being a Hungarian journal comes with a discourse of uncertainty about where the self is geopolitically. 'The West' is a significant element of the HVG discourse because it is a leitmotif in Hungarian discourse in general (Kovács – Leipnik 2008), with more than a hint of longing for inclusion in it. At the same time, while HVG is riddled with all this uncertainty about its own belonging, The Economist is the publication whose discourse is higher on irony. It would appear that writing/publishing/discoursing from a position of security, from a region whose self-ness is unquestioned, irony and sarcasm become affordable. However, certainty about self-ness, while it allows for stylistic richness that encompasses irony, in no way safeguards against reification

and inferiorization. The Economist is higher than HVG on both of those vis-à-vis the regions of Africa and the Middle East.

Conclusions: The Difference This Makes

This inquiry reveals how the regions of Africa and the Middle East are conceptualized in The Economist and in HVG, a structurally similar publication from Hungary, in early 2008. The goal is to identify the meanings these regions carry and to show those meanings are different based on the regions where the journals are produced. The differences between the discourses in the two journals contribute to a better understanding of globally significant processes of Othering. They also shed some light on whether so-called post-communist discourses are characteristically different from non-communist ones.

This study reveals that it is not globally true that the regions of Africa and the Middle East are first and foremost understood as places of violence: The Economist has slightly more focus on actual violence than HVG, and significantly more focus on potential violence than HVG. Further work will have to uncover how prevalent violence is in the understanding of these regions in other publications and to corroborate or challenge patterns that co-vary with the regions where journals are produced. On the basis of the comparison in this article, the discourse of The Economist, of non-communist pedigree, inferiorizes the regions of Africa and the Middle East, reifies them and construes them as places of violence. HVG, which hails from a background that is still identified as post-communist, has a discourse of respect and diversity vis-à-vis Africa and the Middle East. At the same time, the HVG discourse is uncertain about the geopolitical location of the self and engages in reifying 'the West'. The significance of these findings with regards to violence comes from the nature of political discourse. Because discourse is creative and because it **is** political reality,understanding where and how the conceptualizations in terms of violence are the lowest may be a step in the complicated process of decreasing violence.

The significance of the findings with regards to what may be considered the position of the self, is related to geopolitics. The region a publication comes from geopolitically, impacts how that publication portrays other regions. The Economist is not focused on the globally northern and globally western region that produces it, whereas HVG is caught between the understandings of Africa and the Middle East on the one hand, and, on the other, a strong focus on the global west/global north. The Economist presents a discourse focused on the regions of interest, while HVG presents a discourse that hesitates between focusing on the regions of interest and the global north/ global west. It is no accident that the code for 'the West' is more than twice as many per cent of the HVG discourse as it is of The Economist

discourse. In the context of the previously referenced literature on discourses from the eastern European region where HVG is produced, it is clear that there is a concern and uncertainty or tension about claiming that the global west/global north is the self. This may very well be a left-over of communism and/or post-communism. It may warrant the conclusion that where the self belongs, needs to be clarified before other regions can be reported on, understood and clad in meaning (because The Economist has a much clearer and more professional discourse about Africa and the Middle East than HVG). But is also serves as a reminder that clarity about the self may co-occur with inferiorization and that a hesitant, vacillating discourse may end up being globally more just towards the regions of Africa and the Middle East. To the extent that press discourses maintain a global binary and a global dynamic of Othering and inferiorization, The Economist participates in that dominant order more than HVG does. HVG has a less clear discourse but it also engages less than The Economist does in enforcing the global us-vs.-them binary.

There is nothing **essential** about the violence of the regions of the Middle East and Africa. They carry meanings of violence because they are Others and because we know violence, just as we know politics and war, in the paradigms that the press gives us (Kozol 2004). The violence of Others depends on the journals we read, and the ones with the clearest sense of self may not be of the most service.

