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Dear reader,

The decline of bipolar confrontation and the disintegration of Soviet power paved the way for a new era of independent foreign as well as domestic policy of the Central European countries (CEC). Former communist countries had to redefine their interests, goals and policies and their allies and partners in the new conditions of the international system. This was more than substantial in the security field: the security environment of the Central European countries completely changed at the beginning of the 1990s. In the first years of this period the CEC tried to solve their security situation by transformation of the security architecture; many alternative plans for future security architecture emerged, but in a few months it was clear that only one scenario had a real chance to become reality – membership of the EU and NATO.

During the summit of Central European presidents in the Hungarian town of Visegrác (February 1991) the Declaration on cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary on the Way to European Integration was signed. One of the goals of the Declaration was for these countries to become part of the European political, security, economic and judicial system. The next summit of Central European presidents, in Kraków in October 1991, was an official declaration of the interest of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary to join the EU/EC as well as NATO.

However, the security situation of Baltic countries and Balkan countries was much more complicated. The Baltic countries declared independence in 1990 and 1991 but it was clear that any declaration of their interest in NATO or EU membership would go against Soviet and later Russian interests. The Balkan countries had to solve another dilemma – after the dissolution of Yugoslavia many ethnic conflicts arose and civil wars broke out. The UN Security Council even imposed the sanctions on Serbia, which in fact affected all other neighbouring countries. The most serious security threats in the southern part of Europe thus were ethnic clashes; internal displacement; forced migration; unemployment; political and economical instability; the activities of warlords, people trafficking, especially in women and children; and drug and small arms dealing. With the transformation of the CEC societies and political systems and the deepening of globalization threats emerged, which former communist societies were unfamiliar with – xenophobia, racism, political extremism, illegal migration, lack of strategic resources, and terrorism.

This issue presents articles which were presented during the annual CEPSA conference in Bratislava 2006 (Gardašević, Dočekalová, Svete) as well as articles which originated from the research work of individual authors. This issue of Politics in Central Europe analyses the security environment of the CEC and highlights the internal as well as external security threats of various Central European countries. The articles point out a variety of national and regional specific security factors that have
determined the security policy and security environment of the CEC. The editors hope that this issue answers some questions about contemporary Central European security dilemmas and highlights some of the most serious security challenges in the CEC.

Šárka Waisová & Ladislav Cabada
Co-editors
ESSAYS

Radical Right-Wing Parties in Central Europe: Mutual Contacts and Cooperation¹

Pavla Dočekalová

Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyse mutual contacts between and cooperation of the strongest extreme right-wing political parties in Central European countries, i.e. in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The article defines the extreme right, introduces its member parties in the region (those who had or still have parliamentary representation, namely the Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia, Hungarian Truth and Life Party, League of Polish Families and the Slovak National Party) and analyses what kind of bilateral or multilateral relations they have maintained. It explains the possibilities of and obstacles to the transnational cooperation of the Central European radical right. Special emphasis is placed on European Union structures and the question of whether EU membership has influenced the mutual contacts of these parties. The conclusion states that although radical right political parties have maintained mutual relations, these links have been rather limited. The main reason can be found in the very nature of the radical right: its ideology is based on nationalism, which means that these parties do not consider international cooperation beneficial. Furthermore, they often have contradictory interests and aims, and these parties are heterogeneous and prefer different strategies for transnational cooperation.

Key words: extreme right; Central Europe; transnational cooperation; political parties; party family

Introduction

The activities of political parties that are situated on the far right of the political spectrum can be considered as one of the challenges to democracy and democratic governance. Obviously, this statement is valid for all democratic countries, and the Central European region is no exception, but radical right-wing parties differ in their and strength in various countries. In some the extreme right has gained parliamentary representation and even has become part of the executive. Such parties usually do not advocate total elimination of democratic systems, but they express certain ideas and attitudes that undermine the democratic system and are a clear contradiction of

¹ An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Central European Political Science Association Regional Conference, Bratislava, Slovakia, 18–19 May 2006.
Radical Right-Wing Parties in Central Europe: Mutual Contacts and Cooperation

Pavla Dočekalová

democratic values. Radical right-wing parties do not only focus on activities within the arena of national, regional and local politics, but they also participate in European elections and seek representation in the European Parliament (EP). This supranational platform then provides a forum for cooperation of groups of ideologically alike political parties of different countries.

The aim of this article is to analyse mutual relations between radical right-wing political parties in the Central European region and the influence of European Union (EU) accession on these relations. Several questions are considered: do the radical right-wing parties in Central Europe maintain mutual contacts? Do they establish a common platform for cooperation? Has European Union membership increased their interactions?

There are several aspects of the topic of this text that need to be specified. The first is the geographical delimitation: for the purpose of this study, Central Europe is understood as the group of “Visegrád Four” countries (i.e. the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary), which have experienced certain similarities in their developments. Secondly, it is necessary to explain which radical right-wing parties are being analysed. This article deals only with the strongest representatives of the radical right: only those parties that were represented (or are still represented) in parliament are considered. This limitation is in accordance with the aim of this article explained above: to analyse to what extent the radical right in Central Europe has made use of the potential for cooperation offered by European integration structures. The study of small parties that have never attracted significant voter attention, or illegal extremist organizations, is beyond the scope of this paper.2

This article is divided into three parts. The first offers a general definition of the radical right. It is necessary to provide the explanation of the nature of the phenomenon since the character of the radical right influences mutual contacts of its member parties and determines barriers to cooperation within this party family. The second part offers an introduction to radical right-wing parties in the Visegrád countries; it briefly outlines their electoral support, the role they play within the respective party systems, and basic ideological features. The third part is dedicated to analyses of mutual contacts of the extreme right-wing parties in the studied region and explains factors influencing these relations.

Definition of the Radical Right

The radical right-wing party family has attracted scholars’ attention for several decades, with research covering, for example, reasons for electoral support, analyses of the ideology and programmes of these parties, attitudes of established political parties towards the radical right, mutual relations of far right-wing parties, etc. Despite

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2 An in-depth analysis of transnational networks of various types of the extreme right in Central Europe is provided by Miroslav Mareš (2006).
numerous articles and books published on this party family, numerous questions still have been left unanswered, and this topic remains the subject of many debates. Scholars have not even agreed on a proper label for this party family and its definition, and consequently there is no consensus on which parties should or should not be classified as a part of the radical right. As Cas Mudde rightly said, “a large part of the debate on whether the party is or is not part of the extreme right-wing party family is, indeed, more a result of a difference of opinion on the definition of right-wing extremism” (Mudde, 1996: 235). This is true also in the case of Central Europe: the classification of some parties as “radical right” can be doubted (let us take the example of the Slovak National Party).

For various reasons defining a radical right-wing party family can be considered more difficult to define than other party families. Firstly, the phenomenon of “extreme right” has a very diverse and broad nature. It comprises both far-right parties that have representatives in the legislature and that seek (or in the case of some parties even succeed in gaining) participation in governments, as well as extremist movements and groups that fight against the establishment. The extreme right is not a “uniform type bearing essentially homogeneous traits”, but it can be described as “a political family whose constituent parts exhibit certain things in common, but that also may be divided into subtypes” (Hainsworth, 2000: 4–5).

Secondly, the parties concerned do not use the name “radical right”. Some party families are easier to define since the majority of their members use common names, for example, “green”, “communist” or “socialist”. The name criterion cannot be used in the case of the extreme right because given the fact that the parties do not admit to being classified as radical right, they often refuse to present themselves as being right-wing or left-wing, and they define themselves as taking another (third) position (Eatwell, 2000: 410; Mudde, 1996: 233).

Thirdly, these parties clearly exhibit a lack of transnational cooperation. Other party families have transnational federations for the cooperation of national parties, and the membership of parties in these platforms thus suggests that they belong to that respective party family. However, this is not the case with the extreme right (Mudde, 1996: 233).

Many names have been used as a label for this group of parties: radical right; extreme right; extremist right-wing parties; populist right; neo-Fascist parties; neo-Nazi parties; ultra-right-wing parties; far-right; radical right-wing populist; racist parties; etc. (see e. g. Eatwell, 2000: 410, Mudde, 1996: 230–232). However, not all of these

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3 Bearing in mind differences in organizational structures the extreme right, we stress that this article is limited to political parties only; other institutional structures such as non-registered movements or sub-cultures are not considered. Moreover, the text deals only with the extreme parliamentary right, that is, as defined by Jens Rydgren, the section of the extreme right that participates in elections and seeks to gain representation within established political institutions, thus accepting the democratic rules of the game (Rydgren, 2004: 10). Only those parties that have managed to get their representatives into the legislature of the respective country at least for one term, are considered.
terms are synonyms and should not be used interchangeably. Some of them can be used as a label for this party family; some of them are more adequate for various sub-groups within this party family. Since it is not the aim of this article to contribute to a “war of words” (Mudde, 1996) and search for a “proper” name for this party family, there is not enough space to define the aforementioned terms and analyse the possibilities of their use. It should be mentioned, however, that this article uses mainly the terms “radical right”, as well as “far-right” and “extreme right”, which are understood as umbrella terms for this heterogeneous phenomenon. These names are considered more or less as synonyms and are used interchangeably mainly for stylistic reasons.

In order to define the radical right-wing party family, it is necessary to outline not only ideological and programmatic features, but also to describe its common political style and discourse. Scholars tend to agree that the common core doctrine shared by the extreme right-wing parties is nationalism (Eatwell, 1998: 412; Mudde, 1999: 187; Hainsworth, 2000: 12; Fieschi, 2000: 519), which is usually accompanied by ethnocentrism and ethnopluralism (i.e. only one’s “own” nation is given positive qualities; foreign influences and cultures are perceived as threats to a nation and nations should be kept apart in order to preserve their qualities). Other features which are most often referred to are xenophobia, racism (usually cultural racism), support for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, emphasis on law and order, opposition to multiculturalism and immigration, etc.

These parties are usually representatives of populism. Kai-Olaf Lang defines populist style as comprising following elements: “the appeal to the “people’s will” and a strong anti-establishment attitude; oversimplification of problems and possible solutions; confrontation and antagonism; the construction of a dichotomy between “them” (establishment and bureaucracy) and “us” (the people) which cuts across the lines of social class and social layer; a high level of personalization based on strong leaders” (Lang, 2005: 7). Radical right-wing parties therefore often benefit from popular dissatisfaction with established parties (Hainsworth, 2000: 9). These parties appeal to emotions (mainly anxiety and insecurity) in their discourse. They overemphasize threats, and use stereotypes and prejudice. The representatives of these parties often use politically incorrect and socially unacceptable expressions and in some cases cross the boundaries of free speech.

Lang defines two categories of populism, soft and hard. Hard populism is further divided into three groups: national-populists; agrarian populists and left-populist. The

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4 For example, Mudde rightly notes that the terms “neo-Nazism” and “neo-Fascism” should be used only for parties and groups that consider National Socialism or Fascism as ideological influences (Mudde, 1996: 230), and thus they should not be used as a label for the extreme right as such.

5 Similarly, far-right parties focus on the “people” or the “ordinary man” in their rhetoric and claim that the political system of their respective country does not work (Taggart, 1995: 36–37), they criticize other political parties (parties in government as well as the opposition) as being interested only in political power and money. This does not necessarily mean that they reject political parties as such: they criticize the way parties perform in the political system of their country (Mudde, 1999: 191–192).
national populist group comprises the Central European far-right parties, and Lang (2005: 7–8) mentions namely the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Party of Hungarian Truth and Justice (MIÉP), the Czech Republicans and the League of Polish Families (LPR) in this group. These parties are subject of this study and will be introduced in the following section (the countries are presented in alphabetical order).

Representatives of the Radical Right in Central Europe

Czech Republic

The only extreme right-wing party ever represented in the Czech parliament in the 1990s was the Association for the Republic – the Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro republiku – Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ). Its development can be described, according to Miroslav Mareš, in three phases. The first started in late 1989 and lasted until the parliamentary elections of 1992. During this period the party was established outside parliament and soon started to dominate the far right of the political spectrum. Miroslav Sládek became its leading figure. The second stage is the period of parliamentary representation, which lasted for six years (1992–1998). In the third phase (which began after the 1998 parliamentary elections), the party experienced an internal crisis and financial problems and transformed itself into the Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (Republikáni Miroslava Sládka, RMS). The RMS can be considered as the successor of the SPR-RSČ (because there is a clear personal and programmatic continuity), but legally it is a new entity (Mareš, 2003: 187–188). Table 1 shows the electoral support of the SPR-RSČ and the RMS.

Table 1: Electoral support for the SPR-RSČ in parliamentary elections

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>8.01</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
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</table>


** SPR-RSČ replaced by Republicans of Miroslav Sládek (RMS).

The ideology of the SPR-RSČ was based on nationalism, and the Party presented itself as the party of “true patriots and brave people” (Novák, 1995). It emphasized the threats posed to the nation that were perceived as being caused by mutual interdependence among countries which, according to the party, leads to the destruction of national cultures, customs and traditions. The SPR-RSČ considered itself as the only party that can save the nation (Sládek, 1996). Other ideological features besides nationalism, included xenophobia and racism. The targets of xenophobic and racist assaults

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6 For more information about the SPR-RSČ “transformation” to the RMS see Mareš, 2003: 200–201.
were mainly Roma people, whom SPR-RSČ rhetoric referred to as “Gypsies”\(^7\). In the party’s discourse only negative qualities were attributed to members of this ethnic minority; they were associated with crime and seen as an “inadaptable group”. This can be demonstrated by the following quotation: “Gypsies are responsible for 70 – 75 per cent of crime. If we want to lower the crime rate and clean our cities, first we have to solve the Gypsy problem” (Sládek, 1996). Other ideological and programmatic features were opposition to gay rights and multiculturalism (Mareš, 2003: 210), as well as the introduction of capital punishment. The party exhibited strong anti-establishment attitudes, e.g. the parliamentary parties between 1998 and 2002 being known as The Gang of Five. The Republicans accused the government of corruption and advocated direct democracy measures (Mareš, 2003: 222). Nationalism was visible also in the case of the foreign policy proposed by the SPR-RSČ, for example, in the opposition to NATO and EU membership, and in the strong anti-German rhetoric. Given that the leader of the SPR-RSČ became the leader of the RMS, the ideological profile of the RMS remained basically unchanged.

**Hungary**

The Hungarian Truth and Life Party\(^8\) (*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja*, MIÉP) was established in 1993 by secession of a group of deputies of the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The party was unable to win representation in the 1994 parliamentary elections but was more successful four years later when it gained 14 seats in the Hungarian legislature (Benda, 2002: 239; Karsai, 1999: 146). The party lost its representation in parliament in 2002. Table 2 provides data on the electoral support of the MIÉP. The leader of the MIÉP is István Csurka. In 2005 the MIÉP formed an electoral alliance with the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik).

**Table 2: Electoral support for the MIÉP in parliamentary elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2006*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*MIÉP-Jobbik. Percentage of list votes

The MIÉP is also a nationalist party. The “Hungarian truth”, or “Hungarian justice”, in the party’s name represents the demands of the MIÉP for the revision of frontiers and incorporation of the territories settled by Hungarians, into Hungary. “Hungary belongs to Hungarians” is one of the party’s slogans. Hungarian life, culture, values systems etc. are perceived as being threatened by global, American-style mass con-

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\(^7\) The word “Gypsies” is seen as politically incorrect and has pejorative connotations in Czech.

\(^8\) The translation “Hungarian Justice and Life Party” is often used too.
sumption culture and materialism and from inside by “communist internationalism, liberal cosmopolitanism and a liberal media monopoly” (Benda, 2002: 240). Ethnic nationalism accompanied by xenophobia can be demonstrated also in the following example: in 1995 the party leader Csurka “tried to alarm his audience by saying that the aim of the governing socialist-liberal coalition is to eliminate pure-blooded, true-born Hungarians and replace them with Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews from the former Soviet Union, so that, as a result, ‘one third of the country will be Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews, and the other third Gypsies’” (Karsai, 1999: 137). The MIÉP is an anti-Semitic party; anti-Semitism is a component of Csurka’s discourse (Kriza, 2004), as well as statements against the Roma minority. The party espouses Euro-scepticism, although, according to S. Riishøj, it saw problems related to Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries (i.e. in Slovakia and Romania) as more important than EU issues (Riishøj, 2004). József Bayer claims that although the MIÉP cannot be classified as a neo-Fascist party, it has used some expressions from Nazi vocabulary, such as “Lebensraum” or “Judeobolschewiken”. After gaining parliamentary representation the party somewhat moderated its rhetoric (Bayer, 2002: 274–275).

Poland

The strongest far-right party in Poland is the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR)\(^9\), which was established shortly before the 2001\(^10\) national elections that gave the party representation in both parliamentary chambers. The LPR was founded with the aim of uniting the Catholic-national right, which was fragmented into several small parties and movements, with programmatic as well as personal clashes. The effort of unifying this political stream was also supported by Radio Maryja.\(^11\) The League of Polish Families consists of two main programmatic wings: the first is radical, supports orthodox Catholicism, nationalism, opposition to the European Union, often with features of anti-Semitism and xenophobia; the second promotes mainly the national interests of the Polish Republic. The League of Polish Families has undergone several internal conflicts, resulting mainly from its programmatic heterogeneity (Breindl, 2003). The party gained representation in the European Parliament in 2004, and one year later the LPR kept its representation in the Polish parliament. In 2006 it even became a member of government coalition of the Polish republic (together with Law and Justice and Self-Defence). The electoral support of the LPR is shown in Table 3.

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\(^9\) Other members of the extreme right have been rather marginal. It is worth noting that Self-Defence is also often included as a member of the far right, but it is more often classified as an example of agrarian populism than of the extreme right.

\(^10\) The League of Polish Families does not deny it is ideologically inspired by traditionalist authoritarianism (Mareš, 2006: 2). The leader of LPR is Roman Giertych, whose grandfather was an ally of Roman Dmowski.

\(^11\) Radio Maryja is a controversial conservative Polish radio station, whose founder is Tadeusz Rydzyk. It considers itself as a Catholic radio station, but the Vatican and international and Polish media have expressed several concerns about the station, whose message is often seen as exhibiting features of anti-Semitism, authoritarianism and intolerance.
Table 3: Electoral support for the LPR in parliamentary elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The League of Polish Families is a nationalist party (for example, we can mention a slogan “Poland for Poles” that was used in campaign before the referendum on Polish accession to the EU) (Czernicka, 2005: 17). The LPR exhibits clear signs of homophobia; it considers homosexuality as sexual deviance (LPR, undated) and the party is often criticized as being anti-Semitic. It is Euro-sceptic – it strongly campaigned against Poland joining the EU. According to the League of Polish Families, the main reasons for Poland not joining the European Union were: affairs would be managed from Brussels; EU laws would take priority over Polish laws and constitution; Polish agriculture would be damaged; and sexual deviance, killing of unborn children, euthanasia, cloning, etc. would be permitted (LPR undated). The LPR is strongly populist and criticizes the established political élite as being corrupt. Its electoral success can be partly explained by protest votes against the political élites (Czernicka, 2005: 17).

Slovakia

The Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS) was established in 1990. At the beginning of the 1990s the party underwent a period of internal conflicts and clashes which were, among others, seen in the change of party leader. In 1994 the party chose Ján Slota as its head, and he managed to secure its internal stability. Having been represented in parliament since 1990, the party even was part of Mečiar’s government coalitions (Zetocha – Konečný, 2005). Internal conflicts became once more visible in the late 1990s, when Anna Malíková, leader of the parliamentary group of the SNS, tried to put an end to political isolation and proposed a more moderate party orientation. She replaced Ján Slota as party chair in 1999. Under the leadership of Anna Malíková some members of the party (who opposed her) were excluded, and others, supporting Ján Slota, left the party. In 2001 the “True Slovak National Party was formed under Slota’s leadership. The two parties ran on separate lists for the 2002 parliamentary elections, and none of them managed to cross the electoral threshold, thus losing their parliamentary representation. In the spring of 2005 both parties merged again, with Ján Slota being confirmed as leader (Zetocha – Konečný, 2005). Parliamentary representation was regained in the 2006 elections, following which the party joined Robert Fico’s government coalition (together with Direction-Social

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12 The party sees itself as the oldest political party in Slovakia, as an heir of the Slovak National Party, which existed in between 1871 and 1938 and was then forced to become part of Hlinka’s Slovak People’s Party. The decision to re-establish the Slovak National Party was taken in 1989.
Democracy and the People’s Party – Movement for a Democratic Slovakia). The electoral support of the Slovak National Party is presented in Table 4.

Table 4: Electoral support for the SNS in parliamentary elections*

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes (%)</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>7.93</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>3.32</td>
<td>11.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.statistics.sk/ (23. 10. 2006)

** The True Slovak National Party gained 3.65 per cent of the votes.
*** The True Slovak National Party gained 3.65 per cent of the votes.

The Slovak National Party is a nationalist party, and it warns of the threat of irredentism, which, according to the SNS, is posed by the Hungarian minority living in Slovakia. Besides its negative attitudes towards members of the Hungarian minority, the party uses strong anti-Roma rhetoric and is also infamous for its homophobic statements – for example, homosexuality is perversion (SNS, 2004) according to Ján Slota. The party advocated the re-introduction of capital punishment for serious crimes (SNS, 1998) and referred to the Slovak State.13

Transnational relations of the Central European Radical Right

As Miroslav Mareš rightly puts it, due to many modern processes (such as the growing interconnection of internal and international politics), the transnational cooperation of political parties has become more and more important. For them, the main reason for maintaining contacts with their foreign counterparts is mutual ideological (sometimes also material) support aimed at reinforcing the role of an ideological movement within the respective country and region (Mareš, 2006: 6).

Mareš denotes various types of cooperation. According to the number of political parties involved, bilateral and multilateral cooperation can be distinguished. Another possible criterion is the geographical extent; cooperation can be maintained at the world, regional or sub-regional level. The third perspective focuses on the intensity of cooperation, in which M. Mareš defines following categories: “1. free, non-institutionalized cooperation (often even ad hoc); 2. more stable networks and consistent organizations with stable bodies formed from entities at the national level, and 3. transnational organizations forming national branches” (Mareš, 2006: 7, Mareš, 2001b: 8).

13 The Slovak State (1939–45) was a puppet state ally of Nazi Germany. One of the party main goals in 1998 programme was to present “the true testimony of history of Slovakia and Slovaks, which would be purged from intentional falsification and degradation of the Slovak nation and its representatives.” The party mentioned that the Slovak State was misunderstood. SNS wanted to rehabilitate the leading figures of this country (SNS 1998: 4).
In order to analyse the mutual relations of the radical right-wing parties in the Central European region we will deal with the multilateral cooperation at the European level (i.e. the regional level), where platforms for maintaining mutual contacts between radical right-wing parties are represented by a project called Euronat and also by EU structures, i.e. the possibility to form political groups within the European Parliament\(^\text{14}\) and political parties at the European level\(^\text{15}\). We will assess the intensity of cooperation of Central European radical right within these structures. It is important to mention that the bilateral relations of the Central European radical right have been rather limited and that no sub-regional Central European organization (Mareš, 2006: 14) has been founded by them.

**Euronat**


The aim of Euronat was to bring together all nationalist and patriotic parties and groups in Europe. It was a rather loose association, with attempts to coordinate the joint activities of the political parties concerned. It sought to present an alternative to a unified Europe (this alternative was a Europe of nations) and it stated its resistance against globalization. The Euronat youth organization Euronat Jeunesse was established in 1998, having followed the same ideological principles as Euronat (Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Justice, undated).

Le Pen’s invitation to the party congress, where he suggested launching Euronat, was rejected by the majority of Western European radical right-wing parties. However, Le Pen was more successful in inviting Central and Eastern European far-right parties

\(^{14}\) According to the EP rules, “19 Members are needed to form a political group, and at least five Member States must be represented within the group”, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/statisticDisplay.do?id=45&pageRank=4&language=EN (14 November 2006).

\(^{15}\) Regulation (EC) No 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules regarding their funding defines the political party at the European level in a following way: “(a) it must have legal personality in the Member State in which its seat is located; (b) it must be represented, in at least one quarter of Member States, by Members of the European Parliament or in the national Parliaments or regional Parliaments or in the regional assemblies, or it must have received, in at least one quarter of the Member States, at least three per cent of the votes cast in each of those Member States at the most recent European Parliament elections; (c) it must observe, in particular in its programme and in its activities, the principles on which the European Union is founded, namely the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law; (d) it must have participated in elections to the European Parliament, or have expressed the intention to do so” (EC, 2003).
to join it. Three of the parties that are the subject of this study had participated in the 1997 congress: the Hungarian MIÉP sent its leader, Istvan Csurka; the SPR-RSČ was represented by Jan Vik (the party’s Vice-chairman) and Ján Slota represented the SNS (Fiala – Mareš, 2000: 15; Mareš, 2001a: 129–130; Mareš, 2003: 264–265; Mareš, 2006: 11–12). The LPR did not exist at that time and there were no representatives of the Polish radical right.

The activities of Euronat developed in 1998 and 1999, however, since then they have weakened, although mutual contacts of some of the parties have been still maintained (Mareš, 2001a: 129–130, Mareš, 2003: 264–265). Euronat has been more of an informal platform for cooperation between nationalist parties; it has not led to the institutionalized and transnational organization of these parties. Thus, it represented the first level of intensity of transnational cooperation as explained above (loose, non-institutionalized cooperation). As Mareš mentions, Euronat provided a platform where representatives of the Central European radical right could meet; however, they have not formed any Central European bloc within this wider project (Mareš, 2006: 14).

**European Union Structures**

The accession of the Central European countries to the EU provided a new platform for maintaining mutual contacts between political parties, although this platform has not been fully exploited by the extreme right. There is no evidence of cooperation of the Central European extreme right prior to the 2004 European Parliamentary Elections, and we can say that EU membership has not reinforced mutual contacts of these parties. The result of these elections also limited the potential cooperation of the Central European extreme right because only the League of Polish Families gained representation in the European Parliament. Table 5 shows the results of the parties concerned.

Currently, the radical right does not form a common political group within the EP, and the various parties representing it are either members of the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), Independence/Democracy group (IND/DEM) or sit as non-attached MEPs. MEPs of the League of Polish Families are split between two groups: some of them are part of the Independence/Democracy group, some sit as non-attached MEPS. Within the Independence/Democracy group, the LPR cooperates with other EU critics

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16 The group of the extreme right-wing parties existed in the European Parliament between 1984 and 1994. Catherine Fieschi claims that the extreme right-wing parties were unable to work together, and they “were never afforded access to the normal channels for cooperation between parliamentary groups nor were they given any committee chairs” (2000: 523).

17 The Danish People’s Party and Italian National Alliance.


19 The IND/DEM political programme has the following aims: rejection of the European Constitution, rejection of a European Superstate, respect for traditional and cultural values, cooperation between sovereign states, respect for national differences and interests (freedom of votes for its delegations) (IND/DEM website).
and Eurosceptic parties, and two of them are often classified as contemporary radical right: the Italian Northern League and the Popular Orthodox Rally from Greece. The following sub-section tries to explain why the mutual contacts of the radical right are not as intensive as other party families.

**Table 5: The electoral support of the strongest radical right-wing parties in the Visegrád Countries in the European Elections in 2004**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of votes</th>
<th>Percentage of votes</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>15 767</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>MIÉP</td>
<td>72 177</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>969 689</td>
<td>15.92</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>SNS-PSNS</td>
<td>14 150</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: http://www.united.non-profit.nl/pages/elect04.htm (23. 10. 2006)  

**Obstacles to mutual cooperation of radical right-wing parties**

Various factors influence the mutual cooperation of the radical right and are applicable not only in the case of the Central European extreme right but generally to cooperation within this party family. The main obstacle to maintaining mutual contacts lies in the very nature of the extreme right. As these parties are nationalistic, they do not see any benefits resulting from possible international cooperation. Mutual cooperation is very difficult, especially in the case of the existence of historical nationalist disputes and where the national interests advocated by various radical right-wing parties clash (Mareš, 2001b: 8; Mareš, 2006: 7, 9). Should we use the example from the Central European region, it is impossible to imagine that the Hungarian Truth and Life Party, which advocates revisionism, could cooperate with the Slovak National Party, which is known for its negative attitudes towards the Hungarian minority and its rights (perceived, because of its alleged irredentism, as a threat to Slovak unity), in Slovakia. Given these fundamentally different views of history, the issue of borders and the position of minorities, it is perfectly understandable why there is no bilateral cooperation between the MIÉP and the SNS (Mareš, 2006: 9). A similar example of clashing nationalist interest is the SPR-RSČ advocating the unity of Czechoslovakia and the struggle of the SNS for Slovak independence at the beginning of the 1990s (Mareš, 2001b: 8; Mareš, 2006: 9).

