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ESSAYS

The Europeanization of Czech Environmental Policy Post Conditionality: Lessons from the REACH regulation and the Climate-Energy Package

Mats Braun

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to the literature on social norms in IR. The intention is to further specify how social norms influence state behaviour. The empirical material consists of a case study of how the Czech Republic has participated in EU policy making in the field of environmental policy. The paper first discusses the different reasons for why member states adapt to EU norms: i.e. rational conditionality and constructivist social learning. The former of the two is viewed as typical for the pre-accession period whereas the latter is important for our understanding of the post-accession period. In order to outline the actual socialization process a detailed case study of how the Czech Republic has dealt with two different EU policy initiatives (REACH and the climate-energy package) is presented. The conclusions suggest that even if we can find indications of socialization the process is complicated by a strong presence of competing norms.

Keywords: European integration, post conditionality, EU environmental policy, socialization, post-communism

Introduction

There is a broad range of scholarly literature that analyses the influence of the EU on the political transition of the post-communist member states prior to accession and the reasons for why these countries adapted to EU norms (see, e.g., Héritier 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; 2007; Goetz, 2005). However, there is still a shortage of studies of what happened thereafter (for some good exceptions to this trend, see, e.g., Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Pridham 2008). Thus, there is a need for studies focusing on whether the post-communist member states have become laggards within the EU who are unwilling to adapt further to EU norms or,

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1 I acknowledge with gratitude the financial support of the Czech Science Foundation grant Nr. P408/11/P837.
2 Norms are understood in this article as a “relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining appropriate behaviour for specific groups of actors in specific situations” (March and Olsen, 1998; 948).
on the contrary, whether the norms transfer has continued. We also know too little about these states’ contribution to EU policies, and whether they have changed from norm receivers to norm producers.

In the existing literature on the Europeanization of the post-communist EU member states we find two different models for explaining why these candidate countries adapted to the EU norms, and these two models give different predictions for what we can expect of these states after accession. The first model explains adaptation to EU norms according to rational calculation and sees EU conditionality as crucial for the states’ adoption of norms. The second is based on the idea that the states actually changed their identity and preferences in correspondence to a process of socialization (e.g. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). The first model would assume that changes in the preferences of new member states that are caused by the accession period are easily reversible, whereas the second model would rather predict stability.

The bigger part of the existing literature, however, is primarily concerned with the pre-accession transition of the post-communist countries. As a consequence, even if the literature largely discusses the different incitements for new member states to adapt to EU norms, i.e. rational conditionality versus constructivist social learning, it cannot account for the whole dimension of this dispute, since conditionality is to a large degree typical for the accession period, and social learning is more relevant for the post-accession period (see, e.g., Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; 2007; Checkel 2007).

This article contributes to the debate on the relevance of the two models by making a case study of the behaviour of the Czech Republic when it comes to policy making in the field of EU environmental policy. Environmental policy was selected because this policy has the potential to impose highly perceived short-term costs on the new member state. Therefore we can assume that there will be a conflict between economic incentives and norm incentives. Given the underlying assumption that the rationalist and constructivist accounts should not be understood as being mutually exclusive but rather as referring to different phases of one and the same process of Europeanization, there has to be a potential perceived conflict between material incentives and norms in order to evaluate the level of social learning. Since it would be impossible to study the entity of EU environmental policy from a perspective which would allow a deeper assessment, this article’s scope is limited to the study of the Czech Republic’s approach to two concrete legislations, the REACH and the Climate-Energy legislative package. These two sub-cases were selected for the same reason, i.e. due to the perceived high economic costs for the Czech Republic. It should also be stressed that this article deals only with the how the country worked with the proposal during the negotiation phase, and does not look into how the country has managed implementation. The
article, however, includes an overview of how the Czech Republic has transposed EU directives in the field, which is presented in order to put the results from the case studies into context.

The Czech Republic was selected because the country entered the EU as one of the forerunner states of the EU membership. The Czech Republic was described at the time of its EU accession as one of the more progressive post-communist states in regard to economic reforms. Regarding chemical regulation, Liliana Andonova concluded that the Czech Republic, “surprisingly, applied EU standards faster than most current EU members” prior to its accession (2004: 9).

The conclusions of the article suggest that there are indications of a socialization process taking place in the Czech Republic. The country’s approach to the studied proposals is to balance a constructive approach to Commission initiatives in the field with the protection of core elements in its economy. There are two major problems for the socialization process. First, the EU’s environmental norms are challenged by both the political elite (mainly by Euro-sceptics) and organized business interests that can be described as important veto players. Second, there is a lack of resources, which means that the Czech ministries have problems managing the broad agenda of the EU in the field, especially regarding climate change. Furthermore, there is a high fluctuation of personnel in the ministries with the consequence that individually based socialization processes are often interrupted.

This article has the following structure. In the first part the process of social learning is specified and two contradictory assumptions are presented. In the following part the methodology of the study is briefly explained. The third part of the article focuses on the empirical evidence. It includes an overview of EU environmental policy in the Czech Republic and detailed accounts of the country’s position on the two studied sets of legislation. The final part then assesses the applicability of the two assumptions.

Social learning and Europeanization

The starting point of the article is social constructivist literature on the questions of why some norms become internalized and respected and why actors respect norms. (e.g., March and Olsen 1998; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; 2001; Checkel 2007; Lewis 2005; Elgström 2005). The distinction between the logic of instrumentalism (or consequences) and the logic of appropriateness is crucial for the norms literature. First, this distinction has been important for explaining why norms can serve as the causal variable explaining behaviour, and second, the distinction is important for understanding the importance of a certain norm and the stability of actors’ preferences. In the more recent literature increasing attention has been paid to the two different explanations for why agents would behave according to the
logic of appropriateness. First, an agent can do so for instrumental reasons. The agent learns what is expected in a certain community and accepts this (unwillingly) in order to achieve some benefits. In reality, then, this is not much more than a more sophisticated version of the logic of consequences. Second, the agent can conform to the norm because the agent accepts the norm as the right thing to do (Checkel 2007: 6). In both cases the logic of appropriateness shows the importance of norms, but only in the latter case does the agent change his/her preferences more permanently, and it is precisely this kind of case that is described as successful socialization in this article. I use the term socialization in accordance with Jeffrey T. Checkel’s (2007) definition, where socialization is considered to have taken place if “an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness; this adoption is sustained over time and is quite independent from a particular structure of material incentives or sanctions” (Checkel 2007: 5–6).

The analytical point of departure in the study is the behaviour of decision makers on concrete policy proposals. The process of Europeanization is studied through the decision making process. The assumption is that the European Union, through the high level of interaction between state actors and supranational-state actors, influences and shapes social norms in member states, and thus there is a top-down Europeanization (see, e.g., Börzel 2002; 2005; Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002).

If we look at previous research on the Europeanization of environmental policies in post-communist member states (see, e.g., Jelhička and Tickle 2005; Andonova 2004; 2005; Börzel 2007; 2009), we can see that this literature provides for a rather coherent picture of the environmental policy as an area where the adaptation to EU rules prior to accession followed the logic of conditionality. The assumption that follows from the works on the pre-accession period is that given the high costs of adaptation to EU norms in this field, the new member states were largely expected to become laggards once inside the EU (see, e.g., Jehlička and Tickle 2005: 79, Andonova 2005: 135, Börzel 2007).

There is still a shortage of systematic studies of the post-communist countries as EU members, or of post-conditionality. Some interesting contributions, however, were collected in the special issue of the *Journal of European Public Policy* entitled “Beyond Conditionality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement” (2008, 15: 6). The conclusions stemming from the various contributions to this volume suggest that the new member states’ compliance has been rather durable even after accession. But they also suggest that the accession period can be considered rather short and that some of the long term implications will only become apparent long after the accession, in particular in the cases where the EU failed to achieve social learning (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008: 803). Others, however, have been less optimistic and have pointed towards the lack of a full and
reliable implementation of EU directives (e.g. Falkner and Treib 2008). Geoffrey Pridham made an interesting contribution through his comparison of Slovakia’s and Latvia’s actions after the end of membership conditionality on some controversial issues, such as minority rights. Pridham could not confirm the rationalist expectation of a backtracking of the reform process; however, he could not fully justify the social learning thesis either (e.g. Pridham 2008). Nevertheless, the works of literature that deal with the integration of the post-communist countries after accession all argue for the need for further research.

**Outlining the Approach of the Study**

My starting point is the question of whether actual social learning has occurred, in other words whether the actors have changed their identities and interests as opposed to merely adjusting their means and strategies as a consequence of their involvement in the European integration process. The underlying assumption is that the rationalist and constructivist accounts should not be understood as being mutually exclusive but rather as referring to different phases of one and the same process of Europeanization. Therefore, it is not my intention to identify the actual motivation for the actors’ decision to correspond to a certain norm in the first place, but rather to identify the degree of social learning that has been reached among the decision making elite.

Before I turn to the operationalization it is necessary to mention that previous research has shown that there are, largely speaking, two different types of explanations for non-compliance with EU norms: first, an explanation based on a lack of resources (unable) and, second, an explanation based on competing norms (unwilling) (Börzel 2001, Di Lucia and Kronsell 2010).

The focus on the decision makers does not mean that the article completely neglects other actors, such as business organizations and ENGOs. They are discussed (and subject to interviews) as far as they are identified as relevant actors in the policy making procedure. Yet, the focus is on the state administration due to the fact that the new post-communist member states remain very state centred when it comes to policy formulation, and the process of Europeanization has so far done little to change this (e.g. Börzel 2009; Guttenbrunner 2009; Buzogány 2009).

The socialization of the decision makers and the political elite should not be understood as synonymous with the socialization of the society at large. Socialization seems to be easier and faster at the state/elite level than at the level of the society at large. Trine Flockhart (2005) views the political elite as the first filter of a norm in a socialization process and the population at large as the second filter (Flockhart 2005: 52). In a similar way Annette Freyberg-Inan describes the state officials as the primary means by which international norms affect national policy (Freyberg-Inan
Previous literature has also shown that in cases with a high technocratic capture potential, i.e. the possibility of narrowing down the number of involved decision makers, the likelihood of successful socialization is greater (Cf. Radaelli 2003: 47). However, the political elite does not exist in a vacuum. If the broader society does not also get involved, the socialization of the political elite is less likely to be stable over time.

The elite itself also includes different segments, and for the socialization process, which is based on persuasion, the civil servants are crucial. Previous research has shown that civil servants with a high degree of involvement with EU affairs tend to be more socialized, have a better knowledge of Europe and be more pro-European than the population at large (Drulák and Königová 2005; Drulak; Česal and Hampl 2003).

**Assumption 1:** On the basis of the model of rational conditionality, we could expect the new member states to become laggards in the field of environmental policy after accession. They would try to resist as long as possible given the costs of acceptance but not for a longer span of time than what would be tolerable for other member states (cf. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004). Thus, assumption 1) can be formulated as follows:

*If Czech actors behave merely as passive receivers or reluctant opponents of Commission proposals, I argue that there might be a case for the rationalist conditionality account.*

However, we also need to determine the reasons for the reluctance, i.e. whether it was caused by unwillingness or inability. Therefore one of the two following criteria also needs to be fulfilled for assumption 1) to be confirmed.

*The presence of an alternative framing of the issue among the state elite in the country that contradicts the position of the EU proposal.*

*The presence of veto players (e.g. interest organizations and other societal actors with a capability to hamper the realization of the proposal) with an alternative framing of the issue that contradicts the position of the EU proposal.*

**Assumption 2:** Following the socialization thesis, we could expect the new member states to gradually change their identities and preferences concerning environmental policy. Thus, assumption 2 can be formulated as follows:

*If the actors in the studied countries manifest an increasingly pro-reform view on EU environmental policy and the EU decision making process in the field, there is a case for the socialization thesis.*

However, what needs to be added to this assumption is that a positive view on EU initiatives in the policy field in itself is not a proof of actual social learning but

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3 This does not rule out the possibility that socialization might happen in the future.
merely an indication that this process might be happening. If neither criterion A nor criterion B is confirmed, that is an indication of the correctness of assumption 2. However, in order to determine whether the positive view is a result of socialization or not, it is also necessary to take into account the narratives of the involved actors and counterfactual arguments and thus look at the broader context.

**Method**

The first step in the analysis was to outline how the two studied EU policy initiatives have been handled in the Czech Republic and which actors have been involved in the decision making process as well as the public debate. The research therefore started with a study of the news coverage of and the secondary literature on the studied EU proposals.

Thereafter semi-structured interviews were carried out with central actors who have been involved in the Czech decision making process. Among the respondents were five deputy ministers, senior officials at the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Industry and Trade, diplomats from the Czech Permanent Representation to the EU and representatives from industries (ČEZ and the Association of Chemical Industry of the Czech Republic) and ENGOs (Greenpeace and Centre for Transport and Energy). The 15 persons were selected so as to ensure that all major actors involved in the construction of the Czech position were included in the selection. Some of the interviewed officials accepted an interview only under the condition that they remain anonymous, and for this reason their actual positions and other information of this sort will not be specified.

The interviews were structured in accordance with the following points: 1) the coherence of the Czech position on the issues, 2) the nature of the Czech position, 3) the domestic support of the position, 4) the nature of the negotiations on the position (involved actors and their opinions), 5) the general nature of the Czech approach to EU environmental issues and its change over time, 6) the usual coalition partners of the Czech Republic in the EU, 7) the actual negotiations and how positions changed over time, and 8) the interviewed person’s (dis-)satisfaction with both the Czech performance and the final outcome of the negotiations. The actual questions used varied somewhat between the respondents, depending on their position and experience with the policy initiatives.

The interview results were compared to the greatest extent possible with findings from media archives, official materials and secondary literature. Thus, I tried to obtain the ideal of triangulation.
Green policies in the Czech Republic: an introduction

The development of environmental policy in the Czech Republic has gone through three phases since 1989. The first phase can be described as a period when green issues were considered a domestic priority. During the first two years of transition, 1990–1992, several reforms were launched, including, for instance, a new air pollution act, which was designed after the strict German legislation in the field. There was strong support for the tough air pollution act in both the executive and the legislative branch (Jehlicka 2002; Andonova, 2004). This can be seen as a consequence of the fact that environmental issues were salient to the dissident movement during communism (Císař 2008: 95–97). The first post-communist Czechoslovak government also issued a report called “the Concept of State Ecological Policy” (also known as the Rainbow Programme), which called for the integration of the environment into all policy sectors, which is the principle of environmental policy integration (Axelrod 2005: 266). This principle received a legal base in EU treaties only later with the Amsterdam Treaty.

On the institutional level it was important that environmental issues were to be handled by a separate Ministry of Environment from 1990 onwards. During the communist period these issues were handled primarily by the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Culture. Since then there have been occasional discussions about the cancellation of the ministry or its merging with other ministries for instance as late as after the elections to the Chamber of Deputies in 2010.

However, in the 1990s the political interest in environmental policy was soon replaced by a more passive approach. In the second phase the environmental issues were rather initiated from abroad as consequence of the EU accession process. The Czech Republic, like the other candidate countries, had to implement the entire range of the acquis communautaire in this field with only a few minor transition periods (Andonova 2004: 8). Thus, reforms were carried out as a result of outside pressure rather than on the basis of domestic initiatives (Jehlicka 2002). This, however, does not mean that there always was a strong opposition to the EU demands. For instance the chemical industry was in favour of the adaptation to the EU standards for chemical substances, despite the high costs, because they wanted access to the EU market (Andonova 2004: 43).

The third phase began with the Czech EU membership. The EU continues to have a big impact on the national policy after the accession. In the following I first discuss the Czech transposition record on EU legislation in the field. Afterwards I turn to the two sub-cases.

4 Author’s interview, 16 August 2009. All interviews were conducted in Prague unless noted otherwise.
Overview of EU legislations in the field that were transposed into Czech law

Prior to accession the Czech Republic expressed concerns about the possibility of imposing EU law in the field of environment. This was a reaction to the large amount of regulations (over 250 policy-regulations) that needed to be adopted during a short time-span (Andonova 2005). However, the Czech Republic, like the other East-Central European states, was only granted very limited exceptions from this demand, including a transposition period for water (canalization in some municipalities) that lasted until 2010, a transposition period for recycling of waste that lasted until the end of 2005, and an exception related to the emissions of two specific factories5 (Marek and Baun 2011: 115).

Statistics also reveal that the Czech record of transposition of EU law in general has been very low for the most part of the post-accession period and this is also the case in the field of environmental policy. Previous research has explained this as caused by a combination of lacking will and lacking resources (cf. Druľák 2010: 282). The best way to approach the question of how efficiently a specific EU member state manages to transpose EU law is to look at the Commission’s official Internal Market Scoreboard and data on infringement proceedings (Sverdrup 2007). Such information about the Czech Republic reveals that the country’s level of transposition for several years belonged to the worst in Europe only slightly better than the worst performing countries, e.g. Greece, Italy and Poland. The Czech Republic was also for a long time one of the three countries with the longest transposition delays. In 2009 the country was more than two years behind with three directives, and the fulfilment of two of those was five years overdue (they should have been fulfilled at the time of the Czech Republic’s accession, and in both cases the country was condemned by the European Court of Justice) (European Commission 2009). The Czech Republic has also had a bad record when it comes to the number of infringement procedures in the environmental field which gradually increased until 2009, when the country had 26 infringements which meant that only three other countries had more (Spain, Italy and Ireland). 2009 was also the year when the Czech Republic had the most non-transposed directives in the field of environmental policy of all EU member states. That year, 9 of the 19 Czech outstanding directives were in the field of environment. By 2012, however, the Czech Republic had managed to improve its transposition figures in an impressive way both in general and also in the field of environmental policy and the country for the first time reached the Commission’s one percent target for transposition deficit, and reduced its deficit by two thirds compared to the previous year. The

5 In Přerov and Ostrava.
country had in 2012 two outstanding directives in the environmental field which is in line with the EU average. The improvement seems to be linked to increased priority placed on the issue within the public administration (European Commission 2013). Thus, even if the transposition index initially seemed to confirm the assumption of the country being a foot dragger in the environmental field, the latest development would suggest otherwise. It, however, remains to be seen if the positive trend can be maintained. It should also be stressed that successful transposition does not necessarily mean functioning compliance with EU directives in practice. Previous research has shown that in other fields new member states, including the Czech Republic, often fail with the practical application of EU law despite formal transposition (Falkner and Treib 2008).

Chemical policy and the REACH regulation

In the case of the REACH regulation there were both an alternative framing and strong veto-players present in the Czech Republic. The issue in the Czech political debate was largely focused on the cost dimension for the industry and rather little on potential health gains. The Czech Association of the Chemical Industry (SCHP) appeared as a strong veto player with good contacts to the Ministry of Industry and Trade as well as parts of the political elite. On the level of civil servants in charge of the issue there are, however, also indications of social learning taking place. In the following I present a more detailed account of how the Czech Republic handled the REACH regulations.

The REACH legislation was brought onto the agenda long before the Czech EU accession. The idea of constructing a system to provide European consumers with sufficient protection from chemicals came about during an informal meeting of the Council of Environment Ministers in 1998. However, it was not until 2003 that a concrete proposal was discussed in working groups under the Council. The Czech Republic and the other new member states of the 2004 enlargement were present in the working group already prior to accession. The delegates from the new member states were invited to freely express their opinion, but they rarely used this opportunity. The new member states were overwhelmed at the time with trying to comply with the accession criteria, and therefore they were naturally not interested in further legislation which would also mean more administrative work and costs. According to estimations the Czech Republic complied with 31 percent of the EU standards in the field in the early 1990s. (Andonova 2004: 66). The issue was important for the Czech Republic because the country entered the EU with a fairly big chemical industry; in 2001 it accounted for 13 percent of the Czech Republic’s industrial output and 8 percent of its industrial employment; in 2009

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6 Author’s interviews, 18 August, 2009; 9 December 2010.
On the Czech side REACH was in the competence of the Ministry of Environment throughout the negotiations, but there was always coordination between this ministry and the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Ministry of Health. At the working groups the Czech delegate, who was a senior official from the Ministry of Environment in Prague, was regularly accompanied by experts from the other two ministries. Yet, it is easy to get the impression that the Czech management of the REACH regulation was a one man show. In fact the very same senior official (a former chemist) has been in charge of the issue throughout all the phases of the negotiations, and today he is a member of the management board of the European Chemical Agency in Helsinki.\(^7\)

If we look at the Czech position, we can tell that it was initially hesitant. However, this gradually changed as it became clear that the regulation would not be approved and implemented within a short time span as some early estimates had predicted but rather within several years. REACH was initially handled by the Social Democrat dominated coalition government (2002–2006), and especially the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) was critical of the government’s approach. ODS deputies also tried to block the REACH regulation in the European Parliament. In addition, President Klaus, a former Chairman of the party, expressed strong criticism of the proposed regulation. After the ODS came into power in 2006, however, there was hardly any change in regard to the issues, neither during the ODS minority government nor during the ODS’s coalition cabinet with the Green Party and the Christian Democrats. Thus the Czech Republic, throughout the negotiations on REACH, held a fairly critical but non-extremist position in the EU.\(^8\)

The public debate on REACH in the newspapers was fairly limited and mainly echoed concerns about the costs for the chemical industry expressed by the SCHP and, on the political level, by representatives of the Civic Democratic Party (ODS). There was little discussion on the broader issue of the health and environmental risks associated with the use of various chemical substances.\(^9\) Overall, however, the political involvement in the issue was rather low due to a perceived lack of knowledge of the topic. Consequently, the debates on the chemical legislation have

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\(^{7}\) In fact it was difficult to find other people in the Czech administration who would be willing to talk about REACH. All the respondents referred to the same person, Karel Bláha, arguing that this was his issue. Bláha himself does not oppose such a description, as he said “my position was the Czech position” several times during our interviews. Bláha served first as director of the Department of Environmental Hazards, then after the 2006 elections as deputy minister, and later after the elections in 2010 again as department director.

\(^{8}\) Author’s interviews, 9 December 2010; 1 June 2011.

\(^{9}\) Despite campaigns by ENGOs such as Arnika and Greenpeace. The debate was rather similar to the Polish one, cf. Eriksson, Karlsson and Reuter, 2010.
largely been restricted to expert discussions, and the disputes have been between experts representing the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the industry and the ENGOs (primarily Arnika and Greenpeace).\(^{10}\)

The Ministry of Environment is commonly viewed as traditionally having better ties with the NGOs than with organized business, and the opposite is the case with the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The assumption of a conflict between the two ministries is underscored by the fact that the interviewed representatives from the Ministry of Industry and Trade present a very different picture of the situation from that of their colleagues from the Ministry of Environment. In fact their final judgements as to how satisfied they are with REACH are different. Whereas the official in charge from the Ministry of Environment in retrospect evaluates the regulation in positive terms, his counterpart from the Ministry of Industry and Trade is much more critical of it and reflects to a large degree the critical view of the SCHP.

The chemical industry was critical to REACH in all EU member states. The Czech Association of Chemical Industry (SCHP) is a member of the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC). The SCHP admits that the final compromise was in some respects better than the initial proposal. However, the association remains largely critical of the proposal. In addition representatives of the SCHP are critical towards the way the issue was handled in the CEFIC. The argument is that the compromise on REACH was enabled through the support of the major European chemical companies, who at a certain stage decided that they had reached their main targets and thus supported the regulation. The compromise, however, according to the SCHP, was not favourable to smaller and middle sized companies. The SCHP estimates that the negative consequences for smaller companies will become visible only in 2013 when the second stage of registrations begins.\(^{11}\)

If we look at the negotiations in the Council of Ministers in 2005, the Czech Republic had a rather similar approach to, for instance, those of Germany and other countries with a strong chemical industry. These countries were sometimes described as being rather reluctant when compared to the more pro-reform countries, especially the Scandinavian ones, which at the same time had a smaller chemical industry (e.g. Lindgren and Persson 2008: 36). The major collaboration partners of the Czech Republic, however, in these negotiations are described by involved actors as having been primarily the neighbouring countries (the other three members of the Visegrád Four, primarily Poland and Slovakia).\(^{12}\)

On environmental issues there is a general agreement that the post-communist countries have a lot in common regarding the structure of their economy. In this

\(^{10}\) Author’s interviews, 18 August, 2009; 9 December 2010; 1 June 2011.