Appendix 1

The following list contains the descriptions of all codes used, as defined within the Atlas.ti workspace (the definitions are copied from Atlas.ti without editing for content and only correcting for spelling):

Code: across-region-co-op

„references to cases where the regions of interest are cooperating with the globally dominant ones - in a sense, this is the opposite of the ‚other-region-self-region-political-differences' code – that one is about tension and disagreement, this one is about cooperation and working towards the same goals"

Code: actual violence-other region

„code for the mentions of armed violence in Africa or the Middle East"

Code: difference-in-self-region

„mentions of various countries in the region that produces the journal – pretty much mentions of countries in the self-regions other than the us (those go under us politics whatever the reason the us is mentioned) - this is to measure how much there is an idea that countries other than the US ‚matter' in the journal-producing regions"

Code: difference in other region

„this code is for the mention of differences and conflicts of interests among countries of Africa and the Middle East - covering both mentions of non-violent instances and violent conflict, this code covers the cases where the self-region compares specific countries in the other-region and thereby recognizes that Africa and the Middle East are not monoliths"

Code: EU

„all mentions of the European Union, regardless of what it is doing in the quote - especially useful as a contrast between Economist and HVG"

Code: geography

„code for the references to the geographical locations mentioned in the articles - the references have to be specific to geography - whether they are explanatory or ironic in function does not matter: as long as the reference is to specific locations in the regions of interest, it gets coded here"

Code: help to other-region

„code to cover all the instances of aid, assistance or any kind of help that the Middle Eastern and African regions receive"

Code: Hungary

„this is a code specific to HVG: it collects all mentions of Hungary or Hungarians - just to see if the country of origin for the journal appears specifically"

Code: irony

„this code contains all uses of irony, humor, sarcasm - the code is admittedly subjective: it contains those things I think are cases of humor or irony and as such may be more subjective than most codes - nonetheless, the use of irony and humor is expected to be an important indication and so it is its own code"

Code: nuke

„references to nuclear capacity, nuclear weapons or threat"

Code: other-region-self-region-political-differences

„differences in the policy and political agendas, preferences and interests between the journal producing regions and the regions described – also includes mentions of self-region disapproving of or criticizing other-region – mentions of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are here also, since their role in these articles is to express the disapproval of the journal-producing regions (when there is

a supportive or congratulatory mention of one of those organizations, I will have to make a separate code for that)"

Code: peace efforts

„code for mentions of peace talks, peace negotiations or any attempts at making and maintaining peace in the regions on interest"

Code: person: other-region

„references to specific persons from the regions of interest (Africa and the Middle-East)"

Code: person: self-region

„this code is for the mentions of specific persons from the region where the journal is produced - in the case of The Economist, this will be taken to include western Europe and North America - in the case of HVG, this will include Hungary - this is also a code that is based on political significance, not necessarily national origin: Kofi Annan is a person from ‚self-region' because the reason he is mentioned in these articles is that he used to be UN Secretary General, ergo a participant in the politics of the self-region"

Code: politics-other region

„references to the politics of the regions of Africa and the Middle East – tensions, negotiations, anything that they do with one another diplomatically, that does not fit into any easy dichotomy of cooperation vs. violence (those two have their own codes) and also anything that is not as narrow or specific as peace talks"

Code: possible violence

„code for threats, possibilities and guesses about, violence (as opposed to actual violence) "

Code: religion

„any mention of religion (even in country names or names of organizations) goes here – the aim is to gauge how significant a presence religion is in the discourse on the Middle East and Africa - mentions of organizations that are religiously affiliated (e.g. Hamas) go here even though they do not contain religious terms in their names)"

Code: self-region-perpetrator

„this is a code that only exists in the HVG portion of the project and it refers to persons from the self-region alleged or charged as perpetrators (like the French aid workers who attempted to kidnap children from Chad) - the purpose is not the

decision of guilt or innocence but the measure of how prevalent this possibility even is"

Code: the West

„all mentions of ‚the West' as a region (geographical, metaphorical or otherwise) - this is in contradistinction to the differences among countries in the journal-producing regions - this will be very interesting in the HVG analysis because that journal may or may not consider itself as part of the West, however defined, whereas The Economist certainly does – other grammatical forms such as ‚Western countries' are also coded under this"

Code: UN

„all mentions of the UN, regardless of whether they are positive or negative, endorsing or critical - dump all of them here"

Code: uncertainty

„references to uncertain political and policy outcomes - regardless of what region initiated a certain action, if its outcome is presented as dubious, unknown or uncertain, it gets coded here -mentions of hope and hopeful guesses are also coded here because even though their emotional charge is different, they are not any more certain"

Code: US politics

„all mentions of politics and foreign policy goals of the US go here - the purpose is to see how ‚present' the US is in all of this discourse and to compare its relative presence and weight between the two journals"

Code: Western failure

„code for references to failures by the so-called ‚West' in the regions described - failure may be military or diplomatic or any other kind of failure - the understanding is that you fail at something you are trying to accomplish, so there is an underlying assumption that globally western and globally northern regions would be helping or trying to help, the Middle East and Africa"

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BOOK REVIEWS

David Behenský[1]

Post-War Reconstruction and Peace-Building: Roles and Strategies of International Non-Governmental Organisations

In spite of the fact that war is no longer legal instrument of policy, the number of armed conflicts in the world is still high.[2] How to face up to the devastating power of international and interstate violent conflicts that decimated the society and destroyed the infrastructure of the state? It is one of the questions that "Post-War Reconstruction and Peace-Building" is trying to answer.

