The New International Role of Small(er) States
NEXT ISSUES:
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EDITORIAL

Dear reader,

Sixteen years ago the countries in the eastern part of Europe won their freedom in the Year of Miracles, and their societies started on the path towards democracy and prosperity. Democratic transition, (re)construction of constitutional and political institutions, establishment of free market economies and inclusion in global market relations – all these were processes where the East Central European nations showed their willingness to follow example of Western Europe and North America and become part of developed Euro-Atlantic post-modern society.

Over these 16 years East Central European societies have experienced many positive results of the democratic transition and consolidation, but – at least in some sections of the population – some negative consequences of colossal social changes too. The transition produced not only winners, but also groups in society that were marginalized, being unable to adapt to the new conditions. We can see the results of this dissatisfaction in many states in the region, especially in election results – we should remember the electoral results in the former East Germany, support for populist political movements in Slovakia, Croatia, Romania and Poland, and unstable party systems in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Nevertheless, the countries in the region of East Central Europe (what we understand as the region of post-Communist countries in Central, South Eastern and North Eastern Europe) became consolidated democracies with relatively developed and rich market economies, in less than 20 years. The success of the democratic transition was shown also at the international level – new democratic countries were recognized as democratic and stable through their acceptance in the West. The process of democratic consolidation was symbolically completed on 1 May 2004, when eight post-Communist countries (as well as Malta and Cyprus) joined the European Union; Romania and Bulgaria should join the EU in 2007. The year 2004 also saw the second phase of NATO enlargement (after the first enlargement in 1999, when the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined the Alliance) being implemented and Central Europe became part of the Transatlantic community.

All the aforementioned processes were examined and researched by Central European political scientists and other specialists in social sciences. Political science, international relations and other related social science fields were suppressed during the Communist period from 1948 to 1989. Nevertheless, immediately after regime change in all the former Communist Central European countries the process of re-establishment of social sciences began. The development and continuity of these disciplines in Western Europe and North America became an important example for social scientists in East Central Europe. On the other hand, scientific information on issues related to East Central European countries and societies became important for researchers from Western Europe and North America. In particular, comparative
politics and international relations promptly crossed borders and bridged the “gap” including the East Central Europe, into research and comparative analysis.

Political scientists from Central Europe established the Central European Political Science Association (CEPSA) in 1994 as a network of researchers and university professors from Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. The Croatian and Lithuanian Political Science Associations were incorporated into the CEPSA later on. Atilla Ágh, Adolf Bibič, Jan Škaloud and Jerzy J. Wiatr played an important role in particular in the process of establishing contacts among political scientists from Central European countries who were asking similar questions connected with similar political and societal processes in their countries. The including Austrian researchers showed another aspect of cooperation, namely that many research topics that are not connected with post-Communist reality.

The CEPSA has not developed any institutional basis since its foundation; it is still working rather as a network connecting national political science associations in the Central European countries. Once a year the CEPSA organizes an annual conference on themes of the day, inviting not only researchers from Central Europe, but also their colleagues from different parts of the world. At the conference participants can share their methodological approaches, research results and experience.

At the Vienna Annual Conference in May 2005 the Executive Committee of the CEPSA accepted the idea of the Czech representative that the CEPSA should establish its scientific journal, where the results of current research into Central European issues would be presented. As the partner and publisher of this newly-established scientific review, the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia in Plzeň, Czech Republic, was chosen by the Executive Committee of the CEPSA.

POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE – The Journal of the Central European Political Science Association was established as the scientific review that will publish scientific essays, book reviews and information about conferences and other events connected with Central European issues. As mentioned in the Guidelines for Authors at the end of the review: “POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE publishes original, peer-reviewed manuscripts that provide scientific essays focusing on issues in comparative politics, policy analysis, international relations and other sub-disciplines of political science, as well as original theoretical or conceptual analyses. All essays must contribute to a broad understanding of the region of Central Europe.” Our goal is to give scholars from Central Europe and beyond the opportunity to present the results of their research.

Each issue of POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE will be dedicated to one main issue or theme. In the first issue we present material from the Vienna Annual Conference of the CEPSA – The New International Role of Small(er) States. In this issue of the journal the theme of the next issue and the issue after it will be presented, although the co-editors reserve the right to change the themes in connection with important topical events.
Preliminary themes of the next issues:

– *next issue (May 2006): Elections and party system stability in Central European countries*

– *third issue (November 2006): Security in Central Europe*

Besides essays, there will also be essay reviews, and book reviews published in the journal. All important information is published in the *Guidelines for Authors*.

In the journal we would also like to inform readers about the preparations of scientific conferences, symposia, workshops etc., not only on Central European issues. All possible contributors are kindly invited to provide us with information about their activities.

At the end we would like to express our gratitude to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Prague, which supported the publication of first issue of *POLITICS IN CENTRAL EUROPE – The Journal of Central European Political Science Association*.

Ladislav Cabada & Šárka Waisová
Co-editors
ESSAYS

Geographical Proximity and Historical Experience as a Basis for Active Foreign Policy Strategy of Small European States – the Case of Austria and Slovenia regarding the Western Balkans

Ana Bojinović

Abstract: The author tests the theory of a small (European) state’s active foreign policy of choosing to cooperate in a field where it could use its historical experience and geographical proximity to an area as a basis for its active foreign policy strategy. She claims that it is the change of external determinants of foreign policy which makes a small European state decide to use its historical experience or geographical proximity and a relevant area of cooperation, but in some cases selectively. The theory is verified on the basis of two small European states, Austria and Slovenia, and their historical experience, and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans.

Key words: small states, foreign policy, history, geography, Europe

Introduction

The goal of this paper is to analyse whether a small European state necessarily chooses to cooperate in a field where it could use its historical experience of and geographical proximity to an area as a basis for its active foreign policy strategy and, if not, to establish the determinants which make it decide not to pursue this or any other kind of foreign policy strategy.

Firstly, there will be a short overview of small states’ scope of foreign policy strategies in international relations (IR), and the small states’ most common foreign policy strategies will be identified, with the distinction between the traditional passive (pre-Cold War) and more active strategies after the Cold War. In the second section I will explore one of the latter, namely the strategy of using capabilities, based on geographical proximity to and historical experience of an important geographical area. I will argue that history and geography as internal determinants of foreign policy, are more likely to be used in cases where changes appear in an external foreign policy environment. In the following section I will apply this theory to the case of Austria and Slovenia, both small non-pole European states during the Cold War and geographically and historically close to the Western Balkans; test whether the stated theory is true in their case and if not, try to identify the specific situations or possible reasons why either of them applied a different foreign policy strategy. In conclusion, I will present the findings of the analysis.

2 The author would like to thank Zlatko Šabič and an anonymous reviewer for valuable comments.
The methodological approach applied in this research will be a literature review of the possibilities and formulation of a small state’s foreign policy strategies and a comparison of two case studies, with the latter being done by content analysis of primary sources. Then, the foreign policy strategies of the two respective governments will be analysed.

**Small European states’ scope for creating an active foreign policy strategy**

Traditional political theory has offered a very limited understanding of the small state’s abilities and possibilities for foreign policy action in IR; authors have mainly claimed that the first and ultimate foreign policy goal (interest) of a small state was to achieve "defensive power", which means “autonomy, i.e. ability to resist offensive power of other units" (Mouritzen, 1998: 44) or the ability to prevent others from affecting its own behaviour (Singer – Goetschel, 2000: 6). This was mainly the perception of small European states’ foreign policy range during the Cold War, when security was the main “high politics” issue dealt with within the alliances of each pole. The small European states, especially those which were outside the security alliances, were therefore mainly perceived as being able to pursue a passive foreign policy – maintaining the status quo (Benko, 1992: 6) by a form of non-commitment or neutrality (Mouritzen, 1998: 44), conflict avoiding behaviour (Väyrynen, 1971: 96; Baillie, 1998; Erling, 1968: 167) and avoiding large risks or costs – a low profile (East, 1973: 558; Baillie, 1998: 210). Mouritzen (1998: 43) claims that in the Cold War period the higher the level of tension between the two poles in a symmetric constellation, the lower was a non-pole small state’s defensive power. Nevertheless, many small states have, on the other hand been able to exercise active foreign policy serving their national interests in some fields of international cooperation (Goetschel, 2000: 6). An active foreign policy’s main purpose is to be a foreign policy as defined by the small state itself; in some cases it is an offensive policy in the way of searching for alliances (Benko, 1997: 251) too. In the example above Mouritzen (1998: 44) explains that since a small state’s defensive power would be lower, its behaviour would become more active, applying the strategies of non-commitment, acting as a counterweight and, possibly, a mediator. Another possible explanation of the opportunity for a more active foreign policy behaviour of small European states during the Cold War was the growing complexity of the international community, ”dealt with” in the growing number of international governmental (regional) organizations, which has provided

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4 a non-pole state is a state not belonging to either of the two (military) alliances, the Western or Eastern.

5 The small European states belonging to one or another pole did not have much real political choice to apply their own foreign policy independently. Their choice of foreign policy behaviour was mostly “bandwagonning” (Mouritzen, 1998: 50).

6 The literature on small states mainly cites the following: Austria, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland.
more fields of cooperation and therefore also "situations in which quantitative power attributes were not essential" (Goetschel, 2000: 6–7; Hey 2002).

After the end of the Cold War, when states and cooperation within international organizations had shaken off the bipolar system constraints, strategies for a small (European) states’ foreign policy indicated opportunities for being more active. The strategies even to show possible ways for small states to gain influence (in international fora). These possible strategies are: use of information technology (Tonra, 2002: 345); factors linked to the structure of the negotiation process (Sundelius – Goetschel, 2000: 5; Baillie, 1998) such as (diplomatic) bargaining, mediation (being an honest broker); l’art de convaincre; (Erbling, 1968: 165; Väyrynen, 1971: 96; Baillie, 1998; Jazbec, 2001: 58; Hey 2002: 219); expertise and knowledge (Kronsell, 2002, Hey, 2002; Sundelius – Goetschel, 2000: 5); qualification of diplomats and organization of the administration (Zupančič, 2003; Hey, 2002; Knudsen, 2002: 190); good leadership (Hey, 2002; Knudsen, 2002: 190), political legitimacy (Knudsen, 2002: 190); national policies as examples of success (Petrič, 1996: 879; Kronsell, 2002), setting clear priorities (Zupančič, 2003: 100), forming flexible alliances (Zupančič, 2003: 100), being adaptable (Väyrynen, 1971: 96; Knudsen, 2002: 188; Tonra, 2002: 345), norm setting (Kronsell, 2002) and exploiting (political) market niches (Antola et al. in Zupančič, 2003). In the international organizations a small state’s preference for support of strong and effective common institutions has also been identified (Baillie, 1998; Tonra, 2002: 347; Hey, 2002).

As part of a foreign policy strategy, a small state also has to choose its primary field(s) of cooperation in IR. Since it has less resources of its own (financial, natural, human), it is bound to choose fewer fields of cooperation so it can mainly focus its resources and efforts on the selected fields (Paterson, 1969: 122). Therefore, it has to choose wisely. The so-called sectoral approach of small state perception (Šabič, 2002: 5) offers an analysis of a small state’s action (and influence) in specific areas of cooperation, but most importantly also indicates how a small state chooses its issue specific field(s). Small states specifically select a field of cooperation where they try to (and can) turn their existing resources and capabilities to their advantage, meaning they “/…/ choose an issue regarding which they can best use their capabilities” (Šabič, 2002: 6). In some cases this can even represent “comparative advantages” (in the form of knowledge, experience, expertise, tradition and successful national policies) compared to other states, which a small country can therefore make use of in

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7 The international organizations have in fact become crucial centres of interaction and decision-making (Goetschel, 2000: 7).
8 Here I do not distinguish between strategies (long-term, enabling prediction of foreign policy) and instruments (which are short-term or temporary) of foreign policy. Later on, my attention is devoted only to foreign policy strategies.
order to achieve its foreign policy goals (Antola – Lehtimaki in Zupančič, 2003: 103; Bojinović, 2004). Zupančič (2003) points out that this can be a foreign policy strategy that is especially appealing to new small (European) states which are still entering international fora (e. g. European Union) and want to shape their proper foreign policy profile in international organization(s) as soon as possible. Good examples of the latter are: the Swedish norm setting role in the case of EU environmental policy (Kronsell, 2002), Finnish mediation interest in EU-Russian relations (Zupančič, 2003: 104) and Luxembourg’s successful negotiation/mediation in economic/financial aspects of European integration (Baillie 1998; Hey 2002).

Some authors (Erling, 1968; Benko, 1992; Petrič, 1996; Mouritzen, 1998; Baillie, 1998; Hey, 2002) extend the presented range of proposed small states’ foreign policy strategies to the possibility of acting in a field of cooperation where a small state can use its capabilities deriving from its (strategic) geographical position and historical experience. The goal of this paper is to pursue this research agenda, meaning researching whether a small European state necessarily chooses to cooperate in a field where it could use its historical experience of and geographical proximity to an area, as a basis for its foreign policy strategy and, if not, to establish the determinants which make it decide not to pursue this or any other kind of foreign policy strategy.

Geographical proximity and historical context regarding an area as a basis for small state’s foreign policy strategy

The meaning of history and geography as a basis for small state’s active foreign policy strategy

Benko (1992: 6) claims that a small state pursuing an active foreign policy strategy has to make use of the advantages arising from security geography. Petrič (1996: 896) even notes that a small state should do everything in order to assert itself as an active agent and partner in its own region, especially in cases if problems arise in the area. Baillie (1998) and Hey (2002) mention the value of historical experience linked to a geographical position as a small state’s source of knowledge and negotiation assets. According to these authors, the claim that the capabilities of a small state, deriving from its geographical proximity to an area together with its historical experience in this it, can be used in a similar geographical region or in a very different form of cooperation. An example of geographical experience is the Finnish mediation interest in EU-Russian relations, based on the special ”adaptive acquiescence” behaviour (experience) towards the Soviet Union in the Cold War (Mouritzen, 1998: 93) or Luxembourg’s cross-border cooperation with France and Germany, based on knowledge (language and culture) of the German and nations (Baillie, 1998). An example of a different form of cooperation is Luxembourg’s negotiation ability, deriving from linguistic and

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11 Some authors (Paterson, 1969: 122; Väyrynen, 1971: 96) also speak of small states’ foreign policy focus on their regional area, but do not explain the motivation for this action except a lack of resources.
cultural knowledge of Germany and France, being used in many EU cooperation fields (Baillie, 1998). Geographical proximity and historical experience are interconnected and should be of importance not only to the small state but also to the international “context” in which a small state acts (e.g. to an international organization). Erling (1968: 158–59) even notes that the importance of a small state’s geographical position increases if the intensity of a large power’s interest grows, where the latter could, in current IR, also be interpreted as the interest of an international organization.

In the following section I will look at how history and geography can be used as a basis for (small states’) foreign policy strategy by researching their role as internal determinants of foreign policy.

**The mechanism of using history and geography as basis for foreign policy strategy**

Benko (1997: 233) defines geography and history as determinants of the internal environment of a state’s foreign policy. Geography is understood in connection with the state’s extent; location; strategic geopolitical position; configuration of borders; location of the territory in an international environment and international communications network. Geography also means the state’s natural resources (ibid.). History, as another internal determinant, is understood as the historical development of the society and the historical memory, meaning national historical self-understanding (self-perception) regarding the development and experiences of the society (ibid.).

The external environment of foreign policy is on the other hand the "outside world", involving the coexistence of states with transnational relations (Hill, 2003: 186) and is mainly determined by features of a certain international system, including the role of international organizations (Benko, 1997: 236). This environment also has geographical, economic, cultural, and other determinants (ibid.), but they are defined as constituting an external environment of foreign policy because they are “not easily susceptible to change and not part of the political process, which generates decisions” (Hill, 2003: 186). The internal (domestic) and external environments of foreign policy are not separated, but are in interaction, which is well shown by Mouritzen (1998: 82). In this

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12 In this case the possibilities are used more as one of the sources of a small state’s influence (Baillie, 1998) and not “only” as a determinant for choosing a field of cooperation.

13 Some other foreign policy internal environment determinants are economic, cultural and military (security) factors, and formulation, conduct and implementation of foreign policy decisions (Benko, 1997: 233–35). The paper will not devote particular attention to these determinants as a basis for foreign policy strategy, and factors such as economic interests for the formulation of a foreign policy strategy will not be dealt with as such.

14 The external environment of foreign policy is not simply equivalent to the external environment of a state. The state’s external environment is everything physical outside its borders, but some physical external environment factors of foreign policy such as climate, topography or mineral resources (which are also some aspects of a state’s geography) are placed inside territorial limits. Nevertheless, these factors change slowly and are relatively immune to political intervention, and are therefore perceived as external (Hill, 2003: 174). However, as Benko (1997: 233) notes, ultimately a state’s own perception of a determinant makes this an internal foreign policy determinant.

15 Mouritzen (1998: 81–82) claims that an explanation of foreign policy can best be done by supplementing levels of analysis. This means that an explanation belonging to one specific level can somehow be
regard he assumes Goldmann’s\textsuperscript{16} three models of internal-external foreign policy sources (determinants) interplay, one of which is a so-called requisite (control-relax) model, by which external determinants influence the relation between internal factors and foreign policy (Mouritzen, 1998: 82) (further on used as a model for Figure 1).

This confirms that the geographical position of a (small) state or the perception of it is an important internal factor upon which a state will formulate its foreign policy. As previously mentioned, geography can be understood as a determinant of both the internal and external foreign policy environments: internal as a self-perception of geographical position and external because geography is a part of the external, independent and slow-changing physical world (Hill, 2003: 166). From this it can be inferred that it is more likely that geography is also understood as an internal determinant of foreign policy when the geographical external environment is in the process of change. An evident example of that would be a change of an international system or foundation of new states. Less obvious but not less important is the generally accepted and empirically supported social science theory of external environment danger – internal cohesion-centralization (Mouritzen, 1998: 84–85), which is especially true for small states.\textsuperscript{17} This is more directly connected to the geographical proximity of a state to an area, but the author also adds that when the environment becomes more stable domestic political actors get used to it and natural stereotypes may be applied to other units in the neighbourhood (e.g. “hereditary enemy” and “big brother complex”). This usually can lead to domestic institutionalization of the salient environment (sedimentation), including its challenges and preferred ways of dealing with them by developing a certain pattern of rhetoric and bureaucratic code language (Mouritzen, 1998: 92). “In this way the domestic actors can be used by the foreign policy leadership to push in the ”right’ direction” (ibid.).