\(^{11}\) Author’s interview, 1 June 2011.

\(^{12}\) Author’s interviews, 9 December 2010.
case it seems that they had a common interest in the beginning of the delaying of the final agreement. Several of the other countries, such as Bulgaria and Poland, also have significant chemical industries. The Czech Republic, however, by no means collaborated exclusively with the other new member states. The personal relations between the involved negotiators seem to have been important as well. This fact might have been especially important in the Czech case due to the fact that one single person became very important for how the issue was framed by the state. This is in strong contrast to a country such as Sweden, where there was a strong politicization of the issue (Eriksson, Karlson and Reuter 2010).

**Climate-Energy Package**

As in the case of REACH there was regarding the climate-energy package of 2008 both an alternative framing as well as strong veto-players present in the Czech Republic. Leading politicians such as the President Václav Klaus and the Minister of Industry and Trade at the time Martin Říman reject the existence of human caused climate change. Simultaneously the largely state owned main Czech energy producer, ČEZ, was a strong veto-player with a clear imprint on the final Czech position. As in the previous case social learning can be identified on the level of civil servants. However, lacking resources in the department on climate change hampers the process. The lack of resources is in addition partially caused by the alternative framing of the issue among the political elite.

The climate-energy package was negotiated in a rather short time period. The Commission presented the package in January 2007, and it was finally agreed by the European Council and endorsed by the European Parliament in December 2008. The Czech position was more politicized on the climate-energy package than its position on REACH. The first reason for this was that the negotiations on the package were carried out by a coalition government including the ODS and the Greens. These two parties had very different priorities in the field. The package was mainly in the competence of the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, and given the fact that the Green Party controlled the former and Civic Democrats the latter, this conflict was even more apparent in this case than in the case of REACH. The second reason was that the negotiations on the EU level reached their final stage during the French council presidency during the second half of 2008. Given that the Czech Republic had the following presidency and that the package was a major concern of France, Czech politicians came to consider it a more prioritized issue. The issue was also moved upwards in the state hierarchy due to the fact that lobbying from the country’s major energy company targeted officials in the Government’s Office rather than those on the lower levels.
On the other hand the upcoming presidency also meant that there was little room for a strong verbal position on the part of the Czech Republic.

If we look at how the climate-energy package was coordinated in the administration it should be noted that it was in the competences of two ministries – the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Industry and Trade. This was a natural consequence of the fact that the issue included two fields: the environment, where the EU has a rather legal and institutional competence, and energy, where the cooperation is less developed (Bäckstrand 2010: 354). The Czech positions on some of the issues (e.g. the EU ETS) were prepared by the experts from the Ministry of Environment, i.e. from the Department of Climate Change, and the positions on other issues (e.g. renewable energy sources) were prepared by experts from the Ministry of Industry and Trade. According to the interviews the European Policies Coordination Department in the Government’s Office directly intervened in the preparations of the Czech position.13

Regarding the preparations in the working groups the Czech Republic was represented by an attaché from the Permanent Representation in Brussels, and experts from both ministries in Prague regularly went to Brussels to assist him and to help modify the Czech position. Given the upcoming Czech presidency the Czech attaché who was in charge of the issue had the opportunity to take part in all preparation negotiations of the French presidency, and also in the negotiations the French presidency had with the European Parliament. Therefore the Czech Republic was in a good position to look into the details of the issue, and the Czech actors also felt a responsibility for a successful end to the negotiations on the issue.

It is also important to note that the main Czech energy producer, ČEZ, which is approximately 70 percent state owned, is active on the EU level. As the only energy company of the region, it has its own office in Brussels with the intention of working actively not only towards the Czech Republic but also towards EU institutions. ČEZ was very critical towards the demand on auctioning in the energy sector, but since an exception to this demand was obtained, ČEZ is largely satisfied with the compromise.14 This is also confirmed by officials at the Ministry of Environment. When asked the question of how satisfied the private sector is with the final package, one official answered: “ČEZ is totally satisfied. The smaller ones, however, are worse off, but they only recently started to understand the issue and the fact that there are large sums of money involved.”15

Yet, even if the interviewed senior Czech officials claim that the Czech position was moderated as a consequence of the upcoming presidency, it is also clear that

13 Author’s interview, 17 May 2011 – Brussels; 1 and 8 June 2011.
14 Author’s interview, 12 May 2011.
15 Author’s interview, 8 June 2011.
the country managed to defend its most vital demand in the negotiations – i.e. the exemption from the obligatory auction on allowances in the energy sector for countries fulfilling a specific structure of the energy sector (like the Czech Republic). This was crucial for the country given that the Czech economy, like the economies of several of the other post-communist countries, is heavily dependent on energy from coal plants. However, despite this there was not a domestic consensus on this demand. The socialist opposition actually criticized the government for negotiating this exception, the Ministry of Environment was initially against this idea and there was a vote on the issue in the Czech government, where the Green Minister of Environment lost (ČSSD 2008). Once the exemption for the energy sector was granted, all relevant political subjects with the exception of the Green Party were in favour of making use of the free allowances to this sector. This clearly shows in the strength of the partly state owned energy company ČEZ.

Evaluating the theoretical assumptions

Assumption 1: If Czech actors behave merely as passive receivers or reluctant opponents of commission proposals, I argue that there might be a case for the rationalist conditionality account.

Initially the political elite was close to a consensus on the reluctant Czech position on environmental issues within the EU. The reasons were two. First of all, the Czech Republic, like all new member states, had to implement the whole aqcuis in the field quite rapidly compared to the old member states. Therefore, when the discussions on REACH started in the council working groups in 2003 the original Czech approach was hesitant. The second reason was the common view that the Czech Republic, like other new member states, should have the right to catch up in economic terms with Western Europe without the obstacle of facing tough environmental standards. After all, the West European countries all had the chance to enjoy extensive economic growth without comparably strict environmental regulations. In this sense it is justified that the Czech Republic should do more to protect its industries than what is done in older member states. Moreover, an argument in the Czech Republic was that the structure of the Czech economy, with its large industry dependency, makes it more costly to implement EU standards in the Czech Republic than in many other member states.

Thus, there are indications that could confirm assumption 1. In both cases the country tried to avoid paying a high price for reforms, and thus it had, at least initially, a rather reluctant approach. To some degree there seems to be an evolution

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16 Author’s interviews, 5 August 2009; 6 August 2009; 6 June 2011.
17 Hospodářské noviny, 11 August 2009.
18 This does not rule out the possibility that socialization might happen in the future.
19 Author’s interviews, 6 December 2010 Brussels; 1 June 2011 Prague.
over time, but this is largely related to the country’s Council presidency. A more general problem which does not seem to disappear over time as expected is the lack of resources. This is the case especially with the Department on Climate Change in the Ministry of Environment. Even if the Ministry got a staff increase during the presidency so that it would be able to follow the agenda of all working groups this situation was not maintained after the presidency. One reason for why this is conceived as a problem is that the agenda on the EU level is growing in size. Examples of the lacking resources could also be seen in the studies of the consequences of the legislations for the Czech Republic, where the sources invested into the studies, according to officials, were often not sufficient for a satisfying outcome. The problem of lacking resources, however, is not only linked to the lack of financial resources but also to political preferences and I turn to this problem below.

a) The presence of an alternative framing of the issue among the state elite in the country that contradicts the position of the EU proposal.

In both cases there clearly was an alternative framing present, and in both cases the major proponents of an alternative framing were members of the Civic Democratic Party, including President Klaus. In the case of REACH the alternative framing of the issue could in short be described as questioning the need for such a regulation and emphasizing the costs imposed on the industry. In the case of the climate-energy package the whole idea of human impact on climate change was contested. The lack of political acceptance of the existence of the topic, has contributed to a situation where the Department on Climate Change in turn received fewer resources.

In both cases, however, it is not sufficient to state that the debate is between environmental protection and business promotion since there is one more dimension which is important for an understanding of how these two issues have been handled. It is not a coincidence that it was the EU critics within the ODS who were the most critical of REACH and also of the climate-energy package. The Eurosceptics do not want the EU to come up with new legislation in this area. Therefore, in theory their criticism does not necessarily have to be linked to their stand on environmental issues in general. The Minister of Industry and Trade during the negotiations on the climate-energy package was one of the few prominent Civic Democrats who in 2003 voted against EU membership, and he maintains that he would have done the same if a similar referendum took place today.

b) The presence of veto players (e.g. interest organizations and other societal actors with a capability to hamper the realization of the proposal) with an alternative framing of the issue that contradicts the position of the EU proposal.

20 Author’s interview, 16 August 2009.
21 Interviewed in Hospodářské noviny February 6 2009.
The business lobby belonged to the more negative actors within the country regarding both proposals. In the case of REACH the Association for Chemical Industry was the most visible opponent, issuing studies and comments with the opinion that the proposed REACH would be a significant blow to the industry with a large number of lost jobs as a consequence. In the case of the climate-energy package the industry was also visible – especially ČEZ but also the major industry associations.

To a large degree the debates on both proposals were mainly between organized business and ENGOs. However, this is not unique to the Czech Republic. If we look at the negotiations on the European level on the REACH Regulation, Karl-Oskar Lindgren and Thomas Persson (2008) suggest that the split on the REACH in the EU is rather a split between business interests and environmental interests than a clear-cut split between member states (35). The bargaining game in the EU on REACH has therefore been described as one between two different advocacy networks, one acting on behalf of organized business and the other on behalf of environmental NGOs (Pesendorfer 2006). The chemical industry is an important economic sector in several of the EU’s member states and the third largest manufacturing industry in the EU. However, whereas the many of the big West European concerns accepted the compromise after a while, the SCHP did not.

Thus the presence of veto players is not unique to the Czech Republic or the post-communist countries but their position is stronger. One other major difference is the rather weak position of the ENGOs and, in general, of environmental issues in the public awareness. In many other countries using coal for energy production such as, for instance, Germany, the energy producers rather quickly abandoned the idea of derogation from the auctioning system because they knew it was politically impossible to reach that goal. In the Czech Republic, and also in other countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, however, the energy producers viewed it as a feasible strategy and also collaborated with each other in order to come up with a common position. In addition it should be added that politicians to a high degree view promoting business interests as one of their main tasks.

Assumption 2: If Czech actors manifest an increasingly pro-reform view on EU environmental policy and the EU decision making process in the field, there is a case for the socialization thesis.

There are some indications that the Czech Republic has been “socialized” and that it accepted green EU norms. First, several of the interviewed civil servants state that the ways the EU environmental issues are viewed within the Czech Republic have changed. Some of them even argue that their own perspective has changed as a consequence of them being more familiar with the way the EU works. Yet, it is
easy to find top politicians who maintain a principle rejection of the EU despite the fact that they have been heavily involved in EU negotiations.

Second, several of the interviewed persons view the Czech Republic as the leader among the post-communist member states when it comes to EU environmental policy. If asked to describe the general position of the Czech Republic within the EU, most put the country somewhere in the middle, as they see it as less progressive than the Scandinavian countries, for example, but more progressive than other post-communist countries that are new to the EU and also some of the southern member states. The experiences with the presidency are often mentioned by the interviewees as something which has strengthened their position within the EU.

Third, for the Social Democratic Party the European integration process and the party’s work within the Party of European Socialists have had the consequence of a greater acceptance for environmental issues in the party, which otherwise has a preference for solutions that primarily take the perspective of business. For those in the party working with environmental issues, it is clear that without the impact of the European Socialists, it would have been hard to convince the mainstream of the party of the advantages of progressive environmental policy. The party also tends to respond positively to Commission proposals but there are clear limitations set by the party’s good relations to business interests such as ČEZ. Fourth, if we look at the time aspect, there clearly is a difference between the initial handling of the REACH regulation and that of the climate-energy package. The negotiations on the climate-energy package were influenced by both the upcoming Czech EU presidency and the Green Party’s participation in the governing coalition, which strengthened the position of the Ministry of Environment.

The major conclusion regarding socialization, however, is linked to the nature of most of the dossiers that are handled within the EU. As is most clearly illustrated by REACH, they tend to be rather technical in their nature, and principal opposition is not feasible at the EU level. The position of saying no and ignoring the issue is not there. As a consequence the actual policies of governments tend to be much more pragmatic than the political rhetoric of the opposition that appeared before the policies came into effect. The process of socialization according to the definition used here, however, does not refer to this change in so far as it would be a conscious tactical process. The socialization occurs when the actors start considering this process as natural and normatively correct. It is difficult to find hard data proving that this would be the case. However, the interviews with the senior officials still suggest that this is increasingly the case.

One senior official who admitted to initially having a rather negative view of the collaboration in the EU described his learning process in the following way:
The first result, and the first impression once the compromise is achieved, is “Oh gosh, it is not good at all. I’ve lost so much.” But a second impression appears after a while, and it is better. It says, “I’ve lost something but I’ve achieved a lot, you know. That balance is changing. That is my impression of that, and I like it.”

The quotation does not merely show how the interviewee’s perspective on a single case is changing over time. The argument the person presented is that over time he has learned to see the negotiation game in the Council (Council working groups) in a more positive way. Basically, this is how socialization takes place. Given that the process of making a decision comes to be viewed in a better light, and as legitimate from a subjective perspective, the final result is also viewed differently. In the end then, norms are not about accepting bluntly what is produced in Brussels. They are about becoming integrated into the decision making structure to such a degree that it becomes natural to defend the final outcome of that process. As a consequence the actual norms, referring to the specific issues at stake, have a greater chance of becoming internalized.

Conclusion

The conclusions of the study suggest that the Czech Republic has taken on a pragmatic and rather coherent approach to the studied policy issues despite the lack of a verbal consensus and despite changes of government during the negotiations. Even if there are indications of the Czech Republic behaving as a foot-dragger in the field of environmental policy, such as the in the transposition index at least up to 2011, the most sceptical assumptions from previous literature cannot be confirmed. What mostly speaks in favour of the socialization thesis is the climate-energy package. It should be acknowledged that this was for the Czech Republic negotiated in a specific context of upcoming council presidency and Green party in cabinet.

There, however, are a few problems for socialization. First of all, even if some indications of socialization can be found at the individual level of civil servants it is not necessarily the case that the EU norm is diffused beyond this first filter. Thus, the impact on further decision making might be limited. Second, qualified civil servants with experience of negotiations in council working groups and in the comititology tend to leave the public sector after a few years for more well paid jobs in the private sector. This, however, is not necessarily merely a question of resources since at least in the field of climate change mitigation the strong contestation of the existence of climate change among parts of the political elite could be one reason for why relatively fewer resources are invested into public administration in the field.

Author’s interview, 9 December 2010.
The Europeanization of Czech Environmental Policy Post Conditionality: Lessons from the REACH regulation and the Climate-Energy Package

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Icon of the Orange Revolution, Evita of Kyiv, Ukrainian Barbie doll, Jeanne d’Arc, innocent victim? The multifaceted visual representations of Yulia Tymoshenko

Karin Liebhart

Abstract: The article aims at throwing somewhat light on the analysis of political images, metaphors and relating discourses and to give adequate importance to images as independent media of communication. The complex phenomenon of visual representations and image constructions is shown taking the famous Ukrainian politician Yulia Tymoshenko as an example. The exemplary analysis of the manifold visual representations of Yulia Tymoshenko, which are circulating in the public sphere, applies political iconography and analysis of metaphors and points at strategies and forms of presentation that hark back to popular image production and entertainment formats. Popular politicians also serve as role models and “projection screens” for the wishes, desires and hopes of their audience. Political imagery and the symbolic level of politics play a crucial role in this regard.

Keywords: gender, image, imagery, political iconography, Ukraine, visual representation

Preface

This contribution focuses on visual representations of the Ukrainian politician Yulia Tymoshenko, who is said to be second to none when it comes to elaborating self-portrayal and image cultivation (Schmid 2009: 42).

The article aims at highlighting exemplary aspects of the entire phenomenon. For this purpose selected images and metaphors will be presented and interpreted using a range of qualitative methods as analytical tools. The typology of visual representations was built on the basis of a comprehensive internet research: from April 2012 to May 2013, Google images, social media sites related to Yulia Tymoshenko and further online sources were monitored and regularly screened.\(^1\)

Although the analysis also includes textual material, the main emphasis is placed on the visuals, considering that pictures – in this case mostly photographs – do not only attract attention or illustrate text, but constitute a referential framework for the messages conveyed (cf. Schwelling 2004). In what is called the age of mass

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\(^1\) Since the methodological approach is a qualitative one, the sample is naturally not representative as defined by statistics. However, the large set of photographs collected during the respective period, was structured and arranged in order to build a form of typology.
media, effective politics is measured predominantly by its perceptibility. This is first and foremost true for the presentation of leading candidates, but also for the main topics of their respective campaigns, which appear as images on the internet, on conventional posters and other sorts of advertising material.

Moreover, “Politics as infomercial” (cf. Vogt 2002) calls for strategies of how to develop an attractive presentation of leading political personalities, with the aim of turning them into a “high identification brand” (ibid.). Candidates are being presented as a summary and symbol for competing political programs. The pertinent image constructions are designed to address the wishes, desires, hopes and fantasies of potential voters that are not communicated in the form of arguments and discursive justifications, but largely through images, symbols and visualizations:

Against this background, the paper underlines the importance of political imagery and the symbolic level of politics for the perception of political personalities as well as political issues and agenda setting. Popular politicians also function as “projection screens” and role models. The “style icon” Yulia Tymoshenko is a particularly appropriate proof for this assumption.

Analytical tools and methods

The twofold methodological approach combines political iconography and an analysis of (mainly visual) metaphors.

Political iconography (cf. Elkins 2003; Grittmann 2007; Hofmann 2006; Margolies – Pauwels 2011; Mitchell 1996; Müller 2011a, 2011b; Panofsky 1983; Paul 2008; Van Leeuwen – Jewitt 2001) aims at the interpretation of visual content. This approach can also be applied to the analysis of mass mediated images (Müller 2011a, 290, 294; Müller 2011b). Aby Warburg and his followers and colleagues Erwin Panofsky and Fritz Saxl (cf. Panofsky 1983; Panofsky – Panofsky 1972; Vidal 2009) developed a practice of identification, reconstruction and classification of motifs and visual content of images at the beginning of the 20th century. In “Studies in Iconology” Panofsky and Panofsky (1972) elaborated on the concept of three levels of art-historical understanding (“three strata of subject matter or meaning” as there are: the natural subject matter or the depiction of the elements that the painting, the photograph, the poster, the leaflet, etc. consists of; the conventional subject matter introducing cultural knowledge; the final question “What does it all mean?”). This approach was applied to social science research and further developed, in regard to the analysis of visual representations communicated via mass media, by Marion Müller (2003; 2011a; 2011b) and other scholars. The paper is

inspired by this model because it helps to avoid rash and solely subjective interpretations and permits an in-depth analysis of images.

Political images which are communicated to the public feature historical and actual linkages. Thus, they cannot only be interpreted in the context of other contemporary images. They also refer to antecedent ones. It is therefore essential in political iconography to draw the attention to connections between currently circulating images, on the one hand, and between these images and previous, antecedent imagery stored in an iconic memory, on the other. A special interest is paid to types of representation and motifs used (Müller 2003: 69). Political iconography implies a critical “reading” of imagery and aims at studying the identification, description, and interpretation of the content of images. The heterogeneity of references, which does not always result in unequivocal interpretations of the meaning of images, is a central element in this context. Political communication obviously draws from the repository of political memory, political myths and the history of political ideas as well as from popular culture and associations with everyday life in order to load images with meaning. This calls for an approach that focuses on the specific systems of reference addressed in each case.

The analysis of metaphors which is also applied to the sample (El Refaie 2003; Münkler 1994; Schmitt 2003; Wesel 2006) concentrates on those “figures of speech” that use a concrete image to represent a more complex phenomenon (e.g., “the round table”, “the fortress Europe”, etc.) and, thus, facilitate the comprehension of the respective message. Much of our conceptual system is structured metaphorically to allow for better comprehension of complex experiences and issues with the help of concepts with which we are more familiar and which are therefore more easily imaginable. The contribution refers to both textual metaphors and visual representations of metaphorical concepts (El Refaie 2003) although the visual does not convey exactly the same meanings as language.

Furthermore, this approach is supported by qualitative content analysis of linguistic representations and selected discourse analytical approaches (cf. Wodak – Krzyzanowski 2008; Wodak – Meyer 2009; Wodak – Reisigl 2001), in order to reveal the underlying assumptions, social and cultural patterns and to make them explicit. The analysis focuses on the identification of specific contents or topics of the discourse, on the one hand, and on discursive strategies, e.g., the strategy of nomination (how are persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions referred to?), the strategy of predication (what features are attributed to actors, objects, phenomena and processes?) or the strategy of framing (from what perspective are these nominations, attributions and arguments expressed?), on the other hand. Emphasis is also put on linguistic means and realizations.
Eventually, it has to be underlined that all possible interpretations are context-bound. Thus, relevant developments and issues that characterize Ukrainian politics and political culture are also mentioned.

**Gendered images – visual representations of female politicians**

Gender is a society-structuring category that works as a difference marker and describes power relations. In this context, gender stereotypes and respective coded image constructions represent socially divided knowledge about those qualities that are regarded as particularly characteristic for women or men. The corresponding gender roles include socially and culturally divided expectations concerning the tasks, competences and societal functions of men and women.

Acts of political staging are always also marked by gender-specific image constructions and forms of representation: “A male politician is first seen as a politician, a female politician first as a woman, wife or mother” (Van Dijck 2002). Orienting themselves towards the traditional images of masculinity and femininity, however, allows the acting personalities concerned to play with these clichés. The latter can be employed in a modified and varied form in topical contexts, e.g. in order to specifically emphasize certain role aspects as a popular figure although the available repertoire of roles is different for men and women. According to Liesbet van Zoonen (2005: 75), “the cultural model of a politician comes closer to the perceptions of masculinity than to those of femininity, which tends to make a successful performance more difficult for women”. While traditional role models in advertising have slowly been eroding since the 1990s at the latest, it appears that clichés continue to exist at the level of political representation. Women are still “measured by other standards than men (…) and their outfit, their styling or their family life still play a more important role than their political messages” (Lessnerkraus 2005: 7). Pippa Norris (1997) showed that for female politicians gender is always the primary characteristic feature.

A Danish study (Moustgaard 2004) on the coverage of female politicians in the print media found a repertoire of stereotyped female images (inter alia, mother, teacher, Iron Lady, witch or seductrix) which are mostly determined by their appearances. Neither the private nor the public sphere has a gender-neutral connotation. Both are thus preserving factors in the process of maintaining the gender asymmetry (Kotthoff 2002: 21). Politics as a performing art reacts to this phenomenon. It is possible to play with the clichés, but only to a certain extent. It may reasonably be presumed that the limits in this regard are narrower for women than for men.

The new electronic as well as the traditional media provide the forum where the above-mentioned political staging takes place. They represent the most important framework for the communication of politics. The perception of politics is almost exclusively the perception which is communicated via the media. Consequently, political representatives attempt to meet the requirements of a culture of entertainment, which is regarded as the central element of media-related event societies.
The appearance and individual media presence of political personalities therefore continue to gain importance. It is via the media that the identity of a male or female politician as a “person with qualities” is being constructed, who does not merely stand for a particular political party, position or topic, but who also shows certain facets of his or her personality and stands for a certain lifestyle. The Ukrainian politician Yulia Tymoshenko possesses a particular gamesmanship in playing this game.

**Patriotic tribune of the people, power lady and tough politician**

Born in 1960 in Dnepropetrovsk and far from having been brought up in a well-to-do family, Yulia Tymoshenko represents a classic post-Soviet success story. She studied economic cybernetics and, together with her husband, the son of a party functionary, opened a video library still during the times of the Soviet Union. In 1991 she entered the gasoline business. As the top representative of the group “United Energy Systems of Ukraine”, founded in 1995, she acquired a remarkable fortune on the stock market and from dealing in gas and electricity in the mid-1990s. She wore designer outfits and took great pride in her styling. One Ukrainian fashion shop even dedicated a special collection to her under the trade name “gas queen”.

The successful business woman turned into an oligarch and also became the confidante of the then Ukrainian prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who later served a prison term in the USA for money laundering. Under the suspicion of having transferred large parts of her acquired wealth out of the country, Yulia Tymoshenko has already spent over 40 days in custody on remand in 2001. Her group of companies was dissolved, but the charges were dropped – for lack of evidence.