The second factor influencing cooperation of the radical right is also found in the nature of the phenomenon; it is the heterogeneity of this party family. Its member parties embody different strategies in respective domestic politics, and they also prefer different strategies regarding maintaining transnational contacts. As a result, various radical right-wing parties are interested in different international projects. This is visible mainly within EU structures. For example, the League of Polish Families is
a member of the IND/DEM group, and as such the LPR might be also involved in the Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe, while the SNS maintains contacts with the Union for Europe of the Nations and is considered as an associate member of the UEN (see for example the SNS or UEN websites).

Other factors explaining the rather limited mutual contacts between the Central European radical right could be due to the changing success of various parties. Some of them become relevant actors only for a limited time, and with the loss of representation and electoral support they could weaken the emphasis put on their international contacts. This is especially visible in the case of the EP – those parties which are not represented in the EP do not have to consider which political grouping to join. The RMS and the MIÉP thus do not have any link with the parties in the European Parliament.

Some of the parties were formed later than others; the League of Polish Families did not exist when the MIÉP, the SNS and the SPR-RSČ met the other extreme right-wing parties at the FN congress in the 1990s, which makes it impossible to judge whether the LPR would or would not be interested in Euronat.

The last factor to be considered is the factionalism of the radical right, which is often fragmented even at the national level (Mareš, 2001a: 131). Internal splits and conflicts within far-right parties make it difficult for them to be successful at the international level as well as to pursue coordinated cooperation. Changes in leadership can also mean the changes of a preferred strategy. The SNS can serve as an example from Central Europe. Under the leadership of Anna Malíková it focused on more moderate projects of transnational cooperation, while Ján Slota originally supported Euronat (Mareš, 2006: 13).

**Conclusion**

In order to assess the mutual contacts and relations of the radical right-wing parties in Central Europe, it is very useful to quote Miroslav Mareš, who concludes that although the Central European extreme right-wing parties “had met in some Europe-wide projects (especially Euronat), they never formed anything like a consistent Central European bloc within these projects. They haven’t formed their own organiza-

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20 There is a lack of information about the Alliance of Independent Democrats in Europe (http://www.adieurope.org/), and from the available information it remains unclear whether this group is funded as a political party at the European level. The website indicates the participation of a Polish delegation but does not name any particular party or particular members. The leader of the Alliance is Patrick Louis, who is a member of the IND/DEM group in the EP.

21 The RMS still considers itself as a member of Euronat.

22 Miroslav Mareš (2006) categorizes cooperation of Central European extreme right-wing parties in three main groups: “protest-transformational” parties, “neo-(clerical) Fascist” projects and “neo-Nazi” networks. The quotation used in this text characterizes transnational contacts of the first defined group which basically involves those parties that are described in this article. For information on other categories of the extreme right in Central Europe and their mutual contacts see Mareš (2006).
tion within East Central Europe and their mutual bilateral relations were relatively limited. These parties lacked the need of mutual cooperation. (…) These parties didn’t have any collective East Central European identity and therefore didn’t promote it” (Mareš, 2006: 14). Mutual contacts have not been significantly reinforced with EU membership, and the Central European radical right-wing parties have been involved in different projects party groups within the EP and have been interested in different projects to form political parties at the European level.

Thus, the challenge of the radical right posed to democracy and democratic governance seems to be visible mainly at the national (and sub-national) level. Its parties are not creating stable institutions of mutual cooperation in order to promote their interests and policies at the regional (Central European) or European level. Further development of the European Union and further crystallization of its political parties and party system will tell us more about the relations that the Central European radical right-wing parties have with conservative, Eurosceptic and right-wing populist parties that they join in the UEN or IND/DEM platforms. As these groups do not clearly reflect the boundaries of party families, and the extreme right cooperates in these platforms with “non-extreme” right-wing parties, this might potentially lead to a moderation of their extremist discourse and demands. It is too early, however, to draw any precise conclusion. Future research on the behaviour of (not only) the Central European radical right in European Union structures seems to be necessary.

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**Party documents**


**Documents**


**Websites**


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The Notion of Security and Free Access to Information. Creation and Development of the Right of the Public to know in European and Croatian Jurisprudence

Branko Smerdel and Đorđe Gardašević

Abstract: The contemporary notion of security, both in legal terms and international relations, reveals several important issues of crucial importance. The core of the matter centres upon a proper understanding of the balance between the competing values of the public interest on one side and individual rights on the other. The authors deal with the relevant European developments and Croatian experiences in the legal interpretation of standards guaranteeing free access to information, understood as a fundamental right, and show that an appropriate method of interpretation is indispensable for its protection.

Key words: democracy, free access to information, European and Croatian jurisprudence, individual security and liberty, notion of security

Introduction: Security, secrecy and publicity

The contemporary notion of security in international and domestic relations today shows itself to be one of the major issues of concern in at least three ways. Firstly, state (or public) policy decision makers are faced with new demands in security policies arising from the reality of life in the modern world. Secondly there are citizens with legitimate claims on both state-provided security measures and the transparent operation of government. Finally, the academic world, in its traditional role, stands as a kind of a “watchdog” charged with scrutinizing the actual processes of new security policies and all the accompanying relevant issues related to them. On the other hand, the list of questions that are related to the notion of security is almost endless. Thus, we can argue on a number of concepts or principles such as “good governance”, “open government”, separation of powers, a bill of rights, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, governmental efficiency, legal certainty and the rule of law etc. In order to narrow down the discussion, a strict academic analysis therefore has to be focused on a certain area of interest. This article will deal with a special issue of the

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1 Various concepts appear to be relevant here, e.g. the War on Terrorism on a global level, or actual EU integration strategies, especially relevant to the area of Central Europe. There are also opposing attitudes deriving from the concern for civil liberties. Among other sources, see e.g. The War on our Freedoms: Civil Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, Leone, Richard C. and Anrig, G. Jr. (eds.); see also Darmer, K. B., Baird, R. M. and Rosenbaum, S. T. (eds.), Civil Liberties vs. National Security in a Post 9/11 World. For the relative “supremacy” of public interest over individual liberties in wartime situations see Inter Arma Silent Leges, in Darmer et al., 2004: 28–30.
relationship between security and free access to information in terms of constitutional interpretation.

In more general terms, security in this sense represents an example of the fulfilment of the public interest legitimately pursued in carrying out the state’s role as the entity responsible for the protection of its citizens. On the other hand, this raises the question of legitimate restrictions of individual constitutional rights and freedoms guaranteed to the public. A constant clash between public and private interests and rights is thus highlighted in a specific context, with various legal, social and political implications. This can best be seen in the fact that a number of individual rights are touched upon when security measures are applied: e.g. the right to be protected from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to private and family life; the right to a fair trial and the right to freedom of expression etc. The right to free access to information is inevitably related to all these individual rights as one of the necessary preconditions of their fulfilment and will thus serve as a way of explaining how legal interpretation can be used in creating specific and relevant legal standards.

This subject, of course, in a specific context, reflects the broader question of legal interpretation in general, and at the same time it deals with various levels of social (legal) protection of constitutionally guaranteed values. In that sense, it is important to notice that a great deal of this protection relies upon a proper application of the law within administrative and judicial branches of government. For this reason, the appropriate examination of the operation of these two branches, especially the latter, as the ultimate source of authority, deserves special attention. This is especially relevant in the context of integrative processes taking place in Central Europe in the present and future. Moreover, various supranational judicial bodies are vigorously broadening their practice in international adjudication relevant to member states. This process, as it will be shown, brings very important standards of protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. At the same time, their decisions represent valid legal sources for state authorities at the national level, the proper examination of which stands at the forefront of academic tasks. On the political level, the issue is more than topical: the Central European states are already members of the Council of Europe and most of them also of the European Union. Future expansion of the EU will also bring in new states and therefore an appropriate anticipation of applicable legal and social standards is essential. Finally, most European states have already enacted freedom of information laws and some also have constitutional guarantees relating to them. However, the right

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2 For example, Articles 3, 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

3 The two most relevant European integrative institutions – the European Union and Council of Europe – should be emphasized.

4 The linking point is found e.g. in Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, which prescribes that “International agreements concluded and ratified in accordance with the Constitution and made public, and which are in force, shall be part of the domestic legal order of the Republic of Croatia and shall have a legal force superior to the law.”
to freedom of information itself does not depend only on the existence of an explicit norm, be it constitutional or statutory. Much of the legal protection derives also from the proper interpretation of other fundamental rights, and this article will shed some light on this process.

European jurisprudence

As was mentioned above, the discussion on a general level is to be conducted in terms of the clash of public and private interests involved, in this case of security and individual liberty. This is of course a very complex task and certainly not a recent problem. However, our job is easier than presumed, taking into account the necessary focus we have opted for in this case: security will be seen through the lens of free access to information, understood as one of the fundamental human rights. Moreover, the old debate of balancing competing public and private interests is to be revived: constant developments in constitutional adjudication present new issues all the time, and we will try to clarify them in order to make room for further anticipation of the development of legal systems.\(^5\)

At the very beginning it should be noted that in this article a number of very important issues arising out of allowing free access to information will be left out for thematic reasons. We will therefore not address the important issues of an institutional and procedural nature, such as the definition of (state) bodies responsible for revealing official information, the definition of persons given that right in a specific legal system, the legal (administrative) procedure applied, or various institutional protection systems (e.g. regular courts, special tribunals or commissions, ombudsman etc.). Our objective is of a substantive nature and deals with interpretation of various rights underlying free access to information.

The normative protection of private rights and promotion of public interests in the contemporary notion of a state, as well as in a modern understanding of international relations, appears at several levels. Domestic legal systems provide guarantees on constitutional, statutory and by-law grounds. Internationally, this is provided through a number of relevant human rights documents and policy papers, both legally binding and non-binding.\(^6\) Legal analysis reveals that the proper organization of various bill of rights documents must contain three important parts: the definition of specific right itself; its legitimate restrictions; and modalities of restriction. If we take the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms

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\(^6\) Apart from e.g. legally binding conventions, in this area there are a number of non-binding documents of supreme value. Such “soft law” sources, however, still retain some institutional checks. A good example in the context of free access to information is the Recommendation 2 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2002).
as an example, these aspects can easily be seen. Furthermore, the governing principle of restricting fundamental rights is the proportionality principle, both in the European Convention framework and the domestic constitutional systems, as well as in EU case law. In the specific case of freedom of information legislation, however, an additional principle appears under the name of the “public interest test.” Generally this includes the weighing of opposing and competing private and public rights and interests and balancing them. These two principles basically serve the same purpose.

As will be shown, the problem with the free access to information guarantee is that it is not always prescribed by a specific, explicit norm. However, in such cases its existence is regularly interpreted as arising out of the realm of other substantive rights or general constitutional principles. In the case of the European Convention, which does not contain a specific freedom of information norm, it may be shown in a number of cases dealing with prohibition of torture, the right to a fair trial, private and family life freedom and freedom of expression. Firstly, we will concentrate on three most important cases decided on the basis of the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg has dealt with free access to information in several cases. Generally, in technical terms it dealt with the issues of standing, positive and negative obligations of state parties and restrictions of the right to free access to information. Again, not all of these cases are relevant to our subject, and we will concentrate on those touching on the relationship between security and free access.

In the early case of *Leander v. Sweden* (1987), the Court dealt with the Article 8 claim (respect for private and family life) where the state pursued the protection of national security as a legitimate basis to bar the employment of the applicant from a security risk position on account of his alleged political background. On the other hand, the applicant in fact complained that he had no opportunity to challenge the correctness of the information related to him under the Swedish personnel control system. In upholding the governmental position, the Court took into account several safeguards of the Swedish system, which supported the protection of national security as a legitimate and necessary measure. It emphasized the following arguments: “a number of provisions designed to reduce the effects of the personnel checking procedure to an

7 Good nomotechnical examples are contained e.g. in Articles 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11. Articles 14 and 15 are relevant as general standards guaranteeing equality and regulating derogation. Finally, Article 18 applies as a general clause prohibiting misuse of legitimate restrictions.

8 For example, Article 16 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia prescribes: “Freedoms and rights may only be restricted by law in order to protect freedoms and rights of others, public order, public morality and health. Every restriction of the freedom or right shall be proportional to the nature of the necessity for a restriction in each individual case.” On the other hand, the European Convention pursues the standard of “necessity in a democratic society”. The case law of the Court of Justice of European Communities states that the principle of proportionality requires that “derogations remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view” (Case 222/84: *Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary* [1986] ECR 1651, paragraph 38). See also Alexy, 2002: 66–69. For a general overview of the restrictions of fundamental rights see Sajo, 1999: 277–283.
unavoidable minimum”; the fact that “the use of the information in the secret police-register in areas outside personnel control is limited, as a matter of practice, to cases of public prosecution and cases concerning the obtaining of Swedish citizenship”; and the fact that “The supervision of the proper implementation of the system is, leaving aside the controls exercised by the Government itself, entrusted both to Parliament and to independent institutions.” At the normative level, it should be noticed that the Court attached special importance to a rather wide margin of appreciation in cases of national security and to the principle of efficacy of the personnel checking system. The issue of national security arose once again in McGinley and Egan v. UK (1998), a case which involved an Article 8 claim in relation to governmental information on military atomic explosion tests, which allegedly had serious medical consequences for the applicants. The Court pointed out: “In this respect the Court observes that, given the fact that exposure to high levels of radiation is known to have hidden, but serious and long-lasting effects on health, it is not unnatural that the applicants’ uncertainty as to whether or not they had been put at risk in this way caused them substantial anxiety and distress… The Court recalls that the Government has asserted that there was no pressing national security reason for retaining information relating to radiation levels on Christmas Island following the tests… In these circumstances, given the applicants’ interest in obtaining access to the material in question and the apparent absence of any countervailing public interest in retaining it, the Court considers that a positive obligation under Article 8 arose. Where a Government engages in hazardous activities, such as those in issue in the present case, which might have hidden adverse consequences on the health of those involved in such activities, respect for private and family life under Article 8 requires that an effective and accessible procedure be established which enables such persons to seek all relevant and appropriate information.”

In a secondary way, security issues were also touched upon in Cyprus v. Turkey (2001), a huge case which, among other things, included the examination of censorship practices in terms of alleged violations of the human rights of Greek Cypriots in northern Cyprus. The Court established that the free flow of information, being one of substantive parts of Article 10 of the European Convention, was infringed: “…the reality during the period under consideration was that a large number of school-books, no matter how innocuous their content, were unilaterally censored or rejected by the authorities. It is to be further noted that in the proceedings before the Commission the respondent Government failed to provide any justification for this form of wide-ranging censorship, which, it must be concluded, far exceeded the limits of confidence-building methods and amounted to a denial of the right to freedom of information.”

9 See Leander v. Sweden, para 64. All the cases decided by the Strasbourg Court are available at: http://cmiskp. echr.coe.int/tkp197/, accessed 1 July 2006. The Court also explained a number of procedural checks fulfilling the requirements of the limitation clause contained in para 2 of Article 8 of the European Convention.
10 Ibid, paras 59 and 66.
12 See Cyprus v. Turkey, para 252.
Following the best European practice, we will now turn to the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities. At the current normative level, the governing document is Regulation 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2001. In the Regulation, security forms the basis of the public interest and one of the legitimate bases for restricting the right of free access to documents within the Union.\textsuperscript{13} At the case law level the landmark case is \textit{Hautala v. Council} (T-14/98). This involved a request for a document containing criteria for arms exports defined by the European Council. The Council then refused access to documents with the explanation that it “contained highly sensitive information, disclosure of which would undermine the public interest, regarding public security.”\textsuperscript{14} In the final judgment of the Court of First Instance, the question arose whether it is permissible to withhold such a kind of information in order to maintain good international relations with third countries. In rejecting the applicant’s argument, the Court first stressed the political role of the Council in assessing the possible consequences for international relations and then pointed out that the relevant document contained “exchanges of views between the Member States on respect for human rights in the country of final destination” and that “the contested report was produced for internal use and not with a view to publication, and so contains formulations and expressions which might cause tension with certain non-member countries.”\textsuperscript{15}
The more recent \textit{Kuijer v. Council} (T-211/00) judgment reaffirmed the criteria for release of documents in a case involving asylum seekers and information that could possibly involve security issues in terms of both security of persons and international relations between the Union and the third countries. Thus, the exception to a release of information is to be construed only as an exception to the general principle of transparency, the examination is to be made for each document separately and, finally, the principle of proportionality must be combined with the principle of the right to information.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{The Croatian Constitution and the right of the public to know}

\textit{Importance of proper interpretation in constitutional matters}

We hold that the right of the public to know, meaning the right of the public to gain access to information held by governmental bodies, is constitutionally guaranteed under the Croatian Constitution. Although not expressly formulated in the text, it is quite easy to deduce this fact by a proper legal interpretation of the Constitution. Consequently, we regard as erroneous a bare grammatical interpretation, based on the

\textsuperscript{13} Article 4 of the Regulation.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. para 73.
\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Kuijer v. Council}, paras 55--57. In a relevant part of the judgment, the Court emphasized: “Consequently, the Council must consider whether it is appropriate to grant partial access, confined to material which is not covered by the exceptions. In exceptional cases, derogation from the obligation to grant partial access might be permissible where the administrative burden of blanking out the parts that may not be disclosed proves to be particularly heavy, thereby exceeding the limits of what may reasonably be required.”
second sentence of the Section 2 of Article 38 of the Constitution, which says: “journalists shall have the right to freedom of reporting and access to information”, according to which only journalists, but not the general public, would have such a right.\textsuperscript{17} Such an interpretation is a consequence of a formalist approach to the Constitution, limited to a grammatical interpretation of isolated sections of the particular constitutional provisions. The fact that this manner of interpretation still prevails among our politicians and even legal experts, makes an additional argument in favour of an intellectual exercise in constitutional interpretation, as presented in this article.

In each specific case the Constitution should be interpreted by inclusion of other methods of interpretation in addition to the basic grammatical one, and this applies to every constitution in each separate case of its application. Constitutional norms are very rarely formulated so precisely that such an intellectual undertaking would not be needed.\textsuperscript{18} There are various classifications of such methods,\textsuperscript{19} and therefore we would summarize them as follows: systematic interpretation; objective (teleological) interpretation; historical interpretation and comparative interpretation. The most important issue is to consider the whole of the constitutional text as a basis for interpretation, through which only the particular constitutional provisions assume their full and correct meaning (systematic interpretation). Article 3 of the Croatian Constitution points specifically to such a method of interpretation: after outlining “the supreme values of the Constitution”, it defines them as grounds for interpretation of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{20} Departing from these “supreme values“, whereas “the rule of law“ and “a democratic multiparty system“ should be particularly emphasized, it is rather easy to conclude that “the right of the public to know“ is a part and parcel of the Constitution, being implied in formulation of several constitutional provisions taken together. Let us explain our methods and arguments.

**Democratic constitutional order**

The Constitution stipulates a whole array of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which acquire their full meaning only by a reliance on public opinion (\textit{opinio constitutionis}), which is formed within an open public realm of public discourse, as

\textsuperscript{17} Article 38 “(1) Freedom of thought and expression of thought shall be guaranteed. (2) Freedom of expression shall specifically include freedom of the press and other media of communication, freedom of speech and public expression, and free establishment of all institutions of public communication. (3) Censorship shall be forbidden. Journalists shall have the right to freedom of reporting and access to information. (4) The right to redress shall be guaranteed to anyone whose constitutionally and legally determined rights have been violated by public communication.” The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, (\textit{Official Gazette} No. 41/2001 and 55/2001). English translation by Branko Smerdel and Dunja Marija Vićan, \textit{Narodne novine}, Zagreb, 2001.

\textsuperscript{18} Zierlein, 2000: 306.

\textsuperscript{19} For instance, Perić, 1996: 130–135.

\textsuperscript{20} Article 3 reads: “Freedom, equal rights, national equality and gender equality, love of peace, social justice, respect for human rights, inviolability of ownership, conservation of nature and the human environment, the rule of law, and a democratic multi-party system are the highest values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia and the grounds for interpretation of the Constitution.”
well as through institutional protection ensured in the first place by the constitutional judiciary. Accordingly, for the implementation of constitutional norms, and of the constitutional concept of a comprehensive democratic political order, the existence of an educated and well-informed public is a necessary condition (conditio sine qua non). A correctly drafted constitutional text is also a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for the creation, or better, the strengthening of a democratic political order. A democratically-oriented and enlightened political leadership, together with public opinion in a democracy, are of crucial importance for the strengthening and development of democracy. Taking this almost axiomatic position as a point of departure, we could rather easily, from the positive constitutional provisions, come to the conclusion that the right of the public to know, and not the right of the authorities to manipulate information, makes up an important component of the fundamental constitutional concept upon which rests the constitutional order of the Republic of Croatia.

By an application of the teleological method of interpretation we shall easily conclude that the first aim and purpose of the Constitution was to establish a democratic political order, founded upon majority rule and the rule of law, which guarantees full protection to all social minorities. This aim has been formulated expressly in the Preamble of the Constitution in fine: “...the Republic of Croatia is hereby founded and shall develop as a sovereign and democratic state in which equality and human rights are guaranteed and ensured, and their [citizens] economic and cultural progress and social welfare promoted.” Accordingly, the right of the public to know derives from the Article 1 of the Constitution which states that “(2) Power in the Republic of Croatia derives from the people and belongs to the people as a community of free and equal citizens. (3) The people shall exercise this power through the election of representatives and through direct decision-making.” Consequently, if citizens are to rule, i.e. to make rational decisions about whom their representatives should be, or direct political decisions, they must be well-informed.

**Comparative experience**

Implying the historical and comparative method of constitutional interpretation, we find out that by the same way of constitutional interpretation, the right of the public to know has been created in the jurisprudence of developed democracies. Although the issues of governmental secrecy prerogatives were raised very early in the history of developed democracies, the process was particularly intensified after adoption in 1966 of the Freedom of Information Act in The United States. At that time in Great

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21 Giovanni Sartori asserts: “To be sure (it goes without saying) constitutions are a plan or framework for free government. As a manner of speech we have fallen into a careless habit of calling any and all state forms constitutions. As a matter of correct understanding it should be understood, however, that for constitutionalism ....constitutions are only the state forms in which (as Rousseau said) we are free because we are governed by laws and not by other men.” Sartori, 1994: 196.

Britain, for instance, special attention was still paid to the legislation on governmental secrecy by consecutive amendments to the Official Secrets Act of 1911. On the grounds of the principle that whatever has not been forbidden or limited by the law remains permissible, the detailed regulation of exceptions to the free flow of information took this piece of legislation almost to the other extreme during the premiership of Mrs. Thatcher in the 1980s. The Freedom of Information Act was adopted in Britain only in the year 2001. Similar to the processes in the United States, by the adoption of the Act the process of struggle for its full implementation has been opened with an active role of civic society associations, whereas the judiciary has to provide standards and exceptions, which could have not been foreseen by those who drafted the legislation. The American statute was then amended in 1995 in order to include the necessary standards defined in jurisprudence. This is important to stress in order to point to the crucial role of the judiciary in application of legislation of this kind, which relies on the constitutional interpretation of implied guarantees and is regularly supported by a large part of but not the entire public, let alone the bureaucratic structures who are accustomed to being protected by secrecy.

The comparative and historical method of interpretation demonstrates how mature democracies began to take the issues of free access to government information seriously only in the second half of the 20th century. It is interesting here to be reminded of the classic work of the French political scientist Georges Burdeau, who explained the process of transforming the original model of “the governed democracy” into a system of “the governing democracy of the open type” during the course of the 20th century.  

This process, which might be defined as a turn towards a serious consideration of a constitutional concept of democracy, was simultaneously opened in regard to a number of constitutional issues, such as the executive’s prerogative, ethics in government, minority rights, and above all important the issue of public control of the military and security services. For instance, in Harold Wilson’s book *The Governance of England*, published in 1980 and a primordial political bestseller of the time, only one and half pages out of several hundred were devoted to the security services, at a time when the anti-terrorist legislation of the country alone consisted of several hundred pages.

Several years before, the notorious Watergate affair dramatically exposed the abuses of power by the secret services in The United States. In order not to be misunderstood, I mention those instances from the most open democratic governments of the time in the world only in order to point that democracy is not immune to abuse. The situation in the communist world, to which Croatia belonged at the time, was so much worse that it is beyond any comparison.

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24 This insight I owe to the lecture given by Tony Benn, MP at the London School of Economics in January 1980. At the time a huge row broke out after the press published findings about widespread tapping of telephones by the secret services in London, and Mrs. Thatcher claimed state security reasons in denying an answer to a question in the House of Commons.
The Croatian historical experience

When looking at Croatian recent history we find that in the autumn of 1990, the period when the Croatian Constitution was in the process of drafting, the Constitution of the Yugoslav federation (SFRJ) was still in force. This Constitution has also guaranteed a wide array of political and personal rights and freedoms. Article 245, Section 1 of the Constitution states that “the rights of a citizen to be informed about events in the country and abroad which are of interest for his work as well as about the issues of interest to the community,” and in Section 2 of the same Article state the obligation of the media “to inform the public truly and objectively” and “to publish opinions and information of governmental agencies, organizations and the citizens.” One should note that it would be even easier to derive the right of the public to know than from the text of the Article 38 of the Croatian Constitution from this formulation.

However, this was only one of numerous constitutional guarantees that have been merely window dressing of a repressive political system. Censorship was formally forbidden, but the most efficient system of “self-censorship” had been imposed upon the media and individuals working in the media, because the legislation prescribed the “principle of political correctness”, meaning the commitment to communist dogma and the government of the time. The best illustration for lawyers is that the secret Official Gazette existed, containing the classified rules and regulations, prevalently of a repressive nature, which was distributed only to the repressive agencies with a duty to implement those regulations. In legal literature one could even find grotesque “explanations“ that the freedom of thought does not include the right of expression, but would have meant only a right to think in private (cogitatitones poenam nemo patitur). An important focus of the drafters of the 1990 Constitution of was to eliminate such misleading stipulations from the text, and also to stress the protection of journalists, but by no means to limit the right of access to government information exclusively to them.

The aim and language of the Constitution

In the light of this it appears clearly that the formulation of Section 2 of Article 38, which says: “Censorship shall be forbidden. Journalists shall have the right to freedom of reporting and access to information,” aims at strengthening the position of journalists seeking and publishing information versus any possible attempt to introduce censorship, but not to reduce the right to know exclusively to the members of the journalism profession. It seems obvious that any interpretation that only journalists have free access to information would compromise the fundamental concept of the democratic Constitution, which implies the right of the public to know. However confused some legislators may be because of their reliance only on a bare grammatical interpretation, it is simply false to say that only a journalist would have the right to access to information or that s/he would have the right to select which information the public might deserve to know. On the contrary, this guarantee has been given to
journalists in order to strengthen their position as mediators between the public and the government. The guarantee would also contradict the prohibition of any discrimination on the grounds of “a social position” of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Our interpretation is additionally supported by several provisions of the Constitution: Article 83 on public sessions of the Parliament; Article 119 on judicial hearings being held in public; and Article 3 of the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court, which regulates the publicity of the Court sessions. From those provisions it would be erroneous to conclude that only the supreme bodies should act publicly, whilst all the other governmental bodies would remain protected by governmental secrecy. The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights are also of relevance as a positive law, since the European Convention, as all other international agreements, under Article 140 of the Constitution, since its ratification in 1997, makes part of the domestic legal order with a legal force above the legislation. The provision of the Article 68 of the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of scientific research, and contributes to this discussion because it implies free access to information.