History can similarly be used to support foreign policy direction by launching a ”great narrative” and to have a cumulative effect through practice (Grosser, 2002: 363). The author defines history in four terms, namely as the ”weight” of history, its ”laws”, ”choices” and ”the belief in it”, where the weight of history represents an accumulative heritage, either in the form of individual or collective experience or in the form of references, transmitted within an organization, institutions or a social or national group (Grosser, 2002: 262). The author also points out to the use of both, geography and history, claiming that they “can both be understood as contrainte (restriction) or patrimoine (heritage), depending on how they are (selectively or statically) represented by those who are in charge of the representation” (Grosser, 2002: 362). He describes the possibility of choosing ”from history” in order to support and supplemented with factors belonging to other levels if the first cannot in itself account satisfactorily for what it set out to explain.


\textsuperscript{17} The author nevertheless draws attention to cases described by many authors (Coser, 1951; Otterbin – Stein, 1976: 148; Mintz, 1951; Williams, 1947) when this theory does not apply, namely when the initial solidarity between (internal) sub-units does not exceed a critical threshold (i.e. minimum consensus) or if the external pressure does not apply evenly (roughly speaking) to the sub-units (Mouritzen, 1998: 88).
legitimize a certain direction of foreign policy (Grosser, 2002: 371, 375), where history also “can be read and values can be put on certain geographical positions or experience” (ibid.). On the other hand, a historical narrative with reference can be turned around by an event such as the fall of a state system (régime) or a negative experience regarding an event linked to the narrative (e.g. losing a war) (Grosser, 2002: 381). The selective role of history can be seen very well in cases of new states being formed (state-building), when it is hard to construct a policy without referring itself to traditions and therefore “to find a ‘usable past’ is a task of every new state” (Grosser, 2002: 375). History in this regard is used instrumentally, and state-building is an external determinant of foreign policy, understood as a formulation of a state regarding its external environment. On the other hand, Baillie (1998) and Hey (2002) describe historical experience as a tool which offers a small state a (cultural) knowledge of other states (in proximity) to which a history of cooperation is linked. Here I would add that history of cooperative relations among states in geographical proximity brings about more than ”just” cultural (linguistic) knowledge; cooperation with states in geographical proximity also creates a heritage of economic and security related historical experience (historical memory).

In Figure 1 the mechanism of using history and geography as a basis for foreign policy strategy is presented within the framework of interplay between internal and external factors (determinants) of foreign policy.

**Figure 1: Mechanism of Using History and Geography as a Basis for Foreign Policy Strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal determinants/factors</th>
<th>FOREIGN POLICY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>HISTORY</strong> – as a narration with reference, including CULTURAL, SECURITY, ECONOMIC context</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GEOGRAPHY</strong> – as a state’s perception of its geographical proximity to an area, in connection with (supporting) historical narrative</td>
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<td>international system change</td>
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<td>state’s régime change</td>
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<td>state-building</td>
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<td>role of international organizations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

18 Two examples ”from history” are the formulation of Austrian neutrality after 1955 and the legitimacy of Franco-German relations in the European integration process (Grosser, 2002: 346).
19 The reasons why states cooperate in the first place are mostly linked to economy and security (although cultural incentives should not be neglected).
From the examples above it is possible to affirm that both geography and even more history (as claimed by Grosser, 2002: 375) are used as political resources in the framework of the internal environment of a state’s foreign policy. It is also possible to assert that history and geography, as sources (bases) for formulation of foreign policy strategy, may be used in cases of international system change, a country’s change of government and the foundation of new states (state-building) and that the role of international organizations in this regard is also important:

− “geography (reference to a proximity to a certain geographical area) as an internal source of foreign policy is more likely to be used by a state in cases where the external environment is in the process of change, in order to support a foreign policy strategy,
− history (reference to a certain historical experience) as an internal source of foreign policy is likely to be: a) used the basis of accumulated knowledge and experience, as a foreign policy asset; b) more selectively (instrumentally) used in cases of new states being founded (state-building) in order to support ”the right way” of foreign policy strategy (domestic institutionalization and the application of stereotypes towards units in the neighbourhood),
− great narratives can be turned around by an event like a change of state régime or a negative experience linked to the previous narration.”

Based on the revealed theoretical possibilities of a small state’s foreign policy strategies and the mechanism of using history and geography as a basis for foreign policy strategy, attention will now be turned to the two case studies. There will be an examination of whether Slovenia and Austria, which I arbitrarily regard as small European states, with historical and geographical ties (i.e. experience and proximity, respectively) to the Western Balkans, have chosen to use these ties as a basis for their active foreign policy strategies (they have chosen to cooperate on issues where they would make use of this historical and geographical circumstance) or if they have not, what are the reasons for this.

Slovene and Austrian historical context and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans as a basis for their active foreign policy strategy

I will investigate the foreign policy strategy (and actions) of the two respective governments towards the Western Balkans\textsuperscript{20} on the basis of their official foreign policy

\textsuperscript{20} The Western Balkans is an area in South Eastern Europe, comprising Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia (all former Republics of the former Yugoslavia), with the exception of Slovenia and Albania. It is a political term (in contrast to the Balkans as a geographical notion of a mountain range on the Balkan peninsula), founded by EU in 1998 at the European Council in Vienna. Strategy paper presented to the special meeting of ”The Club of Three and the Balkans” (Club of Three, 2000: 13–14) claims the term is inappropriate and suggests retaining South Eastern Europe. The latter nevertheless is a broader term, mainly understood in a political sense to describe the majority of the states in this geographical area; those that are in the process of transition and therefore still entering the European integration process. The term came into everyday use when the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was launched in 1999.
strategy documents (and action). I will briefly present the historical and geographical context of relations between the two states and the mentioned area and, further on, concentrate on the time period from the end of the Cold War until the present day.21

Austrian foreign policy strategy regarding the Western Balkans

Austria today does not directly border any of the states of the Western Balkans, but is situated very close to the northwestern part of the region. Its historical links with the area go back to the 16th century, when the Habsburgs expanded their territory to the southeast (as far as Croatia) in order to create a defence zone against Turkish invasions. The monarchy’s involvement in the Balkans was oriented even more towards the South at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, when its ambitions to gain a passage to the nearby straits in the Mediterranean led it to include Bosnia and Herzegovina under its administration in 1878. This action not only intensified a long-lasting rivalry between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia in the area, but – after Bosnian annexation in 1908 – also increased its tensions with Serbia (Vaďsse, 2000: 32). The Empire at that time, with the help of its ally, Germany, strengthened its position in the Balkans, but its territorial claims provoked the other large players in the area, the Ottoman Empire and Russia, to intensify their own pressure, and caused revolts from the surrounding nations. This led to the two Balkan wars of 1912–1913, in which Austria took part, either by direct military involvement or through financial support (ibid.). After the Serbs had reinforced their claims to unify the Southern Slavs, still under Austrian domination, the situation became more explosive and in June 1914 resulted in the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Bosnia, and consequently in an unfeasible Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, which was practically a declaration of war.22

After the First World War the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, and it should be clearly noted that this meant a major change for Austrian foreign policy too. Austria’s standing suddenly turned from being a large empire to being able to “only” to act as a small state. Between the two world wars Austria was more occupied by internal political affairs and especially with the great economic crisis in the late 1920s and in the beginning of the 1930s. In foreign policy Austria was dealing with (territorial) pressures from neighbouring states, Germany and Italy, therefore its foreign policy activities were not much involved with the Balkan States; one example of its policy in this region was fixing the southern border (with present day Slovenia) in 1920. Before the Anschluss in 1938 Austria was facing demands to align its foreign policy with that of the Reich (Vaďsse, 2000: 21), and during the Second World War Austria, under German annexation, occupied most parts of Yugoslavia. In its constitutional treaty of 1955 Austria had to assume a neutral status in international affairs and was therefore

21 I have chosen the end of Cold War as a point in time when states were able to pursue more active foreign policy strategies. It should be noted here that Slovenia had officially become a recognized independent state after 1989; therefore its policy until 1992 will be assumed on the basis of its foreign policy strategy as a Yugoslav Republic.

22 The latter is also perceived as the cause of the First World War.
a non-pole state during the Cold War. But as Goetschel (2000: 12) claims, “the country never saw neutrality as an obstacle to active multilateral engagement; on the contrary /…/.” It has created a role for itself in fields of development policy, peacekeeping and conflict resolution (ibid.).23 As the state was a “grey area” between East and West (Goetschel, 2000: 13) it undertook a role of bridge-building and offering “Good Offices”.24 In this regard Austria also conducted its political cooperation with the Western Balkan states, which mainly constituted Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – SFRY).25 Although it was pursuing an active foreign policy in this view, “Austria stuck to autonomy (passive foreign policy) as far as its core neutrality obligation was concerned” (Goetschel, 2000: 13).

In 1989 Austria saw the revolutionary changes in the Eastern Bloc as a promising development for rapprochement of West and East and the latter’s path to democratization and a market economy. Austria understood this situation as a change of its position, which placed the country “back in the heart of Europe” which consequently offered new opportunities for its activities in the framework of neutrality. In 1989 Austria also presented its candidacy for membership in the European Community. Its geographical priorities have not changed, and Austria continues to provide assistance to former Eastern Bloc states to pursue the democratization process.26 “As a neighbour, Austria was also called upon to assist the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe to overcome the disastrous legacy of Communism.”27 In 1989 Austria launched its Central European Initiative (CEI) to cooperate with the countries in its neighbouring region, namely Yugoslavia, Italy and Hungary.28 Austria turned its attention more to Southeastern Europe because conflicts there began in 1991.29 It stated that “for geographical and historical reasons it has always had a close relationship with its neighbours in Southeastern Europe, including Yugoslavia. /…/ Austria repeatedly advocated action by the international community and advanced a series of concrete proposals to this end.”30 It expressed its deep security concern for its own existence with regard to the development of hostile developments in the Balkans.31 This concern

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23 Austria was very active within the Council of Europe, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United Nations, but did not join the EU.
24 “Prior to 1989 Austria was trying to establish at a government level a dialogue between states from ideologically antagonistic camps, between Communist dictatorships on the one hand and pluralist democracies in the other and thereby to promote a policy of détente” (Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1993, p. VIII).
25 Although SFRY was not a part of either bloc, it was a leading state of the Non-aligned movement.
26 Außenpolitischer Bericht 1989, Jahrbuch der österreichischen Außenpolitik. Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, p. IX.
27 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991, p. VI.
29 Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that Austria’s activities in the region had already begun 1989, when it mediated bilaterally in the human rights breaches in Kosovo, and within the framework of OSCE (for more see Jandl, 1999).
30 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991, p. 38.
31 Ibid.
increased in 1992 when Austria clearly changed its security strategy from neutrality to active cooperation in the EU integration process. Austria stated that EU membership would give it greater security assurances, which were obviously not satisfied within the possibilities of the passive neutrality foreign policy strategy. The reason for this re-orientation was the perception of an unstable geopolitical environment, colourfully represented in the statement that Austria’s international position in 1992 was largely determined by the "Maastricht – Sarajevo field of tension." The new security strategy can also be explained by the external environment danger – internal cohesion theory. In 1994 Austria presented its foreign policy strategy of cooperation within the EU (of which it became a member in the following year), where it stressed that its policy towards the Balkans would continue in the EU too, and it referred to another, existing foreign policy key goal, namely the “support for enlargement of the EU in Central and Eastern Europe for many historical and geographical reasons.” The two goals have been emphasized more ever since: a) enlargement into (and strengthening relations with) Central and Eastern Europe, which would be a priority objective of Austria’s foreign policy in Europe, not only for political and economic reasons, but “mostly because a region – with which Austria has the most intimate historical, cultural and economic links – will start to grow together once more”; and b) special attention to the Balkan Region will further on be given within the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In 2003 Austria set an even closer approach of the EU to the Western Balkans as its priority.

The analysis of the Austrian foreign policy strategy regarding the Western Balkans shows that after the Cold War Austria did use its historical experience and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans as a basis for its foreign policy strategy. This was Austria’s most recent experience, namely its cooperation with Yugoslavia during the Cold War; Austria did not use its previous negative experiences and historical memory regarding the Western Balkans as a reference for foreign policy strategy. It therefore did choose a field of cooperation on the basis of its (positive) historical and geographical context regarding the Western Balkans. Austria did not have to build a new foreign policy regarding its political relations towards the Western Balkans, since it

32 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1991, p VII. Austria was at the time waiting for the EU membership negotiations to commence. Joining the EU was gradually gaining importance due to the other – very different – source of tension, i.e. the beginning of Balkan conflicts as a danger to stability in its immediate neighbourhood. Although not yet a member of the EU at this time, Austria actively expressed its foreign policy stance towards the Western Balkans in the EU too (Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1992, p. 46).
33 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1994, p. VIII.
34 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999, p. VI.
35 Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1995, p. VIII and Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1999, p. VII.
36 In this regard, Austria stated its priority was to successfully complement the Stabilization and Association Process and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP SEE), under the leadership of its special coordinator, former Austrian Vice-Chancellor Erhard Busek (Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003, pp. 49–50). Dr. Busek, appointed to this position in 2001, was not the first high-ranking diplomat Austria appointed as part of the solution to the Balkan crisis; in 1998 the Austrian Ambassador to Belgrade, Wolfgang Petritsch, was appointed EU special envoy to Kosovo (Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1998, p. 28–29).
had only continued its mediation, conflict resolution and bridge-building role from the Cold War era; its foreign policy strategy in this regard did not have to change because of the change of the external environment, namely the nature of the international system. Nevertheless, as soon as conflicts erupted in the Balkans, Austria was placed in the immediate area of violence and felt endangered. Its neutrality (passive security strategy) was not adequately providing security any more. Therefore, due to changes in perception of its geographical proximity Austria consequently also made its foreign policy security strategy more active (moving away from the policy of “sitting still” or standing aside), aiming for higher security guarantees within EU CFSP. Nevertheless, Austria achieved an exception regarding its neutrality, which might be observed also within the (W)EU. 

The geographical proximity to and historical experience of the Western Balkans did not make Austria ”preoccupied” or “labelled” with this (see further on), as its identity was even more firmly based in Central Europe. On the other hand, Austria did not need to choose a field of cooperation in the EU by claiming advantages on the basis of its historical experience of and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans, because cooperating in this area was already its role and since it had experience which was very much desired by the EU, this foreign policy strategy/activity of Austria was already recognized by the EU (member states).

**Slovenian foreign policy strategy regarding the Western Balkans**

Before being fully independent for the first time, Slovenes were part of three states with populations of mainly South Slavic peoples (an internationally unrecognized country, a kingdom and a socialist federal republic), the second two popularly named the “First and the Second Yugoslavia”. Both internationally recognized states were formed after the First and the Second World War respectively. Before 1918 Slovenes were (with some other South Slavic peoples) for centuries a part of the Habsburg and later on the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Overall, Slovenes have participated in different forms of states, where nations – and Slovenes in particular – had different positions regarding their equality, and the dissatisfaction with the latter was also one of the reasons for Slovenes wanting to pursue the formation of their own state in 1990.

Even before Slovenia was internationally recognized, it had produced a form of foreign policy strategy. The position of Slovenia in this strategy regarding the countries of the Western Balkans as they existed at the time was concentrated only in the Yugoslav republics (not mentioning Albania) with two main concerns: a) to develop

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37 *Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 1994*, p. VIII.
38 Nevertheless, Austria achieved an exception regarding its neutrality, which might be observed also within the (W)EU.
39 The (hi)story of Slovene independence from the referendum in December 1990 to the declaration of independence in June 1991 and international recognition on 15 January 1992 is well documented in literature (see for example Bučar & Brinar, 1994 or Bučar, 1995).
40 For a more detailed description of Slovene political history as a Slav nation and the reasons for the move to independence see Bučar & Brinar, 1994: 425–427.
the best possible relations with the states which were to be formed in the territory of Yugoslavia because of "economic and many other reasons"; and b) to give priority to the issue of succession (international treaties and economic agreements). The main geographical priority in Slovene foreign policy was given to Europe (European political and economic integration, with the aim of European Community membership). A "special intention" was also cooperation with Central European states because of "common political, cultural and economic roots." In the framework of regional cooperation attention was paid to the Pentagonale, the Alps-Adria Working Community and the Assembly of European Regions; the only regional incentive for Slovenia to cooperate with Yugoslav states was its observer status in the Working Community South Adriatic. It is therefore obvious that before and after independence Slovenia did not use its historical experience and geographical proximity to the Balkans as a basis for its foreign policy strategy (and also did not choose the area as a field of cooperation); rather it used its (positive) links to (Western and Central) Europe (as if it had not been or did not perceive itself a part of Europe before) to formulate its pro-European integration foreign policy strategy.

The foreign policy strategy of 1991 was based on the assumption that the disintegration of Yugoslavia would be peaceful and gradual, so when the ethnic conflicts and war subsequently erupted in the area, Slovenia has engaged in a strategy to "get away from the Balkans, no matter what it costs" (Bučar, 1994: 1065) in order not to be linked to the area in the eyes of the international community. Goldsworthy (2002: 33–34) explains that the "flight from the Balkans" was a common strategy of many East European states at that time, not only due to their own perception but also because of the long-term symbolism of geography and historical misrepresentations of the region, which resulted in seeing the Balkans only as a metaphor for conflict, incivility and violence. This also was a reason for Balkan countries to seek to demonstrate that their true allegiance lay elsewhere – in Central and even Western Europe (ibid.). An example of the rhetorical use of geographical and historical perception of the Balkans in the way Goldsworthy (2002) explains is a passage in a document produced by the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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42 Another name for Central European Initiative (CEI) before Poland joined it; after that it was renamed the Hexagonale.
43 These three were also Slovenia’s main regional cooperation frameworks with Central and Western European states during the Cold War. The second and the third are sub-regional cooperation associations, where Slovenia (the entire state) is regarded as one region.
44 Slovenia was trying very hard to show its "natural connection to Europe" and therefore choice of its foreign policy priority, by further underlining its traditional links, geographic location, intensive economic cooperation and also cultural heritage (Bučar – Brinar 1994).
45 See Bučar, 1995: 286.
46 Considering quantitative criteria, the Balkan (border) states are mainly small states – only Romania could not be perceived as such.
48 The text was written by four (it may be claimed at that time leading) Slovene diplomats upon the tenth year anniversary of an independent Slovene foreign policy.
A special achievement, which is in a great deal thanks to Slovene foreign policy, is that Slovenia as an independent state has started its departure from the region, which it was a part of from the end of the First World War, from the area succinctly named by Krleža as "the Balkans’ pub", and in which Slovenia was all this time, despite its attested adaptability, nevertheless a foreign body (Rupel et al., 2000).