Šárka Waisová is a renowned expert in the field of conflict and peace studies and a Head of the Department of politics and international relations at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen, Czech Republic. Her publication focuses on the question of the roles and strategies of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. The main aim is to present a comprehensive account of the theory and practice of post-conflict reconstruction with regard to non-governmental organizations. The theoretical part of the book is supported by three case studies – reconstruction and the contemporary working of NGOs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Angola and Afghanistan.

The topic of the book is not original; it has been dealt with by the modern school of conflict resolution. In addition, Waisová offers a new method of representing contemporary issues. Scholars of modern conflict resolution, such as Peter Wallensteen or Joseph Nye, published a number of texts focusing on the origin of conflicts. They offer useful typologies of armed conflict and perspectives on conflict resolution in the international system based on collective security. However, they do not find a convincing solution to the question of how to mitigate negative impacts on society and state infrastructure after the end of violence. Unfortunately, the end of war does not necessarily imply the end of conflict as Johan Galtung argues in his account of structural violence (Galtung, 1969).

Presumably the best way to reduce the risk of violent conflict is to reconstruct the relationships between the involved parties. In the international conflict, reconstruction represents a task for diplomacy and political agents to resolve. However, interstate conflicts and civil wars bring new problems requiring other than the "simple"

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[2] Compare: SIPRI or HIIK research.

international model of resolution. It seems that traditional war-ending processes fail in civil wars. One of the methods of fighting animosity and violence in society or among people living within a state territory (if civil society is missing) is to try to build a strong state. A state which would perform the role of Hobbes's Leviathan, stop the circle of conflict for good and remove the negative characteristics of the anarchical society in civil war or shortly after the end of fighting.

Building a strong state is one of the most important components of post-conflict reconstruction. In order to successfully carry this out, the assistance of international institutions and other states is usually used. However, the building of state institutions,, as Francis Fukuyama (2004) argues, is only one part of the process. The second and probably the most important stadium is to establish a "healthy life" of the institutions and to get the trust and support of future citizens. Massive influence from other sovereign states won't help here since this must be done from inside and all levels of state leadership must be engaged in this process. As Šárka Waisová suggests (p. 13-15), non-governmental organizations can be one of the instruments of internally driven state building and stabilization processes.

Is it true that the time of non-governmental organizations has come? Obviously, the role of non-governmental organizations has become increasingly important, especially when stable and rich states reduce the risks and their spending on government employees and are willing to outsource specific tasks. However, the implementation of non-governmental organizations into reconstruction depends on political will. There are many interpretations of the relationship between NGOs, state and political institutions. Some are more liberal and some derive from pure pragmatism and the realist point of view (p.52-56).

Šárka Waisová prefers two theoretical concepts of post-war reconstruction. The first one is based on Multi-Track Diplomacy by Luise Diamond and John McDonald (1996). Waisová applied their concept to particular INGOs in her case studies. The second theoretical pillar is based on the text by John P. Lederach (2001 and 2003) who views the process of state reconstruction and political communication as a hierarchical pyramid. The two theoretical concepts do not contradict and present an appropriate and comprehensible view on the process of communication and cooperation between the government, other levels of leadership and non-governmental organizations (p.46-47).

Although the theoretical part of the book does not offer deeper analysis, it is nevertheless adequate to the purpose of the text, which is to emphasize the fact that security, civil society and economical welfare are interconnected. Non-governmental organizations can indeed build or help to strenghten these connections since "INGOs bridge the gap between national and international spheres in individual countries" (p.68).

The main part of the publication consists in three case studies. The author accepted the official goal of post-conflict reconstruction which is to build positive peace. Principles of positive peace result in the expansion of democratization through supporting civil society and liberal environment (p. 27). This is a frequent conception and it is often and relatively uncritically applied to post-conflict reconstruction - not only in the reviewed book but in political proclamations, too. However, reality is not that ideal. It is in the case studies of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Angola that we can understand that ideal concepts do not work in practical life.