**Conclusion: the need for better balance**

**Complex Requirements of Legislative Regulation**

Considering all the arguments presented here, it can be clearly demonstrated that the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia provides a guarantee of a free access to governmental information or the right of the public to know. However, the implementation of this fundamental concept requires proper legislation in order to balance a number of contradictory demands that, taken together, define this complex constitutional right. As with all particular human rights and fundamental freedoms, the legislation has to impose limitations on the abstractly conceived absolute right, balancing the interrelation between the public and the private interests. In the language of Article 16 of the Croatian Constitution: “ Freedoms and rights may only be restricted by law in order to protect freedoms and rights of others, public order, public morality and health.” Further, such restrictions must take care to implement the principle of proportionality: “ Every restriction of the freedom or right shall be proportional to the nature of the necessity for a restriction in each individual case.” In addition to that, the Article 50, Section 2 of the Constitution rules: “Entrepreneurial freedom and property rights may exceptionally be restricted by law for the purposes of protecting the interests and security of the Republic of Croatia, nature, the human environment and human health.”

To make the problem of proper legislative regulation more complex, demands arise from Article 35, which guarantees the right to privacy, ensuring “ a respect for and legal protection of personal and family life, dignity, reputation and honour.” Article 37,

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25 Published in the *Official Gazette* No. 49 of 2002.
which guarantees the safety and secrecy of personal data, has to be taken into account as well.\textsuperscript{26} And finally, even the restrictions to free communications for the reasons of state security and conduct of criminal proceedings are permitted as an exception by Section 2 of Article 36.\textsuperscript{27}

### The crucial importance of the judiciary

The complex requirements of legislative regulation cannot be fulfilled without a full awareness of the existence and importance of the right of the public to know among those who apply the relevant legislation in deciding cases of dispute, in the first place the judiciary. Numerous issues will be raised, such as a legal protection of functionaries and officials, whereas the courts in developed democracies have already defined the restrictions of legal protection due to the position of power that such individuals enjoy. Above all, the problem of balancing the demands of security with the right of the public to know will once again raise this question, and the problem of balancing the public and private interests in each single case of dispute. This is why the role of the judiciary and especially of the constitutional court judges will be of a crucial importance for establishment, maintenance and development of standards in this area in the era of emphasized demands for security.

### The Catalyst Role of Initial Freedom of Information Legislation

As in the case of the adoption of the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, the Croatian Act on Free Access to Information of 15 October 2003, as a number of other pieces of legislation, has prevalently a role of a catalyst of certain imminent political processes, and should be evaluated in accordance with that. This was clearly demonstrated during the action of the Helsinki Watch organization during 2004, when hundreds of claims for information were sent to various public authorities with the intention of spreading awareness of the existence and authority of the new Act. The results of that action show that despite the radical formal innovations introduced by the Act, the traditional approach, according to which every public authority has a right to determine what information should be covered by governmental secrecy, still prevails among administrators and officials. Helsinki Watch, in its report of 28 September 2004 concludes that “there is a lack of political will to implement the Act”, as well as “an insufficient information at all levels about the existence of the Law and the obligations arising from it, within the system of public administration and among journalists and

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\textsuperscript{26} Article 37: “Everyone shall be guaranteed the safety and secrecy of personal data. Without the consent of the person concerned, personal data may be collected, processed and used only under conditions specified by law. Protection of data and supervision of the work of information systems in the State shall be regulated by law. The use of personal data contrary to the purpose of their collection shall be prohibited.”

\textsuperscript{27} Article 36: “Freedom and secrecy of correspondence and all other forms of communication shall be guaranteed and inviolable. Restrictions necessary for the protection of State security and the conduct of criminal proceedings may only be prescribed by law.”
citizens themselves.” These results confirmed the insights we already had about the widespread disregard of the demands of the provision of Article 46 of the Constitution, according to which “everyone shall have the right to submit petitions and complaints, to make proposals to government and other public bodies, and to receive answers thereto.” Government bodies have very rarely obeyed the obligation to respond to senders of petitions and proposals in such cases.

In the described situation the draft Act on Classified Information was presented to the public in the spring of 2006. The concern with secrecy and security of information in this draft was of such a scale that the Act, if adopted would as a lex posterior practically invalidate the main concept and provisions of the earlier Act on Free Access to Information. We do not say that this was the real intention of the legislators. It only demonstrates how the demands of security influence lawmakers, as well as their foreign advisors in the rapidly changing security situation. But those two approaches to the right of the public to know cannot be harmonized. In our opinion, the freedom of access to information, as a relatively new democratic right should be strengthened and maintained despite the diminished security situation in the world. Therefore, we support a thorough revision of the Act on Free Access to Information, which would go beyond its catalyst role and should carefully balance the contradictory demands of security and the preservation and promotion of the achieved level of development and protection of democratic human rights.

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Abstract: This paper explores the sources of votes for radical-right parties using the example of electoral support for the Attack Party in the 2005 Bulgarian parliamentary elections. It expands theoretical propositions on the presence of extremist parties in electoral politics by proposing an analytical model which explains radical-right voting as the result of disequilibria between political supply and voter demand in the electoral market. The paper argues that support for the radical right represents unmet voter demand and combines à la carte elements of single-issue politics, xenophobia, protest and charismatic political agency in electoral choice valid for individual voters but not for clearly identifiable cohorts of voters. The paper examines the evidence on electoral support for the Attack Party against the premises of the à la carte model – the structure of electoral competition, radical-right political agency, and voter preferences – and finds that the radical-right vote in the 2005 election validates its key proposition: electoral support for the radical right lacks coherent social structure and correspondence between voter expectations and party programmatic appeal. Based on the Bulgarian case study the paper concludes that the ability to offer voting choices à la carte, regardless of its ideological positions and the political expectations of its own electorate represents a resource for the sustained presence of the radical right in the electoral market.

Key words: Bulgaria, post-communist party systems, parliamentary elections, radical-right voting, Attack Party, à la carte model of electoral choice

Introduction

This paper sheds light on the sources of electoral support for the radical right in Bulgaria using the example of the 2005 parliamentary elections. Apart from change in the governing coalition, the election marked the surprise electoral breakthrough of a newly formed political structure of the radical right, the Attack (Ataka) Party.2

Attack first appeared in preliminary polls forecasting that it would collect around 1 per cent of the vote, just four weeks before the election. By the time the campaign ended, pollsters projected that it would reach the 4 per cent threshold necessary to

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1 The author wishes to thank BBSS-Gallup International for providing survey data from the period October 2005-May 2006. Thanks are due to Andrey Raichev, Marchella Abrasheva and Marin Stoychev at BBSS-Gallup (Bulgaria).

2 The party names Attack, Ataka (in Bulgarian), and Attack Party will be used in the text interchangeably. The electoral coalition National Union Attack, NUA, is comprised of the Attack Party, the National Movement for the Salvation of the Fatherland, the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party, Union of Patriotic Forces and Military of the Reserve “Defence” and Zora political circle.
obtain parliamentary seats. On election day, exit polls revealed that it ranked fourth among the 22 parties contesting the election, with 8.14 percent of the vote. Attack became the fourth largest parliamentary faction, outperforming all parties and coalitions of the mainstream right.

The electoral success of the Attack Party is a puzzle in Bulgarian parliamentary politics. The party was established just two months prior to the 2005 election, on a nationalist, xenophobic and anti-minority platform. Yet electoral support for Attack cannot be regarded exclusively as a xenophobic reaction of the Bulgarian ethnic majority, which accounted for 99.2 per cent of its national vote share. Nationalist parties outside the political mainstream have been present in Bulgarian electoral competition since the 1990s but none had gained parliamentary representation or managed to obtain more than 1.0–1.5 percent of the vote. \(^3\) Furthermore, the ongoing right-wing diversification has continued to offer electoral choices to conservative voters. The openness of political competition and new party entry would be expected to prevent the consolidation of an anti-establishment vote, especially taking into account the strong ideological foundations of the Attack Party. The long-term trends in Bulgarian party politics point to the decline of ideological factors in political competition. Although such trends are compatible with surprise electoral outcomes, Attack’s entry into parliamentary politics was not the product of “flash” effects. Its broadly based voter support has been a shocking development, with the potential to undermine the prospects of democratic consolidation and sustainability of Bulgaria’s ethnic model, often described as “exemplary”.

Uncovering the sources of Attack’s unanticipated electoral success is important also in view of the dramatic follow-up to its electoral fortunes in subsequent contests. As with the performance of the radical right in the 2002 presidential election in France, Attack’s leader, Volen Siderov, was ranked second after the incumbent in the 2006 Bulgarian presidential election, receiving 21.5 percent of the vote in the first round and 24.1 per cent in the second ballot. \(^4\)

With the objective of solving the puzzle of Attack’s entry into parliamentary politics, this research builds on theoretical and empirical work on the sources and electoral behaviour of the radical right in Europe. Its principal approach is that of examining the phenomenon of *Ataka* from a long-term perspective, against broader trends of political change. One of the objectives is to expand theoretical propositions on the presence of extremist parties by emphasizing the role of structural disequilibria in the electoral market.

\(^3\) Such parties have won seats as part of right-wing coalitions only in a few instances. The moderately nationalist Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-National Movement (VMRO) gained parliamentary representation as part of the UDF coalition in 1997. It won three mayoral races in the southwest of the country in the 1997 and 2001 municipal elections. In 2005 it was part of the Bulgarian People’s Union coalition.

\(^4\) In the first round of the 2002 election in France the candidate of the National Front, Jean-Marie Le Pen, came second after the incumbent, with 16.9 per cent of the vote and contested the second ballot, receiving 17.8 per cent.
Conventional views regard the electoral outcome as a point of equilibrium between party supply and voter demand. However, the complex realities of voting are informed by broader currents, social change and situational factors which often fail to converge at the point of market clearance. The main argument of the study is that electoral support for the radical right is not a “meeting place” between supply and demand; it is rather a residual category in electoral competition – an “escape” or a protest vote – which captures unmet voter demand and persists as an attribute of the electoral market, rather than a niche within its ideological spectrum. Voting for the radical-right has evolved into a self-sustained model of voting à la carte, which combines different elements of single-issue politics, xenophobia and intolerance, protest and charismatic political agency, into electoral choice valid for individual voters but not for clearly identifiable cohorts of voters. Rather than focusing on the proximity between parties and voters, it posits their relative distancing. Voting à la carte further isolates the electorate from the social, economic, or value-based foundations of electoral preferences.

Examination of the model with respect to votes for the radical right in the 2005 parliamentary election will proceed as follows. The analysis first reviews theoretical perspectives on electoral support for the radical right and derives the key referents of the à la carte model of voting: the long-term structure of electoral competition; radical-right political agency, and the socio-political context of voter preferences. It then examines the factors shaping the electoral outcome of the Attack Party in the 2005 election and points to the lack of correspondence between electoral mobilization and voter expectations, resulting in a customized à la carte model of electoral choice. Based on the evidence, the paper presents an argument about the factors likely to sustain the dynamics of electoral support for extreme right parties despite their problematic conformity with democratic pluralism.

Electoral support for the radical right in theory: market niches in electoral supply and demand

The radical right is comprised of diverse streams of political agency ranging from organizations to social movements and subcultures, analytically bound into the ideological family of radical-right political extremism. Studies on the electoral behaviour of radical-right parties, its by far most consequential political representative, concur that the wide variation which characterizes the field largely depends on the national context. Despite their diversity, the parties of the radical right share a core doctrine in nationalism (Mudde, 2000; Eatwell, 2003). They replace democratic pluralism with organic conceptions of political community, posit a direct relationship between leaders and electorate, and reject the political establishment as flawed and redundant.

The contemporary radical right does not necessarily follow the historical traditions of the old Fascist parties of the interwar period. It builds upon high-salience issues in

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5 As Merkl and Weinberg (1993) point out, the terms “radical” and extremist” may be used interchangeably.
current political discourse: chauvinist conceptions of the modern welfare state, xenophobic anti-immigrant appeals, anti-globalism, anti-regionalism and reaction against post-materialist values (Merkl and Weinberg, 2003).

The theoretical perspectives on radical-right voting reflect the foundational principles of electoral competition and are oriented along demand – supply lines. Key supply-side propositions explain electoral support for the radical right as the product of electoral rules, the relative positioning of the mainstream parties, electoral opportunity structures and diverse streams of political agency-party development and charismatic leadership. Demand-based propositions suggest socio-structural change, individual values and orientations, and economic protest as key explanatory variables of radical-right voting.

**Supply-side theories**

There is a consensus in the literature that proportional representation is a factor enabling the electoral breakthrough of radical-right parties. Relatively low thresholds (between 3 and 5 per cent) make it possible for new and small fringe parties to win a degree of electoral support – especially, in secondary elections – sufficient to secure parliamentary seats. The system of electoral rules which shapes the distribution of political parties and voter preferences, as well as the relative fragmentation of political representation (Duverger, 1954), is a source of conditions facilitating or restricting the opportunities for radical-right voting. Furthermore, electoral rules determine the institutional framework of the vote such as availability of public campaign financing, ballot access, and opportunities for ticket splitting (Norris, 2005; Givens, 2005). The electoral system affects also the structural environment in which party élites operate and thus expands or restricts space for political entrepreneurship at the fringes.

The prevalent neo-liberal, pro-globalization consensus imposes significant policy constraints on the parties in government. In two-party and multiparty systems alike, political actors converge towards median positions representing an ideological consensus on market liberalism, economic reform, and inclusive welfare. Such uniformity opens up political space at the fringes to channels of voter mobilization based on anti-establishment rhetoric.

Such premises are reflected in the “winning formula” thesis which posits radical-right voting as the product of political agency under conditions of programmatic convergence between the parties of the right and left (Kitschelt, 1995). Due to convergence, the right loses its appeal to conservative voters. The latter are likely to turn to the radical right if it offers a “winning formula”, combining market liberalism, xenophobic welfare, and conservative-authoritarian appeals. An alternative supply-side proposition holds that the presence of mainstream right-wing parties in governing coalitions is the key variable determining electoral support for the radical right. Conservative voters may turn to the right-wing fringes as an expression of dissatisfaction with government policies (Zimmermann and Saalfled, 1993).
Such models share the assumption that political agency operates within a more or less stable political infrastructure, which enables political entrepreneurs to generate new or respond to existing voter demand.

The concept of a political opportunity structure, originally developed with regard to social movements theory, is consistent with supply-side theories of voting (Tilly, 1978; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1988). The political opportunity structure is the infrastructure of collective action and combines political supply- and demand-side variables (Tarrow, 1988: 429; Kitschelt, 1986: 59). The link between political opportunities for (collective) action and social protest constitutes another analytical premise which connects political opportunity structures to radical-right voting. A multivariate electoral opportunity structure perspective runs the risk of becoming either underspecified or overdeterministic and therefore of limited utility to establish the causal links to radical-right voting. The strategic agency model proposed by Pippa Norris (2005) overcomes this potential deficiency by keeping institutional rules analytically distinct from political agency and individual demands. The model grants institutional factors primary explanatory power, without ignoring the influence that external shocks, shifts in public opinion and other demand-side factors have on voter choices.

Supply-side perspectives are conscious of the causal effects of radical-right political agency. Charismatic leadership and political entrepreneurship within the radical right are key explanatory variables of electoral support for such parties (Schain et al., 2002).

**Electoral demand**

Demand-side theories of the radical right refer to three clusters of variables to explain radical right voting: interests, values, and psychological orientations. Sociological accounts emphasize the role of social change and transformation in advanced industrial countries, which “unfreezes” the existing cleavage structure (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). Traditional cleavages decline in importance, leading to voter dealignment (Dalton, 2002). In line with this proposition, radical-right voting may be explained as an unstructured vote, unrelated to particular socio-demographic and socio-economic variables. Alternative sociological accounts associate changes in the cleavage structure with the emergence of new societal categories and “new politics” dominated by individual high-salience issues and discourses. The traditional class structure of owners and workers is replaced by new divisions emerging between the global and the national, the national and local, as well as between national majorities and the non-citizen population, and/or among ethnic majority and minority groups. Empirical studies show that the cohorts of the lower working class and the unemployed are typically over-represented in the radical-right vote (Norris, 2005).

Elaborations on the transformed cleavage structure thesis state that the radical right constitutes either a reaction to the emergence of new social divisions in the post-industrial world, or the individual’s reaction to post-modernism (Kriesi, 1999; Ignazi,
A related sociological thesis posits electoral support for the radical right as a “normal pathological” deviation; individual protest against mass society and modernization and a preference for traditional values and authority, leadership, and belonging (Wilcox et al., 2003; Zimmermann, 2003).

Value-based theories posit radical-right voting as the product of individual-level variables such as personal orientations and situational predispositions. A focus on values permits establishment of a link between party strategies and voter preferences evident, for example, in the “winning formula” thesis. Most studies conclude that conceptions of an organic political community, xenophobic and exclusionary notions of nationalism, and racism differentiate the extreme right from the mainstream right-wing parties and reveal the value-based foundations of radical right voting (Hainsworth, 2000; Merkl and Weinberg 2003).

A third branch of demand-based theories of radical right voting emphasizes the role of economic interests (Fiorina, 1981; Lewis-Beck, 1988). Government economic performance generates diverse voter reactions based on evaluations of personal situation and sociotropic assessments leading to continued support for the incumbent party or a vote for the opposition, often regardless of the ideological proximity between parties and voters. This argument is instrumental to the thesis of economic protest voting which treats protest as a purposive orientation, rather than a situational vote.

The protest vote hypothesis is an alternative explanation of radical-right voting, which posits electoral support for the radical right as a reaction typical of traditional non-voters (Ignazi, 2003). According to this “none of the above” proposition (Norris, 2005: 149), voters do not expect the party of their choice to win in the election. The radical right benefits from the protest vote as a vote against the political establishment.

Transcending demand- and supply-based explanations, Eatwell (2003) has advanced the micro-meso-macro hypothesis of radical-right voting, which emphasizes factor interactions across levels of analysis. Eatwell’s approach integrates political opportunity structure variables and voter perceptions of legitimacy, personal efficacy, and political trust as a causal stream which explains variation in electoral support for the radical right across national contexts. Eatwell’s model offers significant analytical advantages by capturing the multivariate determinants of the radical-right vote. One of the drawbacks of the model is the lack of a core structural referent. As empirical research has pointed out, electoral support for the radical right often cannot be explained as a consistent arrangement of individual factors and their additive effects (Mudde, 2000: 19). Such findings suggest that it is likely to be associated with a failure of the electoral market to reach equilibrium between the ideological positions, values, structural determinants, expectations, appeals and evaluations of parties and voters.

The à la carte proposition on radical-right voting advanced here is based on the assumption of persistent disequilibria between party supply and electoral demand, resulting in voter support for radical-right parties. Its core premise is that of unmet voter

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Demand. The model consists of three layers of factors whose impact on the electoral fortunes of the radical right varies depending on its capacity to influence the situational context of electoral campaigns. The outer layer is comprised of systemic factors, such as electoral rules and long-term attributes of the party system, which have indirect effects on the opportunities for radical-right voting. The intermediate layer is derived from the patterns of inter-party competition and includes both exogenous and endogenous variables of political agency: campaign strategies of the mainstream parties and ideological positioning and voter mobilization on behalf of the radical right. The centre represents residual voter demand produced by social change and individual voter expectations and unmatched by corresponding party supply. According to this model, the radical right appeals to diverse categories of voters. For some voters support for the radical right is protest, resentment, or xenophobia, for others – charismatic appeal, nationalism, insecurity, or negative performance evaluations. The vote is not necessarily consistent across time and individual categories of voters. Why is this mix-and-match pattern possible and, more importantly, sustainable? It is because elections are discrete events seeking equilibrium between party supply and voter demand in an otherwise dynamic context of social and political change. The possibility for diverse combinations between voter preferences, structure of party competition, and organizational capabilities accounts for considerable variation in electoral outcomes. Often, weak party structures receive considerable electoral support thanks to a charismatic leader, or simply due to a protest vote. The deeper reason for radical-right voting is the lack of conceptual innovation and the distancing between party élites and electorate within the political mainstream. While fundamentally demand-centred, the à la carte model accommodates supply-induced electoral outcomes depending on the proximity and intensity of political agency.

The validity of the model is examined with regard to Attack’s electoral outcome in the 2005 election. Such an analytical perspective allows us to address the question of whether Ataka created a niche for itself in the electoral market or whether it tapped into existing (and unmet) electoral demand, determined by social structure and value change. The evidence is explored through multi-level data analysis. Supply-side variables, such as electoral opportunity structure, party system and political agency, are based on summary national statistics and district-level data on party vote shares reported by the Central Electoral Commission (Bulgaria). Demand-side variables are derived from public opinion polls conducted by BBSS-Gallup International during the period October 2005-May 2006, exit poll summaries reported in the Bulgarian media, and World Values Surveys (Bulgaria 1990, 1997, 1999) and Eurobarometer data.

Political opportunity structure of the 2005 parliamentary election

The structure of Bulgarian political competition during the 1990s shared the common features of post-communist party systems on the road to democracy: parties without a developed civil society, low voter trust, and competition without institutionalization (Rose and Munro, 2003). Political parties have been the principal beneficiary
of the unsettled character of electoral politics. Proportional representation, high levels of competition, new party entry, and variation in voter turnout rates have established a typical “party-enabling” system which tends to privilege party initiative and control over the electoral process (Birch, 2003: 22).

In line with the à la carte proposition, we would expect the system of electoral rules to be relevant to Attack’s electoral breakthrough in several aspects: the principle of proportional representation, which determines the size of the system and the opportunity of new and minor parties to receive electoral support; the threshold for seat eligibility, which affects the proportionality between the vote and seat allocation; and conditions of ballot access.

The rules of electoral competition in Bulgaria include proportional representation with a 4 per cent threshold for parliamentary entry. The party vote is pooled at the national level, according to the d’Hondt method.\(^6\) Voting takes place in multi-member electoral districts with closed party lists ranging between 4 and 14 seats per district. District size is determined according to census data.

The proportionality system has been a positive factor in new party development by balancing consolidation and openness criteria. After the 1997 election openness prevailed over consolidation, thus reinforcing the long-term opportunity structure for new parties. A typical feature of the Bulgarian electoral politics is that since the 1990 constitutive election, every governing party or coalition has been voted out of power at the next election. Three political parties have preserved their place in parliamentary politics: the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) on the left, the right-wing Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), and the centrist, predominantly ethnic-Turk Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF). In every election except 1997 new parties have gained parliamentary representation.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Bulgarian Electoral System (1990-2005)

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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voter Turnout (%)</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>83.87</td>
<td>78.05</td>
<td>62.93</td>
<td>67.03</td>
<td>55.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of two largest parties (%)</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>67.50</td>
<td>67.73</td>
<td>74.33</td>
<td>60.92</td>
<td>50.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of parties contesting an election</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volatility (%)(^1)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>25.50</td>
<td>32.53</td>
<td>35.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasted Vote (%)</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>7.64</td>
<td>14.48</td>
<td>8.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New party vote (% vote / % seats)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11.5/0.0</td>
<td>13.7/4.5</td>
<td>4.9/0.0</td>
<td>42.73/50.0</td>
<td>19.77/21.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^6\) For the method of conversion, see Gary Cox (1997: 59).
The data reveals that the pattern of Bulgarian electoral politics changed abruptly as a result of the 2001 election, with supply-side volatility, share of the new party vote, and the number of parties contesting the election increasing sharply, without a meaningful restructuring of electoral rules. The changes in the party system are associated with changes in the structure of interparty competition. A new liberal-populist party, the National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS), received 42.73 per cent of the vote and 50.0 per cent of the seats in the 2001 election. The entry of NMSS into electoral politics replaced the bipolar left-right model of political competition by introducing a tendency towards populism and candidate-centred politics. The 2005 election confirmed this trend by increasing the number of parliamentary parties with the following distribution of vote and seat shares:

Table 2: Distribution of electoral outcomes in the 2005 election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Coalition</th>
<th>Vote (%)</th>
<th>Seats (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition for Bulgaria, BSP; CfB</td>
<td>30.95</td>
<td>33.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement Simeon the Second, NMSS</td>
<td>19.88</td>
<td>21.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Democratic Forces, UtDF</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF</td>
<td>12.81</td>
<td>14.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union Attack, NUA</td>
<td>8.14</td>
<td>8.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats for Strong Bulgaria, DSB</td>
<td>6.44</td>
<td>7.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarian People’s Union, BPU</td>
<td>5.19</td>
<td>5.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Proportionality has ensured that electoral competition remains fragmented. While allowing new party entry, it also forces new parties to compete both among themselves and against the established parties in order to pass the 4 per cent threshold. In this situation, the system of electoral rules restricts the opportunities for radical-right voting. Two new right-wing parties, the DSB and BPU, both located further to the right than the main right-wing coalition, the UtDF, gained parliamentary representation as a result of the 2005 election besides Ataka, effectively constraining its opportunity to appeal to conservative voters.

Other indicators, such as system fragmentation, proportionality, and volatility, are also relevant in shaping the electoral opportunity structure. The moderate threshold

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7 The list of party organizations relevant to the 2005 parliamentary election includes: National Union Attack, NUA, led by the Attack Party; Bulgarian People’s Union, BPU (a coalition of the Union of Free Democrats); Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organization, (VMRO); Bulgarian Agrarian National Union-People’s Union, BANU-PU; Bulgarian Socialist Party, BSP and its electoral Coalition for Bulgaria, CfB; Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, DSB; Movement for Rights and Freedoms, MRF; National Movement Simeon the Second, NMSS; New Time; Union of Democratic Forces, UDF and its electoral coalition United Democratic Forces, UtDF. For the context and details of the 2005 election, see Spirova (2006).
for parliamentary representation raises the index of proportionality and reduces the
dispersion between party vote and seat share. Throughout the 1990s, the level of pro-
portionality of the Bulgarian party system has been higher than the average for Central
and Eastern Europe (87 versus 84 per cent) leading to a lower percentage of the wasted
vote (Rose and Munro, 2003: 28). The mirror indicator, the discrepancy between
votes and seats, reveals a declining share of the two largest parties in all elections
after 1990, reinforcing the character of the system as one of openness and moderate
pluralism (Siaroff 2000: 72). Reduced system concentration has been beneficial to
new, smaller parties. Three such parties and coalitions passed the 4 percent threshold
in 2005.

The most prominent systematic feature of Bulgarian electoral politics has been the
increasing volatility of the vote under conditions of system pluralization. Rose and
Munro have defined this unstable, almost accidental equilibrium of electoral outcomes
as “a floating system of parties” (2003: 77). Electoral volatility rose in 2001 and
remained high in the 2005 election. It was produced both by structural (supply-side)
volatility, entrance and/or exit of parties from electoral competition, and demand-side
shifts in voter preferences among existing parties.

Besides the general influence over the conditions of electoral competition, the
electoral institutions apply specific provisions effectively restricting the creation and
ballot access of extreme-right parties. As Sarah Birch has noted, the Bulgarian elec-
toral system is “entrenched” in the Constitution, which prescribes domestic and party
politics according to pluralist rules (Article 1). The Constitution is highly restrictive
vis-à-vis separatist and anti-system parties and prohibits parties on ethnic, racial or
religious grounds (Article 11). The Constitutional Court interprets the ethnic principle
more broadly by defining as “ethnic” parties restricting membership of other ethnic
groups.8 Article 44 (2) prohibits political parties which incite racial, national, ethnic, or
religious enmity or restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens.9

The Act on Political Parties also prohibits parties which undermine the sovereignty
and integrity of the country.10 The Penal Code (Article 162) makes actions inciting
ethnic and racial hatred punishable by law. More recent legislation, including the
Anti-Discrimination Act passed in 1998 and the Framework Programme for Roma
Integration (1999), envisages measures against hate speech, social exclusion and anti-
minority politics.

Despite the generally open opportunity structure, it may be argued that electoral
institutions have had an overall restrictive effect on the rise of the radical right. Con-
stitutional constraints on ethnically motivated parties, increasingly restrictive rules of

8 Based on this interpretation, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, whose membership is open to all
citizens but which derives more than 85% of its vote share from the ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, is not
considered an ethnic party. See Ishiyama and Breuning (1998).
9 See State Gazette No. 56 (13 July 1991).
party registration,\textsuperscript{11} and system openness, which dilutes competition among the small parties, historically have prevented radical-right parties from engaging in nationalist or xenophobic political mobilization. At the same time, the lack of system consolidation remains the principal factor sustaining a long-term open electoral opportunity structure. In line with the \textit{à la carte} model electoral rules have had overall indirect conditioning effects over party supply on the extreme-right fringe. The next section will examine the structure of party competition, where the radical right positions itself as a political actor and electoral entrepreneur.