Bučar (1995: 293) states that all previous Slovene foreign policy orientations (before independence) including Balkan cooperation were increasingly neglected. “Slovenia did not seek to participate in any system centred on the Balkan Region /…/; instead it sought to remove itself entirely from the Balkan maelstrom /…/” (Bukowski, 2002: 76). Slovenia was rather more actively cooperating regionally with members of the Visegrád Four, within the Central European Initiative (CEI), and other more western-oriented regional cooperation. Therefore, Slovenia initially did not want to participate in the South Eastern Cooperation Initiative (SECI), launched in 1996, nor in the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (SP SEE), launched in 1999 (Bučar, 2001: 144). The government feared that if it joined SECI, the opposition would interpret that as an act of re-establishing the former Yugoslavia (Bučar & Šterbenc, 2002: 105). This indecisive position of Slovene foreign policy could be explained by the fact that after 1991 Slovenia had practically no foreign policy strategy on which all domestic political actors would agree, “since political parties, at least most of them, seem to have been confusing their party interests with foreign policy national interest” (Bučar, 1995: 288). This fact, accompanied by structurally more unsatisfactory organization and performance due to the fact that the state was young and had little (or non-positive) tradition of foreign policy was at the time clearly one of the permanent features of Slovene foreign policy internal environments. The latter was one of the reasons for Slovenia’s initial unwillingness to participate in the SP SEE, as in 1999 there were "grand debates” within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself as to how Slovenia should define its role and cooperation within the SP SEE (Kliner, 2005). When Slovenia

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49 Miroslav Krleža (1893–1981); a Croatian essay writer, poet and scholar.
50 Bučar (2001: 144) even observes that immediately after independence Slovenia had a superior and distant attitude towards Eastern European countries (Bučar, 2001: 144).
51 Nevertheless, Slovenia never became a member of the Visegrád Group. The state did consider (in 1993) joining the group, but did not pursue this policy because it was told by the members that the association would formally cease to meet, since it did not have any formal structure, nor common action or coordination (Drnovšek, 1997).
52 Slovenia joined United States-sponsored SECI in March 1997 only after the United States expressed that “the international community expected a more determined involvement of Slovenia in regional affairs”. The USA indirectly linked Slovene SECI participation with better prospects for NATO membership (Bučar – Šterbenc 2002: 105). This information was contained in a personal letter of the American President to the Slovene Prime Minister (ibid.). The event is not mentioned in the Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996.
53 Even the strategy of 1991 was not an official document since it was not endorsed by the parliament due to various political parties’ inability to agree on the common security and military position of the state (Bučar, 1995: 287).
54 Bučar (2001) describes conceptual-strategic (planning), organizational-technical (implementation) and political-personal Slovene foreign policy problems.
55 Some claimed that if Slovenia participated in the SP SEE, the international community would see that as an act of re-establishing former Yugoslavia. At the same time Slovenia was also trying very hard to
joined the SECI and the SP SEE its previous foreign policy action was turned around by the country’s use of historical context and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans (i.e. ”away from the Balkans” perception). The government produced a Declaration on Foreign Policy at the end of 1999. In the document Slovenia expressed its recognition that due to its political, security, economic and other interests it has to be present and active in the area of Southeastern Europe. The document states that Slovenia has to become an important and credible partner of the international community in this part of Europe and also describes Slovene participation in the SP SEE. The Declaration concludes that “on the basis of its geographical, political, economic and historical predispositions, Slovenia can offer “Good Offices” in solving complicated situations in its neighbourhood as elsewhere.” It can be seen that the document did not simply represent a change in use of historical experience and geographical proximity regarding the Western Balkans, but that Slovenia’s perception of them was turned into a different – active – foreign policy strategy towards the area. Slovenia was to become a mediator in solving the Balkan issues. This strategy was resumed in an even more intensive way in the following official document on foreign policy, called The Appropriate Foreign Policy of October 2002. The continuation and gradation of the recently established positive perception of and active strategy regarding the Western Balkans was expressed in the following passage under the title “Central Europe”:

“Nevertheless, Slovenia is not only a Central European state; its identity is also built on its Mediterranean tradition and connection to Southeastern Europe; therefore it could be a bridge between different European regions. This is also the perception of other (Central European) countries, therefore Slovenia has to profit from this position and within Central Europe (even as a future member of the EU) assume the role of the leading connoisseur and adviser on political, economic and other problems of Southeastern Europe. “

establish itself as a Central European state. Therefore, the initial proposal of the international community that Slovenia should be a recipient state was unacceptable to the country (Kliner, 2005). Slovenia did not participate in the founding meeting of the SP SEE in Cologne on 10 June 1999 (Austrian Foreign Policy Report 1999, p. 27). After it was agreed that Slovenia would be a donor Central European state to the SP SEE, Slovenia started to participate actively at a high diplomatic level (Poročilo Ministrstva za zunanje zadeve 1999 [Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999], p. 88). The change in foreign policy stance occurred also due to very high expectations regarding the Slovene role in the SP SEE on the part of the international community, especially the EU (Kliner, 2005).

56 Deklaracija o zunanji politiki Republike Slovenije [Declaration on Foreign Policy of the Republic of Slovenia], endorsed by the Parliament of the Republic of Slovenia on 17 December 1999. In this document the state’s activities regarding the Western Balkans as a whole (SECI and SP SEE) and also cooperation with each of the countries from the area, is presented (Albania is included for the first time).

57 Primerna zunanj politična – Temeljne prvne zunanj politike Republike Slovenije ob vključevanju v evroatlantske povezave [An appropriate foreign policy – the basic elements of Slovene foreign policy in its integration in Euro-Atlantic alliances], adopted by the government of the Republic of Slovenia on 10 October 2002.

58 Under the title The Slovene Contribution in the EU, this document stated that within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy Slovenia will have to concentrate on the area of Mediterranean and Southeastern Europe, since it has the advantage of knowing the conditions in the area.
The presented new orientation of the foreign policy strategy is based on the Slovene multiple identity, although (ironically) the (European) identity building just after independence was the reason to use the “away from the Balkans” narrative in the first place. This is not so unusual and could be explained by the fact that Slovenia was at the time a new state, yet entering the international community, and as such it was its task to secure its proper, autonomous political identity (Benko, 1992: 8). At the same time, Slovenia set itself a primary foreign policy goal, which was to enter European integration and ultimately join the EU. Knudsen (2002: 184) notes that “paradoxically, state-building and integration beyond the state are thus closely linked while also being mutually conflicting.” The author explains this identity/integration problem; identity in the outset is usually determined by a matter of finding out who one thinks one is not (Knudsen, 2002: 189). In this regard it is possible to understand the use of “away from the Balkans” narrative based on the general Slovene negative perception of historical experience of and geographical proximity to the Balkans. Therefore, the Balkans during Slovene state-building were ”the usable past” defining what Slovenia’s identity is not, just as it was the case in other (small) Eastern European states. As Mouritzen (1998: 92) says, political actors got used to this, and natural stereotypes were applied on the units in the neighbourhood, which leads to domestic institutionalization of this environment – claiming that links to the Balkans impede Slovenia from being perceived as a Central European state, ready for European integration. Therefore, only external pressures, high expectations of Slovenia’s role in the region and promises to treat it as a Central European state made Slovenia change its perception of and foreign policy action towards the Western Balkans and re-include the area in its identity concept. Afterwards Slovenia used the historical experience and geographical proximity to formulate its new foreign policy strategy (and choose a field of cooperation) where its previously negative perception was turned into an advantage and even an opportunity; Slovenia could become a bridge-builder between the EU and Western Balkans (Southeastern Europe). This narrative has now been consolidated and is being used in formulation of foreign policy strategy towards the Western Balkans in the latest government strategic document on the development of Slovenia.

59 Here, two remarks have to be made. Firstly, it could not be argued that state-building, including creating national identity, was the decisive internal foreign policy determinant for the use of historical experience and geographical proximity to the Balkans in all post-Communist Eastern European states. Some of the latter were not new states (e. g. Romania and Bulgaria), but they still used the negative historical experience in the Balkans as a basis for their pro-European foreign policy. The variable explaining this in this case could therefore be the aim of joining European integration. (For more on the national identity of post-Communist small states joining the EU (case of Slovenia) see Šabič & Brglez, 2002). Secondly, not all Eastern European states were small states, for example Romania. Therefore the use of negative Balkans-related historical experience as a basis for pro-European foreign policy strategy was not limited only to small states.

60 Pierre (1999) observes: “Slovenes prefer to think of themselves as not part of the Balkans at all. Rather, they like to consider their nation as part of Central Europe, like their neighbours Austria and Hungary, but with some past Balkan experience. Another self-characterization is Slovenia as a valuable bridge to the Balkans, without being a part of the region.”

61 The document states: “Historical experience and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans are perceived as ”the biggest opportunity for Slovenia to use its comparative advantages (namely common
Conclusion

The findings of both case studies are presented in Table 1. The table shows how the external environment change has influenced the use of history and geography as a basis for foreign policy strategies of Slovenia and Austria regarding the Western Balkans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External environment change</th>
<th>Historical/geographical basis of an active foreign policy strategy</th>
<th>WB*— field of cooperation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991 – state-building (+ political identity)</td>
<td>Links with Europe from before and in times of SFRY</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 – eruption of Balkan conflicts + unstable internal foreign policy environment</td>
<td>”Away from the Balkans” – even more accent on European links</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 – external pressure and expectancies regarding its membership in Euro-Atlantic integrations + built Central European identity</td>
<td>Geographical, political, economic and historical predispositions for offering Good Offices regarding Southeastern Europe</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 – joining Euro-Atlantic integration, and end of Balkan conflicts</td>
<td>The Balkans as a part of Slovene identity + EU perspective of Western Balkan states</td>
<td>YES/priority in the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 – change of international system</td>
<td>Continuation of the East-West bridge-building role from the Cold War</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 – eruption of Balkan conflicts</td>
<td>Danger to its own security in immediate vicinity</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 – joining the EU 2001 – end of Balkan conflicts</td>
<td>EU enlargement due to historical, geographical, political, economy links to Central and Eastern Europe + EU perspective of Western Balkan states</td>
<td>YES/priority in the EU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*WB – Western Balkans

history, knowledge of language, culture and traditions) to establish itself (in the EU) as an honest broker and a reference point for the Western Balkans and by this also attain a positive profile in this field of cooperation within the EU.” Strategija razvoja Slovenije, osmutek za javno razpravo [Slovene development strategy, a draft for public debate], Vlada Republike Slovenije, Urad za makroekonomske analize in razvoj, 2004 [prepared by the Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Bureau for Macroeconomic Analysis and Development in 2004], p. 26–27, 140–42.
On the basis of the presented analysis of the two small European states it could be concluded that after the end of the Cold War Slovenia and Austria used their historical experience of and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans as a basis for their active foreign policy strategies regarding the area and for choosing their field of cooperation in the international community. However, in the case of Slovenia, this did not turn out to be true on all occasions. Both internal determinants of foreign policy were used when the external environment of foreign policy was changed, but the intensity of the first and the importance of the second depended on the perception of the recent (Cold War) historical experiences regarding the area in proximity (Slovenia’s was negative, Austria’s was positive). The countries were in different situations regarding statehood; Austria was a well-established Central European state, while Slovenia was a new state in the process of state-building and transition.

Based on this perception and situation, the two states saw their historical and geographical links to the Western Balkans differently; for Austria it was mostly an opportunity to continue its active foreign policy of mediation and bridge-building. Even when the state perceived the geographical proximity as a security threat, it continued this policy and "only" changed its security strategy – from neutrality to EU membership – therefore it could be argued that its policy was only put into another framework due to international system change. On the other hand, after its independence Slovenia did not use its historical experience of and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans, and it did not choose this area to be its field of cooperation because it perceived both the geographical and historical links to the area as a constraint on its identity construction (Slovenia as a Central European state) and its European integration process too (however, the latter does not seem to be a case exclusively applied to small (Eastern) European states, but more to European states in transition). The decisive external determinant of foreign policy in the early years of Slovene statehood was therefore not an international system change, but state-building. When Slovenia asserted its Central European identity and made the perception of its historical and geographical link to the Western Balkans positive, it started to formulate this as a foreign policy opportunity and, as Austria did previously, chose the area as its primary field of cooperation within the EU too.

In this regard, it could be claimed that the European integration process and the role of the EU as an organization also proved to be an important external foreign policy factor determining the use of historical experience and geographical proximity to the Western Balkans as the basis for foreign policy strategies and the choice of a field of cooperation for both selected small states. This could be done for two reasons: 1) because the Western Balkans was an area/issue which was high on the organization’s agenda; and 2) given that membership in the organization was the foreign policy goal of the two states, the EU could exercise a direct impact on them (Austria was invited; Slovenia was more pushed/persuaded into cooperation). Since the area/issue has kept or even increased the importance within the framework of Europeanization process, an
interesting subject of further research would be to see how (effectively) the two states are using their identified opportunity to implement their active foreign policy strategy in practice.

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Czech Foreign Policy – Small State or Middle Power Approach?

Ladislav Cabada

Abstract: The majority of countries in the world are small states. Their role grew up rapidly in the period after the Second World War and especially after the end of the Cold War. In this period new themes appeared in the international relations and small states profiled on them as so-called middle powers. Development aid and cooperation or support for human security were two such a themes. The Czech Republic too could in the near future aspire to become a medium-sized power. Czech foreign policy was formed in the dynamic period after the end of the bipolar conflict of the Great Powers and the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation. Nevertheless, since the very beginning the Czech Republic has been able to define its clear priorities, often with reference to the historical development of Czechoslovak statehood. The euphoric period when the Czech Republic was established could be one of the reasons why the first official concept of Czech foreign policy was presented as late as 1998. These policies, and later policies since 2002, represent a combination of small state and medium-sized power strategies. The article analyses which themes could be the vehicle for transforming Czech foreign policy from that of a small state towards the policy of a middle power.

Key Words: small states, middle powers, foreign policy, international relations, Czech Republic

Introduction

The Czech Republic is one of the newest European states. It came into being on 1 January 1993, when after the peacefully agreed split of the two parts of the Czechoslovak Federal Republic two emergent states appeared on the map of Europe – the Czech and Slovak Republics. After the break-up of Czechoslovakia the foreign policy philosophy and activity of both states had to reflect the new geopolitical and foreign policy realities in which they found themselves – in the case of the Czech Republic undoubtedly to a lesser extent than was the case in the Slovak Republic\(^{62}\) – even if basic foreign policy remained the same.

\(^{62}\)The political representation of the Czech and Slovak Republics during talks on the disintegration of the Czechoslovak Federation agreed that neither of the Republics would be the exclusive state emerging from the disintegration of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics. Therefore, both states shortly after their formation asked to join the UN and other international organizations; until then the Czechoslovak Federation was a member of the UN. Despite this, it can be said that with regard to mental image the Czechoslovak Federation has been replaced by the Czech Republic rather than Slovakia. This is also because of several symbols, most tangibly the Czechoslovak flag, but also the Czechoslovak anthem (first part), and the election of the former Czechoslovak President Václav Havel as President of the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the Czech Republic was more frequently understood as the continuation of former Czechoslovakia.
The abandonment of the Czechoslovak Federation by the Czechs and Slovaks and the creation of two independent states meant, among other things, the diminishing of the “real” size and international-political significance of both states. On the other hand, however, at least this was understood by some of the Czech and Slovak political actors as a clarification and at reorganization of the geopolitical position of the states that is their position in international relations. After the disintegration of Czechoslovakia both countries consciously joined a group of small European states that corresponded more or less to the diplomatic rhetoric of their representatives.

Early after its foundation the Czech Republic declared\(^{63}\) that good relations with its neighbours, entry to Western economic, political and military structures (European Union and NATO) and good relations with powers were its basic foreign policy priorities. These aims have basically not changed at all in the almost 13 years of existence of an independent Czech Republic. However, it would be a mistake to say that in the sphere of Czech foreign policy nothing has changed.

The aim of this article is to analyse the foundations of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic as a so-called small state and compare them with the development, changing foundations, ambitions and actual manifestations of Czech foreign policy. I would like to concentrate especially on the question of whether Czech foreign policy is from now on exhibiting the policy characteristic of a small state or whether it is moving to a position which we could consider as the policy of a medium-sized power, i.e. a medium-sized country. I would like to put the research, which is based on both an analysis of policy matters (foreign policy, security policy, development aid policy and the like), executive institutional-political institutions in the Czech Republic (especially the Government and individual ministries) and on current analyses of Czech experts concerned with international relations and international policy, into a theoretical framework of research of small states and their role and position in international politics.

**The Czech Republic – a small or medium-sized state?**

Although the issue of the role and position of small states in international relations is among the most analysed themes in the field of international relations, there is not a single definition of a small state. Experts agree on the fact that small states make up the majority of countries in the world, and the basis of this statement is use of the dichotomy of the small state versus a power. In this concept a small state is every state, which on the basis of criteria that is frequently subjective, cannot be regarded as a power. This dichotomy is naturally disrupted in the “descent” from the global to a lower, especially regional level. States which would from a global perspective not be regarded as powers can, in a regional context, including only a sub-continental sector,

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\(^{63}\) For example in the speech of Josef Zieleniec, Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the Lower Chamber of Parliament of the Czech Republic on 21 April 1993 (see below), which to a certain extent addressed the lack of foreign policies of the first Cabinet of Václav Klaus.
aspire to the role of a “regional power“. In the global perspective Poland is regarded as a small state rather than a power, but if we concentrate on the Central European Region then it is a regarded as a regional power.

Small states were regarded by advocates of realistic approaches mainly as an object rather than a subject of international relations; their existence was regarded as temporary, possibly limited in their full sovereignty by the positions of large states. This approach is succinctly formulated by American researcher Nicholas Spykman, who wrote: “Small states represent a vacuum in the field of high political pressure. Their existence does not come from their strength but the fact that nobody claims their territory or that they have to be preserved as buffer states or weights in the power balance of interests of powerful nations. When this balance disappears the small states usually disappear with it” (Krejčí, 1993: 3).

The difference between a large and a small state, like the difference between a small state and a regional power, can be determined on the basis of various criteria, for example territorial extent, size of the population, ability to contribute to conflict resolution in a regional context and the like. All of these characteristics determine the strength and power of a state, which are the criteria dividing states into groups of small, and possibly large states. However, according to Petr Robejšek, it is evident that the basic criteria of the power of a state in contemporary international relations are represented by its economic power. “Even several years ago foreign policy meant military power. Sooner or later it depended on who had more soldiers. Today economic power occupies first place, and international policy moves on an escalating scale from trade to trade war” (Robejšek, 2002; 30).