Even though Šárka Waisová argues that most INGOs are engaged in all three pillars of post-conflict reconstruction (rule of law and social reconciliation, social and economic welfare and restoring and ensuring security), she claims that states are not always well-disposed to the agenda of NGOs. Case studies show that the situation and work of INGOs usually depends on the good will of army and state officials. To name an example, the biggest problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a complex of several juridical systems representing impassable barriers to small and newly created organizations. In Afghanistan, there is always real danger that INGO workers will be kidnapped, hurt or killed. We can also say that the reconstruction mission in Afghanistan is not "post-conflict" but rather "during-the-war", which causes the dependence of NGOs on the army. Moreover the reports of NGO workers can always be destroyed. Case studies also offer a brief summary of the biggest and most important non-governmental organizations acting in the examined states.

The increased focus on non-governmental actors in conflict resolution could possibly demonstrate the fact that governmental organizations and sovereign states are not always successful in their attempts to reach the goals of post-conflict reconstruction. In spite of the reality that INGOs still play secondary role in state building, their enhanced participation cannot be denied.

"Post-War Reconstruction and Peace-Building" offers a coherent view of the role of NGOs in failed and damaged states. The theoretical part does not offer deeper analysis, therefore it is highly recommended to get familiar with the basic theoretical concepts of international and non-governmental organizations before reading the book. In some respects, it might have been better to analyze work and practical problems of INGOs in greater detail and not to provide a description of simple facts. However, case studies represent an interesting and very useful part of the text. The "combination" of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Angola offers unusual area for comparative research. The author presents a comprehensible study of INGOs in theory and highlighting major problems of these organizations in practice.

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Helena Hricová[1]

Democratization and De-democratization in Europe? Austria, Britain, Italy, and the Czech Republic – A Comparison.

The concepts of democratization and de-democratization have gained the attention of many scholars. These processes comprise changes in all of the world's political systems and can be analyzed from various aspects (the role of media, political culture, party system etc.) through which the quality of democracy can be assessed.

A group of seven political scientists (Ladislav Cabada, Herbert Dachs, André Kaiser, Thomas Meyer, Gianfranco Pasquino, Anton Pelinka and Andreas Pribersky) embraced the concepts of democratization and de-democratization and conducted comparative analysis of the quality of democracy in selected countries. Their findings were published in the book titled "Democratization and De-democratization in Europe? Austria, Britain, Italy, and the Czech Republic – A Comparison". The publication represents the output of a conference held in Vienna in 2006. The authors interpret political systems in Austria, the Great Britain, Italy and the Czech Republic from various perspectives. The aim was to analyze political changes caused by economic and socio-political factors. The scholars concentrated on the impact of these factors on the national-state. They also considered the European dimension that is, the influence of the European Union. The conference aimed at examining the quality of democracy with regard to particular processes taking place in the above mentioned states.

The book is divided into seven chapters, five of them are devoted to the actual development in political systems, two chapters offer special comments. Chapters are preceded by an introduction written by the editors, in which four main questions of the publication are posed: *1. What are the models of political participation? What is the impact on the quality of democracy, democratisation and de-democratisation?; 2. How does the relationship between politics and media affect the quality of democracy, democratisation and de-democratisation?; 3. What is the effect of Europeisation on the quality of democracy, democratisation and de-democratisation?; 4. What reforms in the interest of democratisation and what counterstrategies against de-democratization are feasible and desirable?* The questions present a theoretical framework for empirical research. All articles considered the role of media and their specific position between citizens and policy makers, and determined the process of

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policy making. Next, analyses concentrated on schools and business, how they participate in decision-making processes. Other important issues examined by papers are the political participation of citizens and the influence of the integration into the European Union. The analyses are based on historical and current data covering the development in the given political systems.

In the chapter entitled "De-democratization and Democratization in Europe, Eight Hypotheses" Thomas Meyer describes in detail the research indicators (of the quality of democracy): voter turnout, civic involvement and citizens' trust in democracy, the role of media, influence of the EU, the public opinion and participation in civil society. There are the main issues studied in following chapters. This particular chapter could be viewed as a continuation of the introduction to the book as it offers a deeper explanation of available areas of research. On the other hand, one may see the chapter as a redundant explanation, since it presents the same conception as the introduction. This may lead one to assume that the introduction and the first chapter should actually have been merged, which would make the beginning of the book more transparent and understandable for the reader as he would be clear what to expect from the publication.