It was already before the “Orange Revolution” that Yulia Tymoshenko also gained a profile as a politician. In the mid-1990s, she was a candidate for a seat in the Ukrainian parliament: “Tymoshenko exchanged her Mercedes for a simple Wolga and toured the villages in the Bobrinez electoral district. She had churches renovated, and donated 5 000 tons of coal to the freezing inhabitants (…) From the start, she won 92,3 percent of the votes (…) Now she donated money to the university in her home town, supported a string orchestra and edited CDs by unknown musicians.” And she worked against those structures which characterized the political and economic system of Ukraine: “The richest woman of Ukraine was...

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ready to challenge the system that she herself had benefitted from and that she knew better than anybody else” (ibid.). In 1999 she became deputy prime minister under President Leonid Kutschma and was responsible for the energy industry. She broke up monopolies and forced other oligarchs (and competitors) to pay taxes.

The moment when Yulia Tymoshenko’s prominence and fame grew far beyond the Ukrainian borders was however not until her participation in the “Orange Revolution” on Kiev’s “independence square” where she took the helm of the protest movement together with the later president Victor Yushchenko. She fashioned herself as a tribune of the people and propagated a settlement of accounts with the old system as her program. She had her hair dyed wheat blond and was wearing it as a braided crown. This hair style became Yulia Tymoshenko’s trademark, “(a) halo of bright hair.” Tymoshenko had already hired a photographer and started creating her own myth: “(...) half Slavic mother goddess, half Western-style Barbie doll. On the billboards, she appears in embroidered farmer’s blouses, and in the parliament she calls for a ‘moral break-through’” (ibid.). Her appearances were always well staged with a highly professional blend of Ukrainian patriotism, self-confidence, elegance and modernity. In political discussions she convinced the audience on account of her knowledge and wit (ibid.).

Source: www.dailymail.co.uk

Source: news.bbc.co.uk

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In 2005 she was appointed prime minister by president Yushchenko. She started to impose severe measures, annulled privatizations of the predecessor government and had new calls for tender issued for the companies (ibid.) the alliance between the two leading personalities of the “Orange Revolution” did not last long, and soon the prime minister was dismissed. In 2007 she took office as head of government once more (cf. Popov – Milani 2012).

In how far the Orange Revolution in Ukraine has brought about a sustainable system change – beyond an intermixing of the political elites – is yet to be discussed. Already in 2007, the German weekly ‘Die Zeit’ described Ukrainian politics as a “mixture of soap opera and crime series,” and the parties as “business projects designed by political technologists.”

In political terms, also Yulia Tymoshenko can be described as an ambivalent personality. The party founded by her in 1999, Batkivshchyna (Fatherland), was tailored for her as a chairwoman and had a rather authoritarian leadership structure. At the same time, she was an advocate for more transparency and rule of law as well as a re-structuring of the energy market (including a limit on the earnings of billionaires). In her foreign policy, she steered a pro-European course while at the same time seeking harmony with Moscow. In the presidential elections of 2010 she ran as a candidate but narrowly lost in the second round to her competitor Victor Yanukovych.

Yulia Tymoshenko is/was always playing several roles and staging herself by means of styling, outfit and references from popular culture and mythology as

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a colourful figure in the public sphere of politics and the media. The variety of attributes used to describe her is a reference to this broad spectrum: gas princess, blond angel, shining warrior, Evita of Kiev, Jeanne d’Arc of Ukraine. Visual representations on political advertising bulletins, in print or electronic and online media as well as in other settings of popular culture show her as a kind of knight of the holy grail, as a Jeanne d’Arc, as an action star on the motor bike or as an astronaut with her space ship.

Source: www.feelunited.us/2012/12/yulia-Tymoshenko-graceful-beauty-with.html
Source: forum.teamxbox.com
Source: gulfnews.com
Source: www.s3.amazonaws.com/files.posterous.com/itsrocketsciencebab

Yulia Tymoshenko became a pop icon whose style was also a topic in fashion blogs: “(…) Victorian inspired style icon Yulia Tymoshenko has managed to create a look that is instantly iconic and (…) indie. Skipping the suited look that some politicos try to follow, Yulia paves her own path with a stylish doo that’s a must attempt and a look
that feels like it’s straight off the Prada Fall/Winter 2008 runway.”10 She even made it onto the cover of the fashion magazine “Elle”. On top of that, she was also voted among the 10. “Most Beautiful & Hot Female Politicians of the World”.

Describing her style as a politician, the Kiev-based political scientist Vladimir Malinkovich noted: “She is torn between post-Socialism and right-wing populism

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(...) like a sort of Ukrainian Evita Peron.”11 In the media she was often compared with Eva Duarte Peron: Her gestures and facial expressions, her populist style on her trips abroad and her way of flirting with people caused even her critics to compare her positively with the former “Evita myth”.12

Source: Schmid – Ulrich (2009)

The parallel to the Argentinian legend was also emphasized by Yulia Tymoshenko herself, e.g. when she issued a calendar showing her portrait together with that of Eva Peron (cf. Schmid 2009).

Unbending fighter and innocent victim

In 2011, criminal proceedings were opened against Yulia Tymoshenko and several members of her former cabinet. The prosecution placed their focus on contracts for the supply of natural gas that were concluded during her term as prime minister and that were purportedly disadvantageous for Ukraine (with a damage of roughly € 140 million). Since this trial and her imprisonment in 2011, following her 7-year prison sentence, the role of the unbending fighter for the freedom of Ukraine (whose destiny she has linked with her own in numerous messages) after the model of Jeanne d’Arc (whose statue stands on the desk in her office) and the role of the martyr for a good cause are in the centre of attention. These roles are not only communicated successfully via her personal website13 and her facebook,14 blog15 and

13 See http://www.Tymoshenko.ua/uk/.
14 See https://www.facebook.com/Tymoshenko.UA/.
15 See http://blog.Tymoshenko.ua/.
twitter\textsuperscript{16} accounts: A member of the order of the sanctified martyr Warwara\textsuperscript{17} (…), she “consciously immerses herself in the martyr role.”\textsuperscript{18} The proceedings for abuse of public office were used by Yulia Tymoshenko as a stage on which she presented herself as a fighter for freedom and justice and, at the same time, as an innocent, persecuted victim.\textsuperscript{19}

The EU and numerous European and international politicians, both male and female, have criticized the prison sentence. Steps to reach an association agreement with Kyiv were suspended by the EU: “European leaders on Tuesday night warned Ukraine that its decision to sentence former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to seven years in jail would have ‘profound implications’ for a country vying to join

\textsuperscript{16} See http://twitter.com/YuliaTymoshenko.

\textsuperscript{17} Tymoschenko, available at: http://www.zeit.de/2012/19/DOS-Timoschenko (5 May, 2012).


the European Union.” The trial was already seen as highly controversial at the international level and was considered by many observers as politically motivated. The sentence was nevertheless upheld by the supreme appeal court of Ukraine.

The “Tymoshenko case” also had consequences in the run-up to the European soccer championship 2012, namely in the form of boycott threats from European politicians (inter alia, EU president Herman Van Rompuy, Commission president José Manuel Barroso, or federal chancellor Angela Merkel). The European Union and Ukraine had finished negotiations on a co-operation agreement, but “the deal still hinges on the treatment of Yulia Tymoshenko” as the EU president stated: “Today we can publicly announce that negotiations on the association agreement have been finalized” Herman van Rompuy said at the conclusion of a summit in Kyiv. But he added that signing would depend on political circumstances and “our strong concern is primarily related to the politically motivated justice in Ukraine and the Tymoshenko case.” Yulia Tymoshenko, who has been suffering from a disc prolapse and other health conditions during her custody, started a hunger strike in protest against the conditions of her detention shortly before the start of the European soccer championship jointly organized by Ukraine and Poland: “I want to make the democratic world aware of what is going on in the middle of Europe” (ibid.).

In April 2012, half a year before the Ukrainian parliamentary elections, another court proceeding, which was essentially related to charges of tax evasion committed by her in the 1990s when she was head of the group “United Energy Systems of Ukraine”, was commenced in Charkiv. German doctors, who examined her in jail, found the Ukrainian politician to be unfit for trial. Already in March 2012, the European Court of Human Rights had called for an adequate medical treatment of the detainee, and in May 2012, she was finally transferred from her jail to a clinic in Charkiv.

20 Yulia Tymoshenko says Ukraine trial like Stalins Soviet Union as she is jailed for 7 years, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/8820383/Yulia-Tymoshenko-says-Ukraine-trial-like-Stalins-Soviet-Union-as-she-is-jailed-for-7-years.html (5 May 2013).
Even from jail, Tymoshenko’s media relations work is “highly professional”. Since her conviction, her website has been reporting news at hourly “intervals”. In end-September 2012 she issued a video message recorded by mobile phone from the hospital in Charkiv (where she is treated for a disc relapse) in which she called upon the population to overthrow the government in the parliamentary elections taking place at the end of October. Tymoshenko turned directly to the voters: “I am appealing to all of you! If you do not realize now that criminals and the Mafia are ruling in Ukraine, nothing will be left to protect you later!” At the same time, she pointed out that President Yanukovych was turning her life into hell and that every single day in jail she was “subjected to psychological and physical pressure” (ibid.).

In a judgment of April 2013, the European Court of Human Rights also held that the custody on remand had been imposed arbitrarily and against the law. Ukraine’s imprisonment of the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko was a politically motivated violation of her rights, Europe’s human rights court has ruled (30 April 2013).

Ukrainian world boxing champion Vitali Klitschko has led 15 000 protesters through the streets of Kyiv demanding the immediate release of jailed former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The demonstrators chanted ‘Freedom for Yulia’ and waved the flags of the three main parties opposed to Tymoshenko’s rival, President Viktor Yanukovych (...) Klitschko, whose UDAR (Punch) party has joined Tymoshenko’s opposition group in parliament, said Ukraine’s hopes of one day joining the European Union would remain a dream until the day Tymoshenko was released: “How can this happen if we still have political prisoners? he demanded at the demonstration, ‘That is why I say: freedom for Yulia’.”

This and other protest demonstrations indicate that Yulia Tymoshenko’s styling as the unbending fighter for the freedom of Ukraine “works” politically. However, the numerous protests in Ukraine and at the European and international levels have failed so far to get her released from prison. While her former government members, Interior Minister Yuri Lutsenko and Environment Minister Heorhiy Filipchuk have meanwhile been released as a sign of good will in the direction of Brussels, Yulia Tymoshenko

herself has not. Instead, she is facing more charges for participation in a contract killing in the mid-1990s and for corruption.30

The most important figure in the struggle for her mother’s freedom is her daughter Evgenia Tymoshenko-Carr. She was constantly at her mother’s side during the trial and later became her ambassador and spokeswoman. She is gathering support above all in the member states of the EU, but also in Ukraine. A graduate from the London School of Economics, who is married to a British rock star, her appearances are reminiscent of her mother. This is due not least to the fact that she has meanwhile also dyed her brown hair blond and has again assumed the name Tymoshenko. This is especially true when – as is often the case – she delivers her speeches in front of a larger-than-life portrait of her mother.


For Evgenia, too, the paths of Yulia Tymoshenko and Ukraine are inextricably intertwined. In an appeal to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, she said: “My mother’s fate and the fate of my country are now one. If she dies, democracy will die as well.”31 This fits the image to which the multi-faceted pictures of Yulia Tymoshenko are contributing – the politician as the embodiment of the Ukrainian nation between tradition and the modern world.


Conclusion

Image constructions of politicians refer to the field of the politically imaginary. It is in the combination of the spheres of politics, everyday culture, emotionally charged life-worlds and lifestyles where voters can find themselves and feel touched by the message communicated in this way. Such emotional experience profiles can best be set up by means of visual communication.

Plenty of multifaceted pictures of Yulia Tymoshenko circulate in the political and media public. One constant is that each staging of the politician always also shows her as a woman: Tymoshenko never appears as androgynous or masculinised. In the framework of a spectrum of roles marked by gender-specifically coded representation forms, she plays like a virtuoso despite the fact that “the rules of politics are derived from the male social behaviour” (Kopecky 2011: 245). Several historical role models are at hand: already the English queen Elisabeth I. had herself depicted as an amazon warrior (ibid.: 244). All these pictures contribute to an image, to the “brand” Yulia Tymoshenko. This unmistakable “super image” consists of emotional, affective and cognitive components.

The meanwhile world famous hairstyle, the politician’s trademark, is a vital element of these visual representations. When Tymoshenko exceptionally wears a different hairstyle or thinks about changing it, this becomes a topic in the media. The announcement on her website, prior to the presidential election campaign 2010, that she was considering a change in her hairstyle and that she was working on a new image together with her stylist was not only discussed in the Ukrainian, but also in the international media32 (At the same time, the hype about Tymoshenko’s hairstyle is based on the fact that the relationship between politics and the media can be described as a reciprocal and interdependent system (cf. Plasser 2004).

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This is indicated, for instance, by an appearance of Lena Gercke, a model and TV host from Germany, at the Oktoberfest in Munich. She wore “a braided hair crown, the trademark of the Ukrainian politician” Yulia Tymoshenko;33 or by the styling of US singer Christina Aguilera during her promotional tour for her film “Burlesque”: She came to Berlin tuned up in the style of Yulia Tymoshenko: “The blond hair crown is her trademark. Now the old-fashioned looking hairstyle apparently starts its campaign towards Hollywood.”34 Tymoshenko’s status as a pop and fashion icon became already visible in 2006, however, when her golden hair crown

“(…) was to be admired throughout the entire Givenchy show.” In the meantime, the product “hairpiece Yulia Tymoshenko, braided crown, farmer braid” can also be purchased from several online mail order shops. Politics and popular culture are in an exchange relationship or interaction with each other (cf. Plasser 2004). Political images also have an effect on other segments of everyday life.

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Patterns of Corruption, Clientelism, and Party Patronage in Central European Communist and Post-Communist Societies

Vladimír Naxera

Abstract: This article deals with the issue of corruption, clientelism and party patronage in Central Europe during the communist and post-communist eras. In comparative studies on corruption in European countries, it is common for post-communist countries of Europe to be rated worst in terms of corruption. According to many authors, the growth in corruption after the fall of communism is largely due to the legacy of cultural patterns and the institutional configurations of communism. Reasons for this stance will be researched in the following work. We will point out a number of aspects of this phenomenon which have lasted until even after the transition to democracy and which have gained new dimensions. In connection with clientelism under communism, we will also mention the nomenclature system that was one of the fundamental principles of communist rule. This system will be considered as one of the most severe forms of party patronage, which is also closely connected to clientelism.

Keywords: corruption, clientelism, party patronage, communism, post-communism, transformation, nomenclature

Introduction

One of the most widely discussed topics present in society and media in recent times is undoubtedly corruption. Corruption and the fight against it are almost daily topics in news reporting, which constantly brings new information on corruption affairs. Corruption appears consistently in the speeches of politicians and political activists and also importantly in the electoral programs of political parties and the program declarations of newly formed governments. International comparisons on the state of corruption in European countries show that post-communist states are among those most plagued by corruption. Since the beginning of the 1990s, we can cite cases in these countries of political representatives in high positions accused and often convicted of corruption. Others were forced to leave their posts instead of facing trial. The involvement of a very large number of other politicians and

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1 For a comparison, see tables published by the World Bank or the Corruption Perception Index created by Transparency International.
civil servants in networks of corruption is often considered a “public secret”. This fact shows that corruption has worked its way into the highest political spheres of these countries. It is therefore surprising that in Czech political and scientific environments there has been no extensive and systematic research on corruption practices, while issues such as corruption and clientelism under state bureaucracy are de facto missing in terms of their interest to social scientists.

This article is meant to serve as a brief introduction to the understanding of corruption in both communist and post-communist societies in Central Europe. Its goal is to summarize present research of this issue and to provide a basic conceptualization of this phenomenon. In its introductory paragraphs, this work deals with corruption and its related terms such as clientelism and party patronage on a general level and will briefly evaluate corruption behavior in communist regimes. The following sections of this work will focus on corruption after the fall of communism and primarily on explaining the extent and forms of corruption and the impact of communism’s legacy on the present situation. This study is predominantly theoretical and strives to analyze this phenomenon on a general level; it does not, however, focus on specific cases which could lead to journalistic tendencies and simplifications.

Corruption, clientelism and party patronage – a brief definition of terms

In J. S. Nye’s classic definition (1967: 966), corruption is behavior that, for private financial or acquisition of status, deviates from formal responsibilities that stem from the public role. In simple terms, corruption is most often defined as the abuse of a public position for personal benefit. Leslie Holmes (1997 or 2003) lists four criteria that this behavior must fulfill in order to be perceived as corruption.

The first of these criteria, which is included in the previous definition, deals with an individual or group that holds a public function, mainly in the sphere of state...
administration. Here it is not important whether these individuals are appointed or elected. Secondly, this position must be connected to the authority to issue regulations connected with the administration of the country or with enforcing the law or other types of important resolutions. A “bribe” to a postal worker or a trolley driver thus does not qualify by definition. On the other hand, this definition can include, for example, an employee working in health care or a university lecturer who, although not part of the state bureaucratic system, hold the type of power listed in the previous definition. Thirdly, this given individual must carry out the act (at least in part) for purposes of personal enrichment. The fourth condition states that the individual holding the position is aware of the fact that his/her action (or inaction) is in conflict with the current, normative order or could be at least perceived as such.

The first of these conditions is very crucial. Only holding a public post can make it possible to illegally connect bureaucratic power with private interest (Holmes 1993: 70). If the owner or director of a private company nominates members of his/her family for managerial positions, it does not qualify as illegal behavior, as this person carries a right to do so. However, if this practice is transferred to the public sphere, it carries with it signs of nepotism and corrupt behavior, as family connections or any other personal feelings are not a necessary qualification on which should be based the selection of the members of modern bureaucracy.

The image of modern bureaucracy in Weber’s (e.g. 1998 or 2006) interpretation is very important for the concept of corruption. The development of individual feudal states, under which bureaucracy did not exist in the modern sense, led to a state in which groups of state officials created networks on a patron-client basis (Scott 1972: 89–94; Johnston 2001: 15). Further development, during which these networks began to emerge and bureaucracy began to appear in its modern context, culminated in the 19th century, when more democratic forms of government began to limit the aristocracy and the idea of the modern state was completely established (Scott 1972: 96). During the 18th and 19th centuries, modernization and enlightenment led to the disappearance in Western Europe of the concept of the state administration as private property (Habermas 2000). Thus, public finances in modern bureaucracy and state administration are separated from the private property of the official, while private matters are divided from those public. This situation everywhere is the result of long-term development (Weber 2006: 50). An official who does not hold office in terms of private ownership thus does not live off the profits of this “property”, but from income, which is of a dual nature. The first are gratuities and bribes that are a formally illegal form of this category of income. The second is a salary (either in the form of money or perquisites) (Weber 1998: 255).

The emergence of modern bureaucracy did not mean the demise of practices that were until then customary; however, they began to be perceived differently in
modernizing societies and began to be legally challenged. As this behavior did not completely disappear, we can detect corruption today in various societies and states around the world, including consolidated democracies (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman 2001). The difference is in its quantity and forms, in its perception in terms of society, and subsequently in its punishment by the state. Cases of corruption are in some countries tolerated by the state, as corruption is often a necessity for the economic survival of state employees (Green – Ward 2004: 15).

It is important to mention that corruption cannot be perceived as something objectively determined and as a more or less stably present form of deviant behavior. It is necessary to explore it in the context of various social systems. In individual social contexts, corruption is often considered to be various behaviors that are potentially perceived as socially deviant (Frič 2001). That which is considered corrupt behavior is thus variable in time and space, similarly to various social systems under which this behavior takes place.

The aforementioned definition deals with transcending the normative system. As each deviation relates to a specific set of norms that apply to a given society or community, it is not possible to characterize deviation without differentiating between these specific norms. Although the majority of authors consider corruption to be deviant behavior (Frič 2001: 66), it has a much wider and more significant social dimension.

Corruption is an informal political system (Scott 1972: 2–3; Frič 2001: 66). While election systems, political declarations, overall institutional structuring and other elements represent the formal structure of political organization, corruption is found under this layer as an informal system that is more or less connected to the formal one, often in an institutionalized manner. As we are dealing with the informal aspect, corruption may have similar causes, effects and often forms despite the fact that the political context is completely different (Scott 1972: 2–3). This aspect of the social system possesses its own rules of play, its own development mechanisms and so forth. According to some authors, corruption can help spread a so-called “corruption climate”. This refers to a set of collective concepts and cultural patterns that make corruption among citizens a given and customarily forgivable fact and a form of legitimate behavior (Frič 1999; Krčál 2012). Each act of corruption has norm-setting effects. Without them, all corruption would be divided into various random and isolated moral failures of individuals. In such a case, it would not be difficult to reduce corruption. This is itself a very important question – is corruption the failure of the individual or the system (Frič 2001: 66)? Corruption can gain control over whole branches of bureaucracy and even whole regimes – a solid example of this are the post-communist regimes discussed in this paper. This would not be possible without the creation of specific rules and personal ties.
Repetitive corrupt behavior produces the norms of corruption, which this behavior itself follows, subsequently supporting the spread of corruption.

Thus, from a normative standpoint, corruption is often considered a negative (deviant) phenomenon in spite of the fact that, as we have already outlined, corruption in the political cultures of certain societies (in which this “corruption climate” has spread) may be accepted by the political elite and the general public as a legitimate method of advancing interests and even as a method that does not necessarily interfere with economic development. Italy (Mareš 2006: 45) is often listed as a common example, as are the networks of corruption that have emerged in a number of post-communist countries (Glenny 2009).4

Often weak spots in the normative system are seen as the breeding ground for the growth of corruption and the spread of corruption norms. These weak spots are often attributed to forms of social disorganization (Merton 1961), which primarily emerges in three cases. The first is in situations under which there exist a number of varying rules at once which mutually contradict (or even exclude) one another. Individuals then are not sure of which rule to follow, and their selection may be influenced by corruption. The next example is a situation in which the adherence to norms does not lead to the desired reward or results. This is, for example, corruption behavior of officials who are not properly paid for performing their tasks. The final possibility connected with social disorganization is a period during which rules are completely absent. It is this state that is connected to the transformation of systems after the fall of communism. In this case, old norms no longer applied and new ones had still not been stably established in society (Frič 2001: 67–68). A relationship toward corruption is one of the defining traits of political culture (Mareš 2006: 45). This takes place in those countries that are going through a transformation. The political elite often accept new legislative norms that label corruption an illegal phenomenon; these norms, however, often linger due to a lack of internalization by members of society (Berger – Luckman 1999). Often, in spite of political declarations and the harmfulness of corruption, the political will to realistically reduce it is absent (Holmes 2003: 202).

In the event of the failure of the official set of norms, space opens for the spread of corruption norms. In an environment where these norms apply, it is not possible to define corruption as a deviation, but as an answer to the actual state of the system

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4 There exist practical examples of tolerated corruption actually functioning in a positive manner. One example is ethnically divided Macedonia, which recent research has labeled as being in a state of total state capture, i.e. in a state overwhelmingly plagued by corruption, where private or party property and interests have completely overtaken state institutions (Green – Ward 2004: 17). However, corruption between representatives of Albanian and Macedonian political parties, i.e. corruption that takes place despite all levels of ethnic division, paradoxically helps to suppress ethnic conflict in the country (Hislope 2008).
The system thus fails, giving the impression that corruption could actually prevent disorganization, as it could bring rules to a situation where they previously did not work or did not exist, thus protecting society from anomie (see Durkheim 2005).

The reality of the matter is not so idyllic. Corruption rules are in conflict with the “ideal” (but not necessarily official) normative system. Corruption then does not shed its disorganized character even in cases where it enters environments that (usually temporarily) are not regulated by norms (Frič 2001: 68).