According to Robejšek, therefore, the international-political strength of individual states can lead to their economic power. I personally feel that this is a rather simplistic approach because firstly, it is not clear under which criteria the author is judging economic power (high gross domestic product, high income per capita, high growth percentage of gross domestic product or other criteria and secondly, economic power does not necessarily give individual states a sphere of influence in international rela-tions (the Sultanate of Brunei is undoubtedly a rich state but in international relations it remains a small country and is only barely noticeable).

I do not want, however, to repudiate the criterion of economic strength as a sign that a specific state is not a small state. There is no doubt that among states that have a similar size or populations there may be fundamental differences from the viewpoint of economic efficiency, and we have a tendency to “elevate“ economically more successful states from the category of small states to the category of others. In this regard, the considerations of political scientists and politicians move in the right direction, included in the dichotomy of the small state versus the “central” power type, i.e. a medium-sized state. These states – especially in Western and Northern Europe but also, for example, Canada – are in specialist literature in particular indicated by the term middle powers, which should mean states exceeding the standard limitations of so-called small states in international politics.
For example, according to Canadian political scientist Donald M. Behringer (2003: 1–2), during the Cold War research in international relations, which was dominated by realists, concentrated above all on the role and function of powers. In the period after the end of the Cold War attention is being turned, however, to medium-sized states, which in some areas of international relations (development aid and cooperation, human security concepts and the like) take a *leadership role*. As Behringer states, medium-sized states considered, for example, to be countries such as Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway[^64], are not characterized by “objective“ criteria, such as population size or gross domestic product: their definition is linked to behaviour in international relations. Medium-sized states show the tendency to push for multilateral solutions to international problems or a tendency to adopt a compromise position in international disputes. According to Behringer, the main characteristic of middle powers is the acceptance of the fact that “citizens and governments of the industrialized countries have an ethical responsibility towards those living beyond the boundaries of this world, which suffers from want and poverty“ (Behringer, 2003: 2).

The thesis mentioned above suggests that we must search for medium-sized powers especially, if not exclusively in the Euro-Atlantic sphere. This assumption to a certain extent corresponds to the division of small states offered by Jiří Štěpanovský (1998: 21). In his text he concentrates only on Europe, but if we replace the term “Europe“ with “Euro-Atlantic sphere“, we can make use of his conclusions without restrictions. According to Štěpanovský, there were types of small states in the Cold War in Europe: 1) small states of Central Europe under the control of the Soviet Union; 2) small European states which are members of the European Union and NATO; and 3) neutral states developing economic relations with the West and at the same time emphasizing their orientation towards a policy of non-engagement. According to Štěpanovský, the partial reconfiguration of small European states again into three groups occurred after the end of the Cold War. The groups are: 1) small Western European states experiencing peace and relative prosperity, which are joined by neutral states; 2) small Central European states in transition; and 3) small states in the Balkan zone, suffering from open conflicts (Štěpanovský, 1998: 21).

Let us disregard the fact that in his analysis and second typology the author does not include small states in the post-Soviet region, i.e. the states that are independent of the EU, and let us make use of the positive results of his analysis. In my judgment, the author correctly anticipates the shift of neutral countries (Sweden, Finland, Austria) to Western Europe, characterized by greater involvement in international relations, including discussion on the benefits and character of neutrality in the countries menti-
oned. The second group of countries is noteworthy – the central European countries in the period of transition. The Czech Republic can be included here without a doubt. As Štěpanovský states, small Central European states do not show the same characteristics as small Western European countries. Although the author does not develop this idea further, we can suspect that he considers the position of small Western European states as stronger than the position of Central European states. Some Western European small nations can be characterized as “small powers“, i.e. medium-sized countries.

The third country mentioned by the author is likewise noteworthy; for its classification he used the term “Balkan Zone State”. The small countries in Southeastern Europe found themselves in the vortex of conflicts, which basically changed their position in international relations. From the viewpoint of the theme of this article the decline in economic efficiency and stability of these states (we should remember that the average income per capita in Macedonia is the same in Namibia in Africa) is especially noteworthy. These countries became the recipients of significant international aid, without which the whole regions and countries would have been threatened by a serious crisis, possibly the collapse of state power, as we witnessed in 1997 in Albania.

I would like to conclude the theoretically-oriented introduction to the issue of research of small, i.e. medium-sized countries, by stating that it is not possible to determine objective and always usable criteria for differentiating small states, i.e. medium-sized powers. Economic prosperity in combination with a willingness to engage in the chosen field of international politics, on the basis of other than (neo)realistic approaches to international relations, appears to me as fundamental.

**Historical roots of Czech foreign policy**

Czech, i.e. Czechoslovak, foreign policy was first formulated during the period after the outbreak of the First World War. Even during earlier periods, analyses were made of the position of the Czech nation in international relations. The studies, however, were limited and influenced by the actual position of the Czech nation within the Hapsburg monarchy (e.g. the thesis of František Palacký on the necessity of existence of a strong state in Central Europe, which would, on the one hand, divide Western Europe from the Ottoman Empire and Russia and, on the other hand, would blunt radical Pan-German ideas and activities, which regarded Central Europe as German; or Kramář’s vision of a Slavic Empire including the Kingdom of Bohemia). In my opinion, the conditions for the consideration of the independence of the Czech (Czechoslovak) state were evidently not created until the First World War.

Credit for the international-political establishment of the notion of an independent Czechoslovakia (and other Central European, Baltic and Balkan States) goes mainly to T. G. Masaryk and, through him, the governing Czechoslovak International Committee, which gained the support of France, Great Britain and especially the USA, for this idea. Masaryk’s ideas of the form of Czechoslovakia during the war years basically did not change (See Map “Masaryk’s Idea of Bohemia in 1914“ in Krejčí,
1993: 66), however his consideration of the securing of the Czech (Czechoslovak) state in Europe, i.e. international relations, underwent quite radical changes.

As stated by Masaryk, the fears addressed by Palacký became reality, i.e. the domination of Austrian policy by the Pan-German programme of the German Emperor. For him, Germany and the Germans became the main threat to the Czech state, and for stopping German expansion he suggested the creation of a bloc of Slavic states in Central Europe – Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia – including the corridor between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, which would divide Austria and Hungary. An alliance of these three countries would be guaranteed by Russia (Krejčí, 1993: 65).

However, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia put a stop to Masaryk’s geopolitical considerations, and he returned to an agreement with the Western Powers, mainly the USA and France. The territory lying between Germany and Russia now appeared to Masaryk as a “danger zone“ (Štěpanovský, 1998: 20). The efforts of the nations living in this zone (Zwischeneuropa) had to be, according to Masaryk, oriented towards mutual cooperation and supporting democracy, which linked them with the Western Powers. In his notion the idea of a Central European (con)federation reaching from Finland to Greece (Cabada, 2002: 17), appears, and there were other versions of this federation, which were smaller. Even in 1918, just before the declaration of the independent Czechoslovak Republic, Masaryk became the Chairman of the Mid-European Democratic Union in Philadelphia, in which representatives of 16 nations from Denmark to Greece were brought together. In view of the tensions between the old and new Central European states, which flared soon after the end of the First World War, the Union never began to work properly however (Štěpanovský, 1998: 20).

We can, without a doubt, regard Czechoslovak interwar foreign policy as more multilateral than bilateral; it could even be said that in bilateral relations, especially with neighbouring countries, Czechoslovakia had great problems. The forum for Czechoslovak foreign policy of a multilateral orientation became both the League of Nations and also the Little Entente, a military-political association of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, aimed primarily against Hungarian revisionism. The protracted League of Nations crisis, which had already started with the USA refusing to join, limited the multilateral activity of Czechoslovakia from the very beginning, and the Little Entente underwent a crisis in the second half of the 1930s, which is linked especially with the turn away from democracy in Romania and Yugoslavia. Despite this, the Foreign Minister and second Czechoslovak President Edvard Beneš had similar intentions as Masaryk when the former tried (unsuccessfully) to turn the Little Entente into a confederate structure. The Munich Agreement, the occupation of the Czech lands in 1939 and also post-war development confirmed Spykman’s observations on small states mentioned at the beginning of the article. Even during the Second World War Beneš developed a proposal for a Czechoslovak-Polish federation, which was of course simply unacceptable to Stalin.

We can, in my opinion, evaluate Masaryk’s and Beneš’s conception of Czech (Czechoslovak) foreign policy as a mixture of realism and idealism. Realism is shown
especially in the effort to anchor Czechoslovakia to a power; the USA, Russia, Great Britain and France were came in question, and Italy partially also. After the war the USA of course withdrew into isolationism and Great Britain back to “splendid isolation”. Russia and, soon after the war, Italy, were governed by non-democratic political representation. The logical orientation towards France was limited by a decline in the power bases of this state and also the opportunism of the French political élite after the Marseille attack in 1934, during which Yugoslav King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Barthou were assassinated (Cabada, 2002: 21).

We could regard the policies of interwar Czechoslovakia, using contemporary terminology, rather as the politics of a medium-sized state. The relatively high ambition represented by such policies (for example the thesis on the island of democracy in Central Europe, from which democratic ideas spread to the surrounding areas) became the subject of criticism due to its apparently unrealistic nature after the Munich Agreement. Critics pointed to the fact that Czechoslovakia overestimated itself when it did not want to be a small state. A new foreign-political policy had to be the clear focus of a small state towards a regional hegemony such as Nazi Germany (Rataj, 1997: 147), and the Soviet Union after the Second World War. We can understand the Communist coup and the subjection to the Soviet Union, including the occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as further confirmation of Spykman’s thoughts on small states.

After 1989 the foreign policy of Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, was reconstructed on the basis of the aforementioned principles, i.e. from the historical experiences of Czechoslovak statehood.

**Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic**

The first foreign policy of the Czech Republic, in the form of a coherent document, was formulated in 1998, on the initiative of the minority Social Democratic Government of Prime Minister Miloš Zeman. This does not of course mean that a Czech foreign policy, with its own foundations and priorities, had not been formulated prior to that. As Václav Kotyk (1995: 65) writes, in the first years of its existence the Czech Republic had no foreign policy, but rather the ideas of policy priorities, which were an effort to join the EU and NATO, development of multilateral relations with neighbouring countries and world powers and support of multilateral activities to secure peace. The creators of the foreign policy, which corresponded to the changed priorities, were mainly Prime Minister Václav Klaus, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec and President Václav Havel.

President Havel, in particular, showed the tendency to push for such a foreign policy, which would go beyond the classic strategies of small states. Pragmatism

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65 Geopolitically oriented considerations of small states only seldom consider the nature of a political régime of a specific state. The (regional) power is always a hegemony and the small state must therefore reflect this reality without consideration of the character of the political system in this country.
belongs especially to this strategy, which P. Robejšek regards as “discreet egoism”. According to Robejšek, “discreet egoism is the first commandment of a foreign policy of a small state. One of the permanent goals of foreign policy of a small state should be an intensive search for situations which enable it to share in the benefits of activities whose costs are borne predominantly by others (“free rider position”). Possible future ethical doubts are irrational” (Robejšek, 2002: 31).

In some cases Havel’s foreign policy activities quite significantly exceed this demarcation. Let us remind ourselves of his engagement in the field of the defence of human rights, invitations to the Dalai Lama of Tibet or the official representative of Taiwan and the like. The activities of President Havel of course frequently had a markedly personal nature and need not always be presented as the foreign policy of the Czech Republic. We can say the same, to a certain extent, about the president’s support of the ideas of the Visegrád cooperation. Furthermore, the official formulator of Czech foreign policy is, under the constitution, not the President but the government, which is responsible to the Parliament of the Czech Republic (Lopez-Reyes, 1999: 31).

The foreign policy basis of the first government of Prime Minister Klaus can be deduced mainly from a speech made by Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec before the Lower House of the Parliament of the Czech Republic in April 1993. Minister Zieleniec stated in the speech that: “through the division of Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic, from the geopolitical viewpoint, split itself from the part of the Danubian region, which immediately neighbours the unstable zones of Eastern and Southeastern Europe … “. The Minister further defined the priority of Czech foreign policy: good relations with neighbouring countries; entry to the EC/EU, NATO and the WEU; good relations with powers and monitoring of the situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe. The foreign-political activity of the Czech Republic should, according to J. Zieleniec, concentrate on part of Europe, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic zone; on the other hand, “countries in the Euro-Atlantic zone do not represent an existential, strategic or specific priority for the near future”.

We can see, therefore, that the foreign-political priorities of the Czech Republic during Klaus’s government could be regarded as characteristic of the policy of a small state. The basic goal was integration into Euro-Atlantic and Western European structures, the development of good relations with world powers (in his speech Minister Zieleniec named the USA, Germany, France Great Britain, “other European states“, Japan and Canada) and smooth relations with neighbours. It is noteworthy that in foreign-political priorities the issue of Central European political and economic cooperation does not appear. This approach corresponds, according to V. Kotyk (1995: 70–71), to the lack of interest on the part of V. Klaus and J. Zieleniec in Visegrád Four cooperation; as Kotyk mentions, both politicians assumed that regional cooperation in Central Europe (in addition to the Visegrád Four, there is also the Central European Association of Free Trade/CEFTA and the Central European Initiative/CEI) could hinder the “star pupil” which is how both politicians regarded the Czech Republic.
Let us remind ourselves that theoreticians regard involvement in a multilateral strategy to be one of the main characteristics of medium-sized states. On the other hand, small states advocate bilateral foreign policy as the best strategy (Robejšek, 2002: 32). In the first years of the Czech Republic Klaus’s governments advocated a bilateral foreign policy, meaning that instead of coordinated negotiations of Central European countries with EU bodies there would be “separate” negotiations of each Central European country with the European Union.

Czech foreign policy in the first half of the 1990s was formed in clear connection with the process of transformation of the security situation of the Czech Republic. After the disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 the first task of Czech (Czechoslovak) policy to be dealt with was ensuring security. In discussions two basic possibilities arose: 1) the idea of neutrality based on the Austrian model, as part of the framework of security order in Europe, guaranteed especially by the CSCE; and 2) the idea of joining NATO and the WEU. The first idea, advocated in the first months and years by the official representatives of Czechoslovakia too, was rejected after the outbreak of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, even if a definite alternative appeared in the years to come.

The idea of neutralization of the group of countries lying between Western Europe (NATO) and the Soviet Union (Russia) was to a certain extent based on the aforementioned notions of T. G. Masaryk. The “neutralization” of this Central European zone (Europe in between) would of course expose the Czech Republic to a far greater risk than being oriented to Western Europe, i.e. the Euro-Atlantic alternative, even if it included Germany, which in the past was aggressive. The fear of the power ambitions of Germany, indicating a certain misunderstanding of the development of (West) German politics after the Second World War, could have to a certain extent influenced considerations of official Czech (Czechoslovak) representatives in the first years after the fall of Communism.

The tendency towards the idea of strengthening of membership of NATO of course did not completely quell the fears of the Czech public and parts of the political élite of Germany. The fears of Russian hegemonic ambitions, possible “resentment” of Germany as a power after its reunification, and also the realistic response of the real strengths/weaknesses of France and Great Britain logically led Czech diplomacy to the idea of understanding the USA as a priority security partner. In this idea all the main representatives of the Czech foreign policy agreed. The American presence in Europe was understood by Czech politicians not only as an instrument of controlling Russia but also Germany (Waisová, 2004: 192). The fact that Bill Clinton promoted to the post of Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, a Czech émigré with very friendly relations with Václav Havel and the whole Czech Republic, undoubtedly contributed to good Czech-American relations.

66 In his article, V. Kotyk (1995) draws attention to the idea of Zdeňek Mlynář of a zone of neutral states from Sweden to Austria, which would also include the Czech Republic.
The basic foundation of Czech foreign policy did not change even after the election of governments where the Czech Social Democrats predominated. Indeed it was the Cabinet of Miloš Zeman that presented a coherent foreign policy of the Czech Republic. The first sentence of this document characterizes the Czech Republic as a medium-sized state in a European context. At a time when the Czech Republic had already been promised NATO membership (Madrid summit in 1997), the priorities were EU membership; involvement in securing European and international security; better quality relations with Slovakia and good relations with other neighbours; regional cooperation in Central Europe and active involvement in international organizations. The development of good relations with Russia and states of Southeastern Europe, and economic relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, Australia and Latin America, are mentioned as partial intentions of Czech foreign policy. The Czech government declared its preparedness to participate in the framework of the possibilities for the formulation and fulfilling of the new international development strategy.

We see, therefore, that the new government, and Foreign Minister Jan Kavan, presented a far more coherent idea of the foreign policy of the Czech Republic than its predecessors, which included also some fields which at least partially exceeded the concept of how theoreticians define the foreign policy of a small state. Here I have in mind both the idea of regional cooperation of post-Communist Central European states67, and the issue, for example, of development aid, which of course after 1995 was being dealt with by Klaus’s government, and then the government of Josef Tošovský. The philosophy, in my judgment, displayed a greater foreign-political awareness of Czech diplomacy, which at least in some considerations exceeds the paradigm of a small country. Several statements of Foreign Minister Jan Kavan testify to this reality (see Kavan, 1998; Kavan 2002), and also some concrete steps of the Czech government. One of these was, for example, the “Czech-Greek initiative”, which should have contributed to the stopping of NATO aerial bombardments of Yugoslavia in 1999. This initiative signified the first more serious split between Czech diplomacy and the USA, which we can regard as the first step in the process of the cooling of Czech-American relations (Waisová, 2004: 192).

In his statements Minister Kavan himself was not completely unambiguous concerning his understanding of the position of the Czech Republic in international relations. As we mentioned, the government policy of 1998 marked out the Czech Republic as a medium-sized state; as for example J. Kavan did in his article Foreign Policy of the Czech Republic: the Possibilities of a Medium-Sized State (2001). At other times he confirmed that the Czech Republic belongs among small states (Kavan, 1998: 4). The strongest opposition party, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), on the other hand, regarded the foreign policy of Zeman and Špidla’s government as the policy of a small state, and especially in the relationship to the EU and the dominant countries in it.

67 Especially within the framework of revitalized Visegrád cooperation, which should have helped the new Slovak Government of Prime Minister M. Dzurinda to lead Slovakia into the second wave of enlargement of NATO and, at the same time as other nations of the Visegrád Four, into the European Union.
According to J. Zahradil (2002: 8), this policy manifests itself by a loosening of the Euro-Atlantic ties, and anti-Americanism, which is not in accord with the national interests of the Czech Republic. Zahradil also argued that Czech diplomacy should play a similar role to the foreign policy of Scandinavian countries, which he says: “have long had a visible foreign policy profile (in their case in the field of human rights protection and active involvement in multilateral world organizations)” (Zahradil, 2002: 8). We see, therefore, that the Shadow Foreign Minister J. Zahradil regards the foreign policy philosophy of the Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) as the policy of a small state, which is too subservient to the pressure of the powers of the core of the EU (especially France and Germany). Personally, I would want Czech foreign policy to be rather the policy of a medium-sized state based on a Euro-Atlantic tie (understood as the USA) and international organizations.