Chapters dealing with particular political systems are indeed clearer and easier to understand. Each political system is analyzed by one political scientist, who provides us with details. We cannot say that all chapters follow the same structure, or that they all respect the research questions. Several studies offer theoretical background: Pelinka applies the theory of political system, Kaiser used the consensual and the Westminster model of political system, and Cabada employed the concept of de-democratization according to the theory of Charles Tilly. On the contrary, chapter on Italy "theoryless" – Pasquino preferred description and historical analysis. We must say that every chapter is different, the authors approached the topic from a variety of perspectives

Pelinka´ s paper on Austria covers all the aspects stated in and anticipated by the introduction. The quality of democracy is viewed to be stable since 1945. EU membership has not weakened democracy. Moreover, universities freed themselves from the state. Nevertheless, there are some domains in Austria that show weaknesses of democracy: the freedom of foreigners (immigrants) is restricted, social status is more relevant than personal capabilities. This particular analysis is longer than those of other countries because a special chapter –commentary by Herbert Dachs – was included. Here, he describes in detail major changes in Austria over the last 20 years.

André Kaiser posed a special question – has the British political system transformed into a European system or will the system stay unchanged? The British political system is a special example of an old and stable democracy. Kaiser presents

constitutional reforms and explains changes in traditional principles. He describes changes within the society and the process leading to devolution. Devolution, regional governments and proportional election system (at the local level) changed or partially modified the strictly majoritarian political system. The reforms are interpreted as indicators of the quality of democracy. Nevertheless, the chapter did not evaluate the quality of democracy in the Great Britain, it "only" describes reforms but an analysis of the indicators set in the introduction is missing. The author offers no conclusion; he only presents the current situation without analysing it.

Italian political system was analyzed by Gainfranco Pasquino. Pasquino reflected the First and the Second Italian Republic. First he shows the weaknesses of civil society and institutions in the First Republic and the process of new regime formation (the Second Republic). He then introduces a set of constitutional reforms adopted during the 1990s (the "Judical revolution"). The consequences are evident. Pasquino evaluates the reformatory changes critically. The impact of the reforms is seen only at the local level, the "*partitocrazia*" (typical for the First Republic) has been re-established. The role of media is affected by Berlusconi's monopoly. On the other hand, Italians participate in a lot of associations and organizations; the EU has had positive impact on political and social life. According to Pasquino, political reforms in Italy are still a work in progress and they will affect the future quality of democracy.

The situation in the Czech Republic is described in the context of transition to democracy since 1989. The chapter describes the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Cabada provides an overview of the political scene in the light of party system and changes that might be classified as de-democratization attempts. Much attention is devoted to the role of media. Media are characterized as an instrument which presents news without necessarily backing them up by solid evidence. In addition, there are only few television channels in the Czech Republic and the non-democratic environment is supported by the fact that the Parliament decides who is to obtain broadcasting licence. At the same time, we must take into account the long democratic tradition created during the interwar First Republic. Until now, the quality of democracy has been affected by a strong role of institutions, which is a legacy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The EU is presented as a positive actor who has brought stability and quality to the social and political environment in the Czech Republic. In spite of the described situation, Cabada concludes that the Chech Republic has become a stable and consolidated democracy. We must note that the chapter answers the questions posed in the introduction.

The last chapter was written by Pribersky and offers a commentary. The author considers the de-democratisation and the political culture in the Central Europe. He shows the impact of the Cold War, which can be seen not on both sides of the

Iron Curtain. He draws upon historical data and argues that there has been a similar development. This chapter should have been placed at the beginning of the book (after the theoretical introduction), and not at the end.

"Democratisation and De-democratization" offers a series of papers more or less reflecting its theoretical introduction. Reading is complicated by the differences in the structure of chapters. The introduction does not inform the reader about the perspectives that will be applied to the democratization and de-democratization. Chapters deal with various periods. The reader will not find an explanation of the particular selection of political systems, and it is difficult to find any connecting line of the analyzed states. Although the final chapter does somewhat try to explain the interconnection of chapters, it is still too vague.

Despite the reservations, I do recommend the key studies, which are full of interesting information. On the other hand, I would like to suggest the reader to find additional literature which explains the democratization and de-democratization in a greater detail.

Fröschl, E.; Kozeluh, U; Schaller, Ch. (eds.) (2008): Democratization and De-democratization in Europe? Austria, Britain, Italy, and the Czech Republic – A Comparison. Innsbruck, Studienverlag. 116 pages.