Outline of corruption behavior typology

Corruption comes in many various forms and types, some of which are institutionalized. All types, however, can be divided into several categories. The first is corruption of lower officials (which includes e.g. corruption behavior of transit police officers, preferential behavior in lists of patients or paid examinations at universities). The next two types intervene into higher politics. The first example of this “grand corruption” or political corruption are advantages that are used or abused by highly ranking officials or politicians. The final type is “state capture by corrupt networks”, which is a testament of the overall weakness of state institutions and their subordination to the personal interests of individual political actors (Karklins 2002). The World Bank (2000: 3) characterizes the state of “state capture” as activities of individuals, groups and public or private companies that focus on influencing the creation of laws, regulations, taxes and other governmental regulations to their own benefit. This is done via illegal bonuses for said state employees who have the ability to influence these regulations and also through gaining preferential and informal access channels. It is important to mention concealed alliances between the political and business interests of state officials, which is typical for many countries in their processes of transformation. In spite of the various forms which this “state capture” may take, it undermines or even replaces legitimate means of influencing and mediating interests by limiting access of competitors to state offices and the opportunity to establish competitive interests which stems from this.

Individual categories of corruption are defined based on whether they concern the lower or higher levels of bureaucracy and politics, whether the corrupt behavior is of individual actors or a whole corruption network, whether the corrupt behavior is initiated by an “official” or a “citizen”, and also whether this corruption is systematic or not. Types of specific corruption practices differ based on many factors; however, it is possible to define three general categories of corruption behavior.

In the first group of corruption behavior types, Rasma Karklins (2002: 24–25) places several specific examples – accepting or giving bribes for means of overstepping the law, the intentional creation of confusion and overregulation which leads
to corruption, and the abuse of authority in issuing various licenses and carrying out inspections. The most common form of corruption according to investigations is the type previously mentioned, among police, in health care and in education. The next category is connected to highly ranking politicians and in official circles. This category mainly includes corruption connected with the abuse of state property, but also clientelism and its various forms – nepotism (preferential treatment to family members) and party patronage.

Clientelism (and also patrimonialism) is closely connected to corruption (Green – Ward 2004: 11). Patronal relations, which develop for example under a communist nomenclature (see below), are often considered to be a form of corruption (Holmes 2003: 195–196) – it is actually considered to be one of its most severe forms. The term clientelism refers to the pattern of social exchange between a patron (usually holding a political or administrative function) and a client, who can be a private entity, a company or even an official in a lower position. Patrons use their influence for the benefit of the client, who in turn offers the client some reciprocal service – electoral support, a personal gift and so on. Clientelism can exist parallel to a modern government and bureaucracy.

Patrimonialism is, on the contrary, the antithesis of a modern government and is a form of clientelism in a system where no rational or legal bureaucracy exists. Authority based on patrimonialism is, according to Weber, typical for pre-industrial societies that were founded on personal relationships (Weber 1998: 248–249). Clientelism, which can be found even in developed democracies, is connected with corruption in the fact that both models of exchange are based primarily on the ability to create networks, on “instrumental friendship”, and on a relationship of exchange. Despite the expansion of this model in democracies, its manifestations in connection with corruption in non-democratic or undeveloped countries usually have much more dramatic economic consequences (Green – Ward 2004: 23–25).

We can speak about other phenomenon closely related to the principles of clientelism – about so-called party patronage. Recently, this term has become a subject of interest among social scientists, although it is actually a relatively old concept which appears in the works of Max Weber (1998: 254–255). Weber describes patronage as a system in which important offices are always, after elections, put into the hands of the followers of the victorious candidate or party. A good example is interwar Czechoslovakia, where each new election caused a massive exchange of posts and positions – e.g. directors of schools who were chosen according to election results in a given city. These appointed candidates often do not need to fulfill any other prerequisites for their position apart from providing their party with quality services. In the event that such a system spreads significantly, it can be compared to the theoretical concept of a cartel party (compare Katz – Mair 1995;
Katz – Mair 2009), which instead of advocating ideological interests is focused on ruling the state by gaining as many lucrative posts as possible. One of the authors dealing with party patronage is, for example, Petr Kopecký, who defines patronage as the partisan appointment for functions in the public sector (Kopecký – Spirova 2011: 899). As we will deal with below, communist hierarchy based on the principle of nomenclature was an example of very austere party patronage.

**Corruption in communist regimes**

Corruption is based on the connection of a monopoly and the freedom of behavior and exclusion of public responsibility (Karklins 2002: 23) – in other words, corruption is fostered by institutional settings in which the state and its institutions hold a monopoly in many areas of daily life and officials are not responsible to the public in carrying out their functions, which ultimately leads to less control by the public, a situation valid (not only) for communist regimes.

Many of us can remember references to small-scale bribes in films made in the communist era (or later films set in this era). Such bribes were motivated by the desire, for example, to be given preference in a line for buying meat, to be placed before others for medical examinations, to be accepted to a university or in a general effort to gain any sort of product or service that was in shortage (Uslaner 2008b: 11). This small-scale corruption was not, however, the only form of corruption in communist regimes.

Contrary to the belief of many at the time, corruption under communism was rampant (Holmes 2003: 194). Contrary to today’s situation, corruption (and mainly corruption in high political and official circles) was a topic that was not spoken about. This stemmed largely from the media, which was thoroughly controlled by the state/party apparatus. Corruption cases came into the light of the public only in situations where the regime’s representatives wanted it to. Informing on criminal activities of state representatives only became a common issue after communism was abandoned (Holmes 2003: 194).

Let us first examine the clientelist relationships in communist regimes. Schöpflin (1984: 394–399) divides such personal relations into three types – firstly, classic patron-client relationships (which, according to the author were most developed in the communist regimes of Balkan states); secondly, relationships based on “shared experience” (as an example Schöpflin cites relationships between Yugoslavian partisans who lingered on long after the war)’ and thirdly, as the most common type, networks of contacts where relationships of exchange were advantageous for both sides.

In communist regimes, it was possible to find many types of corruption behaviors which remain present in post-communist societies (and of course in other social
systems). Some other types of post-communist corruption, however, were logically not present in the communist era – an example is the extensive corruption connected with privatization or with the financing of political parties. There are also some types of corruption that were removed, for example the common corruption connected to maintaining the economic plan or types that were at least weakened (Holmes 2003: 195). Other types of corruption behavior merely changed shape but stayed just as pervasive. One example is clientelism, which began to develop after the fall of communism in a completely new environment and ceased to be connected only to various significant posts under the communist party. This clientelism was further maintained along party lines, but under post-communist regimes it (usually) stayed on in pluralist party systems.

Aside from these previously mentioned types of corruption ranging from giving bribes to employees in health care to pervasive clientelism or corruption connected with the necessity to maintain economic plans, corruption under communism also included, for example, the abuse of unauthorized use of state property or the intentional failure to fulfill responsibilities (e.g. during audits of the previously-mentioned maintenance of the economic plan). In some communist regimes, nepotism and other similar negative elements were strongly present.

In examining the works of various authors dealing with corruption in communist regimes, we find a large number of various classification systems. Apart from Schöpflin’s previously mentioned categories, we can cite Lampert’s (1985: 269–270) division of corruption ties in the concept of six basic types of corruption based on the study of abuse of office in the Soviet Union. Lampert created a classification system based on Soviet criminal law in the categories of crimes against socialist ownership, economic crimes and crimes committed by officials. His six types are the misappropriation of property under socialist ownership, untruthful declarations (e.g. on fulfillment of economic plans), the falsification of documents (which is a category similar to the previous one but connected to different types of offices), accepting or giving bribes, deception of clients (or customers), and lastly the use of collective property as a basis for illegal forms of the production of wealth.

Based on this categorization and his own research, Leslie Holmes (1993: 79–88) expands the number of methods of corruption behavior to twenty. The goal of this study, however, is not to describe this typology in great detail, as several of these practices also cited by other authors have already been discussed above. It is important to mention that techniques of corruption mentioned in Holmes’s (1993) work and in others can be (just as we will see in the following chapter on post-communist corruption) included in general categories of small and large (or political) corruption (Karklins 2002).
We can state that corruption gradually gained strength with the development of communist regimes and these systems, in their final phases in the 1980’s, eventually became completely overgrown with corruption. Corruption practices dominated the majority of socialist bureaucracy (Frič 2001). Mostly in the Soviet Union and China, strong corruption networks existed that were based on patronage relationships, the single goal of which was to exploit the regime to its own advantage (Jowitt 1983; Holmes 1993 et al). Parts of these networks have remained even after the fall of communism.5

The nomenclature system – social hierarchy, clientelism and party patronage among the communist elite

Communist regimes were specific social institutions that due to their internal characteristics varied from other non-democratic regimes. Some of the characteristic traits of these regimes included the supremacy of the communist party and subsequent social hierarchy determined by the political or possibly cultural capital of the individual (Szelényi – Treiman 1991: 278). Belonging to a nomenclature was primarily determined by political capital.6 A nomenclature system is a very significant expression of the phenomenon of party patronage (Holmes 2003: 197; Rigby – Harasymiw 1983). Many authors (e.g. Holmes 2003: 197) state that such types of rampant party patronage, which are often based on corrupt exchanges, are reflected in the degree and nature of corruption in post-communist systems.

Hierarchy in terms of an asymmetric social relationship of two or more parties in which one party possesses certain qualities or conditions that the other does not (e.g. a nobility vs. a lack thereof, access to information vs. the lack of access, etc.) has always existed in various forms including modern societies. Medieval scholars inferred a divine hierarchy from the bible and from this a church hierarchy was created. This was subsequently copied in a secular hierarchy. In modern society, hierarchy manifests itself in various institutions – in terms of the army, police, state bureaucracy, companies, political parties, etc. (see Kabele – Hájek 2008).

As a part of the newspeak of the communist apparatus, nomenclature was perceived in terms of the hierarchy of positions in state bureaucracy approved by a party committee or positions under the communist ruling elite. Therefore, it was

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5 For more information on corruption behavior in communist regimes, see Holmes (1993). In addition to the previously mentioned typology, Holmes in his work includes dozens of specific examples of corruption behavior in selected communist countries – mainly China and the Soviet Union – but in other European and Asian communist countries.

6 The terms cultural capital, social capital and economic capital are used in this paper in the sense of Pierre Bourdieu’s multidimensional analysis of social structure (Bourdieu 1986; Růžička – Vašát 2011). Political capital relates to a specific form of social capital and was determined, e.g. by membership in the communist party.
a group of the most prominent political and economic elites. Positions (or functions), which were included in the nomenclature system, were considered to be so important that a codified system of principles was utilized in the process of filling them. The purpose of this process was to ensure that all at least relatively significant posts were filled by those loyal to the regime. The previously mentioned system of authorization was used to ensure this.

Nomenclature was then divided into various levels (e.g. the levels of city, district, region and central levels) and furthermore into two basic types that can be labeled as narrower nomenclatures and ordinary nomenclatures. Lucie Cviklová (2008) cites specific examples of these two groups on a district level in communist Czechoslovakia – in terms of narrow nomenclature on the district level, there were a maximum of a few dozen individuals that were associated, knew each other well and regularly met in work and even personal environments. These were the highest political and economic elites of the district, who created good contacts based on personal relationships. As various studies show, the greatest advantage of belonging to a narrow nomenclature was not the considerable salary (this salary was often not more than experts working in industry), but the opportunity to become involved in clientelist structures. Very soon after nomenclature systems began to function, classic patron-client ties were created between the narrow nomenclature on one hand and “regular people” on the other.

Contrarily, serial nomenclatures on district levels encompassed several thousand positions, including all at least relatively important institutions such as directors of smaller organizations, cultural institutions, schools and so forth. Many of these individuals were not even in the party, had no practical power, and were included in the nomenclature system intentionally. The aim of this was to allow the party to make decisions on nominating people for the highest number of posts. This division of course only corresponds to ideal types, as there were of course realistic examples of members of the serial nomenclature who possessed a significant amount of influence. For example, a director of a secondary school decided on admission or non-admission for study, the director of a hospital could ensure preferential treatment, and so forth. The source of their power therefore did not lie in holding a prominent position in the nomenclature, but in the fact that they provided scarce goods. Advantageous corruption behavior can be connected to such positions.

The system of nomenclature created an exclusive and (to a certain degree) informed group. Its members fulfilled various tasks, the purpose of which was often not connected to their content but to the demonstration of party work, loyalty to the party and comradeship in work (Kabele 2005). Nomenclature however did not function merely as a system of party supervision over society, but also (by providing its members with political capital) as a means of upward social mobility. This
political capital, which was sometimes combined with cultural capital (e.g. in the form of a specific education), defined an individual’s membership in the communist elite (Szelényi – Treiman 1991: 287). In most cases, however, political capital proved to be more important. Thus for elite economic functions, political reliability was more important than being expertly informed. Thus we reach the fulfillment of the concept of party patronage.

Based on the primary functions of hierarchical relationships expressed by the principle of nomenclature, the elite of communist parties divided up not only political functions but filled all strategic positions in non-political areas as well. Thus, a situation arose much like that which Milovan Djilas (1977) described years ago in his well-known work. Furthermore, the modernization of society was managed from the level of central power and mainly concerned members of the communist elite (Bernik 2000; Cabada 2009; Staniszkis 2006; Tomšíč 2011).

Beginning in the 1970s, it was possible to identify the partial, recurring inclusion of communist East-Central Europe and China in the international system. This partial reintegration of communist systems created a whole array of new opportunities for members of the nomenclature, who thus gained access to hard currency. With this came the opportunity to establish meta-exchanges in the area of the grey economy ruled by the nomenclature (Staniszkis 2006: 52). A meta-exchange is defined here as exchange on superior markets, the object of which are the conditions of “common” (material) exchange that takes place on primary markets and is in certain opposition to meta-exchange (see Collins 1990). This can be, for example, operations in hard currency, exchange concerning the purchase of stocks, issuing licenses and so forth.

Together with this phenomenon, there developed interests that surpassed the possibilities of communism and new forms of “political capitalism”. Jadwiga Staniszkis (1990) defines political capitalism as a form of enabling the private creation of capital under a communist economy by means of transferring funds from the state sector. The goal of this principle, which is established from the top down, was to weaken the frustrations of the ruling class. This principle, however, significantly sped up the demise of the communist system of production. A characteristic of political capitalism is also that it shows strong signs of “political allowances” (i.e. the preferential access to information, loans, guarantees, etc., which lowers investment risk) and mainly the utilization of personal ties created in the final phase of communism (Staniszkis 2006: 54). Establishment of a meta-exchange in the final phase of communism gave rise to conflict in the nomenclature (among “large-scale political capitalists” who operated on superior markets and “small-scale” political capitalists who functioned in the system of material exchange) (Collins 1990: 112).
Thus the establishment of the meta-exchange mechanism caused a fissure in communist nomenclature, parts of which began to strive toward freeing itself from the binds of communism. This partially dealt with a section of the communist elite, who took part in activities in the previously mentioned second society, thus creating hybrid economic institutions just before the fall of communism (see Machonin 1997).

**The growth of corruption over the course of post-communist transformation**

As we have pointed out above, corruption was strongly present in communist regimes. According to many authors (e.g. Holmes 2003, Sajó 2003; Åslund 2007 et al), the process of transformation from communism is connected with an additional growth of corruption. While some patterns of corruption have remained from the times of communism, new opportunities created in the process of transformation have allowed for the emergence and flourishing of many new types of corruption.

Leslie Holmes (2003) lists some of the main factors that have impacted the growth of corruption in the post-communist environment in the era starting from the fall of communism. The first of these factors is connected to the legacy of communism. This legacy can appear in a number of various forms. Firstly, we can refer to the influence of the power structure under communism – this structure was clearly hierarchically built and no responsibility of the public existed. This is connected to the non-development of what Holmes (2003: 196) calls moral responsibility. He elaborates on this concept by referring to the overall lack of respect for formal and legally based procedures. The second factor Holmes links with the legacy of communism is an existing institutional ambiguity in spite of a clear hierarchical structure. This stemmed from the unclear relationship between the state and the party (see Kabele – Hájek 2008), ultimately leading to unclear boundaries between the state and private sector after the fall of communism. Many post-communist politicians had (or still have) a problem in understanding the concept of a “conflict of interests”, which promotes a high level of political corruption and lowers the chances of repressing it. The third factor of this legacy deals with the size of the communist state apparatus. After communism was abandoned, individual countries were not significantly successful in quickly doing away with positions that were not were not typical for developed countries – this is (by vast majority in post-communist countries) accompanied by a rising number of state officials whose agendas also become wider. Such developments offer good conditions for corrupt behavior. In some situations, the system of patronage as it functioned under communist regimes can also be perceived as a form of corruption (see previous). This situation has continued to the present in many post-communist countries and,
although similar relationships can differ from country to country, they often remain one of the fundamental characteristics of the system. We can conclude from the previously mentioned information that the persistence of certain institutional and cultural patterns created under communism fostered the spread of corruption after its demise. The nature of institutions in communist regimes and in the course of transformation is connected to the creation of a specific political culture, which is linked to low public participation and social mistrust (see Müller 2012; Howard 2002a; Howard 2002b; Uslaner 2008a et al.) – these are all aspects that also seem to foster corruption.

The second factor is linked to the complexity of the transformation of post-communist countries. After the fall of communism, individual countries were exposed (in terms of the nature of communist regimes) to a much more extensive transformation than in past transformations in Southern Europe or Latin America. In addition to this complex political restructuring, it was necessary for a similar process to arise in the economy and in all of society (e.g. Melich 2005; Roeder 1999). At the same time, the whole transformation took place in an environment where old (or communist) law and norms were removed, but new ones had not yet been established and internalized by society, thus leading to social disorganization (see Frič 2001: 67–68). In the first phase of this transformation, we can refer to the weakness of institutions and the public, leading to the creation of a suitable environment for the corrupt behavior of (but not limited to) state officials.

The third aspect is fundamental for the majority of problems connected with post-communism, including corruption. During the communist era, all wealth (and mainly the means of production) was owned and controlled by the state. After the abandonment of communism, it was necessary to privatize these assets. Situations where no classic capital-owning class existed in post-communist countries led to the disordered process of privatization (see e.g. Cviklová 2008; Staniszkis 2006; Glenny 2009 et al).

Positions of some members of the nomenclature were used during this privatization to gain advantages in acquiring property for strictly private purposes or manipulating the sale of property for the benefit of affiliated investors – this was done either by artificially reducing prices or through non-transparent dealings. In all cases, this situation helped strengthen officials and politicians in key positions through the private purchase of property or through bribes and bonuses from investors. This environment, which was ideal for corruption, was additionally supported

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7 As Leslie Holmes (1997: 286) states, during the rule of Augusto Pinochet a total of 470 companies and organizations were privatized over the course of 16 years. At the time, this transfer of property was considered to be a massive economic transformation. The extent of privatization in post-communist countries is visible in the fact that many of them were able to privatize thousands of companies in just a third of this time.
by the fact that these transforming countries had initially no legislation concerning conflict of interests (see previous). In the event that such legislation was accepted, it was usually ineffective (Holmes 2003: 198). In addition, Holmes (2003: 198) adds that in the time of privatization the “West” had limited means with which to invest in privatization in post-communist countries and therefore it was undertaken in vast majority by the local elites. The number of companies that were bought out during privatization by international companies, however, makes this argument rather debatable.

The last of these factors, which had an impact on the growth of corruption after the end of communism, is the international situation – more specifically that post-communist states “emerged” in a period when (economic) neoliberalism was the predominant approach being applied by Western governments (compare Wacquant 2009a or 2009b). According to this pattern, the state apparatus should be as small as possible and state property and costs should be at a minimum. Due to pressure on privatization, the outsourcing of state services, poorer loyalty of employees to employers (i.e. the state) and a lower degree of social responsibility, this model is also linked to the growth of corruption (compare Keller 2011). In the situation where a large portion of the services that the state needs to operate are commissioned to private companies, it is more likely that a space will open for corruption behavior than if these tasks were carried out by state institutions via their own capabilities and resources. Wasting these contracts or raising prices on them is also connected to such a situation. How is this linked to the post-communist environment? The neoliberal model is not the only form of market organization. An alternate form is, for example, a welfare state, i.e. a model that still (albeit in abridged form) functions in Scandinavian states. Post-communist countries have, however, taken the path of neoliberalism. Leslie Holmes (2003: 1999) assumes that if post-communist countries accepted the Scandinavian model, the gap between the previous and present situation (or the situation during transformation) would not be as pronounced and not as many opportunities for corrupt behavior would appear.

**Conclusion: lasting corruption and a “weak” post-communist state?**

In post-communist (and other) countries, we can find a whole array of anti-corruption practices beginning with lawmaking and ending with international cooperation and the actions of civil society. In spite of the various tools used in the fight against corruption, their realistic impact is, in light of available proof, often minimal. There

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8 It is necessary to mention, however, that neoliberalism has never been introduced in these transforming countries. Political representatives interpreted this model in various ways and in a large majority of cases limited it to the quickest and non-systematic privatization of a large quantity of companies in some sectors, while in others they hesitated with privatization (e.g. the banking sector in the Czech Republic).
are many reasons for this, but possibly the most important one is the lack of political will of individual representatives of post-communist countries (Holmes 2003: 202). The vast majority of anti-corruption measures are not actually aimed at the core of systematic corruption (Frič 2011). This is not always only due to the lack of political will, but can actually be due to a direct intent (see Frič 2001) – anti-corruption campaigns are often only a tool used in a political competition by one candidate against another. In extreme cases, there can even be efforts to maximize corruption through centralizing it via anti-corruption regulations (Sajó 2003: 178).

It is possible that corruption in post-communist Europe will in the near future decrease due to appropriate institutional regulation, higher participation of the media and the strengthening of civil societies. It is just as likely, however, for corruption to remain present in the same degree or even for it to become even more deeply rooted in society and its institutions. This is a concept under which corruption becomes the “norm” among the highest state representatives. It is the political will of these actors that can most effectively suppress corruption (Holmes 2003: 199).

It is essential to perceive corruption as one of the elements that leads to a state’s weakness (Holmes 1997: 280). In communist times, society’s weakness was due to a forced form of the state and collective property rights. Communist regimes are often represented as strong (but repressive), but actually the opposite is true. Although these regimes took over many functions that other non-communist regimes left to their societies, communist governments were relatively weak (Kabele – Hájek 2008). In post-communism, there is an opposite relationship than during communism. Society and other non-state actors take over the functions of the state that weak institutions were unable to carry out. In extreme cases, such a state can lose its monopoly on using violence on its own territory. In more common cases, certain segments of the state are “privatized” and become a part of the creation of private capital (Staniszkis 2006: 20–21).

One of the cases of this weakness is linked with corruption. In communist regimes, corruption was a common phenomenon, but was one that was made taboo to a certain degree by the media of the time (Holmes 1993). After communism ended and during the democratization of various countries, a whole array of legislative norms was espoused in order to fight against corruption. Corruption began to be strongly viewed as a negative phenomenon (Mareš 2006: 45; Frič 2001 et al) that was incompatible with a liberal democracy. Even despite the verbal condemnation of various types of corruption by the elite and public (Uslaner 2008b), corruption has not been significantly suppressed. Sufficient political will of highly positioned representatives is primarily missing (Holmes 2003: 202). Proof of this, for example, is the corruption climate in police forces (Frič 2001). The police, whose representatives come from its common ranks and are accused of the intentional production of
regulations that actually facilitate corruption or regulations that make its investiga-
tion impossible (e.g. the rule that for corruption to be investigated in high political
circles, the consent of the chief of police is needed), cannot effectively battle against
corruption and thus leads to the weakening of the whole system of state institutions.
As the absolute removal of corruption would be a much too utopian vision, the goal
of the battle against corruption becomes more an effort to prevent the fracture of
legitimacy of political institutions than striving for its absolute suppression.

Small-scale corruption is also proof of the disrespect to norms, which does not
however carry more serious political consequences (aside from the fact that it
shows a disrespect of norms in general). As mentioned previously, the environment
of post-communist transformation allowed for social disorganization, which then
created an appropriate state for the spread of corruption norms. In situations where
no rules existed (in which the old communist rules were invalid but new rules had
either not yet been put in place or internalized by members of society), systematic
corruption, which was not only the mere deviation of certain members, flourished
(Frič 2001). State institutions are also weakened by clientelism, which causes in-
dividuals whose only “qualification” is a personal acquaintanceship with their su-
periors to be placed in state office positions. Many positions that were meant to be
highly specialized (e.g. Minister of Defense) were often held by people who were
absolutely unacquainted with the position (Lupták 2009: 200–201; Naxera 2013).