We cannot, however, fail to mention that the Civic Democratic Party and its Honorary Chairman and, from 2003, President of the Czech Republic, V. Klaus, has adopted a stance against some American activities too, which they understood as unilateral. Here I have in mind the position of the political élite on military intervention in Afghanistan and, above all, in Iraq. Politicians representing, and possibly influencing Czech foreign policy in its positions towards the USA, are divided into three groups: 1) the pro-American stream, represented especially by Václav Havel and Foreign Minister Cyril Svoboda (since July 2002); 2) anti-American, represented by the Czech Communists, but also by definite groups in the Czech Social Democratic Party (for example V. Laštůvka and J. Kavan) and the Civic Democratic Party; and 3) the stream “in the middle”, represented by the government (Waisová, 2004, 195).

It would be a mistake to speak about relations of Czech official representatives to the USA as anti-Americanism, as does J. Zahradil; “pure“ anti-Americanism occurs mainly in political parties which we can regard as radical (primarily the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia). Rather than anti-Americanism we could speak about the critical tendency of American policy to act unilaterally. These tendencies are shown also by Czech politicians, whom we can otherwise regard as significantly pro-American. Let us remind ourselves, for example, of the very critical position of President Václav Havel on the convergence between NATO and Russia ahead of the Prague NATO summit. When Havel gave a speech to senators on 27 November 2001 he presented a number of reasons why NATO should be “very reserved, very careful and very cautious“ in convergence with Russia. One of the reasons why Havel fears convergence is “creeping bipolarization“ is because “ahead of every summit of the Alliance these two largest and most powerful members (i.e. the USA and Russia) meet and agree a little on how everything will continue“ (Havel, 2002: 8). In Havel’s speech we see fear of the dominance of the USA inside NATO, and also fear a return to power politics, in which small states are the object of international relations.

The so far most recent official Czech foreign policy was accepted on 3 March 2003, for the period 2003–2006. Despite some differences that can be found, the material is very similar to the policy of 1998. In the policy, the Czech Republic is again defined
as a medium-sized state on the European scale. In this policy, unlike that of 1998, China does not appear as a strategic economic partner. In it the question of emphasis on adherence to human rights, in countries with which the Czech Republic wishes to deepen mutual relations, is toned down. Less space is devoted also to international development aid in the policy. Mention of CEFTA has entirely disappeared from the document.

We can therefore summarize that the policy materials of the Czech Government and further significant political institutions portray Czech foreign policy as the policy of a small state whose goal is to be included in the Euro-Atlantic sphere (which, with entry to NATO and the EU, was successful), develop good relations with non-neighbouring countries (which was more or less successful) and develop economic diplomacy. The policy contains some other points, but in comparison with the priorities mentioned earlier they are not regarded as too important.

In my opinion, what is most puzzling is the absence of a more consistent analysis of Czech-German relations and their further development. Practically all authors of the analysis of Czech foreign policy (e.g. Had – Kotyk, 1998; Pick, 2002; Rouček, 2002; Robejšek, 2002) agree with the opinion that in view of the already increased trade between Germany and the Czech Republic already, Czech diplomacy must regard relations with Germany as of key importance. In the analysed policies it is clear that the same space was devoted to relations with Germany as, for example, to relations with Hungary, with which the Czech Republic has no borders. Czech-German relations have, furthermore, an “asymmetrical” character – while Germany is a key partner for the Czech Republic, German diplomacy understands the Czech Republic as one of a number of neighbours; the German media thus mentions the Czech Republic mainly in connection with the Sudeten German problem (Huddala, 2004).

Analysts evaluate that the “danger zone” between Germany and Russia was “disturbed” by the democratization of Germany after the Second World War68, but in a significant section of Czech politics suspicion of the “good intentions” of Germany remained, and especially in connection with the fear of pressure for damages or other type of settlement in connection with the post-war transfer of the German minority from Czechoslovakia. Neither can relations with the USA be regarded as uncomplicated. Czech politics understood, and still understands good relations with the USA as a safety guarantee against Russia and Germany, but currently it does not have an understanding of some American foreign policy activities and fears a new “agreement” between the USA and Russia along the lines of the “Yalta” model.

Part of Czech politics sees a solution in the tendency towards the pro-federalist group in the EU, including strengthening of the European pillar of NATO (Foreign Minister C. Svoboda and the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People’s Party /KDU-ČSL/) and part of the Social Democratic Party); another section sees it rather in preference to American policy and the dominance of USA in the Euro-Atlantic space;

68 On the other hand a (justified) lack of faith in Russia, i.e. the idea, that Russia has abandoned its hegemonic policy towards Central Europe, remains (Dobrovský, 2001)
and a third group rather vaguely speaks about the importance of multilateral activities to ensure security (Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)). If anything was lacking in Czech foreign policy it was mainly the policy of securing vital national interests.

**Czech foreign policy as the policy of a small state**

The question of whether Czech foreign policy is the policy of a large state or whether it is about the policy of a medium-sized state cannot be, in my opinion, answered completely unambiguously. Regardless of the frequently very high ambitions of foreign policies of Czech governments after 1998 Czech foreign policy continues in the manner set in place by the first government of V. Klaus, which we can unambiguously regard as the course of a foreign policy of a small country. This becomes the case, for example, in comparison with foreign policy of another Central European state, i.e. Poland. Of course due also to its geostrategic position, territorial extent and population size – as early as the beginning from the 1990s Poland is showing tendencies that it is becoming a regional hegemony.

I do not want to suggest that Polish foreign policy is, in comparison to its Czech counterpart, qualitatively better. Instead, I am inclined to the opinion of M. Had and V. Kotyk (1998: 15), who say that Poland has the tendency to overestimate its possibilities. Czech foreign policy has, in my opinion, overestimated its possibilities only once (the aforementioned Czech-Greek Initiative), otherwise it has followed a careful path. On the other hand, comparisons with Poland can reveal that Czech foreign policy lacks a coherent policy on a number of questions, frequently in cases which concern regions or countries situated in the immediate proximity of the Czech Republic. An example could be the issue of Ukraine, where Czech diplomacy resorts only to empty phrases which lack substance. To expect that Czech diplomacy engages in the same way as Poland or Lithuania\(^6\) is evidently exaggerated, but the ambitions of Czech diplomacy undoubtedly show that in the issue in question it was not possible to present a clearly and analytically grounded basis.

In certain cases it is clear that Czech Republic has shown, and continues to show, efforts to be a medium-sized state and at the standard already mentioned by J. Zahradil, i.e. the level of an international political profile which is visible in the long-term. We can regard the contact of V. Havel with significant dissidents at the national and international level as such an activity (paradoxically, this is exactly what is frequently criticized by Zahradil’s party as damaging the economic interests of the Czech Republic). Others are a long-term stable critical position regarding the state of human rights in Cuba, the work of Czech soldiers in the international military and stabilizing missions or efforts to strengthen Czech development aid\(^7\). However,

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\(^6\) There is more on this question in the article by Jerzy J. Wiatr and elsewhere in this issue.

\(^7\) Development aid or development cooperation are without doubt are two the activities through which small states can gain the profile of a medium-sized power. Nations such as Norway, the Netherlands or
Czech policy in these sectors in the meantime operates in a markedly inconsistent and selective way. Practically the entire political élite in the most recent period resigned over the critical position of the attitude towards the state of human rights in China; in this light therefore, the “Cuban activity” appears as unsystematic. Likewise, it is important to mention that development cooperation is frequently developed not entirely transparently – there was, for example, no explanation of basis on which the criteria was agreed for deciding the reduced number of countries on which development aid was focused.

In conclusion, Czech foreign policy in the medium-term perspective could become the foreign policy of a medium-sized state. This assumption here is mainly a strengthening of the economic power of the Czech Republic and the effective investment of the means gained through this, especially into transparent development aid. Therefore, the Czech Republic can be classified alongside the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands.

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Canada distinguished by a high GDP, which is used to fund development projects. Czech development aid was revived in the second half of the 1990s, when the Czech Republic gradually changed from “being a recipient to being a donor. The Development Aid Policy for the period 2002–2007 assumes a continual increase of funds and and at the same time a lowering of the number of countries receiving aid, from originally dozens to around 15 or even eight. For more about the Aid Policy see Lebeda, 2001; Jelinek, 2004.
Sources:


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Switzerland – From Splendid Isolation to Selected Cooperation

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Abstract: For a small, landlocked country with a difficult geography and no natural resources to speak of, Switzerland has done remarkably well. Nevertheless, the Alpine republic faced some difficulties during the 1990s, even a crisis: Since the fall of the Iron Curtain its role as a neutral go-between was questioned. And as European integration was moving forward the Swiss found themselves quite isolated. As a result, Switzerland cautiously took steps towards international integration and joined the United Nations in 2002. But the country still abstains from joining the EU, disliking the idea of laws made in Brussels rather than in Bern. Therefore Switzerland found a compromise with the EU by negotiating bilateral agreements, including on security issues. Although Switzerland still prefers to go it alone, the country is looking for a replacement for its diminished political weight by adopting a new role of selected cooperation: providing assistance in the Balkans within the framework of the PfP and ESDP, and joining the Schengen/Dublin-Agreement etc. As a small, neutral country Switzerland traditionally wants to offer itself as a go-between in today’s conflicts and tries to balance between keeping a low profile in its own foreign and security policy without losing even more ground and to provide space for “Good Offices”. Up to now, the country has been quite successful in doing so.

Key words: Cooperation, European Union, Good Offices, Identity, Neutrality, Security Policy, Switzerland

Introduction

“We want Switzerland to be a small, but active country which is part of the world. We do not want a Switzerland with an inferiority complex, nor one with delusions of grandeur; what we want is a Switzerland that is able to face itself in the mirror, a Switzerland that is not afraid of change, a Switzerland that tries to put its idea of itself into effect in the face of today’s problems and with today’s means.” (Burckhardt et al, 1955: 26)

Those words were spoken by Max Frisch, one of the leading thinkers on the Swiss nation and his compatriots, as the Cold War became constant reality and Switzerland began to find itself very comfortable in its isolated, neutral role as an intermediary between the blocs. Even 50 years ago Frisch could spot the core of Swiss identity that had (and has!) lasting influence on its policies, especially on its foreign and security policy: fluctuation between inferiority complex and thus fears of demise and feelings of superiority.
Small states like Switzerland are often characterized by “a deficit in influence and autonomy” (Goetschel, 1999: 19). To minimize the consequences of this lack of power and therefore to protect their territorial integrity and political independence they often chose neutrality as a security option (Karsh, 1988). So did Switzerland. And this was the right choice for hundreds of years, when the Swiss definition of “nation” as a voluntary association of people having the same political beliefs was questioned by its neighbours France and especially Germany. Because, according to Johann Gottfried Herder, a nation is characterized by its common language and “without its own language, a Volk is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms” (Herder, 1995: 93). That is why Germany constantly claimed the German-speaking parts of Switzerland to be part of the German Empire, as did its powerful opponent for influence in Europe, France, concerning the French-speaking cantons.

Regarded as being an “imperfect nation”, as Max Weber put it, absolute and permanent neutrality therefore was the key to survival for Switzerland, situated in a region of belligerents in the age of nationalism. But times have changed: neither Germany nor France nor Italy challenge Swiss sovereignty any more. The European Union as a peace project is successful and there should be nothing to fear in Switzerland. But the Swiss are still loyal to neutrality, stay alliance-free and are not part of the European Union.

“For a small, landlocked country of seven million people with a difficult geography and no natural resources to speak of, Switzerland has done remarkably well … (The country) stands for direct democracy, fairness, stability, quality, meticulousness, punctuality, thrift, efficiency openness and all sorts of other desirable things” wrote “The Economist” in 2004. Why then should the Swiss adopt a new international role?

Switzerland never was unstable or poor. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, Switzerland faced some difficulties during the 1990s, even of a crisis: Since the fall of the Iron Curtain Switzerland’s role as a neutral go-between was questioned. And as European integration was moving forward the Swiss found them quite isolated. Not that they had not enjoyed their splendid isolation before, but now they had to deal with the growing economic disadvantages and shortcomings in security because of not being part of the European Union or other alliances.

As a result, Switzerland slowly and cautiously took steps towards further international integration, and a small majority voted for joining the United Nations in 2002. Switzerland is now prepared to back UN actions but the country still abstains from joining the European Union. It distrusts the EU’s centralising tendencies, and it dislikes the idea of laws made in Brussels rather than in Bern. Therefore Switzerland found compromise with the EU by negotiating a series of bilateral agreements also including security issues.

Although the Swiss still prefer to go it alone, the country is looking for a replacement for its diminished political weight and adopting a new, modern role: Today, Switzerland is providing assistance in the Balkans within the framework of Partnership for Peace and ESDP, joining the Schengen/Dublin-Agreement and giving support for
the “Geneva Accord”, trying to find new ways of acting as an intermediary and to provide Good Offices to other countries. As a small, independent and neutral country Switzerland wants to offer itself as a trustworthy go-between for today’s conflicts and tries to do the splits between the two sides of its oscillating identity: keeping a low profile in its own foreign and security policy without losing even more ground and to provide space for peace talks and other initiatives. Up to now, the country is quite successful in doing so…

The Traditional Role: Intermediary & Good Offices

In taking a look at Swiss history and identity one can see how Switzerland has changed its attitude towards and role within the international community and it will even have to change in the years to come.

For more than 100 years Switzerland was widely accepted as an intermediary because of its small size and – as supposed – limited political ambitions. No state or party to a conflict would have accused the Swiss of pursuing narrow political objectives, of engaging in power politics. Neutral Switzerland became the world’s leading mediator between countries not on speaking terms and held a range of mandates in arbitration matters. Switzerland’s policy became known as so-called “Good Offices” (Probst, 1989: 2). Those Good Offices trace back to the 19th century, when the first Swiss mediating role occurred in 1871 during the Franco-Prussian War. Although Switzerland’s Good Offices had declined in significance since the establishment of the permanent International Court of Justice in 1922, the country still had 19 Good Offices mandates in 1984, but 11 in 1991, and has only 4 today (Shepard, 2005: 1).

As we can see, demand for Swiss diplomacy’s Good Offices has fallen sharply since the end of the Cold War because the provision of Good Offices for conflict prevention and mediation has largely shifted to the United Nations. For this and many other reasons Switzerland is adopting a more active and cooperative, a more multilateral role.

But in doing so, first and foremost Switzerland has to deal with some key elements of its identity: the army and neutrality.

The Army, Neutrality, Identity and National Cohesion

Isolated territorial defence has become obsolete because Switzerland is surrounded by friends. Yet “the military remains a critical unifying sinew of the Swiss state” (van Heuven – Manning – Treverton, 1998: 6), and so does neutrality. Legally speaking, neutrality is only relevant to armed conflicts between states and not a basic obstacle to take part in European security policy. But huge parts of the Swiss population feel that any European security cooperation is against neutrality and therefore against “Swissness” itself. It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that Switzerland and neutrality are synonymous.
There is a peculiar linkage between Swiss identity and national security. “Switzerland is the only country in Europe where the idea of the nation-in-arms based on a citizen’s militia has survived until today” (Haltiner, 2002: 2). That is why John McPhee concluded somewhat ironically: “Switzerland does not have an army, Switzerland is an army!” (McPhee, 1984: 6). The army and especially neutrality became a symbol of national identification because neutrality fulfils a double function, as Karl W. Haltiner explored: “Externally, Switzerland is one of the few countries in Europe to have avoided wars over the last 150 years. This assured the Swiss of their opinion that the existence of their small Alpine republic is guaranteed only because neutrality has become the constant basis of Swiss foreign and security policy. Internally, the dangers of fragmentation have additionally strengthened neutrality. In a nation linguistically segmented and divided by confessional and cultural differences, neutrality served as an important agent of national cohesion.” (Haltiner, 2002: 4).

In Switzerland, neutrality has survived mainly as a set of beliefs, not as a set of functions, with regard to foreign affairs. There is some kind of fictional sense of neutrality that corresponds with Swiss identity. Permanent neutrality, meaning no membership in any alliance and no foreign troops on the territory, is still closely linked to prosperity and peaceful safety in people’s minds.

But nowadays you do not have to be neutral to follow the peaceful path, even if you are small. In a changed and highly interdependent world peace has less and less to do with neutrality. The policy of “splendid isolation” seemed to guarantee security on a foreign basis as well as on a domestic level for many years. But with the end of the Cold War and intensified European integration some key values of Swiss foreign and security policy became obsolete. Neutrality is no longer the imperative it was for small nations during the 20th century. Given that the security environment is changing Switzerland will have to modify its attitudes and change its policy as well because neutrality is not sensible vis-à-vis terrorism or organized international crime.

A New Role: Security through Cooperation and a More Active Peace Facilitator

Switzerland’s neutrality during the Cold War seemed sensible, especially with regard to its traditional role of an international third party mediator. But today it finds itself in the midst of a new Europe. A Post-Cold War redefinition of Swiss security policy was required (Gabriel – Fischer, 2003). But when it comes to neutrality, the doctrine “Never change a winning horse” is still very popular with the people. The country is adapting to European trends of new security and defence structures, but slowly and cautiously.

There are some Swiss national interests that make it easier to leave behind the old role and look out for a new one. Firstly, Switzerland is directly affected by international crises because it is one of the preferred destinations of people seeking protection and asylum. The country has realized that international cooperation can
reduce flows of refugees. Secondly, with reference to is its small size, Switzerland cannot provide the overall infrastructure for international security operations and can therefore choose a role fitting its profile and interests (Ogi, 2000). And third, highly important for Switzerland, the economic interest: The stability that Swiss business needs to flourish worldwide requires peace. By supporting peace operations Switzerland supports Swiss business. And participating in international activities facilitates important contacts and relationships in business affairs. Moreover, future participation in the Schengen agreement is added value for Swiss tourism because tourists travelling to Europe will not require a second visa for Switzerland. Tourist experts predict a significant increase in revenue as a result.

There are still some leftovers from the good old days, and Switzerland is still trying to play its traditional role as mediator. For example, Switzerland is giving financial and logistical support for the “Geneva Accord”, an unofficial Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative brought into being in December 2003. But since the demand for Swiss Good Offices has fallen, a new more active “peace facilitator” role fills the gap together with the official strategy of “security through cooperation” presented in the Swiss “Security Policy Report 2000” (Sicherheitspolitischer Bericht, 2000).