**The structure of party competition as a source of radical-right voting**

The Bulgarian mainstream parties have shared a commitment to pro-market and pro-individual freedom principles and sought reconciliation between market liberalism and social welfare. The idea of “social capitalism” is a common policy position for all political parties. By contrast, upon its arrival in the electoral competition the Attack Party rejected the existing political consensus by advancing an exclusionary nationalist, anti-market and anti-liberal campaign. Attack’s presence in Bulgarian politics is therefore at odds with the long-term perspective of party development.

It may be argued that despite its surprise appearance in the 2005 election, the ideological foundations of Ataka were laid down long before its organizational contact with the realities of voting and originally made no purposive reference to electoral mobilization. This discrepancy between the conceptual evolution and organizational development of the party is due to the unsettled role of nationalism in Bulgarian politics. The nationalist idea, as well as marginal political structures – nationalist and ethnic minority parties – have had a standing presence in electoral competition. However, prior to the 2005 election, nationalism was not an important factor in the distribution of electoral outcomes.

**Political agency in a long-term perspective: Intellectual sources of the Bulgarian extreme right**

Extreme right organizations do not typically attract societal interest in Bulgaria, although isolated expressions of right-wing extremism, negative stereotyping of ethnic minorities, especially of Roma people, or extremist tendencies within the political mainstream cannot be excluded (Ivanov and Ilieva, 2005: 2). A number of party structures based on a nationalist ideology were recreated or established after the fall of communism, ranging from parties espousing extreme radical-left nationalism associated with the communist past to far-right parties recreating populist movements of the interwar period to contemporary “homegrown” currents emerging as a result of the radicalization of the mainstream right.

\textsuperscript{11} An amendment in 2005 to the Elections Act doubled the registration deposit requirement for parties and coalitions.
Left-wing radicalism includes the Committee for the Defence of the National Interests (CDNI), the intellectual radical-left nationalist circle and later the Dawn (Zora) party, and the political movement Defence, a radical-left formation, registered as a party in 1998 under the name Union of Patriotic Forces and Military of the Reserve “Defence”.

Both Zora and Defence became founding members of Attack’s electoral coalition, National Union Attack (NUA). The right-wing component of the Bulgarian radical right includes the “dark-blue McCarthyism” of the democratic mainstream right and a reactionary faction of the principal anti-communist democratic coalition, the UDF (Bell, 1999: 235). By 1991, the “dark-blue” splinter movement within the UDF developed a core doctrine of xenophobia, exclusionary nationalism, and opposition to party pluralism. Circles within the democratic right openly questioned the presence of the predominantly ethnic-Turkish party, the MRF, in Bulgarian politics, and later caused a series of divisions within the entire democratic movement.

Parallel to such tendencies within the political mainstream, a number of extra-parliamentary party structures (re)emerged on the far right. Although more numerous than the radical-left nationalist-populist currents, they have remained marginal and include predominantly parties with a nationalist and xenophobic ideology. Two such parties, the Bulgarian National Union and the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party, joined Attack’s electoral coalition in 2005.

Charismatic leadership and organizational development of the Attack Party

The political platform of the radical-right opposition and the creation of the Attack Party may be attributed to the political activities of its most prominent leader to date, Volen Siderov. Siderov’s political career developed within the anti-communist UDF circles in the early 1990s. He rose to the position of Editor-in-Chief of UDF party organ Democratsia Daily (1990-1992). During the second half of the 1990s, Siderov’s political views gradually refocused beyond the post-communist left – democratic right divide towards a new interpretation of political conflict anchored in a xenophobic populist-nationalist ideology.

Although in his early political commentary Siderov did not use the nationalist idea as a vehicle of mass mobilization, his career as a journalist was instrumental in sustaining those political forces which shared the conception of a monocultural Bulgarian state. His published work consists of racist, xenophobic and anti-Semitic writings based on variations of international conspiracy theories. A collection of his articles

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12 Attack Vice-chairman Peter Beron was originally a member of Defence (and prior to that, a founding member and Chairman of the UDF).
13 By the late 1990s the UDF had split into the UDF-Liberals, which failed to pass the 4 percent threshold in 2001, and the Union of Free Democrats (SSD), which contested the 2005 election as part of the Bulgarian People’s Union.
14 A detailed account of radical-right party structures and movements preceding the creation of the Attack Party is provided in Ivanov and Ilieva (2005).
originally published in the nationalist *Monitor* daily and other media outlets between 1997 and 2002 appeared under the title *Bulgarophobia* (2003). This book contains the four major themes of Siderov’s “national” political idea: one-nation state, anti-establishment populism, rejection of democratic pluralism, and single-issue discourses anchored in identity politics. Since 2003 regular broadcasts of Siderov’s Attack show on cable channel SKAT TV have broadened public access to such extremist political views. While at the early stages his nationalist-populist rhetoric attracted viewer interest mostly due to its criticism of the Establishment, in the context of the 2005 election nationalism became Siderov’s principal resource of electoral mobilization.

The creation of the Attack Party and its electoral coalition National Union Attack emerged as the next stage of crystallization of the political platform of the radical right. *Ataka* anchored its electoral campaign on exclusionary ethnic nationalism. From an organizational point of view, it neither subsumed, nor made an effort to consolidate the existing nationalist currents. On the contrary, Attack further marginalized them. Party leader Siderov claimed that Attack was the true opposition to the party establishment and the only organizational structure with a real contribution to the political mobilization of the electorate.\(^{15}\) In typical populist style, he pointed to the “awakening” and “soaring spirit” of the Bulgarian people and his personal input as sources of Attack’s electoral breakthrough. “I did not advance these ideas in the last few weeks [prior to the 2005 election]. They have been the essence of my personality for years. And when one possesses the faith and confidence to pursue them, it turns out one can be successful.”\(^{16}\) Such statements do not fit well with the “winning formula” thesis which explains the electoral success of the radical right through its capacity to attract conservative voters under conditions of programmatic convergence between the mainstream parties. *Ataka*’s ideological platform claimed its own political space regardless of the relative positioning within the political mainstream. It refused to identify its ideological standing as either a left- or a right-wing organization but underlined its populist-nationalist principles. Attack’s electoral behaviour also contradicts the winning formula thesis. It made no effort to capture the vote of particular categories of voters; it rather replicated the new-entry model of the centrist-populist NMSS from the 2001 election. The original NMSS electoral breakthrough model was based on several tenets: a loose electoral party, created just several months before the election, in coalition with minor “satellite” parties and dominated by a charismatic leader. While seeking to benefit from the success of the surprise strategy which brought the NMSS to power in 2001 through a vague combination of market populism and charismatic leadership, Siderov also significantly reshaped the model by enhancing its ideological content. It is questionable, however, to what extent that content met with genuine public receptiveness to the nationalist idea. Attack’s programmatic documentation, while intensely ideological, remained underspecified, incoherent, and unrealistic.

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\(^{16}\) Ibid., p 2, author’s translation.
The party electoral manifesto consists of a list of twenty principles (the “Twenty Points,” personally written by Siderov but introduced as a collective party document) and a more detailed paper entitled *Programme Scheme of the Attack Party*, which lays down its programmatic positions. While the Twenty Points represents an eclectic compilation of electoral proposals under the motto “Let us give Bulgaria back to the Bulgarians,” the *Programme Scheme* is an effort to articulate a programme for government.

Attack’s founding ideology posits a one-nation state with no acknowledgement of the existence of ethnic minorities and multiculturalism. It seeks to enhance the spirituality of the nation by elevating the status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to that of a political actor. Key national priorities are determined by the premise that Bulgaria needs to regain full independence from foreign (Western) interests, which had turned the country into a “protectorate”. Attack demands the immediate withdrawal of Bulgarian troops from Iraq, a referendum on NATO membership and the presence of US military bases in Bulgaria while proposing “adequate” defence capabilities in line with the “regional balance of power” and a national-interest approach to European integration. Economic independence is to be achieved through an “appropriate” mix of public and private property, Bulgarian ownership of industry, commerce and banking, and a strong interventionist state which, through active redistribution policies, defends the interests of national firms and ensures the welfare of its citizens. Attack is against free trade and globalization, which it associates with neo-colonialism and poverty. Typical of the issue positions of the extreme right, Attack’s domestic policy agenda is designed to eliminate ethnic multiculturalism. It combines xenophobic approaches to social welfare and political rights with law and order measures. In a rhetoric resembling the anti-immigrant and anti-minority appeals of the radical right in Western Europe (Hainsworth, 2000), Attack proposes anti-crime measures directly targeting the Roma and Turkish minority in Bulgaria and claims that the MRF should be banned from politics as unconstitutional. Although it does not explicitly state opposition to democratic pluralism and liberalism, Attack’s programmatic documentation fails to make reference to democratic principles of politics. Its manifesto suggests that the party seeks to offer voters political alternatives beyond single-issue politics by replacing the essence of the post-communist consensus on market liberalism and Euro-Atlantic integration.


18 See statement of *Ataka* representative Lubomir Ivanov to the effect that members of the Roma community with criminal record should be sent to labour camps, quoted in *24 Hours* Daily, 25 June 2005, p. 5.
Attack’s electoral programme positions it as a strongly ideological and reactionary political actor and, at the same time, as a demagogic and amorphous party with an incomplete and contingent organizational development. Although the party appears to launch a populist reform programme, the latter is more effective as a criticism of the political establishment, rather than a constructive programme of change. The poor fit between values and policy positions makes it an unlikely source of mass electoral appeal. Attack’s core ideological tenet is nationalism; however, apart from monoculturalism, which under certain circumstances may have attracted voters from the ethnic majority, its electoral programme contains diverse propositions which are at odds with the general consensus, especially with regard to European integration. Although Siderov had argued that Attack’s foundations in nationalism were long-established, he himself did not relate it to existing social sentiments. Siderov first mentioned nationalism as a political platform, the “messenger” announcing the “political death” of the party establishment, for the first time in 2002.\(^{19}\) He later personally acknowledged that a nationalist party was not feasible at that time (evidently, because nationalist predispositions within the electorate were lacking).

It follows that if political agency factors had a causal effect on electoral support for the radical right in the 2005 election, they should be sought within the specifics of Attack’s electoral campaign, rather than its programmatic appeal. If equilibrium models of political agency or voter proximity (Downs, 1957) were in place, the obvious disconnect between ideology, issue positions, and the context of voter demand would have isolated voters. But under the à la carte model voters did not form coherent expectations with regard to Attack’s ideological tenets, policy positions and electoral appeals. The anti-establishment rhetoric was instrumental in marketing the party as an acceptable electoral choice whereby voters could vote in a “mix-and-match” fashion without evaluating its ideological coherence, programmatic appeal, or capabilities for policy implementation. Most importantly, Attack presented the electorate with the opportunity of à la carte protest voting by combining anti-establishment rhetoric, reversal of the policy consensus, and anti-system bias.

**Campaign strategies and electoral geography of the Attack vote**

*Ataka* was in a position to present its electoral programme as an alternative to the mainstream parties due to the existing similarities and convergence of their programmatic positions. Throughout the 1990s, the imperatives of economic transition – macro-economic stabilization, privatization, structural reform, and European integration – often determined by the international institutions which guided the transition, left little room for policy alternatives to the parties in government. The “Europeanization” of Bulgarian domestic politics was shaped by the criteria for EU membership, defined as the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities, and a market

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\(^{19}\) See *Nationalism Is Our Immune System*, (Siderov 2003: 362-64), quote on p. 364.

Voter approval for the radical right rose as it intensified its anti-political-establishment rhetoric. Siderov’s Ataka show on cable television and other media outlets, especially the nationalist press, Nova Zora and Between the Lines, permitted it to gain national coverage. On the eve of the election Ataka had established regional party offices in 20 of the 31 electoral districts. Pre-election polls revealed that its popularity was rapidly increasing. The line graph of voter preferences after the 2001 election and voting intentions during the 2005 campaign shows the relative positioning of the radical right against the mainstream parties. The graph reveals considerable variation in voting intentions indicative of the lack of consistency in voter preferences.

**Graph 1: Voting intentions, 2001–2005**


By the end of May 2005 Attack’s estimated support was around the 1 per cent threshold. It was gaining on average 2 per cent per week, parallel to sustained support for the left-wing (BSP), stabilization of support for the centre (NMSS), and increasing support for the mainstream right (UtDF, DSB and BPU) and the minority vote (MRF). Two weeks prior to the election, the share of non-voters consolidated at around 40–45 per cent (a number validated by the actual voter turnout) suggesting that electoral support for Ataka cannot
be directly attributed to the protest vote, otherwise typical of the non-voter. While three weeks prior to the election the Attack vote was projected at 1.6 per cent, its actual vote reached 8.14 per cent. No structural factors could have anticipated such an outcome, as voting intentions for the mainstream parties were either stable or on the increase as well.

Correlation analysis conducted with district-level data on political supply reveals that the modalities of interparty competition and electoral behaviour of the mainstream parties were relevant to the electoral support for Ataka. The following variables measure the distribution of electoral outcomes: 2005 vote shares by district, percentage decline or increase in district vote shares 2001-2005 (relevant to BSP, MRF, NMSS, and UtDF), and share of ethnic minorities by district. Testing for association between Attack’s vote share and the electoral fortunes of the mainstream parties allows us to establish whether Attack’s vote share was derived from the relationship to the mainstream party vote, especially with respect to the electoral decline of the NMSS and UDF. Another set of bivariate correlations tests the thesis that electoral support for the Attack Party was the result of nationalist xenophobic sentiments directed against ethnic minorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>BSP % change 2001–05</th>
<th>NMSS % change 2001–05</th>
<th>MRF % change 2001–05</th>
<th>UtDF % change 2001–05</th>
<th>NUA % Vote 2005</th>
<th>BSP % Vote 2005</th>
<th>NMSS % Vote 2005</th>
<th>MRF % Vote 2005</th>
<th>UtDF % Vote 2005</th>
<th>DBS % Vote 2005</th>
<th>BPU % Vote 2005</th>
<th>Ethnic minorities (% population by district)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP 05</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.55*</td>
<td>-.30</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.62*</td>
<td>-.35</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSS 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.21</td>
<td>-.1</td>
<td>-.54**</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>.41*</td>
<td>-.32</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.28</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>-.40*</td>
<td>-.49**</td>
<td>-.53**</td>
<td>-.79**</td>
<td>-.31</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UtDF 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.79**</td>
<td>-.36**</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NUA 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>-.42*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>BSP 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.38*</td>
<td>-.64*</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.61**</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NMSS 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.84**</td>
<td>.72*</td>
<td>.39*</td>
<td>.49*</td>
<td>-.81**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.70*</td>
<td>-.51**</td>
<td>-.70**</td>
<td>.96**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UtDF 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.52*</td>
<td>.51**</td>
<td>-.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DBS 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.52**</td>
<td>-.56**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BPU 05</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-.74**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p< 0.05; ** p<0.01; N=31.

Data Source: Central Electoral Commission, 2005.

The matrix of bivariate correlations indicates that the association between radical-right voting and voting for both the left-wing and right-of-centre parties at the district level is weak and not statistically significant. According to the winning formula thesis, we would expect Attack to have attracted right-wing voters, reflected in a meaningful negative correlation with the vote shares of the right-wing parties.

The matrix shows that the correlation between the Attack vote and the mainstream-party vote is statistically significant only with respect to the liberal centre – with the decline of the NMSS vote since 2001 (correlation coefficient $r = -0.539^{**}$) and with the MRF vote in the 2005 election (correlation coefficient $r = -0.416^{*}$). The negative sign of both correlations suggests that if Attack was able to capitalize on declining electoral support for the principal incumbent party NMSS, which lost on average 23.83 per cent of its national vote share in 2001, the electoral success of the ethnically based MRF had a potentially negative impact on radical-right voting. Such findings suggest that factors pertaining to the structure of party competition are relevant to Attack’s electoral outcome, although not in the direction prescribed by conventional explanations. The relationship between the NMSS and MRF vote shares, on the one hand, and electoral support for Ataka, on the other hand, suggests that radical-right voting in opposition to the parties in government is a plausible explanation. However, the correlation matrix also shows that no statistically significant relationship can be established between the presence of ethnic minorities and radical-right voting. As Attack’s candidates ran predominantly on an anti-minority platform, it would be logical to expect that in the ethnically mixed regions they would receive the support of voters with nationalist-authoritarian predispositions. By contrast, there is a strong negative correlation between the vote shares of the mainstream parties (except MRF) and the concentration of ethnic minorities: for example, with respect to support for the two new right-wing parties, the DSB and BPU (correlation coefficients $r = -.56^{**}$ and $r = -.74^{**}$, respectively).

Furthermore, summary statistics show that in the ethnically mixed districts the Attack vote was around or below its national average; an indicator that there was a lack of correspondence between its anti-minority campaign and voter preferences. The following comparisons between the distribution of the ethnic minority and radical-right votes confirm the results established through correlation tests.

\[21\] The values of NMSS_{\Delta01-05} are negative.
Table 4: Geography of minorities and radical-right voting by district, 2005 (N = 31)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest MRF Vote Share</th>
<th>Ethnic Turk/Minority in District</th>
<th>Attack Vote Share in District</th>
<th>Highest Attack Vote Share</th>
<th>Minority/Ethnic Turk Population in District</th>
<th>Roma Population In District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>% Rank</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>% Rank</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdzhali</td>
<td>67.30</td>
<td>61.65 (65.89)</td>
<td>2.40 (1)</td>
<td>Ruse</td>
<td>12.30 (9.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Razgrad</td>
<td>46.00</td>
<td>47.21 (56.00)</td>
<td>6.50 (2)</td>
<td>Veliko Turnovo</td>
<td>11.40 (7.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turgovishte</td>
<td>37.80</td>
<td>35.95 (44.59)</td>
<td>7.80 (3)</td>
<td>Burgas</td>
<td>10.90 (13.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silistra</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>34.34 (40.72)</td>
<td>5.60 (4)</td>
<td>Sofia District</td>
<td>10.50 (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>9.42 (16.06)</td>
<td>8.14 (–)</td>
<td>National Total</td>
<td>8.14 (9.42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Examination of the extreme values in the distribution of the ethnic minority- and radical-right vote in the 2005 election confirms that electoral support for the Attack Party does not follow demographic patterns. By contrast, the MRF vote is entirely determined by the geographic concentration of minorities in the Bulgarian population. The statistics demonstrate that the Attack vote cannot be linked to ethnically mixed regions with a Roma minority, despite the aggressive anti-Roma focus of Siderov’s electoral campaign.

While these findings support the relevance of political agency to voter mobilization, they also suggest that voting may not be a predictable process of market clearance but rather a situational occurrence without foundations in the classical supply-side factors of voting. The differences between conventional propositions and the à la carte hypothesis become apparent. The evidence on the dimensions of political agency, notably the mismatch between Attack’s ideological appeals and the lack of minority-related distribution of the radical-right vote, lends support to the à la carte proposition that radical-right voting is most likely neither a positive vote for the radical right per se, nor a negative note against the establishment but a mix of contextual determinants, key among which is the lack of correspondence between voter expectations and party supply. The following section will examine the goodness of fit between voter preferences and party supply from the perspective of electoral demand.

Voter demand à la carte

The structure of voter demand was critical to Attack’s electoral outcome. The radical right benefited from a key attribute of the electoral campaign – voter receptiveness to
electoral mobilization strategies. While Attack’s appeal is generally cited as a factor contributing to radical-right voting, it does little to explain why voters voted the way they did. The surprise electoral breakthrough of the Attack Party has remained a puzzle, at best too simplistically attributed to xenophobia, nationalism, and anti-establishment sentiments.

Three-dimensional change in voter demand

Similar to the long-term trends informing the context of political agency, voter demand has been in the process of change long before the 2005 election. Three interrelated trends – the prevalent structure of political cleavages, value orientations, and voter evaluations – were instrumental in sustaining a sizeable cohort of “free floating voters” (Dalton, 2002: 207) whose electoral preferences were unbound by social and ideological determinants.

The most significant trajectory of socio-political change has been voter dealignment and the resulting reorientation of electoral preferences according to individual issue mobilization, anti-establishment protest, or performance voting. A number of authors have identified such trends as a decline of the impact of cleavage patterns in party politics previously “frozen” along the formative structure of societal divisions (Dalton, 2002, Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, Mair 1997).

Siaroff (2000) has noted that during the 1990s, class has remained the most pronounced cleavage in Bulgarian party politics, followed by regional and religious cleavages. However, the surprise election victory of the NMSS in 2001 revealed that the role of class in voting had declined. Most importantly, the left-right distinction in political competition became less salient after the 1997 election. The socio-structural determinants of electoral behaviour for the majority of voters opened up to the influence of declining partisanship, vote-switching and greater receptiveness towards new parties. As Sarah Birch has noted: “The de facto duopoly [between BSP and UDF] served the interests of both parties while maintaining the outward appearance of democratic alternation of power. The vote for the former King’s newly formed political grouping [NMSS] may be interpreted as an act of desperation by an electorate that could not imagine a leadership worse than the one they had, and was therefore prepared to ‘try anything’. [...] the electorate also demonstrated that it was not subservient to the two main parties” (Birch 2003: 144).

The continuing decline of the bipolar model of Bulgarian party politics after the 2001 election provides evidence to the effect that economic and retrospective models of voting have become relevant to large proportions of the electorate. Vote-switching developed into an important electoral factor. After 42.73 per cent of the electorate changed their party of choice by voting for the NMSS in the 2001 election, 19.63 per cent voted for new parties in 2005. On average, 32 per cent of voters switched to another party in the 2005 election. The data below demonstrate that electoral choices within the centre have been least stable. The principal centrist party NMSS lost 23.83 per cent of voters.

Dalton (2002: 207) estimates that the association between religion and electoral choice in Bulgaria is the strongest in Eastern Europe (Cramer’s V correlation of .29).
its vote share nationally. As 71.2 per cent of its 2001 voters supported it in 2005, the consistent share of NMSS voters in the electorate stood at 14.17 per cent in 2005.

Table 5: Sources of party vote in the 2005 election, % of voting choice in 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>NMSS</th>
<th>UDF</th>
<th>BSP</th>
<th>MRF</th>
<th>Did not vote</th>
<th>Vote share 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSP</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>70.80</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>30.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMSS</td>
<td>71.20</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>19.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSB</td>
<td>11.90</td>
<td>63.10</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPU</td>
<td>24.70</td>
<td>27.70</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>34.90</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>20.30</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRF</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>69.10</td>
<td>11.50</td>
<td>12.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDF</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>72.70</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>7.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>25.20</td>
<td>16.30</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>6.50</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>8.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Change in the distribution of individual values and political orientations has emerged as a second major development in voter demand since the 1990s. The contradictory evolution of tolerance in Bulgarian society represents one of the principal outcomes of value change. Three consecutive waves of the World Values Survey (1990, 1997, and 1999) indicate that during the 1990s, pluralism in Bulgarian society increased considerably. As the graph line below demonstrates, key aggregate measures of social and political tolerance experienced positive trends.

Graph 2: Tolerance and value change

Summary statistics show that the largest increase in tolerance was observed vis-à-vis people of different race (21.7 per cent), Muslims (19.5 per cent), people with AIDS, and homosexuals. Social intolerance persisted only with regard to drug addicts and heavy drinkers.

Furthermore, World Values Surveys and Eurobarometer data provide measures of public dispositions towards nationalism. Bulgarians are not more nationalistic than other Central and Eastern Europeans. Eurobarometer polls indicate that 70 per cent of Bulgarians are very or quite proud of their country versus 86 per cent of Eastern Europeans and 83 per cent of West-Europeans on average. The proportion of Bulgarians sharing exclusively national versus a common national and European identity is in line with European averages. In 2001 39 per cent of respondents saw themselves as Bulgarians only and 39 per cent felt both Bulgarian and European. In 2005 the respective figures were 45 per cent (national identity only) versus 49 per cent (national and European identity). In the Central and Eastern European EU member states, these indicators were 43 per cent versus 42 per cent in 2001 and 42 per cent versus 55 per cent in 2005.23

Against the background of established trends of increasing pluralism and tolerance in Bulgarian society, more recent data reveal that such political indicators have been affected by negative change in interethnic attitudes developing within the Bulgarian ethnic majority. A nationally representative survey conducted in 2005 found that large proportions of Bulgarians prefer not to live in the same country with people from the minority groups, such as Roma (27 per cent of respondents), Turks (18 per cent), Jews (16 per cent), and Armenians (13 per cent) (Cohen 2005). The survey also established that racist attitudes are likely to influence electoral behaviour. Large segments of the ethnic majority regardless of age, education, residence, or income associate their voting preferences with ethnicity criteria.

Table 6: Partisanship and voting preferences, Bulgarian ethnic majority (2005)

<p>| Question: Would you vote for a candidate nominated by your party, if the candidate were a Roma? |
| Answer: Percentage of negative responses by demographic group |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>University degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Primary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Cohen (2005: 14).

The data are indicative of a public tendency to formulate political preferences along alternative dimensions of party support: deepening centre-periphery and regional cleavages and the continued decline of class as the primary referent of electoral competition.

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Voter distancing from and disillusionment with political life and the establishment represents the third trajectory of long-term change in Bulgarian electoral politics, reflected in declining levels of political trust and measures of personal efficacy. Since the 2001 election personal satisfaction with life and confidence in political institutions has been consistently lower in Bulgaria than in other East-European countries. Cross-national research reveals that by the time of the 2005 election, the Bulgarians had emerged as the most pessimistic nation in Europe. Only 29 per cent of Bulgarians were satisfied with personal life in 2005 versus 80 per cent on average in the European Union. By contrast, Bulgarians have higher confidence in the European Union and other international institutions (72 per cent approval) than European citizens on average (59 per cent).  

A social structure of radical-right voting?

The 2005 electoral campaign was affected by the enmeshing of such contradictory trends in voter demand. A number of relationships between socio-structural and political variables, on the one hand, and the distribution of voter choices suggest that electoral support for the radical right emerged as an expression of volatile predispositions and short-term preferences, an à la carte selection whereby different categories of voters opted for the radical right without a coherent approval of its principal tenets: nationalist ideology, populist appeal, anti-system rhetoric, and charismatic leadership style.

The foundations of voter party choices in the 2005 election varied widely. Pre-election polls found that 32 per cent of decided voters intended to support the party of their usual preference regardless of whether it included candidates who they personally did not like; 24 per cent intended to vote for the party of their preference only if it did not include candidates whom they personally did not approve; 26 per cent intended to vote based exclusively on candidate names in the party lists without a clear support for any of the parties in the election; and 18 per cent had no opinion on whether party or candidate approval would affect their motivation to vote. The evidence suggests that the election was open to personalization of the vote, an occurrence particularly instrumental in Attack’s electoral campaign based on charismatic leadership.

A second important development in the 2005 election was the use of ethno-centrism and anti-minority rhetoric as tools of voter mobilization. While the electoral geography of the Attack Party reveals that the ethnic factor was not associated with the distribution of radical-right voting in the election, the fact that 99.2 per cent of Attack’s vote was derived from within the ethnic majority points to the relevance of ethnicity and interethnic attitudes to voting choices.

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26 For comparison, the ethnic majority accounts for between 94.20% (UDF) and 97.40% (DSB) of the mainstream party vote. The vote share of ethnic Bulgarians in the predominantly Turkish MRF is 13.60%. In the 2005 election, the MRF derived 80.0% of its national vote from ethnic Turks and 5.9%
Analysis of individual-level data permits to outline the socio-demographic profile of the Attack voters beyond their apparent identification as belonging to the Bulgarian ethnic majority. Post-election public opinion polls contain information on key dimensions of party support in the 2005 election: ideological, social, and performance-based indicators which may be examined as possible correlates of radical-right voting. One of the tasks is to compare the socio-structural characteristics of the Attack voters relative to the mainstream-party voters, and make inference with regard to the sources of electoral support for the radical right in Bulgaria.

Table 7 demonstrates that there are significant demographic differences between radical-right voters and mainstream-party voters. Such differences are established at two levels: ratios between individual sub-groups of voters in the national vote for the Attack Party and the mainstream parties and, depending on the significance of sub-group differences, the strength of association between individual demographic, socio-economic, and political variables and voting choices. Over- or, respectively, under-representation of individual voter categories in Attack’s national vote share relative to the mainstream party vote indicates the extent to which electoral support for the Attack Party depends on the vote of particular cohorts of the electorate according to gender, age, location of residence, education, class, economic evaluations and political orientations.