High political corruption, which often bordered with situations when state institu-
tions came under the control or influence of private business institutions (the previ-
ously mentioned model of “state capture”) and formal and informal layers of the
political system are strongly combined, is a testament to the weakness of a state and
its fundamental characteristics. This informal element in institutions can take over
and decisions are thus made based on personal relationships instead of decisions
based on “non-personal, bureaucratic” grounds. This is a state that is incompatible
with the modern form of institutions, where a held public office is not viewed as

Many authors (e.g. Holmes 2003; Sajó 2003; Åslund 2007 et al) agree that the
level of corruption after the demise of communism has risen. Reasons for this may
include the institutional and subsequent cultural legacy of communism and the
complexity of transformation, all of which can be linked to the legacy of state
ownership – in a very short amount of time, a very large number of companies
and organizations were privatized, which ultimately led to better opportunities for
corruption behavior. The course of privatization was supported by the concept of
neoliberalism that dominated during the 1980s – a concept that many of the post-
communist elite used to hide behind but in reality did nothing to fulfill.
The degree of corruption in post-communism is high. We cannot, however, consider this to be something strictly specific to post-communism – corruption to varying degrees is found de facto in all regimes in the world. This paper, the goal of which is to provide a brief summary of present knowledge on corruption in post-communist societies, strives to point out that the specific element of corruption in post-communism is rather the degree and specific form of corrupt behavior that often stem from the communist pasts of these systems.

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Patterns of Corruption, Clientelism, and Party Patronage in Central European Communist and Post-Communist Societies

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Governance of international migration of highly-skilled foreigners: an empirical analysis from the Czech Republic

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Abstract: This paper discusses the Czech immigration policy of highly-skilled foreigners. First, we set the definition of highly-skilled foreigners applicable to the Czech Republic that takes into account not only commonly used aspects of education and work position of highly-skilled foreigners but also statistical classification of occupations practically used in the Czech Republic. Another part of the paper focuses on assessing the openness of the Czech migration policy of highly-skilled foreigners. In this respect, we created and applied the index of immigration of highly-skilled foreigners from third countries to instruments of the Czech admission policy distributed according to the relevant types of migration on long-term stays and temporary ones. Results indicate that the most open instrument of the Czech immigration policy is the Fast-track project of temporary stays applicable to employees of transnational corporations transferred through intra-company transfer to the Czech Republic. Also relatively open instruments of long-term movements are the Blue and Green Cards.

Keywords: Highly-skilled foreigners, definition of highly-skilled foreigners, immigration policy, CZ-ISCO classification

Introduction

Global labour supply and demand has been developing in the context of contemporary technological, economic as well as political changes. Since the 1990s, developed countries have allowed the entry of an increasing number of highly-skilled foreigners and this trend is expected to continue in the coming decades. Increased demand for skilled labours in developed economies makes migration a regularly discussed topic by governments on a local, regional, national, international as well as supranational level. Each of these authorities contributes to the debate on immigration from their point of view and representing their concerns. (Chaloff, Lemaitre, 2009; Appave, Cholewinski 2008; UN 2005)

In theoretical contributions, migration of highly-skilled foreigners is being understood in a broader context of global economic processes. (Koser, Salt 2007) We identified three key theoretical perspectives of international migration applicable

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1 The contribution was worked out within the project of institutional support PRVOUK P43-Geografie.
not only to highly-skilled foreigners but also migration as well. These perspectives have their own characteristics and specifications, and are mutually complementary to each other: the first one is focused on immigration policies through which the receiving country’s governments regulate the flow of people, often trying to balance between employers’ needs, local workforce and national, particularly economic, interests. (see Davis, Hart 2010; Khoo, McDonald, Voigt-Graf, Hugo 2007; Koser, Salt 1997) Another one is devoted to the International Spatial Division of Labour (ISDL) (including the concept of global cities) that is prevalent in Transnational Corporations (TNCs) employing significant number of employees and increasing their production and trade in the global world. (Koser, Salt 1997; Khoo, McDonald, Voigt-Graf, Hugo 2007; see also Beaverstock 1991; 1992). And the last perspective deals with links between global economic systems of trade, finance and labour mobility. (Koser, Salt 1997, see also Khoo, Hugo, McDonald 2010; OECD 2002)

Immigration policies are the means that enable developed countries to control the inflow of immigrants, as well as their skill composition and structure. Moreover, immigration policies are understood to become more interconnected with technological and economic development and strategies and that their overall aim is to meet economic needs of respective countries. (Li, Wang 2010; Appave, Cholewinski 2008) The level of flow of highly-skilled foreigners shall not be, therefore studied only in connection with push/pull factors that are primarily considered to be various socioeconomic variables, but also in a broader context of immigration policies. In fact, highly restrictive immigration policies can make economic push/pull factors less important which could reduce the direction of the migrant flow. The flow of highly-skilled foreigners into host countries is considered to be desirable as it does not only solve the shortage of this group of the labour force but also brings human capital, international knowledge as well as promotes innovations. (Appave, Cholewinski 2008; OECD 2002)

One of the means of measuring the labour market mobility is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) it was published in 2004 for the first time. Though MIPEX does not differ between different skill levels of migrants, it provides the picture about differences in immigration policies between countries. Based on MIPEX results, the Czech Republic is evaluated as preparing for its labour mobility needs which is not typical for countries in Central and Eastern Europe. (see MIPEX 2013)

The paper is aimed at two areas: first, to define highly-skilled foreigners so that the definition may be broadly accepted by Czech authorities. Even though the

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2 Afterwards, MIPEX was also published in 2007 (MIPEX II) and 2011 (MIPEX III). MIPEX project is led by the British Council, the Migration Policy Group and partners in the 31 participating EU and non-EU countries.
notion of highly-skilled migration is broadly applied by Czech migration authori-
ties, its definition has not been explicitly expressed, yet. The definition will reflect
availability of statistical data, current immigration policy and aspects of the ap-
proach of governmental authorities to this topic; second, to compare the openness
of Czech immigration policies and various admission mechanisms with focus on
highly-skilled non-EEA\(^{3}\) foreigners. The analysis will be carried out through the
index of the immigration of highly-skilled foreigners (“index of IHSF”).

The paper is structured into six parts. The introduction is followed by part 2
which discusses definition of highly-skilled foreigners, and then part 3 introduces
relevant literature on international labour migration of highly-skilled foreigners.
Part 4 specifies immigration policies for highly-skilled foreigners in the Czech Rep-
public and defines highly-skilled foreigners to be applicable to Czech authorities.
Part 5 on inflow and distribution of highly-skilled foreigners in the Czech Republic
is followed by conclusions.

**Migration of highly-skilled foreigners**

The literature on highly-skilled migration is rich, however, still restrained in
sense to provide a clear concept of defining highly-skilled foreigners that will be
discussed in Part 3 and specifications that constitutes this migration. (Koser, Salt
1997) Based on the character of this paper, we will look more closely at the theo-
retical framework related to immigration policies of highly-skilled foreigners.

Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) characterised two main principles through which
countries attract highly-skilled foreigners – supply – and demand-driven principles.
Demand-driven principle reflects employers’ needs for workers with certain skills.
This approach is often accompanied by a test of the local labour market that is car-
rried out through advertising for the vacant position with the responsible authority
for a given period of time (usually one week to one month) to ensure that there is
not an adequate local worker available for the vacant position. Nevertheless, some
countries use shortage occupation lists that exempt employers from advertising
the vacant position where an obvious shortage of the labour force exists. (Chaloff,
Lemaitre 2009) The other principle of supply-driven migration policy refers to the
situation when the destination country advertises the willingness to attract potential
candidates to immigrate there. Applications are usually independent of the concrete
job offer and candidates are selected on the basis of certain characteristics (e.g. age,

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\(^{3}\) Non-EEA refers to other than EEA countries. EEA refers to the European Economic Area that
includes EU countries, Norway and Iceland. Even though Switzerland is not a member of EU or
EEA, the Czech Republic applies same principles of the immigration policy as if Switzerland was
a member of EU or EEA. Therefore, when referring to EEA, we will consider also Switzerland in
this paper.
education, language knowledge and occupation) for which they get points (hence “point system”). Individuals who get over the certain threshold of points are granted the right to immigrate to the country. (Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009) As Chaloff and Lemaitre (2009) noticed, the current trend is to transfer the responsibility of hiring foreigners from the governmental authorities onto employers so the demand-driven principle is more popular approach applied by countries when drafting immigration policies. (Cerna 2012; Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009)

There are several policies being applied for both supply- and demand-driven immigration principles. One of them is diploma recognition used by host countries to enable comparability of education reached abroad with the education system in the host country. This approach is for example applied by EU countries in case of “regulated professions” (such as doctors, architects etc.). (Peixoto 2001a) Nevertheless, some countries worldwide have incorporated this policy into standard immigration procedures of obtaining permits to work no matter what position the individual will carry out. (Peixoto, 2001a; PwC 2012a, b) Another of the country’s immigration policies concerns general quota or numerical caps on inflow of new workers from certain countries or on certain work positions, eventually both. (Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009) This approach was applied in the examples of the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, South Korea or Australia during the period of the current economic crisis. (Cerna 2010)

Countries’ immigration policy usually differs between two types of stays based on their expected duration and eventual possibility of the settlement: 1) long-term stay migrants usually obtain renewable permits of stay provided that they meet certain conditions (e.g. keep the job) before they are granted a permanent residence after several years or citizenship of the host country. These immigrants are expected to eventually settle permanently; 2) temporary migrants receive permits which cannot be renewed or can on a limited basis only. These foreigners usually leave the host country to return to their country of origin and permanent settlement is not expected in these cases. Temporary permits are usually granted to personnel such as seasonal workers, students, trainees, service providers, visiting researchers or academics and also intra- and inter-company transferees that are closely related to ISDL. (Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009; Koser, Salt 1997; Peixoto 2001a, b)

Intra-company transfers of highly-skilled managers and professional staff among branches of TNCs offices in different countries are an example of temporary migration. These movements are usually connected with professional development strategy of the corporation and/or work on specific projects. (Khoo, Hugo, McDonald 2010; Khoo, McDonald, Voigt-Graf, Hugo 2007, Peixoto 2001a, b; Salt 1983) From a policy point of view, employees must have been employed with the company in another country usually for the minimum of 12 months before being
transferred, and usually has to be employed on managerial or specialised positions. Some countries such as Ireland apply the condition of a minimum salary, another country may apply a limited period of stay (Canada and USA limits the stay to seven years for executives and five years for specialists, Italy and Ireland up to five years). (Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009)

Another example of temporary migration of highly-skilled foreigners is the movement between two different corporations (inter-company transfer) allocated in various countries which differs this type of transfer from the one in the paragraph above. In practice, Mode 4 of the General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) is aimed at facilitating the temporary movements of professionals in order to deliver services across borders swiftly. Employers are driven to use this approach that enables them flexible and rapid response to changing market, to maximise revenues in the market competition and increase market and technological inter-dependency. (Davis, Hart 2010; Khoo, Hugo, McDonald 2010; Khoo, McDonald, Voigt-Graf, Hugo 2007, OECD 2002; IOM 2008)

**Definition of highly-skilled professionals and highly-skilled foreigners**

There has not been any agreed international definition of highly-skilled professionals or highly-skilled foreigners across countries, yet although the literature offers extensive discussion of this topic from a different point of view.

The basic definition assumes highly-skilled professional to be people with tertiary education lasting two or three years that may involve also vocational qualification. Based on the fact that statistics of tertiary education are usually available by countries, this approach enables us to compare the indicator across borders as well as mobility of these people. The weakness of this approach is qualitatively different educative systems not only within one country but also between countries, which makes it difficult to compare relevant data. Some authors however specify highly-skilled professionals by their relatively high salaries (significant differences exist). Another definition may be set based on the individual’s work positions, where “skill” is understood as necessary qualification to carry out certain labour. All three aspects of education, salary and occupation are often combined by destination countries when identifying highly-skilled foreigners. (Cerna, 2010; Cerna 2012; Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009; Lowell 2005; Koser, Salt 1997; OECD 2002; Zaletel 2006)

The only sector where definition of highly-skilled professionals was set is the science and technology sector (S & T). OECD and Eurostat recently developed

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4 We understand highly-skilled professionals to be a broader concept that includes highly-skilled foreigners.
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the conceptual framework to specify human resources in science and technology (HRST) that is called “Canberra Manual”. Under HRST is defined a person who completed tertiary education in S&T, or a person who has not completed studies in S&T, however, has a job in this field. (Zaletel 2006)

In the EU, we meet with the first attempt to define highly-skilled foreigners in the Directive on Blue Cards. Candidates for Blue Cards should hold higher professional qualification attested by the post-secondary education lasting for a minimum of three years, or at least five years of relevant practical experience in their sector. Salary shall be at least 1,5 times that of the average gross annual salary in the Member State concerned. (Council Directive 2009) It is obvious that the definition is rather universal and can be more considered as the general framework to guide Members States to define Blue Card candidates according to their national needs and possibilities.

It is obvious that there are different approaches to the definitions of highly-skilled professionals and highly skilled foreigners respectively, reflecting both purpose of the definition as well as available statistical data. It is possible to expect that it will take some more time till the definition of highly-skilled foreigners is commonly agreed.

Czech policy on international migration of highly-skilled foreigners

Political changes in 1989–1990 influenced foreigner labour migration in the Czech Republic that became a country with significant and continuous immigration flow. (Barša, Baršová 2005) Czech immigration policy has been developing in several periods since early 1990s (see e.g. Barša, Baršová 2005; Kušníráková, Čižinský 2011, Drbohlav et al. 2010), nevertheless the first official, complex and conceptual approach of the Czech Republic to the labour immigration was introduced in “Governmental principles in the area of foreigners’ migration” in 2003. (Barša, Baršová 2005: 223) This document was updated in the course of time but the heart of the matter has not changed until now. (MI 2011b).

While EEA migrants can work in the Czech Republic legally without additional permits, based on the key principles related to employment of non-EEA foreigners no matter the level of their skills is. However, non-EEA migrants can work in the

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5 Current legal framework related to working activities of foreigners in the Czech Republic is rooted in the Employment Act from 2004 and Stay of Foreigners on the territory of the Czech Republic Act from 1999. Both instruments were amended several times due to national and Community Aquis needs. The complexity and structure of the Act on Stay of Foreigners on the territory of the Czech Republic has been often criticized, nevertheless the fully new legislation including new principles of obtaining work visas, residence permits and on foreigners’ stay in the Czech Republic is being currently prepared by the Ministry of Interior and shall come into force in 2015 the latest. The first proposals are being currently discussed with expert public. (MI 2011a)
Czech Republic legally only in case they hold valid permission to work and visa/long-term residence permit, eventually Blue or Green Card. Moreover, there are several minor policies that form the character of the Czech immigration policy as a whole. For example depending on the type of the migration employers are obliged to undergo the labour market test, prior to the vacant position is offered to the non-EEA worker. In relation to the occupation of the foreigner or type of the migration, the diploma recognition carried out by respective governmental authority or University has to be done before the work permit is issued. Long-term migrants may apply for permanent residence permit usually after five-year stay in the Czech Republic; however, temporary migrants are not allowed to apply for this type of permit. In addition, during the current financial crisis numerical caps on the inflow of new migrants from certain countries were applied to some cases. (MLSA 2012a; PwC 2012a, b)

The project of “Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” (was in effect between 2003–2010) was the very first instrument of the Czech policy focused on highly-skilled migrants from certain non-EEA countries. The project applied supply-driven system where foreigners involved in the project obtained points for their completed education, practical labour experience, and length of stay in the Czech Republic etc. After they got over a certain point threshold, they were eligible to apply for permanent residence permit in one and half or two and half years of their stay in the Czech Republic.8 Even though the project was not that successful as expected as “only” about 1 800 foreigners got involved, it was the first attempt to support the immigration of skilled labour force. (Cerna 2010; Chaloff, Lemaitre 2009; IOM 2010; MLSA 2012a)

The Czech project is the Green Card that has been in the force since 2009 and is aimed at non-EEA workers from 12 selected countries. It is the demand-driven policy focused on manufactures as well as highly-skilled long-term migrants. The project was expected to meet needs of employers who faced lack of the labour force in the end of 2000s; however, it does not seem to meet the expectations of its authors. (Cerna 2010, MLSA 2012a, b).

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6 There are two types of work permits: 1) based on the contract with an employer located in the Czech Republic (long-term migration); 2) based on the temporary transfer to the Czech Republic, individual has the contract with the employer located in another country than the Czech Republic (temporary migration) (Employment Act)
7 I.e. long-term or temporary migration; both of them were specified in Section 2 of this paper.
8 Normally it takes non-EEA foreigner five years to become eligible to apply for permanent residence permit.
9 Green Card is a “dual document” carrying both permission to work and residence permit. The Green Card can be granted to highly-skilled foreigners from selected countries in case that they fulfill requirements on the employer’s vacant position. There are several types of the Green Card including the one for highly-skilled personnel. (MLSA 2012b).
The latest instrument of the Czech immigration policy is the project of the “Fast-track procedure for in-house redeployment of workers of foreign investors” (“Fast-track project”) that was launched in 2012. The project is demand-driven and concerns temporary migration of managers and specialists assigned to the Czech Republic through intra-company transfer from the foreigner branch of the TNCs. The aim of the project is to fasten the process of obtaining necessary work permit and long-term visa for temporary migration quickly so human resources and consequently economic needs of TNCs are met. (MIT 2012, PwC 2012b)

Since the Czech Republic entered the EU in 2004, the employment of EEA citizens by employers in the Czech Republic has been the subject to EU migration policy supporting free circulation of skilled as well as unskilled labour force from EEA countries. By contrast, temporary and long-term labour migration policy of non-EEA workers has remained under the sovereignty of EU Member States. The existing exemption is the “Blue Card” project,10 which is aimed at highly-skilled non-EEA foreigners. Most Member States incorporated this instrument of the Common EU policy into their legislation in the form reflecting country’s economic needs. The Blue Card is demand-driven policy expected to be one of the instruments to solve the shortage of highly-skilled foreigners in EU area as well as ageing of the local population. Moreover, the Blue Card project was aimed to be the instrument to compete with USA, Canada and Australia in the fight for “the best and brightest” workers. (Cerna 2010; Cerna 2012; Migracni 2011b; Davis, Hart 2010)

The Czech labour migration policy for highly-skilled foreigners has to be viewed from two very different perspectives of EEA and non-EEA foreigners. While in the case of EEA professionals, the system can be specified as supply-driven with practically no hurdles related to their employment. In case of non-EEA foreigners, the approach is primarily demand-driven with elements of supply-driven approach (Project of qualified workers). It the other case, it is obvious that the country looks for a way to be attractive to highly-skilled foreigners and also successfully protect its local labour market.

Definition of highly-skilled foreigners applicable to the Czech Republic

Different approaches and difficulties related to the definition of highly-skilled foreigners were discussed in Part 3 of this paper. It is obvious that the unified definition that could be used universally does not exist so far and highly-skilled foreigners are more often defined based on the availability of statistical data (such as number of foreigners with tertiary education) than conceptual a more profound approach also covering other aspects than individual’s education. In this part of

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10 Blue Card project was put in place in the Czech Republic in 2011.
the paper, we will try to make the broader definition of highly-skilled foreigners that could be applicable for the Czech labour policy. In this respect, we will try to interconnect generally used aspects of education, work position and salary as one area for characterising labour force, with existing classification of occupations (CZ-ISCO classification)\(^{11}\) and also relevant Czech policy.

Let us start with three aspects of the definition of highly-skilled foreigners: 1) education of highly-skilled professionals is considered to be either completed tertiary education or relevant practical labour experience in the same or similar sector proving individual’s with the qualification for the work position that is usually intended for highly-skilled foreigners (see Council Directive on the Blue Cards 2009); 2) as for the work position, this aspect works also with the education aspect in the context of the CZ-ISCO classification (see Table 1) and will be discussed in following paragraph; 3) last but not least, we assume that the salary of highly-skilled foreigners is usually a minimum of the country’s average salary. The background of this claim is the fact that certain work positions are commonly connected with a certain salary.

CZ-ISCO classification is used to monitor the statistics of the Czech labour market (e.g. information systems about average earnings and salary or sample survey of the labour force) but also in connection with employment of foreigners. (ISPV 2012) Each working foreigner registered with the labour office is recorded on the work position of the CZ-ISCO classification that should reflect both skills and capabilities of the individual. The classification hierarchically classifies work positions into classes and their sub-classes, while reflecting the type of the performed work that the employee is expected to do through his/her capabilities in order to fulfil the required responsibilities and tasks related to the work position. Skill specializations and level of obtained capabilities are being formed by the following factors: 1) character of performed work tasks; 2) level of formal education; 3) importance of informal education and/or previous experience in relevant jobs. (CSO 2012; ISPV 2012)

In the Czech labour policy, there has not been an explicit definition yet of whom highly-skilled professionals are. In this respect we turn to the Czech labour migration policy where this topic has been discussed in several contexts. The first one is the Blue Card transposed by Czech authorities. The potential highly-skilled foreigner is specified as the graduate of tertiary education\(^{12}\) that lasted for at least three years, and whose monthly salary is at least 1,5 times that of the gross monthly salary.

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\(^{12}\) Higher or university degree holder.
in the Czech Republic. Based on these characteristics, Blue Card candidates’ work positions usually correspond with Classes 1 and 2 of the CZ-ISCO classification. Another instrument of the Czech migration policy is the Green Card – type A that is aimed at individuals with tertiary education verified by a diploma and working usually on positions of Classes 1, 2 or 3 of the CZ-ISCO classification. The last specific instrument of the immigration policy on highly-skilled foreigners is the Fast-track project that defines managers and specialists. Specifications of both of these positions correspond with Classes 1 and 2 of the CZ-ISCO classification.

In the context of the Czech labour migration policy and also in the context of this paper, we define highly-skilled foreigners as those individuals holding a passport other than Czech one and occupying work positions of Classes 1 or 2 of the CZ-ISCO classification.

CZ-ISCO classification specifies Class 1 and Class 2 as follows (CSO 2012, ISPV 2012):

- Class 1 of the CZ-ISCO classification includes managers who are able to make decisions, strategies and manage a company or its branch. Obtained education does not play any crucial role as relevant experience in the same or similar sector is expected.
- Class 2 of the CZ-ISCO classification relates to specialists who are able to apply scientific and artistic concepts and theories and solve complex topics. They obtained their capabilities through formal tertiary education lasting at least three to five years but also through practical experiences.

Table 1: CZ-ISCO classification hierarchy and highly-skilled foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>TYPE OF PERFORMED WORK</th>
<th>REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND SKILLS</th>
<th>EXAMPLE OF WORK POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Legislators, senior officials and managers</td>
<td>At least completed secondary education, eventually relevant practice is acceptable; strategy development; company or its branch management; high level of literacy, numerical and communication skills</td>
<td>Managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Specialists</td>
<td>Tertiary education lasting 3–5 years, eventually relevant practice or trainings are acceptable; dealing with complex topics and decision making; high level of literacy, numerical and communication skills</td>
<td>IT specialist, businessman, HR specialist, doctor, teacher, lawyer, architect, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Technicians and associate professionals</td>
<td>At least completed secondary education; relevant practice or training may be accepted; completed technical and practical tasks; high level of literacy and numerical skills</td>
<td>Technician, sales representative, rescuer, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Skills and practical experiences of the Blue Card candidate have not been taken into account.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>TYPE OF PERFORMED WORK</th>
<th>REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND SKILLS</th>
<th>EXAMPLE OF WORK POSITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>Second level of primary education, apprenticed, postsecondary non-tertiary education; relevant practice or training may be accepted; classes of occupation differ in need for skills (e.g. machine operations and electrical devices); capability to understand information, advanced literacy, numerical and communication skills</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Service workers and shop and market sales workers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Secretary, accountant, tailor, driver, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Skilled agricultural and forestry workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Craft and related trades workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Plant and machine operators and assemblers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Elementary occupations</td>
<td>No need for education; usually physical manual work</td>
<td>Cleaner, assistant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CSO\(^{14}\) (2012)

Note: Class 0 (employees in armed forces) was not involved into the analysis; grey background indicates job positions intended for highly-skilled foreigners

**Structure of highly-skilled foreigners in the Czech Republic**

Major data on highly-skilled foreigners\(^{15}\) working in the Czech Republic as defined in Part 4.1 are available from the database of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA). This statistic provides information on the number of foreigners authorised by the labour office in the structure of the type of registration, citizenship and also CZ-ISCO classification. Unfortunately, the weakness of these statistics is that CZ-ISCO classification does not differ between long-term or temporary migration. Another data sources for other instruments of the Czech migration policy are the Ministry of Interior (MI) running the statistics of Blue and Green Cards, Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) that is responsible for the Fast-track project and the MLSA dealing with the statistics for the project “Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers”.