The new role fits and is already working, as recent examples show: On 14 April 2005, the 12th contingent of “Swisscoy”, consisting of 211 KFOR soldiers was sent to Kosovo to act as a peace facilitator. On 30 April 2005, a Memorandum of Understanding between Austria and Switzerland concerning cooperation in airspace security was signed – as much an example for “Security through Cooperation” as the majority vote for joining the European Union’s Schengen/Dublin-Agreement on cooperation concerning justice and asylum on 5 June 2005. This marks an important step, a departure from the traditional status quo of a purely autonomous security and defence policy and is framed by the recent creation of three internationally oriented institutes working on security policy in Geneva: the Centre for Security Policy, the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Centre for Humanitarian Demining (Haltiner – Klein, 2002).

Much to our surprise we find that Switzerland is not excluding itself any more but cooperating on bilateral and multilateral levels. Switzerland has its reasons: The country undertook an in-depth review of its approach to security that resulted in a new threat analysis since the end of the Cold War, causing a development towards cooperative security. Revolutionary developments such as globalisation call for increased political coordination; the strategy of concentration on isolated territorial defence has become obsolete. That is why Switzerland is now implementing the guidelines of the Security Policy Report 2000 called “Security through Cooperation”. Retaining the militia principle, Switzerland undertook army reforms with a clear Post-Cold War profile: Swiss forces have been successively reduced in size and professionalism has increased as have readiness and mobility. The objective was twofold: on the one hand, it is a matter of burden sharing to reduce the costs of an isolated security policy. As a consequence of the changed geopolitical situation the defence budget underwent significant step-
by-step cuts. On the other hand, the back door allows cooperation without alliance membership. The contribution to international peace support and crisis management and European security policies on a pick-and-choose-basis enables Switzerland to minimize the negative aspects of neutrality and standing outside the European Union and other alliances by minding the importance of neutrality for Swiss identity at the same time. Furthermore, neutrality should not be confused with indifference towards the outside world.

Although Switzerland has participated in international peace-support operations since the 1960s a strict interpretation of neutrality confined its tasks in joint security ventures. Not until the 1990s, when Switzerland had to realize that isolation and absolute neutrality were not so promising anymore, the country slowly changed its foreign and security policy by diffidently opening to the world. That is why Switzerland joined the Partnership for Peace following Swiss Chairmanship of the OSCE in 1996 and has been a member of the United Nations since 2002, which was hailed as a major step forward into the concert of nations and a commitment to its long-standing humanitarian tradition. Swiss military observers are active on a number of UN missions, from Georgia through former Yugoslavia to the Middle East and Congo. Switzerland has also been an associate member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) since May 1999 and provides a logistics and support unit as well as mechanized infantry of about 220 men and women to the Austrian “KFOR” contingent (Kosovo Force) called “Swisscoy” (Swiss Company), based in Camp Casablanca, Suva Reka, since September 1999. Moreover, Switzerland is also cooperating at the level of the European Union.

Approaching Europe

After Swiss voters narrowly turned down the government’s membership bid to the European Economic Area (EEA) in 1992 because the union is perceived as falling short in democratic institutions that play a crucial role in Swiss self-conception, Switzerland chose the bilateral path by negotiating on specific interests and problems. The first set of bilateral treaties, mainly on trade, labour and transport issues, came into force in 2002. The second series, signed in October 2004, includes issues that affect Switzerland’s new international role more than any other previous agreement: on 5 June 2005, a popular vote was held on Switzerland’s participation in the Schengen/Dublin association agreements, two areas of great importance for Switzerland, namely cooperation in the fields of police and justice, asylum and migration.

In effect, after the approval of the association agreement by a small majority of 54.6 per cent, Switzerland will cede much control of its borders to the European Union. The Alpine republic finds it harder and harder to remain an island because terrorism and modern forms of international crime know no borders. The threats of the 21st century require better international information and warning networks (i.e. the Schengen Information System (SIS), the fingerprint database EUROPDAC) and
coordination with other states on asylum (van Heuven – Manning – Treverton, 1998: 6). Even cooperation between individual partner states is not sufficient to combat modern forms of crime, and broader networks are therefore required. This conflicts fundamentally with Switzerland’s identity as an international maverick and demands rethinking.

If the Schengen/Dublin would have been rejected it would have been Switzerland that would have suffered as a result because it would have become more attractive as a destination for asylum seekers who have been expelled from the European Union (Haltiner, 2002: 7). Like both other associated states, Norway and Iceland, participation in Schengen/Dublin will give Switzerland no formal joint decision-making rights but a formal right of decision-shaping, i.e. Swiss experts will be able to participate in all relevant EU working groups.

Furthermore, the European Union is now (since the establishment of ESDP – European Security and Defence Policy in 1999) capable of carrying out a wide variety of peace missions both of a civilian and a military nature. In 2003 the EU started to put ESDP into practice and has developed tools for crisis management in Bosnia and Macedonia. Since these early beginnings, Switzerland has placed civilian police officers at the disposal of the EU police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (called “EUPM”) and in Macedonia (called “Proxima”). In order for Switzerland to take part in military peace-promotion activities, a UN or OSCE mandate is required because Swiss troops may not participate in military actions whose purpose is to impose peace. But participation in ESDP peace-facilitating missions means that Switzerland is implementing the guidelines of the Security Policy Report 2000 “Security through Cooperation” with the European Union as a partner.

Maybe this is an indication that even Switzerland is on a “European path”, as Bideleux noticed already ten years ago for other neutral states: “(T)he declining strength of Austrian, Finnish and even Swedish neutrality after the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the end of the Cold War … played a major role in persuading them to join the EU for fear of being left “out in the cold”” (Bideleux, 1996: 292).

**Conclusion**

In addition to the above-quoted Max Frisch said: “We want Switzerland to be a country that, although small, is alive and part of the world, not just a museum, a European spa, a retirement sanctuary, a passport bureaucracy, a vault, a crossroad of merchants and spies, or an idyll.” (Burckhardt – Frisch – Kutter, 1955: 29). It seems that 50 years later his wishes may come true. To put it somewhat cynically, Switzerland is still too well off to join the European Union and to become a full member of this part of the world. But the country is approaching Europe and the international community step-by-step after having realized that entire isolation is not so splendid anymore. Today, the Swiss are experiencing a gradual disenchantment with neutrality and the army as a stronghold of national identification. They have to look out for a new role to cope with this development.
Switzerland’s new role in the world and especially in Europe today knows two ways: 1) Security through Cooperation as laid down in the Security Policy Report 2000, 2) supplemented by the Peace Facilitator role. The Confederacy finally joined the United Nations in 2002 and has already signed two Bilateral Agreements with the European Union. The first set of bilateral agreements on trade and labour issues came into force in 2002. A second set of nine treaties on security issues was signed last year. The most recent step was the approval of the Schengen/Dublin association agreement on 5 June 2005. In September 2005, there will be a vote on extending an accord on the free movement of people to the ten new member states – bringing Switzerland closer to the European Union little by little without renewing its membership bid that is still opposed by the majority (Swissinfo: 20.06.2005).

Moreover, Switzerland joined the Partnership for Peace in 1996, is an associated member to NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO-PA) since 1999, provides the “Swissecy”-contingent for KFOR since 1999 as well, and participates in ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Macedonia since 2003. Additionally, providing Good Offices and a policy called “constructive exertion of influence”, as recently outlined by foreign minister Micheline Calmy-Rey (NZZ: 22.05.2005), remain a Swiss foreign policy goal although Switzerland is no longer the automatic choice as go-between in conflicts as it was during the Cold War.

Despite the wary approval of a more active foreign and security policy by the Swiss public, surveys still reveal strong reservations concerning a more aggressive opening up of the country (Bennett et al, 2002). Switzerland surely is adapting to the changed world order and to European trends of security and defence structures, but slowly and cautiously because it’s peculiar linkage between national identity and national security is an obstacle for changing roles more quickly.

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Cultural Patterns of Enlargement: Do Small Central European States Share Common Values?  

Karin Liebhart

Abstract: The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support. Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil society for this development. The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by public campaigns. Against this background this paper deals with selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns, using three small EU members of the Central European region – Austria, Hungary and Slovakia – as examples. Starting from the assumption that national and European images used in the respective campaigns refer to underlying cultural patterns as frames of political orientation one may analyse commonalities and differences in the perception of political roles of the respective states in the new Europe.

Keywords: EU integration and enlargement, political advertisement, public campaigns, images, cultural patterns, CEE, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia

Preface

The following remarks are based on preliminary results of a comparative and multidisciplinary research project which is currently being conducted within the framework of the research programme New Orientations for Democracy in Europe, funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science and Culture. The Public Construction of Europe (PCE) project combines qualitative social science approaches with methods of semiotic analysis and focuses on the symbolic level of politics, in particular on the field of political advertising and campaigning.

The Public Construction of Europe starts from the following assumptions:
– The ongoing process of Europeanization raises the question of citizen support, which cannot be taken for granted;
– Political actors in the relevant states seek to promote the acceptance of civil society for this development;

71 The paper was presented at the CEPSA Annual Conference 2005 a New International Role for Small(er) States? (Vienna, 19–21 May 2005), Panel 2 Regionalization Processes and Comparative Regional Perspectives: ECE, Baltic Area, South Eastern Europe, Central Asia (Caucasus).

72 http://gerda.univie.ac.at/advertisingeurope (Project Management: Andreas Pribersky, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna); the consortium consists of the Department of Political Science of the University of Vienna, the Institute for Socio-Semiotic Studies, the Institute of Political Science of the University of Lyon, the Department of Political Science of the University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration in Budapest and the Department of Political Science of the Faculty of Arts of the Comenius University in Bratislava.
The political bid for consensus building around EU integration and the enlargement process is accompanied by political advertisement and public campaigns; these political campaigns have become a decisive policy-making instrument due to the importance of the mass media, which has transformed the entire texture of politics, in political communication.

Nowadays, the political sphere is mainly perceived as an infinite sequence of images. Andreas Dörner (1999 & 2000) calls this phenomenon the “visual turn” in political mediation.

Against this background, the purpose of the PCE project is to analyse those representations of Europe and the EU that appear in political advertisements and are generated in political campaigns on European integration and enlargement.

Below, selected images that figure prominently in these campaigns will be presented and analysed from a comparative point of view, using Austria, Hungary and Slovakia – three small EU members of the Central European region – as examples.

Assuming that national and European images used in political campaigns refer to underlying cultural patterns (including identity and mentality aspects) as frames of political orientation, one may analyse commonalities and differences in the respective self-perceptions and the role models the particular states follow in the new Europe.

The three small European states, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, have been chosen due to:

- common historic experiences they share and that proved their resilience despite the European divide after 1945, and the separation over decades as a consequence of the Iron Curtain, on the one hand
- similar political culture patterns as characterized, inter alia, by Peter A. Ulram (2003), that mark significant differences between the Central European and other European regions, on the other hand.

Starting from these presumptions, one may ask how the selected countries evaluate their European role and how far the challenges they actually face within the European integration and enlargement process are represented in public views and political images used in EU campaigning. Also, to what extent the small size of the three states plays a decisive role should be questioned: is it seen as a chance, as an asset or does – from their point of view – smallness entail specific threats caused by the EU integration process? Furthermore, the issue is to be raised whether smallness is generally addressed in the respective campaigns, and whether it is chosen as a central theme.

The choice of themes and images was analysed by identifying themes which are frequently and prominently used in Austrian as well as Hungarian and Slovak EU campaigns – albeit with a different emphasis.

Below I will focus on three selected groups of themes occurring in EU campaigns:

- EU accession as a historic turning point and a benchmark for the definition of the country’s European role;
- EU membership as a promise of advantages and better chances;
- EU as a global player that provides new role models for small states.
EU accession as a watershed in national history and ultimate proof of the country’s importance for Europe

In 2005 Austria celebrates not only the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Second Republic and the 50th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty as well as the declaration of permanent neutrality, but also the 10th anniversary of the country’s entry into the European Union. The latter has been labelled by politicians as the real end of the post-war period, the final step in the process of rebuilding Austria after the Second World War. Furthermore, in the wake of 1989, as a consequence of the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Austria faced an identity crisis of sorts due to the loss of its role as the “island of the blessed” in between the two blocs. The role of a neutral meeting point and trustworthy go-between in the centre of Europe had been crucial for the national self-image for more than four decades and fitted the role of a small state in international relations perfectly.

EU membership offered the chance to redefine Austria’s place in international politics. Political advertisement reacted to the challenge in using the slogan “We are Europe” (“Wir sind Europa”) as a core message in the accession campaign. It is remarkable that this slogan was employed again to promote Austria’s first presidency of the European Council in 1998. As a matter of fact, the slogan maintains the European identity of the country, corresponding to rather than conflicting with national identity. In the Austrian collective memory its European identity has been maintained as part of national identity.

At the same time, the slogan alludes to the traditional Austrian self-image of a bridge between East and West, well known from the tourist image of Austria as the “heart of Europe”. In the run-up to accession referendum variations of the slogan “We live in Europe – We love Austria (“Wir leben in Europa – wir lieben Österreich”), “We are Europeans – We remain Austrians” (“Wir sind Europäer – Österreicher bleiben wir”) were used by the Austrian People’s Party.

![Logo and slogan of the Austrian EU accession campaign 1992–1994 (Demner, Merlicek & Bergmann)](image)

The connecting role of the country as a meeting point is as important for Hungarian self image as it is for the Austrian self-image and is also closely connected with
the metaphor of the bridge, frequently presented in tourism brochures. The image of Hungary as the most western country in Central and Eastern Europe – “Hungary as the Western Part of the East” was the traditional joke about the country during the Kádár period – is quite relevant to the supposed cultural and historical tradition of Hungary. Hungarian culture was always seen as integrating, an identity aspect that is said to help the country to fulfil its European role.

![Poster used in the Hungarian EU accession campaign 2003](image)

The bridge symbol served as the central theme of the accession campaign and also for the most spectacular ceremonials events in the national accession celebrations. The three most famous bridges of Budapest were decorated in different guises: the Lánchíd (Chain) Bridge, for example, offered a birthday breakfast for children born on 1 May. Celebration events used the bridge metaphor profusely, and bridge-related events took place all over the country: The topical association was: “We cross to Europe over the bridge” (Kápitany – Kápitanyi, 2004).

With reference to a famous poem of the Hungarian poet Endre Ady, Hungary is traditionally seen as a ferry country, oscillating between East and West. This theme also addresses the mediator function and was taken up in the run-up to EU accession by the Hungarian weekly HVG. The journal raised the rhetorical question “The ferry berths?” on the cover page. The picture showed a rope tied around a peg on a ship landing stage, which was decorated with the golden stars of the EU. The HVG cover conveys the impression that the small country is finally anchored to the West because of EU accession.
Hungary’s entry into the EU in 2004 was evaluated in political and public discourse as a watershed in national history. The respective debates also expressed the feeling that Hungary had only temporarily been separated from the Western part of the continent by the Soviet occupation. As a result, so-called EU junk-parties were popular in Budapest on the eve of EU accession. Collection spots were designated in the capital for objects people did not want to take along to the beautiful new world of the European Union. The objects dropped off were primarily symbols of socialist ideology. Against this backdrop, the EU means the West, the small state has to join, as it is expressed in a statement of the MSZP politician József Tóbiás: “Hungary faces two routes – a highway which leads to Europe and a swampy field path which leads to the Balkans; there is no third route“ (Népszabadság, 29 January 2003).

Compared to Austria and Hungary, the public debate about EU integration had been delayed in Slovakia. This was mainly due to domestic political developments – at least until the autumn of 1998, the question was not whether Slovakia wanted to join the EU but if the EU wanted Slovakia to join. In the case of Slovakia, EU membership was connected with the attitude of getting rid not only of the communist past but as well of those anti-democratic traditions and political culture patterns that were associated with the government of former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. From this point of view the process of Europeanization meant that Slovaks were exposed to institutions and cultures which were simply far more efficient than their own. Thus, the, Slovaks tried to identify themselves with the peoples of Western Europe. The positive perception of the EU is a reciprocal image of how people perceived Slovakia, which they most frequently
described as poor, timid, lacking democratic quality as well as having a clear potential for the future and – as a small state – relying on somebody else’s help. The image of the Union was therefore very attractive and seemed to compensate for those deficits that Slovak citizens perceived negatively in respect to their own country. The campaign in general reflected the non-controversial nature of the EU issue in Slovakia.

While Slovakia, from the perspective of its citizens, lacked European maturity in the field of politics to some extent, it was clearly pointed out in the media and public discourse that geographically speaking, the country had always been a part of Europe. Nevertheless, fears of a loss of national sovereignty of the small state were voiced in the run-up to the accession. The accession campaign reacted, inter alia, by presenting Slovakia as the missing star in the symbolic configuration of the EU.

Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “We have the future in our hands” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)

Poster used in the Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “Let’s not leave it to the others” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)
EU membership as a prospect for advantages and better chances for the country

Austrian EU membership was promoted by the government also as a promise for the increase of prosperity and economic growth. The slogan “Prosperity or Stagnation?” (“Wohlstand oder Stillstand?”) referred to the “Austrian success story” of the Second Republic that is anchored in the collective memory as a popular auto-stereotype and refers to both political and economic matters. It signals that with EU membership the success story would continue. Staying outside the EU, then, was tantamount choosing stagnation.

Moreover, refusing EU entrance by means of voting “No” in the 1994 accession referendum was portrayed as a way to marginalize the country in European and international politics. The slogan “Together or Lonely?” (“Gemeinsam oder einsam?”) suggested the request for cooperation within a larger and more powerful community, particularly for a small country like Austria. The suggestion was that under the roof of the EU, Austria, as a small state, would be able to cope much easier with those challenges and threats it faces in contemporary international economics and politics. The campaign was successful, and in the final analysis, 66.6 per cent of those who participated in the referendum voted for EU accession.
The Austrian enlargement campaign from 2002 to 2004 also resorted to the argument that especially small states are not able to solve their problems alone, by using the slogans “Cross-border problems require cross-border solutions” and “Europe – we increase our chances” (“Europa – wir vergrössern unsere Chancen”). The topics presented as cross-border problems were mainly migration, asylum, crime and ecological issues such as nuclear power plants in the border regions of the country.