**Table 7: Comparative socio-demographic profile of the Attack Voter**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Attack Voters (% in total)</th>
<th>Mainstream-party voters (% in total)</th>
<th>Over-/under-representation of group</th>
<th>Cramer’s V correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>53.7 (29)</td>
<td>47.4 (359)</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.031 (n/s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>46.3 (25)</td>
<td>52.6 (398)</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-29</td>
<td>5.6 (3)</td>
<td>13.9 (105)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>.092**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>13.0 (7)</td>
<td>16.0 (121)</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>18.5 (10)</td>
<td>16.0 (121)</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>31.5 (17)</td>
<td>19.4 (147)</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 and over</td>
<td>31.5 (17)</td>
<td>34.7 (263)</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of residence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>16.4 (9)</td>
<td>35.8 (271)</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>.117*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town</td>
<td>29.1 (16)</td>
<td>19.9 (151)</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative city</td>
<td>43.6 (24)</td>
<td>30.0 (234)</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>10.9 (55)</td>
<td>14.3 (108)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

from the Roma minority. Source: Exit poll data of the 2005 parliamentary election, Sega Daily, 28 June 2005, p. 3. Census data (2001) determines the ethnic composition of the Bulgarian population as 83.94% Bulgarians, 9.41% Turks, 4.68% Roma, and 1.97% other minority groups.
The descriptive statistics reveal that, relative to voters for the mainstream parties, Attack’s supporters are over-represented in the cohorts of male voters (1.1) residing in large cities and towns (1.46) but not in the capital, aged between 40 and 60 (50 per cent of all Attack voters), with secondary (1.29) and higher education (1.25). The statistics show that Attack’s vote share is derived predominantly from these categories of voters.

Chi-square tests conducted with respect to radical-right voting versus voting for the mainstream parties across all demographic and socio-economic variables reveal that differences by location, age, and education are statistically significant and the relationship between these variables and voting choice is weak-to-moderate. Such comparisons point to the potential relevance of socio-structural variables to explaining the Attack vote by the socio-demographic structure of the Bulgarian electorate. However, more contextualized comparisons with the socio-demographic profile of voters for individual parties reveal that the Attack voters are similar to NMSS (liberal centre) and right-wing voters (UtDF, DSB, and BPU combined) in key socio-economic variables, such as class
and education, status as self-employed, age, and location of residence. Such findings fail to validate claims that Attack’s voters have a distinct socio-demographic profile despite the significant differences with the mainstream electorate as a whole.

**Differences in political and economic evaluations?**

Table 8 demonstrates that Attack voters differ significantly from voters for the mainstream parties according to performance evaluations; both with regard to personal economic situation and sociotropic assessments (the association between economic evaluations and voting, although statistically significant, is weak).

**Table 8: Performance evaluations of the Bulgarian voters, 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic performance</th>
<th>Attack Voters</th>
<th>Mainstream party voters</th>
<th>Over-/under-representation of group</th>
<th>Cramer’s V correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal satisfaction with life</td>
<td>83.9 (73)</td>
<td>72.9 (717)</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociotropic evaluation</td>
<td>71.3 (62)</td>
<td>55.1 (549)</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.09***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * p< .05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001. On column four, see note (ii) in Table 7.

N=1082. Personal satisfaction with life is reported as percent of respondents dissatisfied with personal life (answers “life is hard” and “hardly making a living”). Sociotropic evaluation is measured as percent of respondents dissatisfied with the situation in the country (answer “the country is moving in the wrong direction”).


Once again, such differences disappear in comparisons with individual parties. There is no statistically significant difference in sociotropic evaluations between Attack and UtDF voters, who otherwise report significantly higher rates of satisfaction with their personal life. UtDF voters are typical of those who would vote for centre-right opposition parties after the 2001 election. The UtDF has established itself as the principal opposition party in parliament. Furthermore, while there are significant sociotropic differences between Attack and MRF voters, such differences are not valid with respect to egotropic evaluations. MRF and Attack voters have the highest proportions of respondents dissatisfied with their personal economic situation. As with socio-demographic variables, performance evaluations problematize conventional explanations. The Attack voters share a dissatisfaction with life with voters of predominantly working-class and lower education cohorts (MRF voters), and share socio-demographic characteristics with centre-right voters from higher-education cohorts living in urban areas (NMSS and UtDF). Both sets of variables are instrumental in establishing a rather eclectic voter profile of the radical right.

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27 The difference with voters of the centre according to type of residence is significant at the .1 level (p=.067, Cramer’s V=.137). Summary statistics of tests conducted with respect to individual parties are not reported here but are available on file from the author.
Political attitudes constitute the third set of variables indicative of the electoral preferences of the Attack voters. Political self-identification, measures of political trust, confidence in the Attack Party and its charismatic leader Volen Siderov, as well as indicators of the stability of electoral choice provide conclusive evidence of the à la carte composition of Attack’s electorate.

Political views are the central political variable linking voters to party choice. Measured as self-placement according to the left-right scale, it constitutes a stable predictor of voters’ psychological attachments to political parties (Lewis-Beck 1988: 59). The sub-group composition of the radical-right vote according to political views in Table 9 reveals that the radical right is significantly different from the mainstream party vote and is comprised predominantly of voters from the liberal centre and those who cannot identify their political views according to left-centre-right categorization.

Table 9: Comparison of political views of Attack/ mainstream party voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Proportion of group according to political views</th>
<th>Over-/under-representation of group relative to Attack’s national vote share</th>
<th>Proportion of group within Attack’s voters</th>
<th>Proportion of group mainstream party vote share</th>
<th>Over-/under-representation of group relative to the group in mainstream party vote, national sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>5.7 (5)</td>
<td>36.03 (361)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>10.3 (9)</td>
<td>15.9 (158)</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>35.6 (31)</td>
<td>17.8 (177)</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot estimate</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>48.3 (42)</td>
<td>30.1 (299)</td>
<td>1.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: N=1082. On column six, see note (ii) in Table 7

Individual party comparisons further reveal that, counterintuitively, Attack voters are similar to NMSS voters, i.e. with primarily centrist political views. Second, the radical-right vote is derived predominantly from voters who cannot identify their political views. Such results indicate that while the distribution of political views is associated with party choice, the left-centre-right placement is not a stable predictor in radical-right voting. There is an apparent mismatch between Attack’s strongly ideological platform and the structure of its electoral support, predominantly within the cohorts of voters with undefined and liberal-centrist political views. Such a discrepancy lends support to the disequilibrium thesis. The chart below shows a similar lack of stable political
identification within the MRF and BPU electorate. By contrast, the ideological self-placement is a strong factor for DSB and moderate-to-strong for BSP and UDF voters.

**Chart 1: Political views of the party electorate**

To summarize, the disproportionately high proportion of voters with undefined political views for large segments of the party electorate as a whole also validates the disequilibrium thesis. Such voters constitute 31.6 per cent nationally, and are above the average for the NMSS (36.3 per cent), Attack (48.3 per cent), and MRF (67.9 per cent).

Attack’s voters differ significantly from the electorate of the mainstream parties according to political trust. The average confidence in political institutions on a 1–6 scale is 1.6 for the Ataka voters, versus 2.85 for mainstream voters. This difference is statistically significant also in individual comparisons with the parliamentary parties, except the DSB and UDF. The findings demonstrate that radical-right and right-wing voters are likely to associate trust in political institutions with their status as voters for the opposition. The data reveal political similarities between the right-wing and the radical right and fail to validate the latter’s anti-system character from a voter’s perspective.

The propensity for vote-switching is another political attribute typical of the Attack voters. Post-election polls reveal that Attack’s electorate is on average 1.9 times more likely than the electorate of the mainstream parties to vote for another party in future elections suggesting that Attack’s electoral success in the 2005 election was in part the result of affective voter reactions but not of stable orientations. In May 2006 29.5

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28 The index of political trust is calculated as the total of individual positive responses to six questions on confidence in the following political institutions: the Bulgarian Constitution, Presidency, Parliament, the Government, the Chief Prosecutor’s office, and local authorities.
per cent of the Attack voters declared an intention to vote for a newly established liberal-populist party also led by a charismatic leader (GERB) versus 15.5 per cent of the electorate of the mainstream parties. The evidence is at odds with the value proposition on radical-right voting, according to which we would expect Attack voters to be attracted by its ultra-nationalist content.

For comparison, between-group differences show that vote-switching is more common for the centre-right electorate. While intentions to vote for another party affect between 2.6 per cent (MRF) and 7.0 per cent (BSP) of the centre-left voters, the values of this indicator increase considerably for right-of-centre voters – 23.4 per cent (DSB), 26.5 per cent (UDF), 29.5 per cent (Attack Party), and 43.6 per cent (NMSS). The Attack vote therefore may be regarded as an extreme case of vote-switching, typical of the electorate as a whole.

As Table 9 demonstrates, there are significant differences also in regard to issue-specific political evaluations of radical-right versus mainstream voters. However, introducing temporal comparisons yields surprising results. Key indicators of political confidence of the Attack voters change considerably outside the context of the electoral campaign. Only charismatic leadership and confidence in the Attack Party remain highly correlated with party choice, despite falling confidence in the party and its leader among the electorate.

Table 9: Evolution of political confidence, Attack versus mainstream-party voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Attack Voters</th>
<th>Mainstream party voters</th>
<th>Over-/under-representation of group</th>
<th>Cramer’s V correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in Volen Siderov</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2005</strong></td>
<td>81.5 (32)</td>
<td>11.4 (105)</td>
<td>7.15</td>
<td>.385***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>43.7 (38)</td>
<td>5.8 (56)</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>.270**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the Attack Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2005</strong></td>
<td>69.0 (29)</td>
<td>7.6 (73)</td>
<td>9.07</td>
<td>.408***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>51.1 (45)</td>
<td>6.6 (66)</td>
<td>7.74</td>
<td>.419***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in NATO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2005</strong></td>
<td>28.6 (12)</td>
<td>37.7 (361)</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>.113 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>40.8 (20)</td>
<td>38.2 (206)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.041 (n/s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence in the EU</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2005</strong></td>
<td>38.1 (16)</td>
<td>51.6 (494)</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>.083*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>May 2006</strong></td>
<td>58.0 (51)</td>
<td>54.5 (542)</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>.044 (n/s)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Sample size October 2005, N=1000; May 2006, N=590. * p< .05; ** p< .01; ***p< .001.
On column four, see note (ii) in Table 7.

29 Party name GERB (“coat of arms”) is abbreviation of Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria, a populist party established in 2006 by Sofia Mayor Boiko Borissov, former NMSS leader.
Such individualized comparisons reveal that Attack’s voters do not consistently agree with the principal issue positions of the party. Over time (removed from the influence of Attack’s electoral campaign), the Attack voters are likely to follow the distribution of political confidence typical of the mainstream party electorate. While they have significantly lower confidence in NATO, the radical-right voters are not the most sceptical in that respect. May 2006 poll data indicate that left-wing BSP voters have the lowest level of confidence in NATO (31.1 per cent). Similarly, the Ataka electorate has a higher level in confidence in the EU than BSP voters (47.3 per cent) and MRF voters (44.3 per cent) and this difference is statistically significant. The findings once again point to a mismatch between party positions and voters, taking into account that anti-NATO appeals were central to Attack’s electoral campaign and fully in line with its nationalist ideological platform. On the contrary, all mainstream parties emphasized pro-Euro-Atlantic integration positions.

In conclusion, the wide variation in political views and orientations does not allow the establishment of a clear-cut electoral profile of Attack’s voters which would distinguish them from the political mainstream. While not a completely classless vote – individual categories of voters are significantly over- and under-represented in Attack’s electorate – the radical-right vote is otherwise broadly based across social strata and does not conform to sociological accounts which identify its sources among the working-class, unemployed, self-employed, and lower-education cohorts. The distribution of political views also fails to validate propositions of association between political variables, while repeatedly pointing to the role of contextual and short-term factors of political agency. The various streams of social pessimism – socio-economic, demographic, and political – converge in an à la carte model of voter choice valid across social strata and political attitudes.

Conclusion

The findings along all dimensions of the à la carte model presented here validate its core proposition that electoral support for the radical right is not a coherent vote shaped by stable predictors, such as social structure, interests and values, but a voting choice in the context of disequilibrium between party supply and voter expectations. Radical-right voting represents an element of diverging and/or unmet electoral expectations.

Such findings, although counterintuitive, are not unusual. Studies of the radical right in Western Europe have found that although the extreme-right parties have a clearly defined nationalist-populist ideology, voters often ignore its profound implications for the political community and, in the context of social change and rising insecurity, vote for the radical right based on affective or single-issue appeals, lack of political trust, or charismatic leadership. Voters understand the radical right as a vehicle of mobilization.
of diverse (positive and/or negative) affective reactions, not necessarily a rational choice reflecting stable individual orientations.

As the Bulgarian case study demonstrates, public confidence in the radical right is not consistent over time but it is sustained by the opportunity to vote based on individual aspects of its electoral appeals in the absence of clear ideological self-identifications. The flexibility of à la carte voting is not readily applicable to the mainstream parties generally evaluated according to substantive issues. As a result, this model of voting has become the electoral privilege of the radical right and a resource for its sustained presence in the electoral market.

The flexibility of à la carte voting is not readily applicable to the mainstream parties generally evaluated according to substantive issues. As a result, this model of voting has become the electoral privilege of the radical right and a resource for its sustained presence in the electoral market.

The possibility for formulation of voting choice in terms of a menu selection points to two conclusions: Firstly, the à la carte model is deceptive. It grants public legitimacy to extremist political actors who do not provide voters with meaningful political alternatives. Outside the context of electoral competition, voter confidence in the radical right declines thus distorting the validity of its electoral outcome. Secondly, the efforts of building a public cordon sanitaire around the anti-system political behaviour of the radical right are likely to be ineffective. Regardless of its ideological and programmatic positions, at odds with the liberal-pluralist consensus and with the political expectations of its own electorate, the radical right will continue to appeal to voters due to unmet electoral demand in the mainstream political market, where political innovation has stalled or remains limited.

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The Role of Internet in the War against Terrorism – Threatening Privacy or an Ensuring Mechanism (National) Security – the Slovene Perspective

Uroš Svete

Abstract: The use of information-communication technology (ICT) undoubtedly leads towards greater decentralization and individualization of societies. On the other hand, due to the use of ICT, the perception of physical reality has basically changed. When the ICT (security) implications of individual (human) or national security theoretical and empirical perspectives are discussed, a very interesting turning point can be observed. After 11 September 2001, and following the terrorist attacks in Europe, the state has been trying to increase control over ICT and especially the Internet. At the same time, civil society, non-governmental organizations and even individuals have been expressing their own security and other interests, expressed in the fight for privacy and individual human rights.

Although the state reactions against particular security challenges are often disproportionate, we can see very different policies, even within the same security communities such as NATO and the European Union. Meanwhile, some countries have developed very strong mechanisms for controlling ICT and data retention; in others individual privacy and human rights are still respected and untouchable. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks showed very clearly that telecommunication data retention as well as other control mechanisms could not prevent all kinds of such attacks. They could only be used after security incidents occurred as a means for identifying perpetrators. How much liberty society is prepared to sacrifice in exchange for greater, but in no way absolute, security depends on societal, political and cultural standards.

Key words: human security, privacy, national security, intelligence, civil society, virtual community, human information security, data retention, terrorism.

Preface

The use of information-communication technology (ICT) (the Internet is often perceived as a “symbol” of such technology) undoubtedly leads towards greater decentralization and individualization of societies. Because of ICT use the perception of physical reality is basically changing.\(^1\) When the ICT (security) implications of

\(^1\) As proof, ICT usage for protection against natural and other disasters could be added. The ICT role in times of social crises caused by such disasters, increased enormously in the fields of public information (mobilizing effect), infrastructure support of complex crisis management systems (coordination and crisis communication) as well as disaster simulation. Information-communication technology has become one of the most important instruments in early warning and prevention, as well in mitigating damage
individual (human) or national security theoretical and empirical perspectives are discussed, a very interesting turning point can be observed. After 11 September 2001, and following terrorist attacks in Europe, the state has been trying to increase control over ICT, especially the Internet, for at least two reasons. For the first time the Internet is becoming more and more important as an instrument in the War against Terrorism because of Hacker Intelligence (HACKINT) and Open Source Intelligence data gathering. Secondly, a large amount of propaganda or psychological warfare against terrorism, irrespective of varying definitions, is spread through the Internet by many Western governments. Human security concept supporters, for whom “big brother” has already entered their bedrooms, with the intention of threatening their privacy, have stressed such a development, which is completely unacceptable to Western liberal government. Although the desire to control the Internet is increasing, on the contrary, individual citizens can still use ICT as one of the most important instruments for controlling state and governmental national security institutions (for example, exchanging and spreading information such as the images of Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, secret CIA flights of prisoners to Europe) as well for spreading knowledge and awareness of threats to individual privacy. But the great dilemma remains: should human freedom (of communication) be maintained as one of the basic cornerstones of Western liberal and democratic society or it should be sacrificed in the name of greater security, when endangered by new kinds of challenges such as new terrorism threats.

Although Slovenia is not directly threatened by terrorist activities, its political élite is bound by a common security and defence policy to its allies in NATO and the European Union. As a result, some supranational security instruments apply in the Slovene legal and political system. One of the most recent examples we would like to present is civil society’s reaction to European Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks. Furthermore, because of great pressure from civil society, academics and information technology professionals, Slovenia has joined the group of EU Member States that have made a declaration under Article 15(3) of this Directive to postpone its application to the retention of communication data relating to the Internet, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail, for 18 months. Thus, the dilemma mentioned above is also being faced in Slovene (political) society, and the outcome will not be determined by Slovene citizens. International alliances as well as politics, technology and the international environment are certainly playing a more important and dominant role, and Slovene society has to follow this.

(The tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in 2004 confirms how the mobilising effect on the global public opinion level was dramatically increased by ICT. Another good example of effecting global public opinion is The Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System – GDACS, that provides near real-time alerts about natural disasters around the world and tools to facilitate response coordination, including news, maps etc. (http://www.gdacs.org).
Contemporary security theory – moving from national and state level to individual human security

The (national) security overview in recent centuries shows the prevalence of two main approaches in particular: the traditional (deterministic) and post-modern (complex). For the first, security is the absence of an external threat, or rather military means should be used for confronting external threats. This approach justifies national security as a legitimate basis for organized violence within or between states, but not in any situation beyond that (Malešič, 2004). The state has a central role in these security debates; on the other hand it ensures its security interests in an anarchic and hierarchical international environment, above all using military means or military power (Waltz, 2000). In this sense a traditional security approach is basically realistic. It prevailed during the Cold War and was a theoretical base for simplistic, but very important explanations of wars, alliances, imperialism, blockades and other significant international issues (Walt, 1998).

The main features of the traditional security concept, developed in the Cold War period and based on the mentioned starting-points, are common security, stable peace and security approaches in the Third World. Although these concepts go beyond this discussion, they have some very important implications for moving attention to security from the state to the individual level. While the common security project was created by political élites, the stable peace concept arose from peace studies, based on Galtung’s and Boulding’s analyses. In this sense peace could not be regarded as the absence of war but as a state which ensures the requisite conditions of social justice. Therefore Galtung (Bilgin, 2003: 204) differentiates between personal and structural violence. Equally, he distinguishes negative peace, the absence of armed conflicts, from positive peace, the absence of direct (physical) and indirect (structural and cultural) violence. To achieve positive peace the dialogue, cooperation and solidarity between peoples have to be re-established. It is understandable that Galtung and other authors redirected the research focus from the state and military dimension towards individuals and social groups (Bilgin, 2003: 204–205). The next very important course in security studies is presented by the security approaches of the Third World, in which the great attention to the crises and conflicts of the Cold War period is regarded very critically. Meanwhile Western security concepts, based at that time on the top-down principle, were formed in a completely different way; in the Third World bottom-up principle was preferred as a consequence of the decolonization movement, the Palestinian Question, coup d’états etc. Nevertheless, there were some cases of non-violent, bottom-up security principles. This thesis is easily confirmed by Gandhi’s non-violent uprising against British colonialists in India (Bilgin, 2003: 205–207).

In the 1960s more complex definitions of national security appeared. According to the liberal and especially the constructivist critical security theory, the focuses and security agenda had moved from the national state level towards non-state actors. But the new security understanding (“new security”) acquired significant legitimacy not
until the end of the Cold War, when human beings/individuals as reference objects of security were exposed to the collapse of the static bipolar world order and the influence of globalization (the concept of human security) (Newman, 2001). On the other hand, the legitimacy of discussion about security subjects (whose security?), security emancipation\(^2\) and insecurity dilemmas (butter or guns, individual vs. state/nation etc.), as well as societal/human security and risk society, is increasing significantly. These subjects can be described in terms of social trends, such as growing economic and political inequalities within particular national states as well between them, a lack of natural resources, migration problems, the spreading of intrastate conflicts, undermining of international peace and stability, and technological challenges. These are just some of the agenda-setting\(^3\) or issues a traditional security paradigm is not faced with. Within this framework more complex security definitions should be understood (Bilgin, 2003). Security, whether or not one insists on a distinction between ”hard” and “soft” security, is about more than protecting a country from external threats; security may well include critical infrastructure protection, economic, social security, environmental and human security (Liotta, 2002: 475).

**Table 1: Expanded Concepts of Security as social phenomena according to Møller and Liotta**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical Perspective</th>
<th>Security form</th>
<th>Mode of Expansion</th>
<th>Reference object</th>
<th>Value at risk</th>
<th>Sources of threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional (realistic)</td>
<td>National security</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Sovereignty, Territorial integrity</td>
<td>Other states (Non-state actors after Cold War)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional + Traditional (Liberal and realistic)</td>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Nations, Societal groups, Political groups</td>
<td>National unity, Identity, Quality of life</td>
<td>(States), Nations, Migrants, Allied cultures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional (Liberal)</td>
<td>Human security</td>
<td>Individuals, Mankind, human rights, Rule of law</td>
<td>Survival, Quality of life, Human development</td>
<td>State, Globalization, Nature</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-traditional (Radical)</td>
<td>Environmental security</td>
<td>Ecosystem</td>
<td>Sustainability, stability</td>
<td>Mankind (sources exploitation, wars, environmental pollution)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Møller (2003: 3) and Liotta (2002: 475).*

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2 In critical international studies important attention is focused on bringing to the particular security issues or groups, which were kept in the background for years. In the security debate political, national, social, racial and religious emancipation should be stressed.

3 Agenda-setting is the creation of public awareness and concern of salient issues by the news media. Agenda-setting theory’s central axiom is salience transfer, in other words, the mass media have the ability to transfer importance of items on their mass agendas to the public agenda.
Individuals as the primary reference objects of security – the concept of human security

Assessing the differences between individuals’ and governments’ security concerns, Booth (1991) argued that individual security should come first. In advancing his case, he made three interrelated points. Firstly, states cannot be assumed to act as providers of security at all times because some are willing to make significant sections of their population insecure in an attempt to secure themselves (governments that violate the human rights of their own people), and others fail to respond to the needs of their citizens (examples of Albania before Operation Alba, Somalia in the 1990s etc.). In other words, the security of the state is not necessarily synonymous with that of the people who live within its physical boundaries. Secondly, even those states that fit the textbook definition of national security by protecting citizens are generally doing so as a means to an end, not as an end in itself. Thirdly, and finally, cultural, historic, political and traditional differences between states (the role of security culture) make them unlikely to engage in a comprehensive approach to security. Indeed, state-based approaches to security do not allow us to examine the insecurities of individuals and communities within state borders, thereby glossing over a range of suffering in security analyses.

Within the framework of human security, information-communication technology (especially the Internet) use would have indirect as well as direct implications. We must mention the instant threats to individual economic prosperity (for instance, the largest commercial bank in Slovenia had some problems with “phishing” and misuse of its e-banking service recently), political and human rights and free expression (filtering and censoring Internet traffic, blocking particular Internet services or websites, individual Internet traffic data retention). In this sense states as well non-state actors or even individuals could be perceived as sources and targets of threats at the same time. Therefore, from the point of view of ensuring security the way of treating the threats is very important at the national (state) and individual level. But in general, these mechanisms depend in particular on society and the state. Of course, without protection efforts and cooperation within national and global civil society and social integration, which lead to the increased possibility of ICT misuse and at the same time suggested possible solutions, the individual cannot feel safe. In the light of this, Deibert (in Rosenau and Singh, 2002: 126–127) mentioned private security as a very important security conception regarding the aforementioned threat to the individual from information-communication technology (mis)use. As part of the debate regarding the threat

4 These security measures are institutional (establishment of special institutions for public information about ICT misuse, cooperation with and advising software and hardware producers), educational, strategic-developed and coordinating.

5 Meanwhile numerous liberal-democratic states have established information commissioners (Germany, Switzerland), inspectors (Sweden) or even Ministries: in Slovenia the ombudsman’s deputy has responsibility for the protection of personal data.
to privacy we suggest a new term, joining information (private) and human security, “human information security” – human security within information societies.

The crucial indirect information-communication technology role within the framework of human security is the capacity to share awareness, understanding and knowledge all over the connected world, from the individual to the global community. Without the (digital) media role in security agenda-setting, whenever it presents security issues (threats) or ways of finding a solution, the human security concept regarding technology could never be functioning and efficient. However, indirectly we also should consider information-communication technology and its role in international humanitarian interventions, one of the most important concrete human security mechanisms. Contemporary international interventions deal with peacekeeping, democratic political process and institution-building in very different types of crises, therefore one organization cannot resolve all security challenges. A very good example is Kosovo, where UN, NGO (non-governmental organizations), OSCE, military and international police are building a network organization called the United Nations Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK. But such a network could not be imagined without information-communication technology use, which ensures a very effective use of resources and a more successful operation and goal achievement. In contrast to traditional, bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations, network organizations are becoming more flexible and adaptable in relation to the environment in which they operate, especially for confronting and managing unexpected threats. But the network organizations are involved with more than just electronic communication. We have to be aware of the limited influence of technology, because it is just a means for achieving goals, and without organizational changes and a new institutional culture such goals could not be achieved. But the most important information-communication technology advantage lies in its reaction capacity and real time data transferring. Nevertheless, the organizational and institutional structure defines how a particular organization would implement new technology solutions (Holohan, 2003).

But even more than for the implementation of peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions, with reference to the human security perspective ICT has a key role in new security communities building. Mills (2002) and Rothkopf (1998) argue that virtual security communities should be presented separately. Meanwhile, they

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A very good example of how to increase information security awareness is shown by European Digital Rights, which was founded in June 2002. Currently 21 privacy and civil rights organizations from 14 different countries in Europe have EDRI membership. Members of European Digital Rights have joined forces to defend civil rights in the information society. The need for cooperation among European organizations is increasing as more regulation regarding the Internet, copyright and privacy originates from the European Union. Some examples of regulations and developments that attract the attention of European Digital Rights are data retention requirements; spam; telecommunications interception; copyright and fair use restrictions; the cyber-crime treaty; rating, filtering and blocking of internet content; and the notice-and-takedown procedures of websites. European Digital Rights takes an active interest in developments regarding these subjects in all 45 member states of the Council of Europe (http://www.edri.org/).
have qualities for responding to new threats and challenges developing in cyberspace. On the other hand, civil society’s organisation of opposition to data retention attempts after the major terrorist attacks in USA and Europe basically confirm this thesis. New (human) security threats, coming from cyberspace, could be countered most effectively only by suitable ICT usage in cyberspace itself. The analysis of how Slovene ICT users built a cyber civil society community and how they have been organizing themselves to protect their rights in terms of privacy and anonymity, will be presented more specifically. This case already shows us that the misunderstanding between individual and national/state (security) interests is becoming greater than ever before. And the interactivity of ICT, the possibility for exchanging ideas beyond state control and territory, is just as crucial, but in no way the only means of protecting individuals.