In 2011, based on MLSA data there were verified by labour offices about 218 thousand foreigners\(^{16}\) who were either registered with the labour office or were granted a work permit (Table 2)\(^{17}\). About 15% of the total were highly-skilled

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\(^{14}\) CSO refers to the Czech Statistical Office.

\(^{15}\) Definition of highly-skilled foreigners was set out in Part 4.2.

\(^{16}\) Foreigner is a person holding a passport other than a Czech passport.

\(^{17}\) The complexity of available statistics on labour migration in the Czech Republic was discussed for example by Schovánková (2013).
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foreigners, accordingly about 85% of them were either unskilled or low-skilled migrants. Moreover two thirds of all foreigners authorised by labour offices were from EEA countries.

Almost 4% of EEA individuals were registered on positions of Class 1 of the CZ-ISCO classification and their country of origin was primarily Slovakia and also Germany and the UK. Little more than 13% were verified for positions of Class 2 and originated from Slovakia, the UK and Poland. Statistics of non-EEA workers indicates that in Classes 1 and 2 there were authorised only 14% of employees from these countries. In Class 1 there were verified less than 4% of these individuals and their countries of origin were primarily Russia, Ukraine and the USA. In Class 2 there were authorised 10.5% of non-EEA employed foreigners coming usually from Ukraine, Russia and the USA.

Table 2: Foreigners registered with labour offices (as of 31. 12. 2011, in thousand)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CZ-ISCO</th>
<th>CLASS 1</th>
<th></th>
<th>CLASS 2</th>
<th></th>
<th>TOTAL OF CLASSES 1–9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Abs.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>154.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-EEA</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>217.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MLSA (2012)

Note: EEA are foreigners registered by their employers with the LO; Non-EEA are foreigners who were granted the extended work permit and who were registered with the LO by their employers based on the exemption from the need for the work permit; Abs. corresponds to the absolute value of the indicator; % corresponds to the total of foreigner workers in evidence of the labour office in Classes 1–9

As for the spatial distribution of highly-skilled foreigners verified by labour offices in 2011, EEA highly-skilled foreigners were registered (Tab. 1) primarily in central Bohemia (Prague and its suburb regions as well as Mladá Boleslav dominated in this respect), Brno and Olomouc regions and also in Moravian and Silesia regions bordering with Slovakia and Poland. Non-EEA highly-skilled foreigners were more in evidence (Tab. 2) in regions of western and northern Bohemia. On the contrary they were very rarely verified in the regions south and east of Prague up to Bavarian, Austrian and Polish borders. There was also obvious difference between the regions of Bohemia when compared with Moravia and Silesia where highly-skilled foreigners were only more authorised in Brno, Ostrava and Frýdek-Místek regions.
By the end of 2011 there were about 100 valid Green Cards for highly-skilled foreigners and less than 10 Blue Cards. (MLSA 2012) These low numbers indicate that non-EEA foreigners eligible to apply for Green or Blue Cards are not interested
in these permits and prefer to legalize their stay in the Czech Republic through the traditional way of the work permit and respective visa/residence permit. The Fast-track project was launched in February 2012 and until the end of that year, there were about 30 individuals from six TNCs involved. (MIT 2012) More than 1,800 foreigners entered the project “Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” during its eight-year existence and a permanent residence permit was granted to over 900 employees and their family members through this project. (Zprava 2010)

Index of the immigration of highly-skilled foreigners

Czech immigration policy has applied various instruments connected to the admission of highly-skilled non-EEA professionals into the country. The aim of this part is to compare these instruments and evaluate which of them seems to be the most open to admission of highly-skilled foreigners to the Czech Republic.

This analysis builds on the work of Cerna (2008; 2009) and Lowell (2005) who compared the openness of highly-skilled immigration policies in several developed countries. They carried out their research through the highly-skilled immigration index which is the quantitative assessment of immigration policies and admission mechanisms in several countries. In our analysis, we will focus on the immigration to one country only – the Czech Republic. In this context we created the index of the immigration of highly-skilled foreigners (index of IHSF).

The index of IHSF was constructed for particular instruments of long-term migration and temporary migration (see Part 3). The clear overview of these admission instruments that we used is provided in Table 3.¹⁸

¹⁸ Index of IHSF was not constructed for foreigners involved in the the project “Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” since its applicants have to obtain the work permit based on the local contract and long-term visa or long-term residence permit and arrive in the Czech Republic prior to getting involved into this Project. The project is closed for new applicants, however, still runs for foreigners who applied for the project by 31. 12. 2010.
Table 3: Instruments of long-term and temporary migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE OF THE MIGRATION</th>
<th>LONG-TERM MIGRATION</th>
<th>TEMPORARY MIGRATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMISSION OF</td>
<td>Work permit based on</td>
<td>Work permit for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGHLY-SKILLED</td>
<td>the local contract +</td>
<td>temporary migration +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREIGNERS</td>
<td>long-term visa</td>
<td>short-term visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work permit based on</td>
<td>Work permit for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the local contract +</td>
<td>temporary migration +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>long-term residence</td>
<td>long-term visa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>permit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREEN CARD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Work permit for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>temporary migration +</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>long-term residency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>permit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUE CARD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fast-track project¹⁹</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own table

Note: Work permits may differ depending on the type of the migration. There is not any difference between long-term visas and long-term residence permits by type of the migration.

It is obvious that there are relatively many instruments of highly-skilled immigration policy in the Czech Republic that are rooted in legislative (e.g. enacted by law, governmental decrees) and secondary policy elements (e.g. internal directives, regulations). The Czech immigration policy applies mechanisms that are common for all types of immigration; however, based on carefully studying the respective policy elements we identified seven of these categories that make instruments of immigration policy different to each other. We therefore used these categories in index of IHSF to find out which instrument is the most open one to admission of highly-skilled foreigners and vice versa.

Each category of immigration mechanisms was evaluated in context of every instrument and the value 0 to 3 was assigned by our subjective expert opinion accordingly, where 0 = very open category of immigration, 1 = minimally closed, 2 = more closed, 3 = closed. Specification of evaluated categories is provided below:

- **labour market test** – category is very open (0) in case the labour market test is not processed; is minimally closed (1) in case there may be set the area of requirements on the position; is more closed (2) in case there should be explicitly set requirements on the position; is considered to be closed (3) in case there has to be explicitly set requirements on the position (e.g. education, salary, work load etc.),
- **diploma recognition** – category is very open (0) in case the recognition is not required; is minimally closed (1) in case the recognition does not have to be presented for some positions; is more closed (2) in case the work permit can

¹⁹ Individuals obtain the work permit for temporary migration and long-term visa within an accelerated procedure set by this Project prior to they arrive in the Czech Republic (MIT 2013).
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be issued under the condition that the recognition will be delivered later on; is considered to be closed (3) in case that recognition has to be presented no matter what the work position is,

• **duality of the permit** – category is very open (0) in case of the dual document that comprises of the permit to work and permit to stay; is minimally closed (1) in case that the work permit and permit to stay is applied for separately, however processing of both permits is coordinated by one governmental authority; is more closed (2) in case that the work permit and permit to stay is applied for separately and so is the processing of these permits; is considered to be closed (3) in case that the permit to stay can be applied for only when the permit to work is available,

• **permanent residency** – category is very open (0) in case that time spent in any EU country on relevant permit is included to time necessary to become eligible to apply for the permanent residence permit in the Czech Republic; is minimally closed (1) in case that only time spent in the Czech Republic is included to time necessary to become eligible to apply for the permanent residence permit; is more closed (2) in case that time spent in the Czech Republic is included by one half to time necessary to become eligible to apply for the permanent residence permit; is considered to be closed (3) in case it is not possible to apply for the permanent residence permit based on the permit,

• **numerical or citizenship caps** – category is very open (0) in case there are not any limit on new migrants; is minimally closed (1) in case there are relatively low limit or admission limitations by citizenship applicable on permits issuance; is more closed (2) in case there are relatively high limits and admission limitations by citizenship applicable on permits issuance; is considered to be closed (3) in case there are high limits and limitations by citizenship applicable on permits issuance,

• **visa/permit processing time**20 – category is very open (0) in case visas/permits are approved within 30 days since the application was submitted; is minimally closed (1) in case visas/permits are approved within 90 days since the application was submitted; is more closed (2) in case visas/permits are approved within 180 days since the application was submitted; is considered to be closed (3) in case visas/permits are approved after more than 180 days since the application was submitted,

• **long-term visa/permit validity**21 – category is very open (0) in case permit is normally issued with the validity of up to 3 years; is minimally closed (1) in case permit is normally issued with the validity of up to 2 years; is more closed (2) in case permit is normally issued with the validity of up to half
The index of IHSF was then calculated as the total of category values per instrument. The lower the index of IHSF is, the more the instrument is open to highly-skilled foreigners. Moreover, obtained data enables us to compare also the openness by the type of migration – long-term and temporary one.

Moreover, the index of IHSF operates on equal weighting principle (Cerna 2008: 13). This means that differences between every two categories of immigration mechanisms have the same weight from instruments’ openness point of view. For example an increase of the category of the “labour market test” by one point has the same impact on the total value as one point change of the “diploma recognition” indicator. (Cerna 2008)

Figure 3: Index of immigration of highly-skilled foreigners by instruments of long-term and temporary migration

Source: Author’s own calculations

The span of the index of IHSF for the Czech Republic was calculated to be between 7 and 14. The lowest value was found out in case of the temporary migration
instrument of the Fast-track project that is in fact speeded up procedure of the instrument of obtaining the work permit for the temporary migration and long-term visa. The outcome shows that the Fast-track project is the most open instrument of the Czech immigration policy. This instrument was followed by Blue and Green Cards of long-term migration where indices of IHSF were equal to 8. After that followed the instrument of the Work permit for temporary migration and short-term visa whose indices of IHSF was 12. The highest values of the index were calculated in case of the instrument of work permit and long-term visa or long-term residence permit that reached 13 in case of long-term migration and 14 for temporary migration. This result makes these instruments the most controlled instruments of the Czech immigration policy.

Moreover, when analysing both types of international migration policy we can notice, surprisingly, that long-term migration seems to be more open to highly-skilled foreigners when compared to temporary one.

Conclusions

The aim of the paper is to contribute to the discussion on the country’s migration policy of highly-skilled foreigners. We set the definition of highly-skilled foreigners applicable for the Czech Republic. In this respect we used the CZ-ISCO classification and characterised highly-skilled foreigners as individuals holding a passport other than a Czech passport who works on positions in Classes 1 and 2 of the CZ-ISCO classification.

Based on key features we specify the Czech labour migration policy to be a supply-driven system for EEA professionals who may enter the Czech Republic and work freely. In case of the policy of non-EEA highly-skilled foreigners, we identified the demand-driven system being performed mainly through the work permit and respective visa/permit. We also identified other instruments specific for these highly-qualified workers such as Blue and Green Cards and Fast-track project. There are, however, also elements of supply-driven approach applied in the project “Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers” used for non-EEA highly-skilled foreigners.

As Cerna (2008) pointed out, openness of the migration policy is connected with its competitiveness, whereas restrictiveness is linked with admission control. The openness of the Czech migration policy to highly-skilled foreigners from non-EEA countries (where admission barriers are expected) was studied through the index of IHSF that we constructed. The index was calculated for eight demand-driven instruments of the Czech immigration policy that were assessed by long-term and temporary type of migration. We found out that the Fast-track project is the most open instrument of the immigration policy. This project is strictly aimed at
highly-skilled foreigners of TNCs that need to be transferred between its foreign and Czech branch of the company relatively quickly. These foreigners are not expected to settle in the Czech Republic permanently. Another more open instrument are the Blue and Green Cards that are available for highly-skilled foreigners who are to live in the Czech Republic for long-period of time, eventually settle permanently. These permits are not however that popular for foreigners or employees as there were issued only several tens of these permits so far. In general and to our surprise we found out that instruments applied to long-term migration (that may lead to the permanent settlement of foreigners) seem to be more open to highly-skilled foreigners when compared with instruments of temporary migration that do not expect migrants to settle down permanently.

Discussion of the migration policy is one of three theoretical approaches trying to understand movements of highly skilled migrants in the global world. In our paper, we focused on comparing instruments of highly-skilled immigration to the Czech Republic that balances the need for highly-skilled foreigners on one hand and protects the local labour market on the other. Research of the immigration of highly-skilled foreigners into the Czech Republic from connected theoretical perspectives of ISDL and the engagement of the Czech economy to global markets while concerning the policy aspects may be an interesting topic for further research.

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Civil society organizations as confidence builders: conflict management perspective and what we can win for conflict management when we look at sociology of trust

Šárka Waisová

Abstract: Conflict management scholars as well as practitioners are optimistic about the confidence building capacity of CSOs, especially in cases of divided conflict-prone societies. They believe that activities of CSOs in various issue areas across the society create bridges between former enemies, remove prejudices and can or merely help create trust between them. And trust is believed to be basic stepping stone to a peaceful, working and democratic society. This optimism dominates today’s conflict management and creates a mainstream approach. What the article set out to show is the idea that our optimism about confidence building capacities of CSOs is not based on satisfactory evidence. Conflict management scholars have no clear indication and evidence about such capacities. We also have horribly little information about the circumstances in which CSOs can work as confidence builders. This article has tried to fill the gap and looking outside the conflict management field – particularly into sociology of trust – it tried to shed more light on the issue. As was shown, sociology of trust, especially those, who carried out cross-national multilevel analysis, are sceptical about the confidence building role of civil society organisations and to the impact of associational life on the level of trust. The sociological testing indicates that CSOs work together with other factors and all these factors together have an influence on level of trust or distrust. To critically evaluate the CSOs’ confidence building capacity, it can be said that CSOs can positively influence the “other factors” which were correlated with trust: CSOs can work for income equality, good governance, democratization as well as for well-being and education, but CSOs cannot work for all factors.

Keywords: civil society organizations, confidence building, conflict management, sociology of trust

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Since the middle of the 1980s, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations, agencies of the United Nations, and regional organizations have increasingly intervened in conflict areas. The end of the Cold War brought new possibilities for such actors to play a bigger role in peacebuilding and conflict management. Such efforts are undertaken in all stages of conflict, from situations of latent tension and threatened violence, to full-blown civil war, to unstable periods after peace agreements are reached. This work has a variety of names: conflict management, peacebuilding, conflict transformation, conflict resolution, conflict prevention, peacemaking, or reconciliation (Anderson and Olson 2003).

There are a wide range of programmatic peacebuilding efforts. Agencies offer peace education programs, or training in conflict analysis, peace skills, or non-violent activism. They organise people-to-people exchanges or they develop programs to promote reconciliation through specially targeted reconstruction or economic development efforts. They facilitate unofficial negotiation channels among political leaders, bring representatives of divided communities together for dialogue and they dispatch civilian peace monitors to conflict areas to publicise and prevent abuses. These are just a few of the approaches used. A substantial part of the contemporary peacebuilding and conflict management activities is so-called confidence building. The creation of confidence between the parties – it does not matter if they are states or divided societies – is recognised as necessary condition for conflict transformation and for the prevention of renewed hostility.

There is strengthening belief among the peace practitioners as well as among academics, that agents with an imminent peace- and confidence building potential are civil society organizations (hereafter CSOs) (Lederach 2001, 2003; Diamond and McDonald 1996; Anderson and Olson 2003; Rotberg (ed.). 1996; Crocker and All (eds.) 2001). The optimism concerning the CSOs' confidence building role comes from the idea that CSOs are meso-level social formations between the state. The term “civil society organizations” covers a wide range of entities. Many other terms for these entities have been proposed, for example “non–profit organizations,” “the third sector,” “private voluntary organizations,” “civil society groups,” and even “new social movements” or “activist beyond borders.” Key actors subsumed under the notion of civil society organizations include non–governmental organizations, human rights organizations, social justice advocacy groups, collective interest group organizations (faith–based organizations, trade unions, women, youth and professional associations), community–based organizations, and informational and educational civil society organizations (journalists associations, research and academic institutions and think tanks). We concurrently have as many definitions of CSOs as we have publications dealing with the topic. Despite this variety of definitions, within CSOs are usually included social bodies that are (i) private, i.e., not part of the institutions of government; (ii) nonprofit–distributing; (iii) self–governing, and (iv) non–compulsory. This is what I also accept. I also agree with Habermas (2006) who associated civil society with the public sphere where associations, organizations and movements can be created spontaneously and institutionalization or formal legal existence is not necessary and characteristic feature. For the purposes of this article, a civil society organization is outside the stricter realm of state power and market interests and refers to any private non–profit apolitical and non–party organization that members of which are individuals or groups of
and the individual and their meso-position and characteristics give them ability to build trust and dialogue between different groups of people. CSOs also differ from companies and government agencies because they are not stuck in hard security paradigm and thus are more able to reach a compromise, they usually tend to concentrate on social benefits without being distracted by the need to provide profits to shareholders or owners, or by the need to promote their home countries’ image or policies. The optimism concerning the confidence- and peacebuilding potential of CSOs is strengthened also by the fact that CSOs are becoming independent actors that are active diplomatically with various tasks, including project implementation, that are delegated to them by governments and international organizations [for more see the example of Rutherford and Matthew (eds). 2003]. CSOs are seen as agents having the potential to bridge the gap between the apolitical domain and politics, to serve as a source of information, conceptions and ideas in the public domain, to create multidisciplinary networks of experts and to contribute to the cultivation of debate in the public sector and the articulation of public interest. CSOs are seen as agents who can promote cross-border communication, disseminate norms and values, can exert pressure on governments, and may enhance transactions and mutual trust between societies (Keck and Sikkink 1998). All of this produced strong conviction about the peacebuilding potential of CSOs and led to wide acknowledgment and support of CSOs as the peacebuilders including their confidence building role (for more see the examples of OSCE n. d.; UNOG n. d.; UNODA n. d.; or Council of Europe 1995).

Despite all of this, there are some questions and ambiguity concerning the confidence building role of CSOs in conflict-prone societies. Firstly we have no satisfactory explanation why we should be so optimistic about the confidence building role of CSOs. In other words, conflict management is optimistic on the potential of CSOs for influencing trust in the shorter run without having enough evidence and empirical testing for this. Secondly there are no satisfactory analysis and explanation of what the circumstances in which CSOs work as confidence builders in conflict-prone societies are.

The aim of this article is to fill the research gap and think about the correlation between the trust and CSOs’ activities and about the circumstances in which CSOs work as confidence builders. The article critically reflects the existing conflict management research of the issue. The critical reflections will not be built on critical investigation or lessons learned from the field (this is what we already know – for more see Anderson and Olson 2003; Carey and Richmond 2003 or Nicolaidis 1996), but the critical reflections will be built upon the confrontation individuals who are associated in view of achieving some common interest. The groups can be created spontaneously and work without formal legal existence.
between contemporary theory and practice of confidence building in conflict management and outside-of-conflict-management research – particularly the sociology of trust. The present article assumes that conflict management scholars as well as practitioners should pay more attention to the new research in “sociology of trust” and once again rethink the concept as well as practice of confidence building as the instrument of conflict management, especially the possible role of CSOs in confidence building. The main reason why to do this is that sociological research of trust has evolved tremendously in the last decade and have brought new and important findings about relationship between trust and CSOs which can say more about what the circumstances are in which CSOs can work as confidence builders.

This is what determines the structure of this article. The first part will introduce confidence building as a concept and practice in conflict management, the history of confidence building as an instrument of conflict management, what confidence building is, and what confidence building measures we know. The second part will show what CSOs do, can do or are expected to do by peacebuilders for the confidence building in conflict-prone societies. But the core of presented article is the third part; sociology of trust, namely the work of those researching relationships between trust and associational life is confronted with the concept of confidence building used in conflict management and ideas of conflict resolution practitioners and scholars about the confidence building role of CSOs.

Confidence building in conflict management: history, what is it and typology

History of confidence building as a concept and as the measure in management of conflicts

The importance of confidence, of reciprocated expectations of non-hostile behaviour, and of measures that may generate such confidence have existed for centuries, but confidence building measures as a complex of concentrated activities had been applied for the first time to a greater extent during the peak moment of the Cold War in Europe. The term confidence building measures (hereafter CBMs) in connection with conflict prevention and peacebuilding was first used in the mid-1950s in connection with the United States and Soviet proposals on open skies and ground post controls at the United Nations. It was later adopted to refer to the modest, politically binding, largely voluntary provisions on exercise notification and observation in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereafter CSCE). The term “confidence and security building measures” was introduced at the 1981–1983 follow up conference of CSCE in Madrid for “the measures to cover the whole of Europe and be of military significance, politically
binding, and provide adequate forms of verification which correspond to their content” (Federation of American Scientists n. d.). Later the review process resulted in the Stockholm document of CSCE and significantly improved and widened the CBMs. The follow up CSCE meetings continued to widen the CBMs and prepared a whole list of tools which were set up as confidence and security building measures such as exchange of military information or obligatory notifications of military activities and invitation of observers. The process of development of confidence and security building measures as defined within CSCE culminated in the beginning of the 1990s with the end of the Cold War and the political changes in Europe.

Speaking about confidence building measures within CSCE or within the UN till the 1990s these were meant as political and military CBMs in Europe, or better yet seen as between the East and West (UNOG n. d.; UNODA n. d.). However during the first half of the 1990s the attitude to confidence building measures started to change – they were also applied outside Europe [for example in the Middle East, Asia Pacific and between India and Pakistan – see for example Cossa (ed.). 1995] as bilateral or regional peacebuilding efforts and in the other issue areas besides political or military ones.

Despite this change CBMs remained, to a considerable extent, within the traditional conception of intergovernmental cooperation. The increasing prominence of minority, ethnic and religious problems resulting in interstate conflicts in the 1990s revealed that confidence building measures supplemented by specific initiatives on the ground in close collaboration with the communities concerned had been developed. This approach correlated with the changing attitude of the international community to conflict resolution. An increasing number of interstate conflicts and humanitarian suffering near the end of the 1990s urged the international community into action and brought new approaches and conflict management tools such as conflict prevention, humanitarian interventions, early warning systems for timely prevention and multi-track diplomacy (for more see below). Confidence building measures were undertaken as a relatively common tool in a wide variety of fields and in various stages of conflict and these activities involved governmental as well as non-governmental actors. This new practice has been accompanied by the expansion of academic and field agents’ thinking about the role of CSOs in conflict management, especially in conflict prevention and conflict reconstruction which is seen as an inherent part of confidence building. The wider application of CBMs asked for conceptualization of confidence building and typology of CBMs.
The concept of confidence building in conflict management and typology of CBMs

Conflict management believes that social trust can be thought of as a strategic belief in a situation of incomplete information where some level of trust can determine our behaviour in one-shot interactions. This view also entails that any level of social trust is self-perpetuating as we act ex-ante according to the present norms and thus reveal a trustworthiness to match their trust (Bjørnskov 2008: 272). It is believed that trust or lack of trust influences people’s behaviour and decisions. Trust is believed to influence political, security and economic performance (Knack n. d.; Schelling 1984; Putnam 1995 and 2000; Lederach 2001 and 2003; Knack and Zack 2001).

According to dozens of security studies – T.C. Schelling (1984: 57) – confidence building is extremely serious business, because nothing is more threatening than the loss of trust on either side with regards to the other’s restraint, patience, and security. The conceptualization and understanding of confidence building in conflict management is itself optimistic, because conflict management scholars and practitioners believe that it is possible to increase trust in the shorter term through public policy which is able to impact factors or components that influence and build trust. This idea has its comparisons in economics, where some scholars (see for example Knack and Zak 2001) argue that there are government policies which are able to negatively impact the trust or raise the trust respectively, influencing components producing trusting behaviours (for these components see Knack and Zak 2001: 3).