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.

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– a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes

– a brief biographical note about each author, including previous and current institutional affiliation

– a full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about the second author.

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Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

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Authors are urged to write as concisely as possible, but not at the expense of clarity. Descriptive or explanatory passages, necessary for information but which tend to break up the flow of text, should appear in footnotes. For footnotes please use Arabic numbers. Footnotes should be placed on the same page as the text reference, with the same number in the essay.

Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994-1998; or the 1990s.

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In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

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References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: '(quoted in *International Security* (Summer 1990): 5).' If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).

List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:
Diehl, Paul F. (1994): *International Peacekeeping. With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia,* The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Two or more authors:
Degnbol-Martinussen, John – Engberg-Pedersen, Poul (1999): *Aid.*

Understanding International Development Cooperation, Zed Books, Mellemfolkelight Samvirke, Danish Association for International Cooperation, Copenhagen.

EDITED VOLUMES:

Rittberger, Volker (ed.) (1993): *Regime Theory and International Relations*, Clarendon Press.

CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:

George, Alexander L. (2004): Coercive Diplomacy, In: Art, Robert J. – Waltz, Kenneth N., eds., *The Use of Force. Military Power and International Politics. Sixth Edition,* 70-76, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Haas, Ernst B. (1961): International Integration. The European and the Universal Process. *International Organization* 15 (4): 5-54.

Online editions of journals:

Judt, Tony (2002c): Its Own Worst enemy, *The New York Review of Books*: available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15632 (15 August 2002).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Excerpts From the Pentagon´ s Plan: Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival (1992) *The New York Times* (9 March).

Online editions:

Cooper, Robert (2002): 'Why We Still Need Empires', *The Guardian Unlimited* (7 April): available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4388915,00.html (2 November, 2003).

RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:

Waisová, Šárka (2005): Czech Security Policy – Between Atlanticism and Europeanization, Bratislava: Ministry of Defence, Working Paper No. 05/2.

Illustrations and tables

Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced. Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and

acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

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POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

– A book review should not exceed 1,500 words
– State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
– If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review
– Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified
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- – Authors may either review several books related to a common topic, or provide a review essay of a single book considered to provide an exceptional contribution to the knowledge in a given field of research

While a review essay should primarily deal with the contents of the book(s) under review, *Politics in Central Europe* encourages authors to use the reviewed material as a springboard for their own ideas and thoughts on the subject.

Notes

Jahreskonferenz des Deutsch-Tschechischen Gesprächsforums
Bedeutung des Subsidiaritätsprinzips in den deutsch-tschechischen
Beziehungen
Ladislav Cabada, Linda Piknerová (eds)

Dieser Sammelband ist aus der Konferenz hervorgegangen und umfasst die Beiträge der einzelnen Redner. Das erste Panel war den historisch-ideellen Perspektiven der zu untersuchenden Erscheinung gewidmet, die Teilnehmer daran waren Robert Falkenauer, Generalvikar der Diözese Pilsen, Josef Isensee von der Universität in Bonn und Jan Wintr von der Karls-Universität. Da das zweite Panel jenen Organisationen gewidmet war, die an der deutsch-tschechischen Zusammenarbeit mitwirken, haben die Herausgeber beschlossen, sowohl die präsentierten Beiträge als auch sog. Karten in den Sammelband aufzunehmen, die kurze Informationen über die Gruppierungen bieten. Der Schwerpunkt des dritten Panels entsprach aktuellen Problemen, die mit der Mitgliedschaft beider Länder in der Europäischen Union zusammenhängen.

paperback, 288 pages, 260 CZK

EC Environmental Law
Soňa Košičiarová

The study has the character of the review of legal provisions relating to the protection of the environment functioning in European Union. The study includes acts of secondary legislation and a lot of international agreements connecting Member states of the Union. In spite of the limited volume they presented in the study all essential for discussed field legal documents and essential problems in them regulated were discussed.

The study is commencing the chapter about leading character, discussing basic institutions of the European Union and the politics implemented in it concerning the environmental protection into the general way. It is discussing the complex of s. c. horizontal provisions, remaining they devoted to regulations concerning individual sector problems. One should recognise this arrangement of the work as correct, he lets introduce all essential for the study matters in the well ordered way.

It is worthwhile clearly emphasizing meaning of preparing this study in the English what should constitute the very significant help for students.

Prof. Marek Górski, dr. hab., the reviewer

book in print