It has to be noted that – though Austria shifted from the borders to the centre of the EU due to the 2004 enlargement round and Austrian companies strongly expanded into the CEE region during the last decade – the majority of Austrians were not in favour of EU enlargement in the East, an attitude that does not correspond to the aforementioned bridge metaphor. With the exception of Hungary, the former Eastern Bloc states of Central and Eastern Europe were not welcomed as EU members by the majority of the Austrian population as respective surveys showed (cf. Hintermann et al., 2001). Thus, the government tried to promote EU Eastern enlargement by means of a topic-oriented campaign, which, by the way, was hardly noticed by Austrian citizens.
The Hungarian accession campaign (cf. Kurtán, 2005), implemented by a national foundation (ÑSEUK), which was founded by the government in order to prepare Hungarian society for EU entry (http://www.ufi.hu/feltolt/ufi2003aprilis.pdf) – aimed at providing information about the advantages of EU membership and underscoring the importance of the referendum. Campaign materials such as placards, folders and advertisements in the print media, in the first phase, focused primarily on those social groups that were supposed to be particularly afraid of the consequences of EU membership, especially farmers, peasants, workers in agriculture and small entrepreneurs. The subjects suggested, for example, that EU membership would provide better chances for Hungarian agriculture, family businesses and small companies, on the one hand, and present the chance to expand to other European countries, on the other hand.

Subjects of the Hungarian accession campaign 2003 (Young & Rubicam)
The governmental campaign was complemented by statements of Hungarian politicians such as that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, László Kovács, who stated that EU membership would not cause disadvantages, but at most some difficulties, and finally the result would make up for those troubles (Népszabadság, 17 February 2003). The small states issue was not addressed particularly in this argumentation.

The Slovak EU referendum campaign (Gyárfášová, 2005) was very general in its slogans (“We have the future in our hands”, “Let’s not leave it to the others”) and carried images of open hands, with yellow EU stars – several of them in one hand, while in the other hand just one – symbolized the bid for joining the stronger club. The slogan “It’s better to be in than out!” also pointed in the same direction. It was shown in two ways: firstly as a picture that shows a boy and a girl divided by an almost invisible glass wall; and secondly, a depiction of a fish lying outside an aquarium, out of water, in a dangerous situation.
Boomerang free cards/ Slovak EU accession campaign 2003. Slogan: “It’s better to be in than out” (Creo/Young&Rubicam)

Positive public attitudes towards EU membership provided ideal conditions for the smooth course of the Euro referendum campaign. The Slovak referendum campaign did not target any specific social group and did not put a question mark over the EU membership issue. It thus reflected the stage of the EU debate in Slovakia, where EU entry was a strategic priority not just for the political élite and above all seen as a ticket for little Slovakia to join a sound and prestigious club.

However, public opinion polls conducted in spring 2003 signalled that the main problem would not be the final outcome, but sufficient voter participation and the validity of the plebiscite (there is a 50 per cent turnout quorum in Slovakia). Eventu-
ally, voter turnout reached 52 per cent of eligible voters, which was less than in other CEE countries such as Poland and the Czech Republic, but more than in Hungary (45.62 per cent). The “Yes” for Slovakia’s EU membership was more than resounding (92 per cent), as was the case in Hungary (83.76 per cent).

New role models for small states?

According to the EB 62 survey (autumn 2004), 57 per cent of Slovak citizens thought that their country’s EU membership is a good thing. This figure is close to the EU 25 average (56 per cent) and is the second highest among the 10 new member states. Support for Hungary’s EU membership stood at 49 per cent in autumn 2004. In the case of Austria, 46 per cent viewed the country’s EU membership as an advantage.

Moreover, according to Eurobarometer, 62 per cent of Austrians came out in favour of a more assertive stance of the EU in world politics. An increase in this figure can be observed since spring 2004, especially in security matters. This contrasts with the fundamental identity factor of neutrality, which has been connected with the special role of the small Austrian state in international politics for a long time. The Austrian population seems to be in favour of EU integration as a security project too. Surveys show that Austrians still stick to neutrality as part of their identity, and the neutrality topic was used as a frequent leitmotif in EU campaigning (especially in the European Parliament election campaigns, which have not been analysed in this paper). However, 72 per cent also supported the further development of a common European foreign, security and defence policy, free of NATO influence. The opinion is held that decisions on European defence policy should be primarily taken by the EU (46 per cent); 30 per cent preferred the national government, and only 7 per cent NATO.

Interestingly enough, 63 per cent of Hungarians supported an EU common foreign policy as well as their own foreign policy, and 84 per cent agreed that the EU should further develop a common defence and security policy. Seventy-five per cent of Hungarians agreed that the EU should have a rapid reaction military force to be deployed as a trouble-shooter in case of an international crisis. Against this background it has to be mentioned that although Hungary has been a NATO member since 1999, the Hungarian EU campaign also focused on the advantage of an international security system in which large powers and their neighbours, in particular the smaller states, would act together and which would guarantee protection.

The Common Foreign Policy of the EU towards third countries was supported by 75 per cent of Slovaks, and the highest percentage of supporters (86 per cent) was recorded for the Common Defence and Security Policy. This result is probably related to the lack of interest among Slovaks in their country’s membership of NATO (Slovakia has been a member since 2004) on the one hand, and the lack of tradition in foreign policy formulation, on the other hand. Fifty-five per cent of Slovaks felt more secure thanks to Slovakia’s EU membership, but in general they did not think
their country is particularly threatened because they perceive Slovakia as too small and uninteresting to become a potential target for an attack. Fifty-six per cent wanted decisions in the field of European defence policy to be made jointly at EU level. As in Hungary, a significant majority agreed that the EU should have a rapid military reaction force to guarantee stability and peace in the world.

On top of that, public opinion polls show that smallness is mainly perceived as a potential problem for the countries’ future development. The campaigns reacted to this stereotype: The “in/out” topic was prominently used in the Austrian and the Slovak campaigns, by advertising the necessity of belonging to a larger political player in order to safeguard prosperity and economic growth, in order to guarantee that the small country avoids staying outside and thus would have to cope with forthcoming political and economic challenges alone. Entrance into a larger community was presented not only as an increase of future chances but a step towards protection and shelter as well.

At the same time citizens in all of the three countries are rather pessimistic as regards their influence in EU politics, i.e. the influence of their country. When it comes to Slovakia, only 37 per cent believed that their country’s voice counts in the EU, while in the EU 25 the corresponding figure is 68 per cent. Eighty-three per cent of Slovaks believed that the largest countries have the most power in the EU (in the EU 25 overall this opinion is shared by 75 per cent of citizens).

In respect to EU accession and enlargement campaigns it has to be stated that such topics as common foreign, defence and security policy are hardly mentioned as a concrete advantage of EU membership or a field of politics where small states too could potentially find new roles to perform on the international scene. A tentative explanation might be that EU campaigns in most countries tend to focus on so called domestic issues and identity aspects. Ordinary citizens are not particularly interested in foreign policy.

The small state topic occurs in political campaigning on European integration and enlargement in all of the three countries as an important aspect of the national self-image, but there is no clear idea what the smallness of the respective countries could mean in the framework of a new European and geopolitical configuration and what chances it offers for the construction of a new role in international politics.

The issue that was stressed in the campaigns under analysis was the traditional European character of the small states as an identity-founding pattern that had to be proved by successful EU integration. At the same time, the entry into the European club was presented as a decisive break in the countries’ post-war history: for Austria it meant the final step of the rebuilding of the state after 1945 and the crowning of the Austrian success story. As regards Hungary and Slovakia, EU membership was linked with the decision to clearly become part of the West (Europe), as opposed to remaining in the East (sometimes identified with the Balkans). By the way, it has to be mentioned that this issue was discussed in Austria as well, on the eve of EU accession, but not with the same emphasis. The Austrian and Hungarian campaigns both stressed the
connecting and mediating function of their countries, a pattern that perfectly fits the traditional roles of small states and goes with the national self-image. Both campaigns also reflected tourist images of the countries.

To summarize, what is missing in the analysed campaigns – though debated among political élite and discussed in the media – is a clear idea about the future role of the smaller states in European enlargement, neighbourhood and international politics. Moreover, one can hardly find any views that would indicate concepts for the formation of a new regional or topic-related group. The diversity among European small states seems to offset commonalities, such as shared political interests or specific properties of smallness.

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Népszabadság, 17 February 2003.


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Per Asper Ad Astra. Human Security in International Relations Practice: a Comparative Study of Foreign and Development Policies of EU/HSN Member States

Šárka Waisová

Abstract: In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something of a buzzword, used by United Nations agencies, national development agencies, international as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations scholars. Besides the UN, there are other international forums where the incorporation of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been discussed – primarily in the Human Security Network (HSN) and the European Union. The main goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understanding of human security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, instruments and approaches of these states. I argue that EU/HSN countries have based their human security conceptualization on strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and all of them have accepted security-development interdependence. However, the human security paradigm is not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these states have been accepting and using human security only as far as their national security strategy and EU membership makes it possible.

Key words: human security, Human Security Network, European Union, Austria, Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Slovenia

Debates about security and strategies and instruments for conflict resolution have retained their place at the core of international relations theory and practice for several decades. In the post-Cold War period, when many bloody local and intrastate conflicts have broken out, a broad debate began among politicians as well as scholars about new sources of insecurity, possibilities to meet new threats and risks and about the role of the state and of international organizations in the maintenance of security. The debates showed an agreement that security is crucial, but disagreement as to what it entails and how it should be maintained.

In the 1990s in the debate about security and conflict resolution a new term appeared – “human security”. In the last 10 years “human security” has even become something of a buzzword, used by United Nations (UN) agencies, national development agencies, international as well as national NGOs and, last but not least, by international relations (IR) scholars. From the vocabulary and politics of UN agencies such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), we have the feeling that human security is a broadly accepted

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Over Hurdles towards the Stars.
term and deeply rooted approach. However, there is a group of IR actors who generally have not accepted this term – and these are states.

Despite this resistance by some states, a (small) group of countries emerged which more or less accepted the human security concept in their foreign and domestic policies. Some of the states supporting human security established a group of like-minded countries called the Human Security Network (HSN). The Network emerged from the cooperation between Canada and Norway as part of the campaign to ban landmines. It was formally launched at a conference at of Foreign Ministers (of Austria, Canada and Norway) in Bergen in 1999. Today the HSN has 12 member states: Austria; Canada; Chile; Greece; The Netherlands; Ireland; Jordan; Mali; Norway; Slovenia; Switzerland and Thailand, along with South Africa as an observer. The Human Security Network today represents “a coalition of the willing” which, politically and financially, supports various programmes and activities to strengthen human security.

Besides the HSN and the UN there are other international forums where the incorporation of human security issues into foreign and development policy has been discussed – primarily in the European Union (EU). In recent years many workshops and conferences have taken place among EU institutions, EU member states, EU member states’ NGOs and scholars about the need to incorporate human security into the EU agenda. One of first official steps in this incorporation was a document presented by Javier Solana in December 2003 – a Secure Europe in a Better World: a European Security Strategy. This document sees both the regional and global environment as one of the key conditions of European (EU) security. The Strategy puts forward the key security challenges, specifically terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures on EU borders and organized crime (Solana, 2003: 6 – 9). Key referent objects are the EU, its member states and population. Solana’s paper also accepts non-military threats as a challenge and understands security as a first precondition of development and vice versa (Solana 2003: 6 & 19). The most important instrument for ensuring EU (member states) security is ensuring the human security of the EU as well as the non-EU population (Solana, 2003: 4). To sum up, in terms of European security strategy one of most important security strategies is securing human security inside EU borders and beyond.  

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74 The Human Security Network grew out of a bilateral arrangement between Canada and Norway, signed at Lysøen Island, Norway in 1998. The HSN wanted, through an informal and flexible mechanism, to promote actions on behalf of human security. The HSN is today a forum for consultation and its actions are based on ministerial meetings at least once a year (Fuentes, 2001).

75 One of the states which also supports human security but is not a member of HSN is Japan. It supports human security programmes and strategies primarily within the UN framework, particularly the activities of the Human Security Commission, UNDP and UNHCR.

76 The development-human security nexus is seen also in other EU documents – see for example the Annual Report 2004 on the European Community’s development policy and external assistance.

77 … in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand … (Solana, 2003: 11). … Even in an era of globalization, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed (Solana, 2003: 12).
The European security strategy therefore includes at least two security paradigms: national security and human security. However, the “war on terrorism” marginalizes human security and development issues in EU policies. Development aid is becoming secondary to, and subsumed by, foreign policy concerns.

The deepening of discussion and the first practical steps towards incorporating human security into the EU agenda can be observed during the EU presidency of Ireland (first half of 2004) and the Netherlands (second half of 2004). The Irish and Dutch EU presidencies significantly influenced the understanding and integration of human security into EU policies. As the Irish and Dutch example shows, EU/HSN member states can have a great impact on the integration and embedding of human security into EU security doctrine and policies. In addition to Ireland and the Netherlands, the EU/HSN member states are Austria, Greece and Slovenia.

The main goal of this text is to analyse and compare the contemporary understanding of human security in EU/HSN member states and the human security strategies, instruments and approaches of these states. This can give us a perspective on future EU security conceptualization, strategies and instruments, which are still in the process of formation.

The article is divided into four parts. Firstly, I will introduce a brief history of the concept of human security. Secondly, I will show how HSN member states understand human security and what the difference is between the HSN’s conception of human security and other human security conceptions, mainly the conception of the UN and its agencies. Thirdly, I will discuss the main issues of the HSN’s agenda, i.e. issues which the HSN – as a group of like-minded states – prioritizes. I will also briefly mention the values, principles, norms and rules that HSN states share. The fourth part of the article analyses the human security conceptualization and priorities of individual EU/HSN member states (not all member states prioritize all issues in the same way) and demonstrate the instruments and strategies which are used by these states to realize their human security priorities.

My text is based primarily on research of the activities and official documents of EU/HSN states, such as annual foreign policy yearbooks, development reports and statements of EU/HSN representatives; I also studied official web pages, documents and activities of EU/HSN states’ partners, especially those of non-governmental organizations.

A brief history of the concept of human security

Although the national security paradigm dominated IR in the last 50 years, the emphasis on the security and the sovereignty of the individual is a much older idea (for more see Rothschild, 1995). The liberal or pluralistic understanding of security as an objective of individuals and groups as well as of states was characteristic, in general, of the period from the mid-17th century to the French Revolution. The military sense of security, where it is an objective of states, was a new concept that coincided with the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (Rothschild, 1995). In fact, until the beginning of the 20th century, security was seen as a condition both of individuals and of states. However, the two world wars, increasing armaments and expanding armies, and finally the nuclear path of the superpowers in the 1960s led to a redefinition of security, which lost both non-military and non-state features. Since the second half of the 1940s in the USA and since the beginning of the 1960s worldwide, the national security conception dominated in IR theory and practice (Earle, 1943; Morgenthau, 1948 & 1993 & 1952; Souers, 1949; Huzar, 1950; Furniss 1952; Wolfers, 1952 and Waltz, 1979).

In late 1980s a more significant transformation of the concept of security started. This was influenced mainly by the work of the Copenhagen School (scholars from the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, such as B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, P. Lemaitre and M. Kelstrup) and of the Third World School (A. Acharya and M. Ayoob). Both challenged the national security paradigm by debate about referent objects of security and sources of threats. Buzan, Acharya and Ayoob more or less recognized individuals and groups (e.g. humankind and the family) as a referent object of security too, and the particular importance of non-military threats such as underdevelopment, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and the like. These authors criticized the realist vision of security for the individual, who was made synonymous with citizenship, i.e. security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from being a citizen of another state. According to these IR scholars, individuals have explicit rights, which are not dependent on the (non-)existence of the state or citizenship.

The idea of rights for the individual or groups, which should exist independently of the state, led to the emergence of the human security concept in the theory as well as practice of IR. IR practice has had an even deeper impact on the conceptualization of human security. The main driving forces in this process during last decade have been the United Nations and Canada and the HSN.

UN versus HSN human security discourse

There are many and varied formulations of human security; most formulations emphasize the interdependence between development and security, the welfare of ordinary people, maintaining basic human rights and the realization of human potential. As noted above, we can identify in contemporary IR discourse two main approaches to human security: the first is the United Nations approach; the other is that of the HSN (or of Canadian or middle-power states). First, it is necessary to make clear the differences between these two approaches and then introduce their common elements before we analyse the foreign and development policies of EU/HSN member states, because the difference/commonality is crucial for this analysis.

The UN human security agenda is based on the human security definition of the UNDP, which “understands security first and foremost as the prerogative of the
individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights and dignity to the relief of human suffering” (Hammerstand, 2000: 39). The major components of the UN human security conception are freedom from fear and freedom from want. According to the UN’s conception, human security has various categories or dimensions such as economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (Human Development Report 1994: 24 – 25). However, the main feature of the UN’s human security conception is prioritising the individual over the state. State security is merely the means by which to achieve individual security – the state is a means to an end, not an end in itself. One of the most important aspects of the UN’s human security conception is the clear human security-level of the development-security nexus. This approach essentially equates human development and human security by proposing that human security involves alleviating all types of human insecurity.

The HSN perspective on human security differs from that of the UN. The HSN uses the human security concept as an umbrella to cover a wide humanitarian agenda, including support for the International Criminal Court, the ban on landmines, prohibition of child sexual and labour exploitation and preventing, suppressing and punishing human trafficking. The HSN’s conceptualization of human security focuses on the security of people, complementing the traditional emphasis on state security. In the HSN perspective, the necessary conditions of human security are maintenance of territorial integrity, the building of good (domestic) governance and the broader responsibility of the international community. The HSN connects the level of human security clearly to the level of development, as does the UN, but the development is not understood purely economically. Development in the HSN perspective integrates strong human rights aspects. That is why one of the HSN strategies supports the internalization (embedding) of human rights norms and values. The HSN’s approach is more narrowly focused than the UN’s approach; it focuses on protecting individuals and communities against any form of violence.

To briefly sum up this section, what are the differences between the two conceptions of human security and what are their common features? The main common feature of both perspectives is acceptance of non-military and indirect threats such as underdevelopment, population displacement, and the clear security-development nexus. The main difference relates to the understanding of the role of the state and of the international community in the maintenance of the security of the individual. The UN’s conception has long ignored the state as the guarantor of individual security. The UN pays more attention to global forces (such as economic disparities, environmental degradation, etc.) and economic (developmental) conditions (such as fair trade and minimum living standards). The HSN’s conception prioritizes the enlargement of international (global) acceptance of humanitarian law, human rights (and their internalization by various actors) and socio-economic equity by being careful to respect the sovereignty of the state. HSN member states do not understand human security as a substitute for conventional security, but rather as a component of it, adding the
element that the first priority is concern for the welfare of people, citizens and civil society (Fuentes, 2001: 84).