In conflict management confidence building is a process between potential adversaries and in its broadest terms can refer to any gesture made by one adversary to another which indicates goodwill or relieves tensions (Spears 2000: 24). Confidence building measures focus on changing perceptions and building or rebuilding of relations between adversaries. CBMs are directed towards replacing distrust with trust through human contacts and institutional practices that reduce the level of suspicion and replace it with practices that build mutual understanding. They refer to such practices which develop social contacts and encourage psychological changes (Emamjomehzadeh and Jahanshahrad 2003: 65). The short-term purpose of confidence building measures is creation of sufficient trust among parties in order to prevent dangerous consequences arising from misunderstandings. The long-term purpose of them has been fundamental resolution of conflicts and an increase in predictability. CBMs facilitate identification and understanding of normal patterns of activity and make it easier to identify significant deviations from established patterns (Asada 1988). These measures are seen as contributing to a reduction of uncertainty, misperception, and suspicion and thus help to reduce the possibility of incidental or accidental war (Glosserman 2005: v).
CBMs can take many different forms, depending on the stage of the conflict cycle at which they are used, how deep the conflict between the two sides is and whether they are used in intra-state or inter-state conflicts. CBMs can start up as unilateral measures of goodwill, or take the form of an international agreement. They can include various military and non-military initiatives such as unilateral or reciprocal declaratory measures, communication measures including hotlines and functional exchanges, maritime safety measures including joint rescue exercises and maritime safety agreements, constraint measures, transparency measures to foster greater openness such as pre-notification requirements for exercises and troop movements, data exchanges and voluntary observations, and verification measures (Allen n. d.).

More specifically, CBMs can include activities such as establishing reputations of benign intent, statements of goodwill, visits by leaders, unilateral disarmament, dialogue among factions, changes in leadership or lead negotiators, joint infrastructure and development projects, presence of monitors and peacekeepers, dispersed cantonment, and verification and demobilization (Spears 2000).

Despite the well developed conception and practice of CBMs there is no unified typology regarding the CBMs. The typology which is mostly used is a division of CBMs according to the level [who is the main entrepreneur of the confidence building action, if the highest political and military representatives (track I level) or lower levels such as middle range leaders or grassroots leaders (tack II level)] and according to the problem area (in which specific field the activities are carried out). The typology according to the level will be brought up below in connection with civil society organizations, speaking about confidence building and field specific confidence building will be introduced.

CBMs are usually divided into military and non-military measures, where non-military measures are developed in wide variety of fields including politics, cultural or social areas, economics, environmental protection and last but not least humanitarian assistance and civil emergencies.

Political CBMs build confidence in the political system and problem areas related to the political system. Measures used in political CBMs are power sharing, proportional recruitment and allocation of posts in national and local authorities from different regions and/or nationalities, religious groups or ethnic groups, electoral reform and the decentralization of power to localities and regions. In intra-state conflict there are especially important measures such as democratization which foster political inclusion and allow political exchange and learning among parties in conflict (OSCE n. d.).

Economic CBMs can bind actors (it does not matter whether they are states or communities) together through economic cooperation. In the world of economic interdependence and global competitiveness, economic factors can play a significant
role in confidence building because communities and states are aware of the significance of trade. As seen in many cases, companies have different interests than states or communities and can effectively put pressure on conflict parties to ease the relationships. The private sector can be an actor at the level of the official peace process both through direct participation and by means of pressuring the government to pursue a negotiated solution. Permanent economic contacts can help institutionalise the trust between individuals and companies, which does not serve only economic communication and trade. Local or regional businesses can build various peace initiatives or effectively put pressure on conflict parties to solve the problem (more see Banfield, Gündüz and Killick 2006).

Societal and cultural confidence building constitutes a very dynamic field in the world with its belief in soft power and using social electronic networks and new media. Cultural CBMs like societal CBMs aim to demonstrate sensitivity to local cultures and show respect for different cultures and traditions. Art and culture are seen as helping to create bridges between people, helping to overcome stereotypes, and to promote community. Art and cultural projects are believed to transcend differences between groups and lift the community’s spirits after serious events. Cultural and societal CBMs can include bringing separated families together, academic conferences, joint research projects, exchange of students, journalists, academics and other public figures, promotion of travel facilities, regular air and bus service between the territories, joint infrastructure projects, demonstrating respect for religious and cultural leaders, exchange of arts and cultural gatherings, joint summer culture camps, and last but not least the elaboration of joint dictionaries.

Also sporting ties are sometimes interpreted as a part of the cultural and societal confidence building.3 The idea about sport as confidence building instrument comes from the view of sport as a positive and generally constructive influence on society, inculcating values, and discipline and providing a source of role models for the youths. In other words, the idea goes out from the premise that sport is a basic feature of many cultures, the achievements of athletes have enhanced the image of a nation, participation in sporting activities contributes to the health of the people, sports events teach people about teamwork and fair play and last but not least that

3 It is necessary to be very careful to use sport and sports events as confidence building instrument, because we know many cases when sports events have been used for political purposes such as political propaganda and gaining specific political advantages, or sport matches have been interpreted as the metaphor of conflict between two countries and sports victory as supremacy over another nation (more to the role of sport in state–politics compare for example Lin, Lee and Nai 2008). As we witnessed in last few decades sports venues can also be turned into arenas for ethnic, cultural or religious conflict or can provoke an outbreak of violence. Well known examples are the football war between Honduras and El Salvador following the games played during 1970 FIFA World Cup or clashes between Croat and Serb supporters at the European Water Polo Championships in 2003.
internationalisation of sports competition and the advance in media technology have combined to make sport an increasingly attractive diplomatic resource (Lin, Lee and Nai 2008: 25). The confidence building potential of sports events depends on the popularity and influence of sport in each society and following the principles of good sporting behaviour. Sport venues and sports programs can foster understanding, tolerance and mutual respect for others as means of combating prejudice and stereotypes, can facilitate contacts between sports teams, could serve as an efficient platform to promote equality and respect, and engage young people in joint sports teams. Team games can promote loyalty, friendship and solidarity among players and friendly matches create the first positive contact.4

Environmental confidence building emerged a short time ago in discussions about environmental peacebuilding (UNEP 2009, Conca and Dabelko 2002). One of the basics of environmental peacebuilding is the idea that the environment can be an effective platform or catalyst for enhancing dialogue, building confidence, utilising shared interests and broadening cooperation between divided groups as well as within states (UNEP 2009: 19 and 22). Environmental issues exceed state borders and interstate relations and environmental dynamics ask to turn the focus from the interstate bargaining to the broader patterns of trans-societal relations. In this context, a strategy of environmental confidence building would emphasise creating and exploiting positive forms of trans-societal interdependence, building transnational civil-society links, fostering new norms of environmental responsibility and a peaceful resolution to disputes, and transforming opaque, security-minded institutions of the state (Conca 2002: 10). Environmental confidence building can be useful and effective for several reasons. Firstly, environmental issues are becoming ever more visible both to governments and to citizens at large. Secondly, people even with widely divergent backgrounds and cultures appear to relate to nature in a more or less comparable, perhaps fundamental, fashion, with the important result that environmental issues have a tendency to transcend political, racial, ethnic, or religious divisiveness.5 It can include joint environmental education programs, joint protection of soil and water resources, joint monitoring of soil, air and water quality, regular conferences and workshops enabling the exchange of information, establishing collective platforms for exchange of information about environmental protection and ecological degradation, common warning systems in case of ecological

4 Such as “ping–pong diplomacy” in the case of US–China relations, and wrestling teams in the case of Iran and the US.
5 Environmental confidence building has been put into the test in many countries such as in Moldova, between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; in the south Caucasus or in Georgia/South Ossetia, in Rwanda, between Peru and Ecuador and in all these cases had imminently positive results (more see OSCE 2012, UNEP 2009).
accident, shared natural reserves and parks and joint monitoring and protection of border areas and species migrating across borders.

Last but not least, an area which is seen as having strong potential for collaboration and building trust is the management of civil emergencies and humanitarian assistance after natural and man-induced disasters and accidents. Using analogy from post conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief not only help save lives of the local population but help “win hearts and minds” of the local people. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief help provide and secure community needs and open doors for dialogue, interaction and establish communication channels with the host community. The communication channels opened by humanitarian assistance can be used (by governments) to further develop policies of constructive engagement, confidence building and the slow but essential formation of trust that is crucial for bringing about security. Confidence building in disaster relief and civil emergencies can include measures such as joint rescue units or joint exercises of rescue units, collective disaster response planning and creation of joint disaster response capabilities, creation of platform for exchange of reliable information on natural disasters, humanitarian gestures, and last but not least combined training for disaster managers from both defence and civilian agencies involved in humanitarian and emergency response operations. Disaster relief, civilian emergencies and humanitarian assistance are problem areas where an important role is played by militaries and state agencies, but also by humanitarian organizations, humanitarian medical assistance teams and volunteers.

To sum up CBMs, taken on their own, cannot solve a conflict. They cannot eliminate the social and economic root causes of a conflict. They will not change existing balance or imbalance of power and are unlikely to affect the core interest of the conflict parties (Neukirch 2012: 4). Where peaceful intentions do not exist and where military advantage goes to one of the parties, CBMs can work only very limited capacity (Schelling 1984). It is today clear enough that the concept of CBMs should not be universally applied without contextual specifications. And the context, where the CBMs are applied, creates the critical elements for developing particular confidence building instruments (Lee 2003).

Civil society organizations as peacemakers and confidence builders

Before analyzing the sociology of trust and thinking more about the context of confidence building, the idea about CSOs as peacebuilders, or more specific, confidence builders in conflict management field will be introduced. Historically, CBMs have been initiated top-down by elites, but in the last two or three decades we can observe a new phenomenon: CBMs are initiated bottom-up, by affected communities (very often with the support from foreign governments or from international
organizations – see for example the Council of Europe 1995). The importance of civil society involvement in conflict resolution and confidence building has during the last decade been increasingly recognised. Civil society is believed to be uniquely placed to address some of the key problems that are usually ignored by governments. It has the ability to include the conflict’s key stakeholders, those communities most affected by it including displaced people, those who have lost loved ones, who actively participated in the violence and those living among the ruins of war. Perhaps most importantly civil society has the ability and willingness to take risks that government’s lack. Civil society can move ahead of governments in engaging with the other side, advocate for internal policy change and bringing new ideas to both the negotiating table and to contribute to the social transformation needed for peace (Behrendt 2011). And in all this it is believed that CSOs activities can have a multiplier effect and stimulate others to follow the example given (Council of Europe 1995).

The vast literature on conflict management contains two models of the role of civil society organizations in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. The first of these two models is a peacebuilding model presented by Lederach. The second is the Diamond and McDonald’s model of multi-track diplomacy. Lederach (2001 and 2003) believes that there are three levels of actors in the peacebuilding process and each level of actors engages in different peacebuilding tasks. These three levels are presented in the form of pyramid and include top political, military and religious leaders (level 1), middle range leaders respected in various sectors such as the leaders of humanitarian NGOs (level 2), and grassroots leaders (level 3), who include local leaders, community developers or leaders of indigenous NGOs. The actions of top leaders are more visible, but in fact leaders higher up in the pyramid affect fewer people. The grassroots leaders affect many people. Lederach (2001 and 2003) argues that true peacebuilding is the social, economic, socio-psychological, and spiritual changes in the lives of the people involved and these changes are best caused by grassroots leaders and adds that sustainable peace can be built only by involving external and internal actors and all social strata in reconciliation and peacebuilding.

Diamond and McDonald (1996) introduced a model, not based on a pyramid, but on a steering wheel, called multi-track diplomacy. The model is based on the idea that there are nine tracks (segments of the wheel) or, more precisely, nine types of actors who should collaborate to reach peace. These are 1) governments, IGOs and official diplomats, 2) conflict resolution professionals, 3) businesses, 4) private citizens, 5) professionals dealing with research, training, and education, 6) activists, 7) churches, 8) foundations and 9) public opinion and media (Diamond and McDonald 1996). In multi-track diplomacy also unofficial third parties work with
people from all walks of life and sectors of their society to find ways to promote peace in settings of (violent) conflict.

Lederach’s pyramid as well as Diamond and McDonald’s steering wheel originated due to the inefficiency of pure government mediation, and they argue that there is a need to utilise a more interpersonal approach in addition to government mediation. Both models utilise all levels of society in order to determine the needs and facilitate communication between all social strata and are aimed at building or rebuilding broken relationships across the lines of division among ordinary citizens and between institutions and divided societies in communities. They enable various actors to create a structured network and to enter the process of negotiations, to formulate demands for the others and to influence the decision-making conflict resolution. According to both models, confidence is best built up by combining several CBMs reaching out to different layers of society in a cumulative process with reciprocity and local ownership as essential elements.

The idea of both models rest not only on the argument that grassroots leaders affect large parts of the population, but also on the idea that the local level is a microcosm of the larger conflict and top-level agreements are too far and too general to comprehend the daily life in local communities. Lines of identity in the conflict are often drawn through local communities dividing them into hostile groups. People at this level experience the day-to-day consequences of those divisions and of the decisions of the political elite. Furthermore, the contact on a grassroots level enables personal relations to be built, which are seen as critical to developing a process for coming to the table and dealing with the obstacles in the negotiation process.

As demonstrated, the conflict management literature anticipates that civil society will provide popular support for peace and promote dialogue, confidence and reconciliation between polarised groups. Non-state actors are often believed to be more efficient and suitable to work towards peace than state actors, as they are visible, less expensive and more flexible, less constrained by narrow mandates, and able to talk to several parties without losing their credibility and to deal directly with the grassroots population.

**Sociology of trust and what we can win for conflict management when we look at its new findings**

As we know today, confidence building is agent-context specific. We also know that there are environments where to embed confidence building measures is difficult and that psychological capital accumulated by CBMs is fragile and can be quickly spent. But what we are unsure of is what the circumstances are in which CSOs work as confidence builders. As mentioned above and proved in some studies (for example Chaitin et al 2004) is the ability of civil society and civic
organizations to carry out CBMs are challenged by various factors such as non-democratic or institutionally weak environments. A field which could offer findings to help us better understand the environment and circumstances in which CSOs work as confidence builders is sociology of trust, particularly critical investigations of relationship between trust and associational life. In this part of the text sociology of trust will be introduced which will open the door for analysis, what research of social trust says about CSOs and their confidence building capacity.

Research of social trust is a very old issue in sociology, but it was not until the 1990s when it became an independent theory as well as a research area. Results of new sociological research of social trust are used today in almost all social sciences. The popularity of the research of social trust is connected with the fact, that 1) trust is a “soft variable” which conditions social, economic as well as political development and 2) that concepts of trust offer a bridge between micro- and macro-level of sociological analysis and make it possible to bridge the dichotomy between society/state and individual.

In sociology trust is defined as the expectation that others will behave in a predictable and friendly manner (Inglehart 1991). This includes expectations that they will not knowingly do harm and will look after one’s interests, if possible. The basic claim is that trust reduces transaction costs (Fukuyama 1995) and evokes positive actions towards others (Sztompka 1999), which facilitates human relations and cooperation at all levels, from small communities to the international system.

Sociology of trust works on the idea that 1) trust is the basic condition of social life in all societies, it does not matter if it is traditional, modern or postmodern, and 2) that despite trust as the principle remains the same, the forms in which it manifests transform together with the changes of character within whole societies.

Trust should not be understood as a phenomenon, but as a relationship, as a continuum, which is determined by the size of the uncertainty. Trust is learned [people take advantage from their past experience and lessons learned (Sztompka 1999)], a generalised expectation of behaviour of others. These expectations go beyond particular relations and situations. Trust adopted towards a person, a member of particular social group, can be analogically applied on other members of the same group. People need trust, because they are mutually dependent. Trust is the basic ingredient of social cohesion and a necessary condition for social order (Seligmann and Dumouchel according Sedláčková 2012: 43 and 46).

Sociologists of trust make distinction between particular and general trust. Particular trust is functional in small, face-to-face communities where people know each other and interact closely, general trust is trust in unfamiliar people. General trust is functional for complex societies that involve countless daily interactions between unfamiliar people (Delhey, Newton and Welzel: 2011: 787). Generalised
trust is likely to be associated with social stability, integration and peace; distrust is likely to accompany many forms of social disturbance, disruption, and conflict.

There exist different theories of trust in sociology but these theories are not mutually exclusive or incompatible and their indicators overlap to some extent. The “only” thing they differ in is what types and levels of explanation they use (Delhey and Newton 2003: 100).

Taking into account our research goal, the attention has to be paid to the relationship between trust and associational life and civic participation. Classical sociologists (for example Tönnies) believed that social trust in society is connected with the existence of the so called meso-structure which is in modern sociological theories thought as civil society. Civil society is interpreted as intermediary sphere of diverse people’s groups located between micro-level of family/human individual and macro-level of nation/state. According to some sociologists (more see Sedláčková 2012), civic organizations create a barrier against the spreading state and against the tyranny of the majority, and create an environment, which enables people to learn and teach civic skills including trust to other people. The space between the family and the state is understood as the key area for creation of social trust. These intensive, long-term and personal relations help create trustworthiness and spreading of trust in the community (Sztompka 1999).

Conflict management, similar to the above mentioned sociologist, believes in the trust-building capacity of CSOs.

The idea about the relationship between associational life and trust to other people is repeatedly theorised, empirically tested and critically investigated in sociology. In the next part we will look closely at critical reflection of the correlation between associational life and level of trust and at the results of empirical testing.

Critical investigations of the relationship between general trust and civic participation can be divided into three groups. The first two deal with a general theoretical nature of the issue, the third one is more detailed and bases its critical investigation on empirical testing. The first group of scholars (for example Sturgin and Smith 2010; Miller and Mitamuka 2003) point out, that there are ambiguous wordings and definitions of trust in various surveys and that apparent differences in trust across question formats and groups derive from heterogeneity in the questions interpretations. These authors conclude that where a gap exists between the
researcher’s operational definition and respondent’s interpretation of a question's meaning, the researcher is likely to come to false conclusion about the substantive concept of interest. Thus all surveys about the trust are problematic especially if making cross-cultural studies and comparisons. The results of trust research show that for a number of countries, one must be careful in interpreting the standard trust questions as a measure of general trust. The questionnaire seems to work well in Western and affluent nations, but less well in other parts of the world, particularly in East Asia (more see for example Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2001).

The second group of scholars (for example Delhey and Newton 2004 or 2003) pay attention to the cause and effect question, i.e. if trust is cause or effect. These scholars concluded that the empirical testing shows that it is not clear if trust is either a cause or an effect. It seems that trust is mutually reproducing with other factors. Some factors help produce trust, but trust helps to maintain these factors.

The third group of scholars (for example Delhey and Newton 2004 or 2003; Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011; Bjørgenkov 2008; Knack n. d.; Knack and Zak 2001; Gesthuizen et al 2008; Hooghe et al 2008) critically investigated and empirically tested factors, with which trust is associated. For our research the findings of the last group are the most important. The question is, if trust is associated (or produced by) with associational life or with other factors and if there is something like “structural basis of trust”.

Trust, the theory goes, is the product of experience and we constantly modify and update our trustful and distrustful feelings in response to changing circumstances. So what do we know about the significance of associational life for generalised trust and what is the result of empirical testing? In spite of the growing of trust research in the social sciences, trust remains puzzling. Conceptually, it is clear that trust is the key ingredient of social life, but its origins remain uncertain and its consequences are yet to be clearly established (Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2001).

Delhey and Newton (2003; 2004) believe that social trust is based upon the social circumstances in which people find themselves. According to both Messrs the study of trust requires a top-down approach that focuses on the systemic or emergent properties of societies and their central institutions. Trust should be statistically associated with social variables. However, there is little agreement in sociology about what variables are important. For research about CSOs confidence building role in divided conflict prone societies this is a critical part. It is not only the participation or direct, face-to-face, and sustained involvement in voluntary organisations, but there is probably also a set of social circumstances which together with involvement

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6 Do people become more trusting as a result of close and sustained interaction with others in voluntary organizations? Or is it rather, that trusting people join voluntary associations and get involved with their community, leaving distrusting ones at home to watch television?
in voluntary organizations help to “produce” trust. This idea is supported by recent surveys which, in spite of voluntary organisations theory, show that there is rather no indication that interaction with other group members would automatically lead to the development of a more socially oriented value patterns, to a rise in trust level, or to the abandoning prejudices’.

Despite the vast sociological writing on the significance of associational life for generalised social trust it seems that single correlation between associational life and generalised social trust is invalid. Delhey and Newton (2004), looking for correlations between generalised social trust and associational life, find out that none of the measures7 of voluntary life turned out to be significant. It was found that associational life plays a role in confidence building, rather than in second-stage multivariate analysis.

There exist several studies offering multilevel studies of trust. All of these studies (for more see below) offer interesting and inspiring findings about correlation between trust, associational life and other social, economic, political or security variables.

The first analysis was offered by Delhey and Newton (2004; 2003). They tested theories on the origins of social trust and tested variables coming out of these theories to find factors which may act as intervening variables between trust and voluntary organizations and civil society. Both Messrs showed that there is some evidence of an association between voluntary activity and social trust at the cross-national comparative level, but it is not notably strong. Active membership of voluntary associations is not important for trust, whereas the figures for membership of associations are significant. Delhey and Newton (2004) conclude that there is not strong enough evidence to support the idea that voluntary associations generate trust, but enough to suggest that the membership variable should be included. They found out that variables, which show strong negative correlation with trust are income inequality, poverty, bad governance and ethnic fractionalization8 (Delhey and Newton 2004).

Secondly, economically based analysis offered by Knack and Zack (2001) and Knack (n. d.). They found that social trust is associated with a set of various outcomes not only with civic participation, but may occur without this participation. The propensity of people within any nation to trust each other correlates with economic growth, the rule of law and overall quality of governance, level of corruption, education, the extent of violent crime, and subjective well-being. Their

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7 Active members of any association, active members of three or more associations, members (either active or inactive) of any association, and members (either active or inactive) of three or more associations.

8 More to ethnic diversity and generalised trust see for example Hooghe et al 2008.
cross-national comparative analysis of generalised social trust in 60 countries showed that it is associated with, and is an integral part of, a tight syndrome of cultural, social, economic, and political variables. High trust countries are characterised by ethnic homogeneity, Protestant religious traditions, good government, wealth, and income equality. Knack’s and Zak’s (2001) investigation also suggests that trust levels can be influenced by policy interventions; trust can be raised directly by increasing communication and education, and indirectly by strengthening formal institutions that enforce contracts and by reducing income inequality.

Other empirical tests (Gesthuizen et al 2008) demonstrate that in European societies, economic inequality and the national history of continuous democracy turn out to be more important for explaining cross-national differences in social trust. Gesthuizen and his colleagues (2008) found that economic inequality appeared to reduce significantly all dimensions of formal social capital (i.e. public connections in organizations), as well as one dimension of informal social capital (i.e. giving help). They also found that the democratic histories of European societies turned out to affect interpersonal trust, giving informal help, donations, membership and participation in organisations. It is not ethnic fractionalization but instead the years of continuous democracy and the level of economic equality or inequality that are important for social trust in European societies. Economic inequality may increase social barriers between (ethnic) groups that in turn reduce, even though it may be slight, one dimension of informal and all dimensions of formal social capital.

After researching the sample of 100 countries Bjørnskov (2008) concludes that the strongest overall determinants of social trust are those associated with social fractionalization and in particular income inequality and political diversity. The results show that ethnic diversity is not significantly associated with social trust and that political fractionalization and formal democratic rights are equally unimportant. But social fractionalization might have differential effects across specific conditions (Bjørnskov, 2008: 279).

There are also first stage studies which discovered some evidence of correlation between voluntary activity and social trust, but these scholars (Sedláčková 2012, Marada 2005) point out that the influence of civic participation on trust depends on the type of the organisations, heterogeneity of the membership and on the level of formality or informality of the participation (Sedláčková 2012: 142). It seems that an important role is played by the goals of the association; associations aiming for different goals could have a different impact on the evolution and production of generalised social trust. There are empirical tests showing that cultural and community associations are more likely to produce social trust than political organizations. It also seems that the evolution of social trust can be influenced by the level of professionalism in the organisation. Despite all the positive effects of professionalism
it seems that the growing power of these professionals marginalises the voluntary action which last but not least transforms the character and social functions of CSOs. Highly professionalised non-profit organizations offer fewer opportunities for production of social capital and the chance to learn civic skills including trust is smaller. Stated generally, less formal organised associations offer a better chance to produce social trust.