The Internet and the War against Terror(ism) in Slovenia

Slovene national security policy, including institutions and systems, has been affected by dramatic changes in the last few years. Even though we had to develop a national security system in Slovenia from scratch (the exceptions are the police and in some way civil intelligence), on the other hand the wish to join NATO and European Union (EU) was expressed very quickly, and the transition after entry to both organizations was quite difficult. The Slovene National Security system had to find its own position within a new geostrategic environment, and consideration of the common security policy (the role of Euro-Atlantic organizations) was needed. Taking into account that NATO as well as the EU is founded on a common culture and political values, the more radical Slovene left-wing political élite was forced to redefine some values and principles; on the other hand right-wing parties and intellectuals were and still are very strong NATO and EU supporters, without doubting in both organizations’ activities and their (international) policy. After the terrorist attacks and declared War on Terror, connected with the “Coalition of the Willing” invasion of Iraq, the first divisions appeared in Slovene relations with NATO. The left-wing political élite started to express more critical points of view, although Slovenia under a left-centre government signed the Declaration on Joint Cooperation to Counter Terrorism after 11 September. On the other hand, right-wing politics continued to be pragmatic and advocated measures against “rogue states and individuals” suspected of cooperation with terrorist organizations. After the last parliamentary election in 2004, when right-wing parties won and a centre-right coalition was built, former opposition standpoints of uncompromising NATO support became formal. On the other hand, a new opposition and left-oriented media radicalized their antagonism towards US policy in Iraq and also towards the perception and treatment of security issues, prevailing in “New Europe”.

Following the Slovene government decision to send military instructors to

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7 “New Europe” is a rhetorical term used by conservative political analysts in the United States to describe European post-communist countries. The term implies that there is no single Pan-European identity in the European Union, but that it is divided (and that part of it is “better”). It is a common example of
Iraq and to support the European Parliament and Council proposals on data retention, the political divide in the Slovene public became obvious. The case of data retention and supervising telecommunications was just one in series of events, intensifying the discrepancy between national (state) and individual security efforts.

After the London terrorist attacks European Union member states began to think again about data retention as part of combating terrorism. Just a few days before this tragic event the European Parliament rejected British suggestions for strengthening telecommunication (Internet and mobile telephone traffic) control, but the London terrorist attack again legitimized these attempts. The Slovene Interior Minister made a statement supporting telecommunication data retention as one of the urgent measures and security mechanisms in the fight against terrorism, from the national security perspective of course. It was argued that human privacy would not be affected a result, but mistrust across Europe concerning these data has spread very quickly. Experienced ICT users perceived data retention as a threat to human privacy and security, where state control over its citizens has been increasing dramatically. A major campaign began in cyberspace against data retention and controlling telecommunication, and some Slovene ICT experts as well as the opposition media (for instance Mladina weekly) and intellectuals joined the movement. For example, Slovene activists have joined civil society organizations such as Privacy International, European Digital Rights and Statewatch. They have translated the web page Data Retention is No Solution (www.dataretentionisnosolution.com/), and made banners and pamphlets. In the second stage of their campaign they informed some Slovene Internet forums, websites and portals. They therefore tried to influence public opinion directly and through electronic and paper media. But the campaign did not stay just at the level of civil society and politics; the opposition against data retention has also been spread to the commercial sphere. Various Slovene Internet providers claimed that the proposed data retention is technically not possible, and on the other hand would cause unacceptable financial and human resources costs. From my point of view it would be exaggerated to claim that these civil society pressures caused the appeasement policy of the Slovene authorities, but the fact is that Slovenia has joined the group of Member States which have declared an 18-month postponement of the application of the Directive on the retention of communication data relating to Internet, Internet telephony and Internet e-mail. Obviously European civil society has had success in some way, thanks above all to the communication capability of the Internet, which ensures coordination among different civil societies at state level. We can say that virtual civil society has become a reality,

the conservative American view of European affairs, and is regarded as an „ignorant“ one by many European politicians and many others. „New European“ countries were most of all distinguished by their governments’ support of the 2003 war in Iraq, as opposed to an „Old Europe“ seen as unsupportive of the war. The term Old Europe surfaced in January 2003 after the U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld used it to refer to European countries that did not support the 2003 invasion of Iraq, most notably France and Germany. It has come to mean a subset of the countries of continental Western Europe(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/New_Europe).
with real political impacts and also interests. The thesis about human (information) security seems to be confirmed or rather, the split between national and human security interests is becoming more obvious. The case is also very significant for authorities, which should, especially within specific technological matters, consider partnership with the private sector (public-private partnership). Without telecommunication companies and experts as well as experienced users support, such a restrictive policy has no choice of succeeding. But the data retention directive is not the only case in Slovenia where individual privacy is threatened from the human security concept point of view. The Slovene government has moved an amendment to the Slovene Intelligence and Security Agency Act. According to it, the time limitation of six months for continual supervision and secret retention of telecommunication data retention should be abolished. The intelligence and security agency accordingly had the theoretical possibility of unlimited encroachment upon someone’s communication privacy. The second change is connected with the special/secret use of methods and instruments of the intelligence and security service, which should be controlled and permitted by the Supreme Court president (according to an old legal regulation this was the competence of the district court president). All these attempts have excited curiosity among those opposing the government, in particular the media and experts, and there were accusations that some MPs’ e-mails were being intercepted when confidence in intelligence services and government intentions was at its lowest level. The fact is that the growing ICT importance for intelligence data gathering is nothing new (see Figure 1), but on the other hand experienced users are more aware and better organized regarding their protection of privacy rights. The knowledge about state (intelligence) capability for intercepting telecommunications is also spreading very quickly, and is ensured by Internet forums.

In the end we also have to mention ICT use by terrorist organizations for their communication and coordinating activities, psychological warfare, recruitment and fundraising. Extremist and terrorist asymmetric\(^8\) groups have spread propaganda and anti-propaganda through the Internet, as well as coded messages. For such purposes publicly accessible coded software is applied, on the other hand viruses and Trojan horses and other malicious programmes for paralyzing the opponent’s information systems are spreading (Kovacich and Jones, 2002). The Iraq case also shows us that information technology and digitalized media have been used for influencing domestic public opinion (for gathering its support) as well for international (especially Western) or global public opinion. This is because Iraqi Islamic groups and some media (Arab information service Al Jazeera) are very skilled in making use of the advantages of information-communication and satellite technologies, and are trying, by showing violence against kidnapped civilians and soldiers, to influence the Western public above all

\(^8\) Asymmetry is warfare where the threats go beyond the enemy’s expectations and beyond the readiness of its security mechanism. Therefore, today’s terrorism is very often described as contemporary form of asymmetric warfare.
Transmitting some forms of violence (beheadings, showing executions directly, and the torture of prisoners) is particularly sensitive for Western civil societies because these images cause upset and anger. Therefore state controlling attempts in the ICT sphere are logical, even in those countries which are not directly threatened by terrorism (such as Slovenia). If modern states want to confront terrorist threats, ICT for intelligence services is indispensable. But for avoiding or minimizing the difference between national and individual security interests, controlling mechanisms should be established and in this sense the role of civil society has to be strengthened. Combating terrorism is not just the matter and interest of a particular national security service, political élite or even ideology, but it should reflect the interests of the society as a whole.

**Figure 1: Modern intelligence activity**

```
Intelligence activity
    ├── TECHINT
    │    └── SIGINT
    │         └── COMINT
    │         └── ELINT
    └── HUMINT
        └── IMINT
            └── PHOTONINT
                └── MSS
        └── HACKINT
            └── NOSINT
                └── network based
                    └── computer access
                        └── open information sources
```

*Source: Davies (1999)*

### Conclusion

Terrorism is undoubtedly one of the most important threats to modern security efforts. Although the state reactions are often disproportionate (terrorism seems to be more a matter of perception than a matter of reality), we can see very different policies, even within the same security communities, such as NATO and European Union. Meanwhile, some countries have developed very strong mechanisms for controlling ICT and data retention (USA, Great Britain, Italy), in some other countries individual privacy and human rights are still respected and untouchable. The antagonism between “new” and “old” Europe as two separate security communities in NATO and the EU and also between supporters and opponents of the data retention directive, confirms this division. When the mentioned dilemma was faced by Slovene (political) society it became clear that the outcome was not in our hands. Alliances as well as the political
and technological international environment are certainly playing a more important and dominant role. Thus, the Slovene government had just two possibilities: join the group of states that decided in favour of a declaration postponing the Directive implementation or to join the hard-liners in combating terror. Under the pressure of civil society and the Internet community, it decided to join the first group. But nevertheless, the terrorist attacks showed very clearly that telecommunication data retention could not prevent these kinds of attacks. Data retention could just be used afterwards for identifying perpetrators. Thousands of video cameras, the Echelon\textsuperscript{9} intelligence system and other data sources undoubtedly confirm that total security can never be achieved.

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\textsuperscript{9} ECHELON is a name used to describe a highly secretive world-wide signals intelligence and analysis network run by the UKUSA Community (otherwise described as the „Anglo-Saxon alliance“) that has been reported by a number of sources including, in 2001, a committee of the European Parliament (EP report). According to some sources ECHELON can capture radio and satellite communications, telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and other data streams nearly anywhere in the world and includes computer automated analysis and sorting of intercepts. The EP committee, however, concluded that „the analysis carried out in the report has revealed that the technical capabilities of the system are probably not nearly as extensive as some sections of the media had assumed“ (EP report, p. 11)


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Between Atlanticism, Anti-Americanism and Europeanization: Dilemmas in Czech Foreign Policy and the War on Terrorism

Šárka Waisová

Abstract: US–Czech relations have a long tradition, dating back to the time of an independent Czechoslovakia. The author analyse US–Czech bilateral relations in the post-Cold War period. The primary focus will be on long-term trends, along with the influence that particular events have had on the evolution and periodization of these relations. Some of the consequences of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism for US–Czech relations will be examined.

Key words: Czech Republic, the war on terrorism, US-Czech relations

US–Czech relations have a long tradition, dating back to the time of an independent Czechoslovakia (1918). The foundations of US–Czech relations were established against the backdrop of the outcome of First World War. Analytically, their evolution can be divided into four distinct periods. First, from 1918, the establishment of an independent Czechoslovakia, until 1948, the final victory of the Communists and the beginning of a strong orientation towards the USSR. Second, the 1948–89 period, marking the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc. Third, the period from 1989 until the autumn of 2001, which includes the establishment of an independent Czech Republic as a result of the peaceful dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. Fourth, the period after 11 September 2001.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse US–Czech bilateral relations in the post-Cold War period. The primary focus will be on long-term trends, along with the influence that particular events have had on the evolution and periodization of these relations. Some of the consequences of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism for US–Czech relations will be examined. An emphasis on the long-term evolution of US–Czech affairs gives way to the development of the argument that the 11 September attacks served as an intervening factor in Czech domestic politics which deepened the existing divergence among political élites, as well as the distance between élites and the general public. I maintain that the development of US–Czech relations in the post-9/11 period does not constitute a new stage per se, but rather signifies a continuation of the process of “deterioration” which started long before 11 September, during the second half of

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1 This text is a preliminary version of the text published in Miller, Mark J. – Stefanova, Boyka (eds.) (2006): The war on terror in comparative perspective. US security and Foreign Policy after 9/11. Palgrave.
the 1990s. It reflects the dilemma in Czech foreign policy towards the US and the cleavage between Atlanticism and Europeanization in Czech politics.

It should be noted that Czech academic writing on US–Czech relations remains limited. Most of the current literature deals with the interwar period, while other publications examine Czechoslovakia and its relations to the West during the Cold War. The post-Cold War period of Washington–Prague relations lacks a comprehensive analysis from the perspective of their long-term evolution. The purpose of this chapter is thus not only to address specific features of the Czech responses to 9/11 and the War on Terror but also to contribute to the broader understanding of US–Czech relations.

The legacy of the Cold War in US–Czech relations

After Second World War, the ideological differences between the US and the USSR led to the outbreak of the Cold War. The final division of the European continent was concluded by the end of the 1940s following a whole series of events: the Marshall Plan; the Berlin crisis; the establishment of the West German and East German states, etc. After a short intermezzo between May 1945 and February 1948, when the Czechoslovak political élites oscillated between the East and the West, Czechoslovakia became an integral part of the Communist Bloc. After the establishment of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, directed against the Western powers and internal anti-Communist threats, there was an intensification of the Soviet imposition of its security concept, military doctrine, and foreign policy goals.

The evolution of US–Czech relations was thus strongly influenced by the Cold War and more or less paralleled the evolution of US–Soviet relations. Despite the correlation, there were significant differences in the relations between individual members of the Eastern bloc and the US as well as other Western countries. During the Cold War period, the US prioritized its relationship with Poland among the East European countries. While several US presidents visited Communist Poland (Nixon, Ford, and Carter), no US president visited Czechoslovakia.

Three important factors influenced US–Czech relations before 1989. Firstly, the Czechoslovak lobby in the US was small and weak. There were no emigrants of the statute and profile of Polish émigré Zbigniew Brzezinski among the Czechs in the US, the Czech diaspora in the US suffered from a great degree of fragmentation. Secondly, the geopolitical role of Czechoslovakia during the Cold War was marginal. Thirdly, the US, despite its status as a symbol of freedom and democracy for the Czechs, conceded to the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and thus accepted the Brezhnev Doctrine. American consent to the “limited sovereignty” of the socialist countries resulted in a deep frustration within the Czechoslovak population, which relied on the US to reject Moscow’s intervention. The consequences of this frustration could be viewed in the conduct of Czech political élites and public opinion throughout the 1990s, and particularly following the Kosovo intervention of 1999.
The Velvet Revolution: a new challenge and opportunity for Czech foreign policy

The decline of bipolar confrontation and the disintegration of Soviet power constituted decisive moments for all Central European countries. Their newly restored independence cleared the way for a new era of foreign and domestic policy. Under these new conditions, former Communist countries redefined their interests, goals, and policies, as well as their allies and partners. The essential policy goals of the Central European countries were to acquire a stable, free security environment and achieve the prerequisites for democratic development.

Four alternative scenarios for the future security architecture in Central Europe emerged at the beginning of the 1990s (Waisová, 2003):

First, maintenance of the status quo, that is, continuing the presence of the Soviet Army in Central Europe and maintenance of NATO and the Warsaw Pact adjusted to the new political and security conditions. Second, isolationist neutrality. Third, dissolution of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact and institutionalization of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (currently the OSCE). Fourth, enlargement of the transatlantic institutional security structures to include the East European countries and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.

The status quo alternative was questioned by many former Soviet satellites and directly rejected by Hungary and Czechoslovakia (Šedivý, 2001: 17). The isolationist neutrality alternative and the possibility of institutionalization of the CSCE were opposed by former Soviet satellites as well as by the NATO countries. Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the official dissolution of the Soviet Union – the Central European states eventually abandoned the status quo alternative and that of neutrality, and were inclined to accept the fourth alternative.

The summit of the Central European presidents in Visegrád in February 1991 de facto confirmed this decision by the signature of the Declaration on cooperation between Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary on the way to European integration. One of the goals of the Declaration was for the Visegrád countries to become part of the European political, security, and economic system. The Kraków summit of the Central European presidents of October 1991 officially declared the interest of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary to join both the European Union (EU) and NATO.

The security situation in Europe deteriorated during the early 1990s as a result of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The inability of both the EU and the CSCE/OSCE to resolve the entire range of new conflicts and crises became obvious. In response to this situation Czechoslovakia opted for NATO’s collective defence system. The unification of Germany, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and, last but not least, the dissolution of Czechoslovakia strengthened the Atlantic orientation of Czech politics to such an extent that a pro-US and Atlanticist orientation ultimately prevailed.
among the Czech political élite. The Americanization of Czech foreign policy deepened during the Clinton Administration when Madeleine Albright, an American citizen of Czech origin, became the US Secretary of State. The Clinton Administration promoted friendly and cooperative contacts with the Czechs, based on positive personal relations between Madeleine Albright and former Czech President Václav Havel. In 1997 the French Foreign Ministry even went so far as to label the Czechs as members of “the American camp.” Prague was said to be “more interested in the US protection than in France’s vision of the Union as the European pillar of NATO.”

**Europeanization, Czech foreign and domestic policy, and the causes of anti-Americanism**

Two strands in Czech foreign policy – one pro-Atlanticist, one pro-European – emerged following negotiations on EU and NATO enlargement during the late 1990s. Atlanticism was strong in the period shortly before and after the NATO enlargement. The Kosovo intervention, however, was followed by an increase in anti-American sentiments among the Czech public identified as a negative stance towards Atlanticism. Since the Kosovo crisis in 1999, Czech anti-Americanism, coupled with anti-Atlanticism, produced a stronger focus towards Europe as an ever more likely alternative.

This shift – or, rather, dilemma – between an Atlanticist and a European choice has been significant for Czech foreign policy in the post-Cold War period and has remained a problem of great gravity ever since.

The European orientation of Czech foreign policy was strengthened by the process of Europeanization, which led to the Czech accession to EU membership on 1 May 2004. On the one hand, Europeanization is invoked to describe the development of EU-level institutions and their growing policy competence, and therefore the emergence of an authoritative system of European governance. On the other hand, Europeanization is also understood as a process by which domestic actors and institutions adapt to the institutional framework and logic of the EU (Poguntke et al., 2003: 2). In the Czech political environment, Europeanization is understood as a process of acceptance of European formal and informal rules, policy paradigms, styles, beliefs and “ways of doing things.” For the Czechs, Europe constitutes a symbol of democracy, human rights, and norm-guided multi-lateralism.

In the early 1990s the Czechs had a profound respect for US foreign policy. The transition of US engagement in world politics towards a global leadership during the second half of the 1990s, accompanied by the erosion of multi-lateralism, led to an increasing wave of anti-Americanism both worldwide and in Central Europe. Czech

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public opinion was highly critical of US ambivalence towards multilateral engagement, especially of its reluctance to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the International Criminal Court.

For the Czechs, being a European meant full acceptance of democracy, human rights, peaceful resolution of conflicts, and support for international humanitarian law. The European orientation became the antithesis of the unilateralism of US foreign policy. Czech public opinion regarded pre-emptive action as a sign of aggressive, non-democratic and hegemonic policy on behalf of the US. Hence, the rejection of pre-emptive action stemmed from respect for international law and democratic values, which the Czech public saw in the European Union.

NATO enlargement as an important facet of US–Czech relations

In the early 1990s, not only the Czech Republic but also Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states were interested in joining the NATO collective defence system. The strong preference of the Central European countries for NATO membership, the new global security environment, the transformation of NATO’s strategy, and the increasing structural weight of the US in the international system profoundly affected Czech–US bilateral relations.

The special role of the US became obvious in the eastward enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance. Historical context and tradition prompted the Czech Republic to adopt a strong orientation towards the US in the early 1990s. The Czechs perceived American influence and presence in Europe as an instrument of control over German and Russian power as well as an insurance in the case of weakness or indecision on the part of France and Great Britain.³

The EU and NATO strategy of enlargement to the east had a significant impact upon the new European security architecture. The traditional transatlantic area was expanding and becoming more inclusive. It changed the perceptions of threats and security priorities of the former Eastern Bloc countries. Since the new member states considered the US to be the main driving force behind NATO’s enlargement and a guarantor of European security, enlargement reinforced US hegemony within the Alliance. Poland was the key new actor in European security to have supported the US after enlargement was completed, by maintaining a close special relationship with it. American initiative during the enlargement process also helped foster the pro-American stance in Czech politics. Prior to NATO’s enlargement and for a short period afterwards, Czech public opinion was very optimistic about the benefits of a NATO membership and a partnership with the US.

³ The sources of these perceptions can be traced back to earlier European policies of appeasement, the Munich Conference, and the Prague Spring.
The Kosovo intervention – further deterioration of US-Czech relations

Post-Cold War Europe did not become the zone of stability and peace as expected. Increasingly, the need emerged to reshape and transform the relationships among members of the transatlantic community so as to build a functioning security system in Europe. From the mid-1990s on, Washington had been losing interest in participating in the European security architecture and had tried to pass more responsibility to its European allies. A significant discrepancy persisted between the relationships of the Central European states with the US on the one hand, and those with Western Europe on the other, concerning security, political, and economic issues typical of the early 1990s. The Central European countries were economically highly interdependent on Western Europe, but on security issues they trusted in and relied on the US.

After the outbreak of conflicts in the Balkans and the partial withdrawal of American soldiers from Europe in the second half of the 1990s, Central Europe became NATO’s strategic partner in Europe. The eastern borders of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary became the eastern borders of the Alliance. The territory of the new member states constituted a natural bridge to the Baltic area, the Balkans, and the Black Sea area. Due to Austria’s neutrality, which prevented it from authorizing the transit of military and strategic material over its territory, Hungary became the strategic point of transit and over-flight operations during the Gulf War and the conflicts in the Western Balkans.

As NATO members, the Central European states started to fulfil tasks and commitments related to the implementation of democratic principles, democratic control and modernization of the armed forces, and strengthening of economic and political stability. The transatlantic community, particularly the US, referred to NATO as a “community of common values,” which implied that NATO members shared values which distinguished the Alliance from the rest of the world. After joining NATO in 1999, the Czech population finally experienced the feeling of being back in Europe, that is – being part of the democratic and free world again.

But this victorious feeling was rapidly replaced by disappointment. Immediately after accession, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary had to cope with NATO’s decisions on the issue of (non-)intervention in Kosovo. As the Czech people traditionally regarded the Alliance as an opposition to Russian power and as a symbol of democracy and respect for human rights, its decision to intervene in Kosovo without a UN Security Council resolution caused considerable consternation among the Czech public.

Two other factors were at the origin of the negative response to NATO’s intervention. Firstly, the Czech government was unable (or unwilling) to declare openly how the Czech representatives at the North Atlantic Council had voted. Secondly, the Czechs had traditionally had good relations with the former Yugoslavia and, therefore, had mixed feelings about the real motives behind the intervention. The potentially
all-too-close resemblance between the Kosovo intervention and Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 was what most preoccupied the Czech people. Furthermore, Czech public opinion interpreted the Kosovo intervention as evidence of US unilateralism and the neglect of the UN system of rules and norms. The intervention resulted in pessimism about the impartiality of NATO’s action, which precipitated a strong wave of anti-Americanism.

The Kosovo case and all subsequent attempts to resolve the conflicts in the Western Balkans exposed the reality of excessive American influence within the NATO Alliance, as well as the limitations of American security guarantees in Europe. The negative assessment of the Kosovo intervention in a number of countries, the gradual withdrawal of US forces from Europe, the emphasis upon European responsibility within NATO, accompanied by the EU’s attempt to develop its own security and foreign policy, caused a rift in the transatlantic relationship. Political debate in the Czech Republic in the wake of the Kosovo intervention prompted a dilemma and doubts about the value of Atlanticism. Public trust in the Alliance and the US diminished. The Czech government was affected by the status quo of the transatlantic dialogue. The decline in public trust of the US was enough to begin a search for alternatives to NATO in international politics. The desired alternative appeared to be the EU and its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

**What did 11 September 2001 change? Consequences of the war on terrorism for US–Czech relations**

Washington and Prague entered the new millennium in a state of hostile mutual relations. The first years of the 21st century were characterized by events which markedly influenced the evolution of bilateral relations. The chain of events was initiated by the terrorist attacks on American targets on 11 September 2001. The US global War on Terrorism, which included the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, brought about a major redefinition of America’s strategic interests, the foreign and national security policy instruments, and the configuration of possible allies. The European NATO member states were divided in their reaction to the US led war on terrorism. The US went in search for new allies for its anti-terrorist coalition.

Immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the Czech Republic expressed its solidarity with the American people and support for the American response to the attacks. Prague was among Washington’s anti-terrorist allies. However, the situation took a sudden turn when the US began to look for new

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5 See poll data on public approval of foreign countries in Mladá Fronta Dnes, 9 August 2004: A2. Opinion polls showed that 64 percent of the Czech population trusted Slovakia, 59.6 percent France, 54 percent Great Britain, 53 percent Italy, 39.9 percent the US, and 21.3 percent Russia.
partners and allies outside Europe, and Russia emerged as a key partner in the global War on Terror. The reality of the US coming together with non-European regions and partners, especially with Russia, elicited insecurity among the Czech political élite and the population in general. This anxiety, or even fear, was largely due to Donald Rumsfeld’s widely cited statement that the “coalition does not determine the mission, but the mission determines the coalition.” Czech citizens asked themselves whether their partnership with the US within the NATO Alliance was one of principle, or whether the US priorities had changed and a new policy of cooperation with Russia was emerging.

This insecurity is “new” in terms of its sources. It is not an insecurity about the Czech Republic’s own security; it is rather an insecurity about its role and position in world politics. The Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999 but the NATO of 2006 is a quite different Alliance than the one it initially joined. Washington puts NATO members under pressure to act “out of area” and extend the regional responsibility of the Alliance. Czech insecurity stems from the open-ended nature of US demands. Do the Czechs genuinely have interests in Northern Africa or Afghanistan? Are the Czechs able to send troops to non-European areas? Are the Czechs able to be a US partner or is the technological and interest gap deep enough to impede any possibility of equal partnership? And the nagging question resulting from the Kosovo intervention and Belgrade bombing is: what kind of division of labour will emerge in NATO in view of the technological gap between the US and the new member states?

Afghanistan and beyond

When the Afghanistan intervention started, US–Czech relations had for a time been cool. Nevertheless, the deterioration in the relations between Prague and Washington continued, for several reasons. First, differences and discrepancies between Prague and Washington arose over the rationale of the intervention in Afghanistan and its subsequent management. Second, a clash of conflicting opinions regarding the issue became apparent in Czech domestic politics.

As witnessed during the Kosovo intervention, deep cleavages reappeared with regard to the Afghan, and later the Iraqi, intervention among Czech political élites, as well as between élites and mass public opinion. The Iraqi intervention and the negative results of the search for weapons of mass destruction escalated the frustration of the Czech citizens and decreased public trust in the US. Against the backdrop of the cleavages, three camps, or policy positions, gradually crystallized: an anti-American position, a pro-American position and an intermediate position. The anti-American camp brought together the Communists and the Civic Democratic Party, led by Václav Klaus who replaced Václav Havel as Czech President in February 2003. Klaus criticized the American intervention and denied Washington any Czech support. The former Czech President Václav Havel became the leading representative of the pro-American position.
A staunch supporter of American activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, he even signed an open letter in support of the War on Terror together with representatives of Great Britain, Spain and other countries from the “new” Europe. Havel’s pro-US position owed a great deal to his antipathy towards Václav Klaus.

The Czech government, a coalition of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, occupied an intermediate position. It supported the US in Afghanistan and Iraq by means of military material, field hospitals, and permission to fly through Czech airspace, but at the same time rejected Havel’s open letter.

In fact, the Czech government supported the French and German position and asked Washington to be withdrawn from the list of the antiterrorist coalition countries. A Czech field hospital was officially sent to Iraq and deployed at Camp Doha, and another one to Afghanistan. The Czech Republic contributed to ISAF for humanitarian reasons and not as a member to the anti-terrorist coalition. The often-heated debates among policy makers enhanced public uncertainty about the Czech Republic’s foreign policy goals.

The issues of Afghanistan and Iraq were used by Czech political parties as an instrument of pressure in the presidential election of February 2003. All parties, especially the Civic Democratic Party and the Social Democrats, needed a clear issue to help them attract votes. After the US intervention in Afghanistan, the Czech population became dubious about American values and power interests. Criticizing Washington became fashionable. The anti-American position and the refusal to participate in the antiterrorist coalition were merely vicarious issues, as the bottom line of the debate on the provision of the field hospital was an issue of the state budget and the reform of the Czech Army. Different positions defended by individual policymakers caused anarchy inside the Czech government. Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla remained in the “in-between” camp while the Czech Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence joined the “pro-American camp.”

The contradictory Czech positions were accordingly reflected in bilateral relations with the US. Washington redefined its relations with Prague and members of the political élite. During Havel’s presidency, Czech politics was more or less regarded as coherent in the field of foreign affairs. Now Washington started to differentiate among various representatives of the Czech state. While the Bush Administration maintains contacts and negotiations with the government, especially the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence, it more or less ignores Czech President Václav Klaus.

Finally, negotiations about the sale of Czech Věra radars to China in May 2004 raised high expectations of the warming of Prague-Washington relations. The Czech Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Defence had previously authorized the sale of six radio-locators to China by the Omnipol company. The government later revoked the contract due to American disagreement. US leaders, mainly President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell, expressed anxiety about the possibility of the Chinese use of radio-locators, which could facilitate monitoring of American
vessels operating between China and Taiwan. Although the Czech government reached a consensus concerning the reversal of the sale, US-Czech relations remained cool.

**From Atlanticism to what? The dilemma between Atlanticism and Europeanization**

Czech politics has been oscillating between pro-Americanism and Atlanticism on the one side, and anti-Americanism and anti-Atlanticism on the other side for a long time. The pro-Atlanticist orientation of Czech foreign and security policy gradually weakened, accompanied by a retreat of the pro-US lobby in the Czech Republic. Since the second half of the 1990s, there have been two main strands in Czech politics – the pro-Atlanticist and the pro-European group. This dichotomy is crucial to understanding contemporary Czech politics and has greatly affected the conceptual foundations of Czech foreign and national security policy.

Different perspectives can be found within the Czech Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Ministry, as well as among the parliamentary parties. The Ministry of Defence is traditionally more oriented towards NATO while the Foreign Ministry primarily tends to take the Czech position as a EU member into consideration. Not only are the Civic Democrats the bastion of self-proclaimed Euro-scepticism in the Czech Republic but in terms of security policy, they also hold a strongly pro-US and Atlanticist stance, with the exception of Václav Klaus, who favours the Alliance but criticizes US foreign policy. Meanwhile, the Social Democrats embrace a particularly positive approach towards the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the EU (Khol, 2003: 8).

The lack of consensus about the fundamental foreign and security policy orientations of the Czech Republic is ever more important due to the policy entanglement over the state borders issue. Political consensus about foreign and security policy is impeded by numerous factors: the absence of a Czech “strategic culture,” limited expertise of the actors of security policy, limited participation on behalf of civil society, political disagreements about foreign policy priorities among political parties and divergent goals of individual government departments.

**Concluding remarks**

During the last decade, the bilateral relationship between the Czech Republic and the US has been suffering. There are various reasons for its deterioration. Both states have common interests and concerns in world politics, but their points of departure are different. The foreign policy behaviour of the US and the Czech Republic, as is the case in general, is influenced by domestic politics. Foreign policy has become an important election issue and is considered a part of securing the economic well-being and prosperity of society. US domestic politics led to a change in Washington’s
behaviour in world politics, a departure from multilateralism, and the non-ratification of international humanitarian and environmental norms. The US perceives the Czech Republic as one of many small states, whose relationship with Washington is not decisive for US global interests. Czech foreign policy has been crucially determined by changes in the US international role. It also depends on domestic political conflict and competition and the party in government. If the Civic Democrats win an election, the Atlantic and pro-American orientation would be strengthened; in case of a Social Democratic victory, the pro-European multilateralist inclination of Czech politics would gain momentum.

The prospects for Czech relations with the US may be forecast through a comparison with their bilateral relations since the 1990s. If we are to compare Washington’s and Prague’s participation on the development of bilateral relations, we observe that in the case of the US, foreign policy goals are more important and influential in public policy (at least after 9/11), while in the case of the Czech Republic, the relationship to the US has been maintained in a rather irrational way. Atlanticism and a pro-American stance have become synonymous, just as anti-Americanism has become interchangeable with a pro-European position. It may be argued that the negative Czech assessment of the US does not fully reflect the impact of 9/11 and the war on terror, but rather stems from the US retreat from multilateralism. Important questions remain. How will Czech EU membership shape the future relationship between the US and the Czech Republic? Will Czech politics find a consensus about the relationship to the US? And, last but not least, what will the US policy towards Central Europe be in the coming decades?

References


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Civic Education for Human Rights

Jerzy J. Wiatr

The success of democracy depends on the formation of social capital conducive to the maintenance of democratic patterns of behaviour. Civic education is the most important instrument of the formation of such social capital and is, therefore, an essential responsibility of the democratic state. The concept of social capital, introduced in the social science theory by such authors as Pierre Bourdieu (1984) and James Coleman (1988), implies that the quality of democracy depends on the relations between citizens, particularly on the acceptance of such values as trust in others and willingness to accept them as equals. Consequently, the way in which human rights are perceived in a society has profound importance for the quality of political life and constitutes the crucial component of democratic political culture.

Human rights are a relatively new concept in the sense that they are now considered universal and fundamental. They are considered fundamental in the sense that there are rights which are inalienable and that there are no circumstances whatever in which they are to be denied, except in specific conditions defined by law. Their universality means that they are rights to which all human beings are entitled simply as *humans*, that means – regardless of their individual or collective characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity, religion, social status and sexuality. Human rights are universal also in the sense that they are based on the concept of moral obligation which we all, as humans, share, and not on the legislation of a state (Fawcett, 1985). In this, they are fundamentally different from citizens’ rights, which are based on the constitution of a given state and can be defined more or less broadly, depending on the will of the legislators.

The idea of fundamental and universal human rights came fully into being after the Second World War. It is true that we can find its early elements in such documents as the American Declaration of Independence (1776) or the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1789), which expressed the belief in the fundamental equality of men. There were, however, implicit restrictions in the universality of such concept. “All men are born equal”, declared the Founders of the American republic, but they did not extend this concept to the Negro slaves or to the Indians, whose rights were flagrantly ignored. Gunnar Myrdal, in his monumental sociological study of race relations in the United States, observed that the popularity of the racist concepts in American society resulted from the conflict between the moral standards expressed in

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1 The paper was presented at the XVI World Congress of Sociology, Durban July 23–29, 2006.
the Declaration of Independence and the reality of slavery and, after 1865, of the caste system. “The influences from the American Creed – wrote Myrdal – thus had, and still have, a double-direction. On the one hand, the equalitarian Creed operates directly to suppress the dogma of the Negro’s racial inferiority and to make people’s thoughts more and more ‘independent of race and colour’, as the American slogan runs. On the other hand, it indirectly calls upon the same dogma to justify the blatant exception to the Creed...The need for race prejudice is, from this point of view, a need for defence on the part of the Americans against their own national Creed, against their own most cherished ideals” (Myrdal, 1944: 89).

Race has not been the only criterion for the exclusion of some categories of people from the declared principle of human equality. Both in the United States and in France women had to wait a long time before they were granted the right to vote and to run as candidates in elections. In France they won this right as late as in 1947, long after several other European states. What is even more difficult to comprehend is that for a very long time their exclusion from the most important democratic right was not even considered inconsistent with the declared human equality.

Exclusions are not the only difference between these early declarations and the contemporary concept of human rights. Both in the United States and in France of the late 18th century (as well as of later years) human rights were considered the rights of the citizen, as the French document made clear in its very name. This not only meant that the right applied to citizens only, but also that they have their source in the constitution. They were considered rights bestowed upon the citizens by the democratic state. The contemporary concept of human rights is based on the opposite idea. Human rights are fundamental in the sense that they are derived from Natural Law and not from the will of a state. It is the legislation of a state that can and should be judged in terms of its accordance with the standards of human rights. In this sense human rights stand above the legislation of a state.” Once security is achieved – writes the American political philosopher John Chapman – ... men who are come to think of themselves as individuals demand more from their political arrangements. No government is legitimate unless it has their consent; their obligation to obey is conditional upon the performance of government, upon its protection of their natural rights, especially the right to freedom in all its various forms” (Chapman, 1970: 150). This is the modern formula for fundamental human rights and their implications for democratic states. It puts human rights above rights and obligations based on the laws of the state, not vice versa.

The source of this concept is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948. The President of the General Assembly, Dr H.E. Evatt of Australia expressed the feelings of this world body, when he stated that the Declaration was “the first occasion on which the organized world community had recognized the existence of human rights and fundamental freedoms transcending the laws of sovereign states” (Osler & Starkey, 1996: 2). The
Declaration is composed of “four pillars”. The first concerns personal rights (life, freedom, security, justice), defined in Articles 2 to 11. The second concerns rights regulating relations between people (freedom of movement, rights to start a family, asylum, nationality, property), defined in articles 12 to 17. The third deals with public freedoms and political rights (freedom of thought, religion, conscience, opinion, assembly, participation, democracy), defined in Articles 18 to 21. The fourth concerns economic, social and cultural rights, such as social security, work, equal wages, trade unions, rest and leisure, adequate standard of living, education, cultural life, defined in Articles 22 to 27. The final part of the Declaration (Articles 28, 29 and 30) refers to the international order and defines the duties of the world community of nations to implement the provisions of the Declaration (Osler & Starkey, 1996: 4–5).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights initiated the series of other documents in which human rights have been given further elaboration. Europe has become the cradle of several initiatives to push forward policies protecting human rights. In an important sense, the European efforts to promote human rights can be considered the model for other parts of the world, including the United States. (Rifkin, 2004: 6–7). It is, therefore, understandable why special attention should be devoted to the history of the European efforts to promote human rights and to use education for this purpose.

In May 1949, the Council of Europe, composed at that time of ten countries only, adopted the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (signed in 1950 and entering into force in 1953), which with the passing of time became the foundation of the European policy of protecting human rights, presently shared by 46 member-states of the Council of Europe. In 1959, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the Rights of the Child and on November 20, 1989, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the Rights of the Child, extending the concept of human rights to the specific conditions of children. With great pride I should like to mention that the initiative to adopt such convention came from the government of Poland. In 1975, the Helsinki Agreement on Security and Cooperation in Europe contained the “third basket”, concerned with the protection of human rights. Contrary to the pessimistic views expressed by many, the Helsinki Agreement became an important tool in the struggle for human rights in the then communist states of Europe.

The Council of Europe was the first international institution to systematically address the question of the role of education in promoting human rights. The most important documents of the Council of Europe dealing with for human rights education are:

1) Recommendation 1346 on human rights education of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (adopted on 26 September 1997);

2) Recommendation 1401 on education in the responsibilities of the individual, adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly on 30 March 1999:

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2 The formal proposal was submitted by the government of Poland in 1979. The initiative came from the former Chief Justice of Poland and my friend of many years, Professor Adam Łopatka (1928–2003).
(3) Declaration and programme on education for democratic citizenship, based on the rights and responsibilities of citizens, adopted by the 104th Session of the Committee of Ministers on 7 May 1999;

(4) Resolution on results and conclusions of the completed projects in 1997–2000 Medium-term programme, adopted at the 20th Session of the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education held in Kraków (Poland) 15–17 October 2000;

(5) Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers on education for democratic citizenship adopted at the 812th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies on 16 October 2002;

(6) The decision of the Committee of Ministers (adopted in March 2004) to declare 2005 the European Year of Citizenship through Education and to establish the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts (CAHCIT) to monitor the implementation of this decision.

In addition, education for democratic citizenship and human rights have been discussed at the Conference of the European Ministers of Culture and of Education held in Wroclaw (Poland) to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Cultural Convention of the Council of Europe. As the General Rapporteur of the Wroclaw Conference I have summarized this aspect of the Conference in the following way (Wiatr, 2004:76–82):

Civic education has two main components: education in democratic citizenship and education in human rights. Human rights must be based not only on the respect for law and for legal guarantees but also on attitudes protecting the groups and individuals whose rights are endangered by intolerant attitudes and behaviour because of their race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation and other group characteristics. Education in democratic citizenship and for human rights must realistically take into account several problems confronting both the older democracies in Western Europe and the new democracies in the Eastern part of the continent. It would be unrealistic to assume that education alone can solve these problems but sustained educational efforts are indispensable, if we are to deal with them effectively.

Tolerant attitudes are essential components of democratic political culture. They are now under attack because of the rapid increase of intolerant behaviour, hostility and fanaticism. Ethnocentrism and xenophobia are old ills in Europe, but recently they have become a growing danger. The growth of anti-Semitism in the Europe of today is caused by the aggressive propaganda of some militant groups hostile to Israel and to Western civilization as a whole and ready to go beyond legitimate criticism of the

The Cracow conference continued the work done in this field by the 19th Standing Conference of the European Ministers of Education, Kristiansand (Norway) 22–24 June 1997. I had the honour to represent Poland at the Kristiansand Conference and to propose that the next conference takes place in Poland and deals with the progress in education for democratic citizenship and human rights.

CAHCIT has been chaired by Dr Krzysztof Ostrowski, former chair of the Committee on Higher Education and Research of the Council of Europe and my advisor during my term as Poland’s minister of education. It gives me special pleasure to note the outstanding job done by CAHCIT under his chairmanship.
policies of the Israeli government to the generalized attacks on Jewish communities. Simultaneously, in some parts of Europe, there has been a wave of hostile, often violent acts directed against the Muslim minorities in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Education in democratic citizenship and for human rights must face this challenge. It is not enough to denounce such behaviour as inconsistent with the values of democracy. It is necessary to remind people, and particularly the young generation, of the horrors to which xenophobia in all its forms brought Europe only 60 years ago. The experience of the Holocaust has already become an important part of education. The year 2005 has been commemorated to this tragic chapter of history and, under the recommendations of the Council of Europe, teaching about Holocaust has become part of the school curriculum.

In many parts of the world we can observe an alarming increase of xenophobia, including manifestations of anti-Semitism, and of religious fanaticism. There are also – in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks – manifestations of hostile, even violent acts directed against Muslim minorities in some Western societies.

Civic education in human rights should include the teaching of history, with special emphasis on the history of the Holocaust and of other crimes against humanity committed in recent history. It is important to teach young people about such crimes committed by the representatives of their own nations and to show the ways in which reconciliation between former enemies has become a reality.

Protection of the rights of religious and cultural minorities is essential, particularly in the world in which we observe an increase of religious fundamentalism and fanaticism. The tradition of tolerance and understanding of others exists in all great religions but in all of them there are also currents of fanaticism. When educating young people in the spirit of tolerance and understanding we should rely on the best tradition of each of the great religions.

Civic education in human rights should be based on intercultural dialogue. It is important to promote contacts between people from different cultures. It is particularly important to enrich the school curriculum by an informed and balanced presentation of the history and contemporary problems of Islam and of the relations between Europe and the Middle East. Europeans often have problems with understanding why the memory of the crusades, idealized in European literature, has an ominous character.

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5 In this context I should like to point to the importance of dealing with the role played by some segments of the conquered nations in the German Nazi’s policy of genocide. In July 2001, under the auspices of the president of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski, the 60th anniversary of the massacre of entire Jewish population by its Polish neighbours in the Polish town of Jedwabne was commemorated. The case was discussed publicly and has become part of the teaching about Holocaust. As could have been expected, such an approach was strongly attacked by those of the political Right who refuse to acknowledge Polish responsibility for crimes committed during the last war. It is essential, however, that other nations, without denying the principal responsibility of the German Nazi régime, deal honestly with the much more difficult question of the co-responsibility of some sections of their own societies.
for Arabs and other Muslims. In such a context, intercultural education becomes an essential element of democratic education in the sense that it helps to overcome a limited and one-sided understanding of history and of its impact on contemporary politics.

Most important is the role of education in reconciliation between former enemies. More than 30 years ago, under the auspices of UNESCO, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and of Poland undertook pioneering work to review school textbooks from the perspective of eliminating material detrimental to the process of German-Polish reconciliation and strengthening the positive image of the other side. Such an educational effort has contributed to the improvement of relations and helped build an atmosphere of friendship between the younger generation of Poles and Germans. Later on, the experience of the German-Polish Commission on Textbooks was replicated in several other countries.

Education in human rights has three basic components. The first is knowledge. It includes information of the very concept of human rights, of the ways in which they are or can be protected, of the history of the struggle for human rights as well as of the history of crimes committed against humanity. In this component, education in human rights. The second is the formation of attitudes. Teaching human rights is not like teaching mathematics. It involves the formation of values and norms conducive to the behaviour consistent with the principles of universal human rights. Finally, education in human rights has its practical component. It should teach people how to effectively struggle for their rights, how to protect those who need protection, and how to use national and supra-national institutions designed for this purpose.

It is an education of all – not only school children and students, – but adults as well. At the XVII World Congress of the International Political Science Association held in Seoul 1997, I chaired the plenary session devoted to civic education and presented an introductory paper on this subject (Wiatr, 1998). I have recommended the following six principles for educating students and adult citizens in democratic citizenship and human rights:

1. The fundamental values of democracy and the rule of law must be explained in the interrelationship.
2. The quality of good citizenship must be defined and presented as a model of civic education.
3. The functional knowledge of democratic mechanisms, of laws and procedures is important for the ability of citizens to perform in the political sphere.
4. Civic education should make people aware of the way the system of their country works and allow them to find proper information themselves.
5. Civic education should also address moral issues of politics, one of which is the question of limits of political obligation. The universal concept of human rights dictates the acceptance of such limits if the dictates of policies run counter to the moral commandments of human rights.
Civic education should promote respect for the adversary, a willingness and ability to argue without hatred and to seek compromise. All these recommendations are important for the way in which education in human rights should be conducted. It is a very central part of civic education, very much as human rights are the cornerstone of democracy.

At the end, let me address the question of who should have the primary responsibility for human rights education. While governments bear primary responsibility for civic education and education in human rights, independent social initiatives are most important as well. Voluntary associations, educational institutions and mass media have a major role in educating people in human rights. In many cases they complement the educational policy of the government. But sometimes they must take upon themselves the role of the principal educators. It is particularly so, when governments, captured by extremist political forces, fail to meet their responsibilities. In some states, the intolerant attitudes of the ruling politicians run counter to the principles of universal human rights. A recent Polish example illustrates this point.

In the Spring of 2006, the new minister of education in the right-wing government (and himself the leader of the extreme nationalist Rightist League of Polish Families) dismissed the director of the National In-Service Teacher Training Centre for having published the Polish translation of the Council of Europe’s textbook on civic education Compass. The offending part was a paragraph in which ways to combat homophobia were discussed. The minister’s decision caused a widespread controversy in Poland and made clear that – endangered by the action of the government – human rights education should be taken care of by institutions of civic society. Fortunately, such institutions have grown during the years of democratic transformation and they are now the principal guardians of human rights.

References


Discussion
Civic Education for Human Rights

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BOOK REVIEWS

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Right-Wing Radicalism in Germany and Poland
(National and European Perspectives)

Right-wing radicalism is a prominent issue in contemporary Europe. Radical right-wing parties and movements are registering election success in the states of the former EU 15, and even in the new EU countries that have been through political transformation since 1989 and became members of the EU on 1 May 2004. In Western Europe there is intense political interest in extremism but also in the attitude of majority communities toward foreigners and asylum-seekers. However, as yet there are few social-scientific studies on these issues in the context of the functioning of political systems in Central and Eastern Europe.

This publication in German is an example of an attempt to fill this gap. It was prepared from papers presented at an international conference organized by the Viadrina European University in November 2005 in Frankfurt (Oder). The title of the book suggests a narrow German-Polish perspective, but this collective work also offers a broader perspective in certain regards. It presents examples of the development of selected right-wing parties and movements in Western and Eastern Europe. It also reveals psychological and legal aspects closely connected with the topic, such as the role of respect for the constitution and constitutional institutions, manifestations of extremism among young people, and the role of NGOs in combating extremism. The publication argues that the very terms “right-wing extremism”, “right-wing radicalism” and “populism” must be defined in the discussion and at all times, in relation to the object of reference. At the same time, in Germany the term “extremism” is connected primarily with “the rejection of the democratic constitutional state and its basic values” (p. 130).

The book is divided into three thematic sections and includes an appendix. The first part, which makes up one-half of the book, is devoted to the subject of right-wing radicalism in general, but also to the topics covered in individual case studies (the rise of Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and the Front National in France). The analytical thread that runs through all the contributions in the first section is a comparative view of right-wing radicalism in Western and Eastern Europe. The thematic core of this section comprises papers on right-wing extremism in Germany on the one hand and right-wing trends in Poland on the other.

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The second section describes possible policies designed to combat right-wing radicalism (p. 218 ff.). The main regional focus is Germany. The section looks at possible strategies of and actual steps taken by German governments to combat extremism. Special attention is justifiably directed at the situation in the new German states since 1990 (particularly Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Berlin) with regard to the activities of the following extremist parties: the NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) and the DVU (Deutsche Volksunion).

The third section of the publication, which is shorter but nonetheless very interesting, focuses on the activities of the non-governmental sector. The NGO sector plays an important role in combating radicalism, and not just in Germany. Some of the papers in the third section address the issue also in the context of the European Union (e.g. the European Network against Racism – ENAR). The significance of the role of civil society and NGOs in combating racism and extremism is demonstrated by the very varied structure of their movement. In one paper, Thumas Grumke points to the fact that the primary significance of the radical right does not just lie in its election successes (p. 246); a potential threat also exists in the attainment of “cultural hegemony” and in the predominance of radical and racist ideological models in the environments of young people. Here it is necessary to seek the source of the social pressures that lead to ethnically biased social policies and policies directed against foreigners.

The title and concept of the book suggest the first section is the key part. This section of the book is a monograph on right-wing radicalism. The composition of papers included in it clearly shows that they are intended to complement one another and provide readers with a coherent picture of the basic features of populist and radical politics in Europe. The other two sections mentioned above complement the political science and sociological analyses in the first section.

The three introductory and more generally conceived chapters in the first section, by Michael Minkenberg, Franz Decker and Dieter Segert, classify right-wing radical and populist movements chronologically and by ideological focus. They focus on the circumstances surrounding the origins of these movements and parties and their election successes and they identify the differences between Western and Eastern Europe. At the end of the era of twentieth-century European dictatorships (leaving aside the Iberian peninsula) it is possible to distinguish three stages in the development of right-wing radicalism. The first occurred immediately after the Second World War, with the emergence of parties and movements such Poujadism in France, the SRP (Sozialistische Reichspartei) in West Germany, and the MSI (Movimento sociale italiano) in Italy. Another wave of radicalism occurred at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s, and the third in the 1980s and 1990s. Research on the most recent wave indicates that radical right-wing parties and movements have gradually established themselves in all Western European states. A comparison shows that the increase in supporters of right-wing radicalism in the 1990s stemmed from the presence of leading figures such as Le Pen, Berlusconi, Bossi, Haider, Fortuyn (p. 45). Another precondition for the rise in
preferences for radical right-wing political parties was that the traditional ties between voters and democratic political parties dissipated. In addition the media sphere became pluralized (including private media) making it possible to target dissatisfied voters in European states more intensively. New opportunities for media influence stood at the very genesis of populism as a medium for mobilizing voters in the direction of radical movements.

Right-wing radicalism in Central and Eastern Europe differs from radical movements in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. The organizational structures of Eastern European extremist parties are not as advanced as in the West. Consequently, the publication focuses more (especially in the case of Poland) on the ideological and social environment in which radical political parties seek support, and also on the ties between political parties and more loosely organized movements. In comparison with parties like the *Front National*, *FPÖ*, *Vlaams Blok* or *Lega Nord*, populist and extremist parties in the consolidated democracies in Eastern Europe do not achieve equally as strong election results. Ideologically extremist parties and movements in Eastern Europe are more intensively oriented toward the historical roots of “authoritarianism” in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920s and 30s. Their programmes are therefore more anti-democratic and militant. The Czech Republic is evidently an exception because it is able to draw on the democratic roots established in the First Republic between 1918 and 1938.

Dieter Segert takes short cases studies of extremism in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania (64 ff.) to demonstrate the situation in the post-socialist states and reaches an interesting conclusion. Despite the frequent references to the period between the two World Wars, in his view the roots of the radicalism that has emerged since 1990 in Eastern European states lie in the socialist period. In the last phase of “real socialism” many people in the Eastern bloc regarded the ideal solution to social and economic problems to be a “third way”, which is supposed to be some combination of freedom and democracy on the one hand and social justice on the other hand (p. 69). It was the frustration of the impossibility of realizing this ideal notion and fear of a decline in social standing among some groups of the population that laid the ground for adopting radical and authoritative solutions.

Readers are acquainted with the Western European context through comparative analyses of selected radical parties and movements. Populism and radicalism are described in the chapter on the rapid rise of Pim Fortuyn’s party LPF (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*) in the Netherlands in the elections in 2002. The authors, Meindert Fennema and Wouter van der Brug, based their analysis on a study of election behaviour and an analysis of the debate on multiculturalism and Islam in Dutch society. The problem of immigration, which forms the centrepiece of the chapter on the LPF party in the Netherlands, is also addressed in the paper on the same issue in France and the role of the *Front National*. The authors of this chapter, Michael Minkenberg and Martin Schain, attempted not only to pinpoint specifically French features but also to identify common
aspects shared by democratic systems in Europe that tend to strengthen right-wing radical tendencies. From this derives the publication’s claim of a comparative view. They reached the conclusion that right-wing radicalism in modern and rapidly changing societies can be regarded as a “normal pathological state” (p. 123). The political influence of radicalism in the majority of EU states stems from similar socio-economic factors, which may point to phenomena that are common to “post-industrial societies”. In Austria, Germany, or Belgium, for example, the proportion of workers among those who vote for radical right-wing parties is increasing. Another fundamental aspect affecting strategies against extremist parties is the existence of radical movements and sub-cultures in countries in which radical right-wing political parties do not have very strong election results. This points to the fact that just banning active and demonstrably anti-democratic parties is often not enough to solve the problem of extremism (i.e. increasing manifestations of extremism) in modern plural societies.

In the mid-1990s extremist parties in Germany again began to register an increase in support, especially at the level of individual states. For example, in the elections in the state of Saxony-Anhalt in 1998 the DVU won 12.9 percent of the votes, and in Saxony in 2004 won 9.2 percent of the votes (p. 143). This book offers both an analysis of voter behaviour and an analysis of the causes of the rise in right-wing radicalism in Germany, and also a discussion of related topics such as the roots of “the hate directed at foreigners”, observed from a “bottom-up” perspective, and including coverage of the social and psychological effects. Owing to Germany’s past, today the radical right-wing scene is constantly monitored by state bodies in the country (Verfassungsschutz). This attention is a practical manifestation of the “defensive democracy” under what is known as the “Basic Law” of Germany (Grundgesetz) from 1949. Germany’s constitutional system contains mechanisms and norms that prevent extremists from systematically using the rights and freedoms of plural democracy against the “free democratic system” itself.

The authors Michael Grün and Katharina Stankiewicz analyse the situation in Poland taking the example of two particular political parties, the LPR (Liga Polskich Rodzin) and Samoobrona, which were successful in the parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2005 (p. 170). In comparison with the NPD and DVU parties in Germany, which address their campaigns to the same group of potential voters, the LPR and Samoobrona in Poland do not compete with one another in the elections. The nationalist and Catholic LPR harks back to an interwar tradition, established by Roman Dmowski (1864–1939). On the other hand, Samoobrona does not adopt a purely negative stance toward the communist period and promotes the concept of a “third way” between capitalism and communism. The nationalism and authoritarianism of the party’s members is aimed at defending “the ordinary Polish farmer” against the European Union and the impact of foreign capital. A positive feature of the publication is that radicalism in Poland is monitored comprehensively, both at the level of political parties and at the level of right-wing movements and the media (the Catholic Radio
Maryja, the magazine Szczecinec). This approach is evident also in the empirical and sociologically oriented chapter on the attitude of Poles toward immigrants from African countries (pp. 200–216).

The publication contains an interesting appendix (p. 261 ff.), which introduces readers to research centres and institutions in Germany and Poland that deal with manifestations of right-wing extremism in society and in politics. The appendix also includes brief descriptions of individual projects on the issues of anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and political extremism.

As a whole, the book tries to go beyond its thematic constraints as a volume of texts to become a collective monograph. Particularly valuable are the chapters on Germany and Poland. The publication’s limited size made it impossible to include independent detailed analyses of radical parties in the other Eastern European countries. However, in the future the academic public would certainly welcome a more broadly conceived comparative study on the extreme right in Eastern Europe. This topic represents a call to political scientists and sociologists to turn their attention in this direction.

This book is essential reading for everyone working on the issue of the extreme right in Europe and the issue of migration and the integration of foreigners in the majority society. It can serve as a useful aid for specialists in this field and for students of political science. The practical focus of some of the papers means that the publication is also useful for politicians, political advisors, and media professionals. It is thus a welcome contribution at a time when various streams of the extreme right are on the rise in Europe.