**Conclusion**

Conflict management scholars as well as practitioners are optimistic about the confidence building capacity of CSOs, especially in cases of divided conflict-prone societies. They believe that activities of CSOs in various issue areas across the society create bridges between former enemies, remove prejudices and can or merely help create trust between them. And trust is believed to be basic stepping stone to a peaceful, working and democratic society. This optimism dominates today’s conflict management and creates a mainstream approach. What the article set out to show was the idea that our optimism about confidence building capacities of CSOs is not based on satisfactory evidence. Conflict management scholars have no clear indication and evidence about such capacities. We also have horribly little information about the circumstances in which CSOs can work as confidence builders. This article has tried to fill the gap and looking outside the conflict management field – particularly into sociology of trust – it tried to shed more light on the issue.

As was shown, sociology of trust, especially those, who carried out cross-national multilevel analysis, are sceptical about the confidence building role of civil society organisations and to the impact of associational life on the level of trust. The analysis presented above tested a few independent variables simultaneously and they showed that the highest levels of generalised social trust across the globe are closely associated with a tight syndrome of religious/cultural, social, economic, and political characteristics. Protestantism, but none of the other religions, forms the religious and ethical foundations for trust. Ethnic homogeneity is the social basis; GDP per capita and income equality are the economic conditions. Wealthy and egalitarian societies are trusting societies. Good governance is an essential structural basis of trust. Government, especially corruption free and democratic government, seems to set a structure in which individual are able to act in a trust-worthy manner and not suffer, and in which they can reasonably expect that most others will generally do the same. To sum up empirical testing of the relationship between trust and associational life (see chart below), we see that the intervening variable present in all tests has been income inequality.
It can be concluded that sociology of trust, especially empirical tests, showed that the idea about the confidence building capacity of CSOs is overestimated. We do not know how and in to what extent the membership in civic associations or the existence and activities of civic associations can influence the trust in comparison with other social, economic and cultural factors. The sociological testing indicates that CSOs work together with other factors and all these factors together have an influence on level of trust or distrust. To critically evaluate the CSOs’ confidence building capacity, it can be said that CSOs can positively influence the “other factors” which were correlated with trust: CSOs can work for income equality, good governance, democratization as well as for well-being and education. But CSOs cannot work for all factors; there are factors such as ethnic homogeneity, long democratic history or Protestantism which cannot be influenced by CSOs. Thus CSOs can work for trust and can be seen as confidence builders but conflict management should be aware that the only existence and activity, no matter how intensive and conscientious, of CSOs alone cannot produce trust.

References


Civil society organizations as confidence builders: conflict management perspective and what we can win for conflict management when we look at sociology of trust

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Civil society organizations as confidence builders: conflict management perspective and what we can win for conflict management when we look at sociology of trust

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BOOK REVIEWS

Habermas’s Unfinished Project of the Public Sphere: On Walking the Talk

Lenka Strnadová

The end of the 20th and the start of the 21st century have seen a large bulk of literature revising and critically revisiting more or less all theoretical concepts born throughout the modern history of thought. What most of these texts have in common is the understanding of going further, not rejecting all there has been but rather as taking the knowledge we already have and reinterpreting it in a way more plausible from the contemporary point of view. This is exactly the case with the collection of essays reviewed in here. As James Tully reminds us, Habermas perceives the relationship between the real and the critical ideal as a relationship of an ‘unfinished project’ (p. 174). Thus for him, the actually existing public sphere bears features of its own ideal form, though distorted. Looking at this volume, this is exactly the way its authors approach Habermas’s account of the public sphere – as a project of highest value that, nevertheless, comes short of fulfilling its own promise (so far). All essays included in the volume somehow touch on Habermas’s conception of the public sphere and its relation to democracy and legitimation through knowledge production, and at the same time come up with a critique and new perspectives reflecting the weak points of Habermas’s work.

Despite the great diversity of contributions represented in this volume, we can certainly identify some overarching ideas and common points of interests highlighted through the whole book. First of all and perhaps most explicitly, the book presents a very consistent, though multifaceted, critique and reassessment of Habermas’s idea of a single universal public sphere. Most of the authors in their own ways suggest there is a multiplicity of publics and modes of publicity that cannot be ignored if we want to stay true to the ideal of democratic inclusiveness. Of course, authors represented in this volume can refer to a long line of like-minded scholars who have raised the question of the exclusionary character of Habermas’s universal public sphere regulated by the rules of rational discourse before. Here, the groundbreaking study of Nancy Fraser (and the whole Calhoun’s excellent volume) serves as a common point of reference of many presented essays, together with a diverse mix of authors ranging from Iris Marion Young, to Anne Phillips, to...
Richard Rorty, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, and many others. The second issue that binds the contributions together concerns the relation of knowledge and democracy. Here, the main question is of course the epistemological one, whether and what kind of knowledge is possible, how knowledge is produced, and specifically, whether society’s knowledge of the good and the bad, the right and the wrong is or can be produced within the limits of the public sphere. And if so, how? Was Habermas right to claim that the consensus attained by means of rational discourse may produce knowledge upon which to ground democratic political legitimacy? Or do we have other, more adequate conceptions of the public from the epistemological perspective? The third topic is certainly the distinction between the private and the public so indispensable for Habermas’s view of the public sphere and at the same time so contentious in the eyes of many Habermas’s critics.

According to Lord Wilson (p. 19), the volume seems to grow out of a conference. Unfortunately, there is no other reference to the conference in the whole book. For sure, the book seems to benefit from the same positive factors as other similar volumes (the variety of perspectives) but also faces similar challenges. The chapters are rather fragmented and at first reading, it is quite hard to see where it overlaps, the overarching theoretical framework, place of individual contributions within the design of the book (particularly in part II), and distil the key topics at stake. For this purpose, I find the introductory chapter very useful and instructive. Needless to say, the plurality of perspectives, disciplines, and theories represented places quite a difficult task in front of a reader informed in just one or two of those fields.

The volume is divided into three parts, each containing three essays. At the core of part I (Public Opinion in the Democratic Polity) is a reassessment of the place and function of public opinion in democratic polity. From their respective perspectives, Lord Wilson, Gordon Graham, and Gary Wihl warn against underestimating public opinion as Habermas does. Lord Wilson in his chapter does this by citing very interesting examples from political practice proving that there is a vivid interaction between governments (in this case the British one) and public opinion, both sides intentionally influencing each other. While Lord Wilson’s practical contribution to the academic debate is undoubtedly very illustrative, unfortunately the relation of this text to the general framework of the book is rather vague. The second chapter, written by Gordon Graham, includes a much deeper theoretical insight. Here Graham, by positing against each other the ‘laïcité’ of public opinion and the ‘expertise’ of public sphere discourse, demonstrates the exclusionary character of any expert public sphere and the gap between scientific rationality and the procedural rationality of Habermas’s public sphere. He eloquently highlights a burning question of all democratic societies: either our democracy and public sphere is inclusive, and then we cannot expect the decision-making process to live up to standards of substantive...
rationality; or we go beyond proceduralism and bestow authority in hands of an epistocracy – but then we abandon the ideal of inclusion, and in fact what we understand under the term ‘democracy’ in modern days. While I am not ready to accept Graham’s sceptical conclusion that for this reason, political philosophy cannot give recommendations, I find the way even Habermas’s critique of the role of experts in democracies of late capitalism resonates in the text very inspiring. In the third chapter, Gary Wihl takes up the issue of public opinion and defends the public role of minority opinions against the Habermas inspired tendency to present such opinions as private and thus exclude both them and their holders from the public sphere. While I find Wihl’s analysis very concise and I believe he is generally right, I’m afraid the power of his argument is to an extent diminished by the sheer range of authors and theories he cites.

While the issue of knowledge already resonates especially in Graham’s essay, it is part II of the volume that targets the relationship between knowledge and public explicitly. In general, essays in part two provide insights from outside political theory, with excursions to history and theory of science (Christian J. Emden), applied issues of public health (Anne Hardy), or the technology-driven world of the geek community (Christopher Kelty). While the range of topics in this part is very wide and at points is a bit distant for political theorists who might form the primary readership of this book, each of the chapters undoubtedly sheds light on certain socially and politically relevant topics. In his historical analysis of interface between science and public, Emden illustrates the shortcomings of Habermas’s acultural and ahistorical account of the public sphere. In fact Emden deconstructs ‘the traditional distinction between expert science and lay public’ (p. 10) quite as authors in the first part of the volume attempted to challenge the line between public opinion and public discourse. Also Anne Hardy’s analysis of the concept of public health revolves around the contentious issue of the public/private division. This historical excursion is in fact highly illustrative of the general points of critique I have already outlined. Contrary to what Habermas claims, history shows that the boundary is constantly renegotiated, and there are no essentially private matters. Moreover, the case of the public health discussion up until today exemplifies that there are many various publics, not a single one. This way Hardy relates her analysis again to Fraser. The subsequent chapter written by Christopher Kelty carries us from 19th century to the contemporary world of the Internet and the geek community. Kelty introduces geeks as recursive publics. Unfortunately, and here I rely also on discussions of Arendt related democratic theory included in this book, I cannot join Kelty celebrating geeks’s independence and discourse circulation capacities. While Kelty’s analysis of the geek community and the sphere of the Internet using the concept of social imaginaries reveal many internal mechanisms of the group, questions of the group’s relationship to other public spheres and matters of general
concern stay unanswered. To me, the interesting question would be whether and how geeks not only circulate discourse but also act in the form of topical publics.

While part II focuses on issues of particular concern and only broadly relates to the theoretical framework of the book, part III of the book could be considered a theoretical culmination of the volume. While Georgina Born starts with a quite straightforward analysis of the changing role of public broadcasting and the possibilities opened up by the process of digitalization, the main power of her argument does not lie in the outline of possible range of new public communications initiatives. Her text includes a great number of crucial arguments, from the warning against self-commercialization of public broadcasting media (citing John Keane, p. 126), to the rejection of the idea of a universal media public sphere, and most importantly the need for media to reflect cultural pluralism and social inequality. In contradiction to Graham, Born insists that media can and should learn from political theory of politics of difference (Iris Marion Young), Mouffe’s agonism, or Phillips’s politics of presence. While I concur with Born and support the idea of inclusion of marginalized groups and individuals in media at the level of practice, I am afraid many theoretical questions are left to be resolved, the issue of representation or representativeness would be somewhere on the top of that list. The following contribution by Steven G. Crowell may be the most theoretical part of the book. Crowell confronts Arendt’s and Habermas’s account of the public sphere only to create his own, powerful, and persuasive interpretation of the public sphere combining the potential for universalisation taken from Habermas and respect and inclusion of local, individual identities enhanced by Arendtian politics of meaning. In what becomes one of the most brilliant essays of the volume, Crowell manages not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. I hope to not misinterpret his ideas when I conclude that he seems to be defending a very sophisticated mode of ‘soft’, of ‘pluralized’ universalism, keeping thus the critical strength of universalist models but at the same time overcoming their exclusiveness. The final essay by James Tully presents an excellent argument linking together many issue and standpoints of previous chapters. Tully defends what he calls universal critical theory, mainly owing again to Fraser, and democratic approach to public sphere against the “Habermasian” project of the universal rational public sphere and critical liberalism. On the way, he criticizes in-built constitutional and cultural presumptions of Habermas’s model that are exempt from any criticism and public discourse. His excellent attack on things that ‘go without saying’ (p. 185) does not apply only to Habermas but could with same efficiency be used to the critique of Rawls, the parallels are extremely close.

In the final argument of the book Tully gives a highly sophisticated form to what other authors maintained as well – there is pluralism of public spheres but at the
same time universalist ideals need not be forgotten altogether. The universal regulative cannot be reason but human beings, ethics of care, human relationships and ethics of everyday life. In media, in families, in civic life, in geek community, in science, we must be walking the talk.

The Workers’ State

Ondřej Stulík

Mark Pittaway wrote this book, regarded as his most important contribution, before his tragic death (Foreword IX). The reviewed book deals with the phenomenon of creating a socialist ideological “illusion” in post-war Hungary within the labour class. Mark Pittaway focused on several identity creating concepts. We can see how the Hungarian regime established legitimacy in three case studies, the differences of which are constituted by the variety of three regions’ social structures including a final comparison.

The focus on several identity creating concepts is determined by specific duality – the nature of state as a concert of institutions (static complex of a state) and a social realm projecting onto the state institutions (bottom-up dynamic effect). Pittaway worked with the latter, as he wanted to open up the most important “infrastructural power” of the state (p. 3). Infrastructural power is characterized by imposing and influencing the everyday practice of (not only) the Hungarian socialist regime (p. 4). According to Pittaway, the practices of the Hungarian regime act as mirrors to the social realm and rhetoric positions of the real communist policy capable of creating the “new” working-class consciousness.

There was only one ruling party in the Hungarian socialist regime – Magyar Kommunista Párt (MKP; Hungarian Communist Party) and its close successor – Magyar Dolgozók Pártja (MDP; Hungarian Workers’ Party), which absorbed Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata Párt (MSzDP; Hungarian Social Democratic Party). The attitudes of this party to workers are discussed widely in the book and this discussion elaborates on the whole picture of the Hungarian regime’s infrastructural power between the years 1944–1958. However, as Pittaway mentions, the Hungarian regime came into a deficit of legitimacy during the first five-year economic plan (p. 7).

The MKP wanted to transform anti-socialistic identities into socialistic ones to achieve the goal of the constitution of the “new communist” working class. Christians, rural communities and former right-wing supporters of Nazi Germany were regarded as anti-socialistic identities. After the war, Hungarian society was polarized and the MKP, to achieve this mentioned goal, strove to find a concrete political enemy which could then be destroyed. The MKP construed this enemy from the Független Kisgazdapárt (FKgP; Independent Smallholders’ Party) which won the
first elections after the war and constituted an integral part of anti-socialistic identities. For the struggle with this party, the MKP used practices of Soviet Stalinism that were often illegal or semi-legal. Specific measures used during the struggle can be seen in the following three case studies, a selection which the author deems suitable as they all represent certain kinds of communities – thus, these case studies are highly representative. As we will see subsequently, the comparison of these case studies will show us the limits of the legitimacy of the MKP’s policies.

The Case Studies

The case studies are divided into eight chapters by using the path-dependency approach. We will follow this author’s prescription and describe the main policy of MKP/MDP and the reactions of workers.

The first case study takes place in Újpest, an administratively independent city in the industrial suburbs of greater Budapest. Újpest was a predominantly working-class town and, we assume, it was the area which gave the most significant support to the socialist regime. The second case study is in Tatabánya, a multiethnic area where a large coalmine was situated and where a type of “caste system” existed which included workers, office staff, engineers and managers. This case represents some possible problems created by the division of society in this manner. The last area and case is Zala County’s southern region, where oil fields were built and most of its inhabitants were manual workers. This region was the site of the biggest issues with the polarization of identities, as half of the workers were farmers (especially women) while the other workers worked in the oil industry.

As we examined above, after World War II there was a deep-seated polarization in Hungarian society. The MKP wanted to usurp political power illegally and beyond democratic boundaries. To achieve this goal, the MKP stood behind the rhetoric of “liberation” and the workers followed it. In Újpest, this liberation, which was framed in terms of bringing security, was successful for some but not all citizens. The most numerous of the socialist labour movements were driven underground during the war and all political power was taken from them. Other manual workers felt the growing sense of exclusion. In Tatabánya the “liberation” lost control and polarization and animosity began to grow between coal miners and administrational staff. This was driven by income inequality, lack of food for workers, and the collaboration of administrational employees under the wartime regime. Tension was moderated by the growing material support of the MKP, although the workers were still unsatisfied. In Southern Zala, the politics of “liberation” was non-functional because of the bad reputation of the Soviet troops (for committing rape and other traumatic post-war consequences) that were connected with the communists. In the
process of liberation, many Soviets were in charge of managing the oil field (as war reparations).

The second tactic of the MKP was a specific policy of struggle after the election defeat in 1945. The MKP wanted to destroy dominant conservative political culture, especially in the southern area of Zala County, and to disturb the social democratic wing (represented by the MSzDP) in the other two examined regions (p. 52–55). The MKP was able to assert its leadership over the left-wing and mobilize the minority against the FKgP. In this light, the MPK used a wide range of propaganda which included the MKP’s accusation of the FKgP as a power of reaction. Moreover, the MKP started to control the local trade unions and established the income for minimal living conditions, solving the poor material situation in the regions (Pittaway calls this “ politicization of employment”), blaming private ownership of the mines (in Tatabánya), securing price stability, and pushing the rural inhabitants (in the southern area of Zala County) to the collective form of property holding (see also p. 138). Part of these policies were successful but the strength of socialist identity strengthened only in a small part of the population (Pittaway does not forget women and their social situation). One reason of failure was that the MKP did not wipe out the deep-seated material discontent, poverty and insecurity (p. 63, 73).

The next period of legitimacy struggle took place between the years 1947 and 1951. The main event (after MKP won the election) in Hungarian politics was “fusion”, when the MKP “swallowed” the MSzDP, thus creating the MDP. However, Pittaway does not give proper attention to the characterization of this fusion and only mentions that this act meant establishing the MDP’s dictatorship (p. 85–87). Despite its repressiveness, the “new” regime was seen as legitimate by most left-wing workers. In the case of right-wing workers, there was a social polarization, especially in Újpest. Real incomes rose and the MDP promised that its policies would bring an increasing living standard for what they dubbed “our” people, or for “our” nation (p. 88). Factories were constructed in new places where the accumulation of labour forces could take place, in order to allow them to be better ideologically controlled (p. 116). For the satisfaction of conservative workers, the MDP used nationalistic rhetoric, for example in Southern Zala, rupturing the “internationalist” Catholic identity. However, supplies decreased and shortages of food arose in cities and “labour spaces”. These conditions shattered the legitimacy of the MDP’s regime.

During the period from 1951–1953, the identities and policies of the MDP were only reproduced. The MDP resigned to create a “new communist working class” and tried to hold the regime by using widespread repression, especially in Zala’s border district where “class war” was in progress (p. 149–150). During the period from 1954–1955, the class war grew – despite taxations and repressions, the real
incomes of individual landholders grew more rapidly than the wages of industrial workers. For example, in Újpest the power was in the hands of skilled workers. This war was not only class based but also among industrial workers – i.e. between the less (those young or new in the factories) and more skilled (p. 177). These struggles characterized the process of the revolution in 1956. After the (second) Soviet revolution, the situation cooled down. As Pittaway mentioned “…in order to even attempt to rebuild…legitimacy, the state had to place material flesh on…ideological bones” (p. 233). The myth of “counterrevolution” was therefore established to win some degree of acceptance and after that the social practice was known as “Goulash Communism” or “Kadarism” in Hungary.

Conclusion

We can conclude that Workers’ State is well written book. The book does not have many weak points and has a coherent structure that corresponds to Pittaway’s perspective of the identity and legitimacy of the research. The topic of this book is still valid. Comparison of identity can be remarkable and fully explanatory, for example in official state documents, such as the constitution or the MKP/MDP methods incorporated into the election system. Pittaway very often cites contemporary documents and speeches – he works with huge amount of data. Workers’ State is a necessary book for comparative political scientists who want to examine Hungary’s political system (especially the election system). Due to the fact that it examines identities as a whole, the book is suitable for providing relevant comparative criterions.

Elites in Post-Communist Societies

Vladimír Naxera¹

The collapse of the Soviet bloc was probably the most significant event of the late 20th century. In Václav Havel’s words, the significance of this situation was comparable for example with the collapse of the Roman Empire. After the fall of the communist regime, a process of complex and profound social change took place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. According to Matevž Tomšič, we can comment on whether we would like to understand this change and very complicated transformation (so-called “triple transformation” due to necessity to transform economics, society as well as politics) it is important to know who were the key actors controlling the process of social transformation and privatization of former state property, to know their character, origin and also relations between them. These key actors are usually called “(political) elites”. The members of these political elites are perceived as those individuals (or groups) that create and control social institutions. The term “elite” can be understood in several different meanings. Social sciences normally deal with numerous elite theories which focus on different aspects related to these elites. According to some social scientists dealing with post-communist transformation, very important aspects of the nature of elites can found in their origin, after the fall of the communist regimes. Everybody who deals with this theme needs to take into account two different theories. Indeed, both theory of reproduction of elites and theory of circulation of elites are very important for the investigation of post-communist development.

The reviewed study is a very good introduction to the nature of so-called “post-communist” or “post-socialist” elites. The author of this book, Matevž Tomšič, could continue on his former research of these elites, namely the Slovenian ones. The book consists of three main parts. The first one focuses on the theme of elites in general. The author summarizes the general topics related to the phenomenon of elites in modern politics, economics and societies. In the beginning Tomšič presents different definitions and views of the term “elite”. As he states, there are two more commonly used but different meanings. The first point of view is connected to some exceptional traits of these individuals while second focuses to the capability enabling the control over society – we can speak about “the elite of knowledge” and “the elite of power”. This distinction is similar to the concept of Pierre Bourdieu who defines three types of elites, or more exactly three types of personal capital that individuals can dispose of. The second term mentioned above (“the elite of power”)

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is usually used to describe the political elite. As we mentioned before, in social sciences there are several theoretical approaches to the elites. In this first part of the reviewed book Tomšič presents very schematically and shortly but sufficiently for needs of this text several of these theories, both classical theories of elites (for example theories of Mosca, Pareto, and Michels) and modern political theories (especially of Robert Dahl, Charles Wright Mills, Eva Etzioni-Halevy, and others). The main issue of author’s interest in this part of the book is the role of elites in the modern societies (in both democratic – namely in Robert Dahl’s polyarchy – and non-democratic political regimes) characterized by Max Weber’s well known words about a “high level of structural and functional differentiation”.

The next part deals with the role of the political system in the transformation process in former communist countries. Tomšič sees transformation after the fall of communist regimes as a systemic modernization. According to Ivan Bernik and his theory of “obmodern society” and “marginally modernized societies” or the very significant Polish sociologist Piotr Sztompka and his words about “fake modernity” of communist regimes, Tomšič claims that we cannot think about communist regimes in the same way as modern ones. These social formations were modernized from above and this modernization was related only to members of the ruling communist elite. Systemic modernization after the fall of these regimes is understood as a way of establishing institutional structures of the Western type in all segments of society. As we mentioned above, in this complex and very difficult process of so-called triple transformation the actors played a very important role. As Tomšič notes, these actors had to establish conditions for the transformation and stabilization of the system, but they also had the key responsibility to create the institutional basis for all societal areas, the process of privatization included. According to many social scientists, this point (the role of elites in the process of privatization) is the key moment during whole transformation, because their position enabled the members of the elite to significantly influence the way of change of the ownership structure.

The third (main) part of the book deals with the nature and origin of elites after the fall of communism as well as with the relations between elite members and between elites and social institutions and society in general. The members of the elite in each post-communist country are heterogeneous – they have a particular cultural and social origin. The question of origin within the communist nomenclature or out of this structure seems to be the crucial one. It is therefore not surprising that the explanation of relationship between the reproduction and the circulation of elites is the most important aim of this chapter (apart from other aspects related to the topic which the author presents in the third part of the book). Tomšič also focuses on the question of the nature and structure of communist elites in conjunction
with the theory of elite reproduction. In my opinion this part would merit more space because of the essential importance of this theme for an emergence of post-communist elite and for the opportunity for the members of old elite to retain their privilege positions during the transforming process. And this question – the capacities of members of communist elites which result from their position within the nomenclature – lies in the core of reproduction theory.

To summarize this review we can say that Tomšič’s book is very suitable for everybody who is interested in the question of the post-communist elite. The author clearly (in some cases briefly and schematically) presents every important theme related to the topic. One of the few comments which we can express negatively in this review is the undersized part within the third chapter bringing us numeric data and evidences about the measure of reproduction. It would certainly be interesting to find out the comparable data and their changes through the time to have an opportunity to compare the data from particular countries during a long time period. However, this final comment seems to be really insignificant in the context of the general quality of the book.

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