The authors selected eight main topics, in which the role of the EU as a global player is described. The first chapter is predominantly introductory. Further on, particular attention is paid to the following topics: European identity (2nd chapter); the EU as an economic power and trade actor (3); the EU as global leader in environmental policy (4); as a development and humanitarian actor (5); candidates and neighbours: the Union as a regional actor (6); EU Common Foreign and Security Policy CFSP (7) and lastly the EU as security community and military actor.

In the preface, the authors explain why the book is an interesting contribution to the study of issues related to European Union and globalization. Why the EU and globalization, when there is much debate about trade, global warming, human rights, local conflicts and international intervention. The EU should also be included in this issue because these policies are on the agenda of this international organization. The EU is an actor in international politics, because some of the instruments of the EU are of global characteristics (Euro, CFSP, communitarization, European security strategy, and expansion eastwards).

In the introduction the authors try to define the status of the EU. It is not, as is stated, a state nor an international organization. The EU is in fact a regional organization, but the level of integration and institutional and political competencies makes the EU organization different from NAFTA. The development of the EU into a global actor came in the late 1980s with the Single European Act, aimed at the creation of a European integrated market, which enjoyed success in the early 1990s. This was than strengthened with progress of the CFSP policy and establishment of the High Representative of the CFSP, Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice has reinforced the institutional structure of the EU and was an important step towards expansion.

In the discussion about European identity and European values, Ian Manners states that the core European values are: peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law (p. 42). As subsidiary values he mentions social solidarity, anti-discrimination, further development and good governance. Nationalism, imperialism and wars, which occurred in European history, are to be abandoned as a precondition for creating European identity.

The third chapter focuses on the EU as an economic power and is introduces economic development in the world’s largest economic power, with 455 million consumers. The first important step to major world major player status was the admission of Great Britain to the EU. This chapter features the main EU trading partners, GDP and other
figures. The common agricultural policy, the single market and economic as well as monetary union and major bilateral trading partners (USA, China, and Japan) are also discussed. The EU is presented as a multilateral trading negotiator with a focus on the WTO. The conclusion states that the EU is constructed as a single economic entity from an outsider’s perspectives but in fact economic unity is so far unfinished business (p. 88).

As for environmental policy, the Union is presented as global leader which started to pursue an environmental policy in the international field from the end of 1970s, and its role in this sector has intensified with the rise of global environmental diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. The Green identity of the EU was strengthened during the 1990s, when it the organisation was inspired by the environmental policy of Scandinavia, Germany, the Netherlands and Austria. In the late 1990s, the EU very much aligned its CFSP with the Kyoto protocol (p. 110).

Chapter five introduces the EU as the world’s greatest development and humanitarian aid donor, making up 51 percent of the global share. One of the reasons is the historical burden of imperialism, showing the historical development of external Union policy. This can be seen in the originally post-colonial phase through to the first Lomé Treaty and the neo-Liberal era during liberalization in the 1980s and early 1990s to a humanitarian assistance policy aimed at reducing poverty in the poorest countries after the end of the Cold War. Lastly, the EU shifted its priorities more closely to the international security agenda (p. 113).

As for international relations in practice, the EU is developing intensive relations particularly with the states of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP group) (111–112). Strategic Partnership agreements concluded by the EU with Japan, India and China reflects the current concerns and priorities of the Union’s security agenda (p. 135).

Chapter six concerns the EU’s neighbours and countries applying for EU membership. The author reports on EU policy towards the Balkan candidates (Bulgaria and Romania) and other potential candidate countries in the Western Balkans. Beside relations with Russia and Ukraine, there is particular focus on developments of the EU-Turkey relationship. A major priority of the Union’s foreign and security policy is developing a partnership with Mediterranean non-member countries (p. 154).

The main focus of the next chapter is development of the CFSP (p. 164) from 1970, when intergovernmental EPC (European political cooperation) was established, and through to the 1990s was reinforced through the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam the Nice Treaty, and up to the recent European Security Strategy. Although the EU is a multilateral actor in the international field due to its role towards the WTO, it is ensuring the establishment of International Criminal Court and plays a key role in promoting the Kyoto Protocol. It is “an important regional actor, particularly in relation to Eastern neighbours” (p. 187), the failure to reach consensus within
the Union on the content and direction of foreign diplomacy remain one of the major problems of the EU.

The last chapter is an analysis of the security and military role of the EU. The failure of the WEU project, the unsuccessful EC/EU policy in the former Yugoslavia and lack of access to military capabilities could put the EU as ”security community“ into question. Nevertheless the EU has recently developed its new role in the international environment through direct activities in Bosnia – Herzegovina, Macedonia and Congo as well as through its security strategy policy that pursues limits on WMDs, combats terrorism and dealing with failed states. In spite of this, “a multidimensional civil identity continues to be at the core of the EU’s external persona“ (p. 214).

To conclude, the EU is unquestionably not only a powerful economic player, but also has a significant role in international policy. This applies not only externally but also internally, where the EU as a political system strongly influences the internal environment – as was seen when Brussels regulations created unique large mobile telephone market thanks to the unified GMS system in Europe (p. 71). Externally, the EU policy has been able to influence non-member states, seen for example in the abandonment of the death penalty in Poland, Cyprus, Albania, Ukraine, Turkey, and Russia (p. 44). The EU was also strong enough to put forward and succeeded in anti-monopoly actions. The most well-known case was against Microsoft and its monopoly software (p. 71). Symbolically, the USA regarded the EU in the 1990s as organization which was almost a state, as Washington strengthened diplomatic ties with the EU through establishing its diplomatic mission in Brussels. George Bush is the first US president who has officially visited the EU Council and EU Commission, in 2005 (p. 84). On the other hand, in many cases, the EU project as a global hegemon is an unfinished business: the Euro currency has not been adopted in every member state, and the organization has so far failed to create a consensus in the CFSP and develop a consistent and comprehensive strategy towards Latin America and Asia.

The book is an interesting contribution to study of Union policy in a globalized world. While referring to the EU as global actor, each chapter takes different point of view and therefore serves as useful inspiration. The text is complemented by tables, figures, maps and statistics related to major trade partners of the EU, humanitarian aid is recommendable not only for students and researchers in political science, international relations and European studies, but for all having interest in the EU in a global era.

In the last years of the 20th century, European political parties on the left of the political spectrum underwent substantial changes in response to social and economic developments. These changes can be seen in left-wing parties all over Europe. Communist parties that had held a monopoly position in the socialist nations of Central and Eastern Europe for over more than 40 years had to react to the fall of authoritarian régimes, the subsequent transition towards democracy and to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Similarly, communist parties active in the democratic part of Europe also had to deal with the erosion of the ideological centre and with social change in the first half of the 1990s. Even the social democratic parties of Western Europe, which had been using a practically unchanging strategy since 1945, could not avoid change. The changing population structure, increases in the numbers of a post-materialistic electorate and economic globalization brought about new rules of the political game.

As the editor notes, the aim of Trajectories of the Left is “...to explain the current state of the social democratic and communist Left across Europe, and its causes” (p. 9). This aim and the title of the publication seem to hint at a very broad scope of interest that (as the Editor himself notes) could hardly be covered in its entirety. That is why only certain cases were chosen for the book. These however, cover all three kinds of left-wing political parties currently existing in Europe, i.e. the post-communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe, communist parties active in democratic party systems in Western Europe after 1945 and European social democratic parties. The book constitutes the proceedings of workshop organized by Masaryk University in Brno. The individual contributions (chapters) were written by researchers from the Czech Republic as well as abroad (Denmark, France, Greece, Poland, Slovakia and the United States).

The book is divided into two sections according to the region where the analysed political parties operate – section one covers Western Europe (four chapters), section two Central and Eastern Europe (six chapters). Before section one, the book opens with a preface by the Editor, Lubomír Kopeček, and a theoretical study by Ondřej Císař, dealing with the political positions of the contemporary (European) left. This study gives an overview of the causes of left-wing parties’ crisis at the beginning of the 1990s and their varied reactions to it. The article puts its main emphasis on dealing with the challenges posed by economic globalization. The author presents four models of reactions by the political parties: revolutionary radicalism, or sometimes post-revolutionary radicalism, in connection with particularism or with globalism.

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The section on Western Europe contains two chapters that deal with social-democratic parties which have been active for a long time and had been successful in the past but are currently facing a decline in electoral support and exhaustion of their political strategies.

The first chapter, written by Vít Hloušek, concentrates on the Austrian Social Democratic Party (SPÖ). The author outlines the party’s history from the second half of the 19th century up until the present, concentrating primarily on the “golden period” of the Austrian Social Democrats in the 1960s and 1970s. The central part of the article is an analysis of the decline of SPÖ’s political influence, above all in the 1990s, and of internal clashes between the traditionalist and supporters of modernisation, which have been influencing the organizational and programme changes in the party. The author concludes his article with a statement that holds true also for other European social democratic parties: “The SPÖ became in a sense a victim of its long and successful tradition that causes that the party is not capable of radical modernization in the style of Blair’s Third Way, but instead copies the long and hesitant modernization à la the German SPD.“ (p. 51).

The second chapter is an article by Søren Riishøj dealing with the Social Democrats in Denmark. The study presents an analysis of the situation within the party following its failure in the February 2005 parliamentary election. After it lost the head of the Social Democratic party resigned and the party split into two camps with differing opinions on the future programme orientation of the party – there were the “reformers” (calling for a modernization of the welfare state) and the “traditionalists” (holding on to the classical model of the Scandinavian welfare state). In the end, Helle Thorning-Schmidt, a supporter of a modernist Blair-like style, became the new head of the party. According to the author, the Danish Social Democratic party is now in a period of crisis, trying to establish a new footing in between neo-liberalism and social-democratic traditionalism.

The two following chapters deal with communist political groupings in France and Greece. In his study, Michel Perottino analyses the reasons for the crisis in the once (in the 1950s and 1960s) very strong French communist party. The main reasons he gives are the changes in French society, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the development of the political system (in particular involvement of the communists in the government). The other chapter, written by Stathis Kalyvas and Nikos Marantzidis presents an overview of communist parties in Greece after the fall of communism. The authors outline the history of the communist movement in Greece after First World War and describe the division in 1968 of the Communist Party of Greece into two political entities. Since 1990, the orthodox communist party KKA has been more successful than the post-communist reform-oriented Synaspismos party. In the new socio-economic environment, both parties are, however, facing political marginalization.

Section two of the book (Central and Eastern Europe) opens with Lubomír Kopeček’s comparison of the development of formerly monopolistic communist parti-
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In the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia after 1989. In particular, the author analyses the development of the parties, their political results and the reasons for differing levels of their success: the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDE) in Slovakia and the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP). In addition to the post-communist political parties, Kopeček extends his analysis also to the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD), a unique case of a successful historic social-democratic party in the post-communist region of Central and Eastern Europe.

In the next chapter, Leszek Skiba provides an analysis of the development, transformation, government participation and programme orientation of the Polish Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). The SLD was formed in the run-up to the 1991 election from the post-communist Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP) together with other post-communist entities. The author concentrates specifically on the formation of the party élites (Kwaśniewski, Cimoszewicz, Miller and Oleksy) and their influence on the activities of the Alliance.

Two further chapters have been devoted to the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). The study by Miroslav Mareš analyses the conflict between the reformists and the dogmatists within the party. The author looks at the attempts of a group within the KSČM to reform the party and provides reasons for the failure of these attempts. He also tries to establish who are the current reformists within the KSČM and what are their aims. The second study of the KSČM was written by Stanislav Balík. His topic is the attitude of the KSČM to its own history. After looking at official documents, the less official communication of the party’s head officials to the party members and ordinary members’ attitudes towards the communist past, the author comes to the conclusion that “…the declamations of top KSČM’s officials related to their new attitude towards communist history are falsehood.” (p. 148).

The chapter written by Ladislav Cabada looks at the ideological profile of the Slovene post-communist United List of Social Democrats (ZLSD), or rather Social Democrats, a name the ZLSD has been using since 2005. The first part contains an outline of the historic development of the party system in Slovenia, the second gives an analysis of the political programme foundations of the Social Democrats. As Cabada suggests, the party mainly emphasises the post-modern items in its programme, but the programme also includes traditional socialist agenda items, still evoking a certain post-communist nostalgia (p. 161).

In the final chapter, Juraj Marušiak provides an analysis of the process of constructing the identity of the Slovak political party Smer. Based on the study of programme documents, the author provides a historic reconstruction of Smer’s shifts from political pragmatism through a “third way” model to social democracy. However, the author brings the reader’s attention to the fact that in many respects the social-democratic orientation of Smer is questionable, and the party’s programme still has populist and right-wing aspects.
The book Trajectories of the Left gives a clear snapshot of left-wing parties in contemporary Europe. Although the authors do not provide the reader with an analysis of a large number of political parties, the selected examples are representative and include model cases of communist, post-communist and social-democratic parties currently active in Europe. Due to the nature of the publication – proceedings of a workshop – the individual studies are relatively heterogeneous. They include texts describing the whole history of a single political party (e.g. Austria – Hloušek, p. 29) or even the formation process of a party system (Slovenia – Cabada, p. 150), but also texts that only refer to one specific situation of limited duration in the life of a single party (e.g. Denmark – Riishøj – p. 58). The heterogeneity of the texts is understandable, given the extensive scope of the topic under review. The individual texts were probably drafted at different times with considerable time spans between them. This leads to some factual discrepancies – for instance in Balík (p. 146), Miroslav Grebeniček is mentioned as the current chairman of KSČM, while Mareš (p. 135) already describes Vojtěch Filip as the head of the party. Most of the texts are case studies (except for the comparative study by Kopeček), in some of them the authors provide a wider background for their arguments, mainly referring to a Europe-wide crisis of left-wing parties. On p. 66, Riishøj draws a comparison between the crises in the Danish, German and Czech social democracy. This comparison may, however, not be very viable as the 2004/2005 crisis in ČSSD was not caused by socio-economic changes in society, but above all by scandals relating to the former Prime Minister and ČSSD chairman, Stanislav Gross. To allow better orientation in the text, a list of abbreviations used in individual chapters would have proved useful, as the texts make extensive use of acronyms to denote political parties.

However, the above reservations are not substantial and should not cast a shadow on the very good impression the publication makes. Experts, students as well as the more general public can use the book for obtaining a clear overall picture of the left end of the political spectrum in contemporary Europe. On the other hand, individual chapters (case studies) may prove to be a suitable source of information on individual parties and party systems in European countries. Especially valuable are those cases that are not covered too often in the Central European discourse (Greece) or that receive increased attention as a result of recent developments (Slovakia). Without much hesitation the book can be recommended to anyone interested in (not only) left-wing politics in today’s Europe.

CONFERENCES


Every two years, the European Commission (DG EAC/Action Jean Monnet) organises the international/global conference of scholars included in the Jean Monnet scheme (chairs, modules and centres of excellence) on contemporary issues connected with the process of European integration. In the year 2006 the conference was organised in the last week in November and entitled Europe’s Challenges in a Globalized World. Europe’s role and position in the globalized world was the general theme of contributions and discussion held in the Paul Henri Spaak building (European Parliament).

The opening, political session was led by a member of the European Commission (EC) Mr. Ján Figel’, and contributions were made by the President of the EC, Mr. José Manuel Barroso, and two former Presidents of the European Parliament (EP), Mr. José María Gil-Robles and Mr. Pat Cox. In all contributions a stress on the contemporary institutional crisis in the EU (failure of the “European constitution”, democratic deficit) can be recognised. It contradicts the EU’s role, challenges and responsibility in the globalized world. Issues such as European citizenship (Gil-Robles), the “common purpose” (Cox) and democracy (Barroso) became an important part of their politically motivated speeches. For the representatives of the mostly supranational paradigm of the European integration globalization seems to be a new and important reason for deeper European integration and co-operation (Figel’). In their opinion the Lisboa strategy/agenda must be continued, because only the innovative potential created by political turns at the European level, in their opinion, could keep Europe able to deal with the challenges of competition with the United States, China and India. Only Pat Cox presented a slightly different opinion, showing that Europe is a responsible power (55 percent of world’s Official Development Assistance is provided by EU-countries) and we should develop an EU “united by diversity”. Otherwise, a strongly different opinion beside the very Euro-optimist (federal) one was not presented, in the political panel, or also in the following, scientific panel (more later). For the presented scholars in the European studies, Mr. Figel’’s promise from the EC to give more financial sources to the “soft” (social) sciences might be understood as an important sentence.

The scientific part of the conference was opened by Mr. Yves Mény, President of the European University Institute in Florence. The programme was then divided into three panels. The first entitled A globalized world and the EU model for economic prosperity and social justice tried to present important challenges for the EU connected in the economic development of the EU and other regions in the world. Jacques Pelkmans from the College of Europe presented globalization as something that is not dangerous for the EU, but on the contrary, the EU is leading this process. In his opinion, the
EU has to enjoy on the globalization. Saskia Sassen, visit professor at the London School of Economics, focused her contribution on the fact that the legislature in the EU related to the economic issues is created by the executive powers (EC and national governments), but not in parliaments. In the last contribution, Loukas Tsoukalis of College of Europe talked about economic reform in the EU, based on the resolution of economic problems (unemployment, lack of innovation etc.) showing that such reform will produce large groups of “losers”. These groups could be potentially dangerous for the stability of European societies. He also showed that while unification is needed in the globalized world, in the EU the internal diversity grew with the enlargement in 2004. Finally, he called for a European energy market and the creation of European politics besides European policies.

The second panel Integration of persons in an international context and EU citizenship presented some interesting approaches related to the topic of European citizenship. In particular, the contribution given by Elspeth Guild from Radboud University Nijmegen presented some interesting aspects connected with the issue (differences at the Schengen borders, decline of rights for citizens from Rumania and Bulgaria living for many years in the EU countries after the next EU enlargement on 1 January, 2007 etc.).

The third panel Developing a peaceful world order and the EU’s security strategy showed the challenges for Europe in its security and foreign strategies. In particular, the clearly structured contribution given by Dieter Mahncke of the College of Europe showed important aspects of EU’s Common foreign and security policy. Failed and collapsed states were presented as the first challenge, and importance was given also to the democratic peace theory, democratic governance, European neighbourhood policy, prevention and last but not least to the important recognition that EU can not fully resist using force. The contribution by Nicole Gnesotto of the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris was interesting, and she argued that the EU should have its image about the global order project preferred (in the US both big parties, Conservatives and Democrats, prefer bipolarisation). She also mentioned that there are three important regions in the world where it is certain if they will join (democratic) modernisation – Russia, Middle East and Africa.

The closing session repeated and summarised some important ideas from the previous sessions. Péter Balázs of the Central European University showed that there is a lack of solidarity in the EU (for example, the EU-15 countries export more capital to the United States than to the new EU-member states). The summary was given at the end of the conference by the newly elected President of ECSA-World, Manuel Porto.

For the observer from a Central European country, the conference did not primarily focus on the EU rather than on globalization and the EU’s role in this process. Thus we could understand the big number of invited participants from Latin America, Asia and partly also Africa. We could regard the largest problem of the conference as the absence of critical, alternatives positions to the European integration, or the EU’s role
in the globalization. In the economic part we missed the pure liberal opinion, criticising above all the budget policy of the EU including the Common agricultural policy and the “socialist” approach protecting the welfare state without looking for alternatives. In the panel about EU citizenship a contribution about the EU’s final borders would be welcomed; it was partly mentioned by P. Balázs, who defended the idea not to enlarge EU in the near future.

The contributions at the conference were mostly prepared by the scholars working on “EU’s” institutions (College of Europe, European University Institute etc.). At least for the comparison it would be useful and interesting to invite some respected critics of contemporary processes and/or also to present the view from outside (China, Latin America, and Africa). These views were present in the discussion but to place them in the programme of a “global” conference would be much better.

Nevertheless, the Global Jean Monnet Conference – ECSA-World Conference Europe’s Challenges in a Globalized World offered an interesting possibility for a scientifically – but also politically – based discussion on important questions and issues related to the EU’s future role in the politics.

_Ladislav Cabada_
CEPSA ANNUAL CONFERENCE 2007

The Future of the EU: Democratic Constitutionalization of the EU and the Role of States

Call for Papers

We invite you to take part in the CEPSA Annual Conference and Slovenian Political Science Days (SLOPSA), held in Portorož from 23 to 26 May 2007, and to propose a paper relating to the aforementioned general title (elaborated below).

Abstracts of proposals (approximately 150 words) containing the title and main arguments of your contribution, as well as your (postal and e-mail) address for further correspondence should be sent to Milan Brglez (milan.brglez@fdv.uni-lj.si). The SLOPSA organizing committee will inform you of the decision made regarding your contribution.

Elaboration of the General Theme and Panels

The fact that the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe has still not entered (and will probably not enter) into force demands a thoughtful and in particular political analysis and deliberations on the constitutionalization processes of the European Union (EU). Such deliberations might reflect the nature of the political community that the EU has so far been able to accomplish with its own primary (constitutive international treaties establishing a new legal order of the European Community/ies (EC/EC) within the international legal order and legal orders of its member states) and secondary (acts of the institutions of the EC/ECs) legal sources. This could be a basis for some key reference points in the discussion of the EU’s future.

We pose the key question: “Is it possible to democratically constitutionalize the EU?” More specifically: “Since the EU is not a state, does it actually need a constitution?” Whichever answer one would like to argue for and elaborate on, is there a need for the EU’s institutions to gain some kind of legitimization? European citizens, European peoples, the governments of the nation-states or member states are just some of the candidates in favour of more direct or indirect legitimization. At the same time, one might agree that constitutions are not merely sets (or systems) of norms, but also reflections of culture as well as development projects. From that viewpoint, the EU needs a document allowing a common understanding of the present and future, even one that might, based on its own supranational character, provide an extra vehicle for democratic globalization.

More concrete questions arise from these general considerations, including:

– Which model of democracy corresponds to the EU’s specific nature and demands for the legitimacy of the political community?
– What kind of institutions are appropriate to the EU project to ensure its deepening and enlargement?
– What role can human rights play within the EU (in particular its Charter of Fundamental Rights)?
– What role should the EU play in the international community, particularly with respect to the processes of globalization?

In reflecting the aforementioned questions, the SLOPSA is planning to organize and divide our discussion up into the following panels:

Achievements, Capabilities and Possibilities for Democracy at the Two Levels within the EU
The Role of Human Rights in the EU
EU Institutions and Policies as Part of the Constitutionalization of the EU
The Role of Member States and Their Institutions within the Constitutionalization of the EU
The Present and Future Political, Economic and Security Roles of the EU in the International Community
Possibilities of the Democratization of the (Public) Administration of the EU and Member States
The Future of the EU as an Economic Project
Local Authorities and the Future of the EU
The Role of Political Science in the Constitutionalization of the EU
The Europeanization and Democratization of Political Parties
GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS

*Politics in Central Europe* publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.

Manuscripts should be submitted in electronic version via e-mail to cabada@kap.zcu.cz, preferably in Word format.

Presentation of the paper

Each issue the *Politics in Central Europe* focuses on one main topic or theme. This theme is indicated in advance, at the latest in the previous issue. Besides essays focused on the current issue, essays with other themes are welcomed too.

Essays should be written in English (preferably British English).

Essays should not normally exceed 12,000 words in length.

When submitting the essay, please also attach:
– an abstract of 150 – 200 words, in English, stating precisely the topic under consideration, the method of argument used in addressing the topic, and the conclusions reached
– a list of up to six keywords suitable for indexing and abstracting purposes
– a brief biographical note about each author, including previous and current institutional affiliation
– a full postal and e-mail address, as well as telephone and fax numbers of the author. If the manuscript is co-authored, then please provide the requested information about the second author.

All essays are checked by a referee; they undergo a double-blind peer review. At least two external referees review manuscripts. *Politics in Central Europe* reserves the right to reject any manuscript as being unsuitable in topic, style or form, without requesting an external review.

In order to ensure anonymity during the peer-review process, the name(s), title(s), and full affiliation(s) of the author(s) should only appear on a separate cover sheet, together with her/his preferred mailing address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers.

*Politics in Central Europe* reserves the right to edit or otherwise alter all contributions, but authors will receive proofs for approval before publication.

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Style Guidelines

Below are some guidelines for in-text citations, notes, and references, which authors may find useful when preparing manuscripts for submission.

Manuscript style guidelines

Authors are urged to write as concisely as possible, but not at the expense of clarity. Descriptive or explanatory passages, necessary for information but which tend to break up the flow of text, should appear in footnotes. For footnotes please use Arabic numbers. Footnotes should be placed on the same page as the text reference, with the same number in the essay.

Dates should be in the form of 1 November 2005; 1994–1998; or the 1990s.

References in the text

In the text, refer to the author(s) name(s) (without initials, unless there are two authors with the same name) and year of publication. Unpublished data and personal communications (interviews etc.) should include initials and year. Publications which have not yet appeared are given a probable year of publication and should be checked at the proofing stage on an author query sheet. For example:

Since Bull (1977) has shown that ... This is in results attained later (Buzan – Jones – Little 1993: 117). As contemporary research shows (Wendt 1992), are states the ....

Publications by the same author(s) in the same year should be identified with a, b, c (2005a, 2005b) closed up to the year and separated by commas. Publications in references that include different authors should be separated by a semicolon: (Miller 1994a: 32, 1994b; Gordon 1976). If the year of first publication by a particular author is important, use the form: (e.g. Bull 1977/2002: 34). If there are two authors of a publication, separate the names by ‘–’ (not ‘and’ or ‘&’). If there are more than two authors, put the name of the first author followed by ‘et al.’, or write all names separated with ‘–’ (four authors maximum).

References to unauthorized data from periodicals may be given in brackets in the text together with the exact page(s). For example: ‘(quoted in International Security (Summer 1990): 5).’ If such a reference is included in the reference list, the title of the contribution referred to must be provided, and a short title without inverted commas and a year of publication is used for in-text-referencing (e.g. short title year). As a general rule, an exact web address of a particular article can be substituted for its exact page(s).
List of References

References are placed in alphabetical order of authors. Examples of correct forms of references for alphabetical style:

BOOKS:

Single author books:

Two or more authors:

EDITED VOLUMES:

CHAPTERS FROM MONOGRAPHS:

JOURNAL ARTICLES:

Printed journals:

Online editions of journals:

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES:

Printed editions:

Online editions:
RESEARCH REPORTS AND PAPERS FROM CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS:


Illustrations and tables

Supply tables, figures and plates on separate sheets at the end of the article, with their position within the text clearly indicated on the page where they are introduced. Provide typed captions for figures and plates (including sources and acknowledgements) on a separate sheet. Electronic versions should be saved in separate files with the main body of text and should be saved preferably in Jpeg format.

Authors are asked to present tables with the minimum use of horizontal rules (usually three are sufficient) and to avoid vertical rules except in matrices. It is important to provide clear copies of figures (not photocopies or faxes) which can be reproduced by the printer and do not require redrawing. Photographs should be preferably black and white gloss prints with a wide tonal range.

Book Reviews and Review Essays – Guidelines for Contributing Authors

Politics in Central Europe welcomes reviews of recently published books (i.e. those published in the year in which the current issue of Politics in Central Europe was published or in the previous year). Authors should submit reviews of works relating to political science and other social sciences with the themes focused on (East) Central European issues.

Politics in Central Europe encourages authors to submit either of two types of reviews: a book review or a review essay.

When submitting a book review, authors should abide by the following requirements:

– A book review should not exceed 1,500 words
– State clearly the name of the author(s), the title of the book (the subtitle, if any, should also be included), the place of publication, the publishing house, the year of publication and the number of pages.
– If the reviewed book is the result of a particular event (a conference, workshop, etc.), then this should be mentioned in the introductory part of the review
– Review authors should describe the topic of the book under consideration, but not at the expense of providing an evaluation of the book and its potential contribution to the relevant field of research. In other words, the review should
provide a balance between description and critical evaluation. The potential audience of the reviewed work should also be identified

– An exact page reference should be provided for all direct quotations used in reviewing the book.

Contributors of review essays should meet the following requirements:

– A review essay should not exceed 6,000 words. It should also comply with all of the above requirements for book reviews

– Authors may either review several books related to a common topic, or provide a review essay of a single book considered to provide an exceptional contribution to the knowledge in a given field of research

– While a review essay should primarily deal with the contents of the book(s) under review, Politics in Central Europe encourages authors to use the reviewed material as a springboard for their own ideas and thoughts on the subject.