**HSN agenda and strategies**

Since the establishment of the HSN in 1999, the issues of priority which form the basic framework for HSN member states’ activities and projects have been formulated. At the first ministerial meeting, the participants clearly stated that human security can be advanced through protection and promotion of human rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, good governance, a culture of peace and the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Fuentes, 2001). Between the Lysřen meeting in 1998 and the last ministerial meeting in Thailand in late 2004 the following issue areas were established in the HSN agenda:

- **Millennium development goals:** All HSN member states accepted the list of MDG and participate in fulfilling them (for more information see [www.milleniumdevelopmentgoals.org](http://www.milleniumdevelopmentgoals.org)).
- **Anti-personnel landmines:** Landmines are seen as one of most serious hurdles for local economic development and as a serious threat to the health of all local people, primarily children. The HSN aim is to ban the use of landmines worldwide and to remove the mines from contaminated countries to increase the security and support the development of local communities in post-conflict periods.
- **Small arms:** Widespread illegal ownership of small arms has had a great impact on almost all intrastate conflicts in recent decades. There are regions where small arms are a part of daily life. The HSN aim is to establish a control mechanism for national, regional and international illicit and licit traffic of armaments, decrease the number of illegally held small arms and weaken the culture of weapons by building peaceful civil societies.
- **Children in armed conflict:** In recent decades children have been almost entirely hidden by all types of armed conflict. The HSN aim is to identify the specific needs of children in armed conflict, primarily to prevent recruitment of children into regular as well as irregular armies, to help former child soldiers in leaving the armies and finding alternative ways of life and to help children harmed by armed conflict (psychosomatic disorders, mine victims, etc.). One element of this issue is the fight against all forms of labour and sexual exploitation of children.
- **International humanitarian and human rights law:** The HSN member states are convinced of the strong relevance of international humanitarian and human rights law for increasing human security. The aim of the HSN is to broaden the human rights norms incorporated into international law and to broaden the group of states which sign, ratify and respect these international norms. Two elements of this aim are the support of the International Criminal Court and the improvement of the situation of refugees and internally displaced persons.
Conflict prevention: The HSN member states are convinced that a working early warning system and early prevention of the outbreak of violence can decrease human suffering and many material losses. The HSN aim is to strengthen the capacity of the UN as well as other international, regional and local frameworks to develop cooperative strategies for prevention of the use of violence. An organic part of this aim is the promotion of gender dimensions in peace-building.

Transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons: In connection with many local and intrastate conflicts, there is an increase in the amount of resources obtained by guerrilla forces, warlords and other actors through transnational organized crime. The aim of HSN member states is to make the international trade of resources more transparent (compare, for example, the Kimberley process as an instrument of controlling illicit and licit traffic of diamonds79) and to develop the legal framework to combat transnational organized crime.

Resources for development: the HSN confirms the broadly accepted human security-development nexus, the key condition for fulfilling previous tasks being to concentrate sufficient resources and to invest them meaningfully and transparently.

As mentioned above, HSN works as a group of like-minded countries, whose foreign policies are guided by a “human internationalist orientation, which features an acceptance that the citizens and governments of the industrialized world have ethical responsibilities towards those beyond their borders who are suffering severely and who live in abject poverty” (Behringer, 2003: 2). The HSN framework makes possible collective action of all or only some of the members, as well as the collective action of some members together with non-members and also individual action. In the first years of HSN existence, the member states usually took advantage of collective action. As Ronald Behringer notes, collective action made it possible for these medium-sized powers states to exercise effective leadership in international politics (for more see Behringer, 2003). These collective action cases include the attempt to create a rapidly deployable brigade for United Nations peacekeeping, the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines, the initiative to establish the International Criminal Court, the effort to produce international regulations on the legal trade in small arms and light weapons (Behringer, 2003: 1), the initiative to produce international regulations on children fighting in armed conflicts and, last but not least, on preventing, suppressing and punishing people trafficking (see Table 1).

In the last three or four years, we can often observe the cooperation only among some HSN countries which was officially confirmed at a meeting in Santiago. At the HSN meeting in Santiago de Chile (2002) member countries even officially concluded that human security should be discussed not only in global forums, but that the

discourse on human security concerns in regional frameworks should be increased (Address by H.E. the Austrian Foreign Minister B. Ferrero-Waldner). Thus, many bilateral or trilateral projects among HSN countries have been established in recent years and months (see below).

In the following section I will show the specific national human security approaches and strategies of HSN states to open the floor for comparison and for analysing the possible influence of EU/HSN member states on the EU security conceptualization.

**Austria**

Austrian foreign and security policy has been based on neutrality since 1955. As a neutral country, Austria – very similar to Ireland – has oriented itself towards multilateral cooperation within the UN. Austrian military forces have traditionally participated in various peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, and it has funded many UN development aid activities. In response to the Gulf War, the prevailing view in Austria changed: it now holds that obligations under the Statute of the UN take precedence over obligations under neutrality. Further changes of Austrian neutrality were mostly influenced by the country’s membership of the EU (since 1995) and by adopting Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The acceptance of the CFSP and ESDP profoundly changed the organizing principles of Austrian security policy, which “is today characterized as non-allied rather than neutral” (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). The contemporary Austrian foreign and security policy is dominated by state-centred strategies (as in most EU member states and in the CFSP), which were furthermore strengthened in accordance with the “war on terror” (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine).

One of the national security strategies seems to be human security and development support. Austrian security policy respects the idea that geographical distance no longer guarantees sufficient protection of national security and that long-distance instabilities and underdevelopment can threaten the country (Resolution of the Austrian Parliament: Security and Defence Doctrine). In the Austrian perspective, human security and development projects can be a way to ensure the state’s national security.

Austria became a member of HSN in 1999 and chaired the Network for the period 2002–2003. Between 1999 and 2005 it adopted the HSN concept and is one of the most active member countries. The Austrian human security approach has been deeply influenced by the country’s neutrality and later changes to this policy. The principal issues of Austrian human security policy are women’s rights (legal regulation of violence against women, particularly a ban on female genital mutilation), children’s rights (particularly a ban on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, and support of programmes for children affected by armed conflicts) and human rights generally (abolishing the death penalty, human rights education, protection of
minorities and rights of refugees and internally displaced persons) (*Austrian Foreign Policy Yearbook 2003*).

The main Austrian human security strategies comprise development cooperation (for comparison of development aid see Table 2); support and assistance to programmes and funds of the UN system (particularly UNIFEM, UN Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, UNESCO, ILO, WHO); grants for humanitarian non-governmental organizations, creation of a human rights education system and initiation of international humanitarian law norms and their incorporation into national laws (see Table 1; Austria and Norway regularly put forward a resolution on internally displaced persons, within the UN). Austria’s partners in human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries and governmental (UN and OSCE/chaired by Austria in 2000) and non-governmental organizations (International Red Cross Committee and Austrian organizations).

The responsibility for development policy belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Department VII *Development Cooperation, cooperation with Eastern Europe and coordination of international development policy*. In 2002, upon passing the new Federal Development Cooperation Act the several-year long restructuring process of the Austrian Development Cooperation was finished. The Act provides an improved basis for Austrian development cooperation activities. The Act also strengthened the legal status of Austrian NGOs, which are the most important partners of Austrian human security policy (*Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development Policy*: 23 – 29). Austrian development policy is guided by a commitment to combating poverty, ensuring peace and human security, preserving the environment, and protecting natural resources (*Three-Year-Programme 2004–2006 on Austrian Development Policy*). Two years later, in 2004, an amendment to the Development Cooperation Act was passed which created a new structure – the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). The ADA, which started operation in 2004, is responsible for implementing projects and programmes for development cooperation and cooperation with Eastern Europe. ADA especially focuses on promoting human rights, democratic participation and responsible governance, as well as on conflict prevention. The main area of Austrian interest is Southeastern Europe and Iraq.

Austria concentrates on various mine-action funding and the support of demining – in 2002 it served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty and since 2003 it has financed demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Mozambique. In 2004 Austria co-organized and chaired “The Nairobi summit on a mine-free world”. Together with Slovenia and Jordan, Austria established the Initiative to assist war-traumatized children and child victims in Iraq, as part of post-conflict reconstruction activities. Austria also supports the Slovene Centrum TOGETHER (see below) and is the main donor to the Austrian Aid for Mine Victims, an NGO.

Austria (MFA) funds the European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Graz and the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights in Vienna. Both institutes create academic bases for Austrian human security initiatives
and prepare policy papers and manuals. During the Austrian HSN presidency the Child Rights Training Curriculum “Child Protection, Monitoring and Rehabilitation” and the Manual on Human Rights Education was prepared, which has been translated into English, Spanish, French and Arabic. Austria also broadly supports the creation of regional human rights centres, which provide local human rights training. The main idea behind these Austrian human rights activities is to bridge the gap between universal human rights standards and their implementation; between programmatic concepts and a systematic response on the ground (Chair’s summary. Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the HSN).

**Greece**

Greek security and defence policy had been traditionally focused on “hard” security, particularly on territorial defence. The Greek security conceptualization started to change in the 1990s, when “soft” security concerns, including migration and refugee flows, took centre stage in the national debate. This significant change in foreign policy reflects the new Greek geopolitical position in the post-Cold War period, which was caused by the end of Greek geopolitical marginalization mainly because of the shifting of security challenges from the centre of Europe to the periphery. Greece became an important actor not only in the Balkans, but also in the Black Sea region, the Transcaucasus and the Middle East. The country’s foreign policy was also strongly influenced by changes within Greek society and in the economic and political imperatives of a more European policy. Changes in the EU agenda after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties accelerated profound changes in Greek foreign policy; some scholars even say that it is undergoing a process of strong Europeanization (Lesser – Larrabee – Zanini – Vlachos 2001: 68 & 103 – 105). Europeanization involves profound change of value-orientation and of the organizing principles of Greek foreign and security policy, which is still markedly state-centred. However, in many cases we can observe a growing respect for human security.

Greece became a HSN member in 2000, and its human security activities are very limited in comparison with Austrian efforts. Greece, which recognizes the human security-development nexus is at the half-way stage in its adoption of HSN ideas and is one of the least active member countries. The principal issues of Greek human security policy are peace building, rule of law, human rights (Greece strongly supported the establishment of the International Criminal Court), demining activities, eradicating organized crime and support of good governance. Greece is one of the EU/HSN states with the lowest development cooperation grants. The country itself has participated in EU development cooperation since 1999.

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80 Possible evidence of Greek human security acceptance could be in the near future the agenda of the Greek UN mission within the UN Security Council, because Greece became a UN Security Council non-permanent member for the period 2005–2006.
The main Greek human security strategies comprise support for all development cooperation and demining initiatives in Southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region. The responsibility for development policy belongs to the International Development Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The national development agency – Hellenic Aid – was established within the MFA in 2000. Hellenic Aid partners are mainly regional or national NGOs, the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), the International Orthodox Christian Charity and the Athens-based International Mine Initiative.

Greece concentrates on various mine-actions and support of demining, mainly because of regional conditions. It understands the demining process as a confidence-building and conflict prevention instrument within the region and with its neighbours – Greece itself actually used landmines on the borders with Turkey and Bulgaria. Greece and Turkey decided to join the Mine Ban Treaty simultaneously (in May 2003), and Greece is now carrying mine clearance operation in the Epirus and Macedonian regions, and supports demining in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Lebanon. In addition to helping in the demining process, Greece also assists mine survivors. The main bodies involved in this assistance are the Ministry of Defence, the National Health Service and the Hellenic Red Cross.

Official development cooperation is the responsibility of the national development agency Hellenic Aid. The Responsibilities of Hellenic Aid involve designing and implementing the national strategy for urgent humanitarian aid and development cooperation. Hellenic Aid concentrates its activities on food security, providing aid in emergencies and support of good governance (supporting civil society and institutional capabilities). In comparison to Austria, Greece focuses its development activities strongly on Southeastern Europe. Since 2002 a Five-Year Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans (HIPERB) has been in force. HIPERB has financed specific projects in the areas of agriculture and processing. The main partners for Hellenic Aid are NGOs actively involved in the Balkans and ECHO.

One of the newest Greek initiatives, which are presented as a part of the human security framework and which is more or less symbolic, is the creation of the International Olympic Truce Centre (officially launched in Athens in 2000). The Centre grew out of the agreement between the International Olympic Committee and the Greek Governmental should encourage the use of sport and the Olympic ideal to promote a peaceful world. However, until now no projects have been begun.

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81 Greece is a member of the Pact of Stability for South Eastern Europe and also a member of the Black Sea Cooperation Initiative.
82 For more see [www.deming.gr](http://www.deming.gr).
83 Greece maintains minefields on its border with Turkey and along the Evros River in the north of the country. There are also mined areas dating from the Greek Civil War (1947–1949) in the Epyrus, Grammos and Vitsi Mountains, and in areas near the border with Bulgaria (Landmine Monitor Report 2003).
Ireland

Ireland has been a neutral country strongly oriented towards multilateral cooperation within the UN. The priorities of Irish foreign and security policy have for many years included participation in UN peacekeeping, development aid, humanitarian cooperation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations. Neutrality is more deeply embedded in Irish society and politics than it is in Austria, but when we observe contemporary Irish neutrality, it is going through the same crisis as in the Austrian case. The main reason for the Irish neutrality problem is Irish EU membership, primarily development of the CFSP/ESDP. The UN-oriented multilateral security strategy was replaced by a state-centred security paradigm oriented towards NATO and an armed EU (*White Paper on Defence, 2000*). This crisis was demonstrated during the referendum on the Nice Treaty, when EU opponents used posters saying “Hello NATO, good-bye UN” (Doyle, 2005: 3). This clearly shows that many Irish people understand EU/NATO strategies as incompatible with UN strategies and the neutral status of the country.

The human security orientation is today mostly visible in development aid policy. Although Ireland became a member of the HSN in 1999, it is adopting the human security catalogue relatively slowly. Ireland has been adopting a holistic human security paradigm, which focuses on all threats, both those of a violent and those of a structural nature. While in the case of Austria and Greece the main driving force behind human security initiatives are national governments, in the Irish case the government, including the MFA, lagged far behind – the main driving force was NGOs. The strongest Irish human security actor is Dóchas, The Irish Association of Non-Governmental Development Organizations. Dóchas has organized many workshops, conferences and other activities to pressure the Irish government into integrating the human security concept not only into Irish, but also into EU external policies. In the last two years Ireland has supported the change of the HSN from an informal network into more formal fora (*Opening Address by Mr. Tom Kitt TD*).

Ireland experienced a great deal of progress in adopting human security vocabulary and initiatives in late 2003 and in the first half of 2004, in the period of Irish EU presidency. But we can observe Irish activities relating to the human security paradigm before, in the early 2000s, when Ireland was a UN Security Council (UNSC) non-permanent member (Ireland’s term in the UNSC was 2001–2002). The UN Security Council has had discussions on geographically defined issues, as well as occasional meetings on thematic issues, where the Irish human security perspective was most visible. Though the Irish UN mission decided not to hold any such debate (Doyle, 2005: 22), Ireland participated very actively in debates about conflict resolution, the relationship between conflict prevention and development aid, the negative humanita-

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86 Irish Defence forces have participated in UN peacekeeping since 1958.
87 As John Doyle explains, Ireland took a tactical decision not to use the Council as a platform to raise issues on which it had no hope of making progress (Doyle 2005: 28).
rian impact of sanctions, and women and security (primarily on the effects of conflict on women and girls and the contribution of women to conflict resolution). During 2001 and 2002 the establishment of the International Criminal Court was discussed many times within the Security Council. Ireland promoted the establishment and full functioning of the ICC in clear opposition to the USA; Ireland has also rejected any suggestions of exemptions for US soldiers or US members of UN missions.

As mentioned above, the period when progress in Irish human security activities was most visible was during the Irish EU presidency. The Irish EU presidency priorities were implementation of the EU Guidelines on Children in Armed Conflict and the adoption of EU Guidelines on Support for Human Rights Defenders. Dóchas’ pressure during Irish EU presidency led to the initiation of the first (but informal) meeting of the EU’s development cooperation ministers, which aimed to focus the debate on the development-security nexus. The main result of the NGOs’ discussion with development ministers and the Irish MFA was the consensus about future rules for development aid: development aid has to be securitized and incorporated into security measures such as peacekeeping operations or other UN mandated security missions, because “the language of the ‘war on terror’ won’t overtake that of development” (Opening address by Mr. Tom Kitt TD).

Ireland is one of the strongest supporters of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. It strongly prefers three issues of human security policy and MDG, which in the Irish foreign policy agenda are not officially connected to human security, but are main points in the HSN agenda: 1) Development aid; 2) Human rights (particularly promotion; protection and support of children’s rights and the International Criminal Court); and 3) Provision of UN peacekeeping personnel. This was made possible by the evolution of Irish national security beyond the narrow role of territorial defence towards issues of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and crisis management. The main driving force in development aid and other human security activities is, besides Irish NGOs, the Irish MFA (partly in cooperation with Ministry of Defence) and the national development agency, Development Cooperation Ireland (so-called Ireland Aid or DCI). Ireland Aid, which was established in 1974 (compare the Greek and Austrian cases), is assigned to a minister of state for development cooperation and human rights.

When researching Irish human security activities, we can always see a more cross-sectoral and comprehensive approach. The Irish strategy of development aid is based on coherence between trade and development policy (the Irish motto is “trade people out of poverty”). Irish human security activities incorporate strategies on gender, governance, HIV/AIDS and development activities. In comparison to Greece, Austria and Slovenia, the Irish development cooperation initiatives are not oriented towards European countries, but more or less outside Europe, particularly towards sub-Saharan Africa. As part of the development aid policy (for a comparison see

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89 In March 2003 East Timor became the first country to receive Ireland Aid assistance country outside sub-Saharan Africa (www.dci.gov.ie/print.asp 4 May 2005).
Table 2) the Irish MFA supports various programmes fighting against HIV/AIDS, projects eradicating poverty, and educational projects (*The Report of the Ireland Aid Review Committee*).

**The Netherlands**

After their negative experience with neutrality, the Netherlands gave preference to NATO and EU membership after the Second World War. The country, which became a member of the HSN in 1999, adopted a rather “intermediate” position in respect of the human security paradigm in which the NATO state-centred security strategy continue to dominate Dutch security policy (Silva, 2001: 65), while the individual-centred security paradigm is promoted slowly, and primarily in development cooperation (similar to Ireland and Austria). The Netherlands has traditionally supported multilateral UN operations and humanitarian and development programmes, but as a former colonial empire it has also preserved its own special relationship with many countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. Development, humanitarian and technological aid thus has a long tradition in Dutch foreign policy. The colonial heritage, together with issues such as international drug and people trafficking and pandemics such as HIV/AIDS or SARS, has blurred the traditional distinction between national and international security issues.

During the last few years, five main goals of Dutch foreign policy can be identified: 1) strengthening of international governance; 2) promoting international peace, security and stability; 3) promoting European cooperation; 4) reducing poverty in a sustainable way; and 5) maintaining and strengthening bilateral relations. As we can see, there are three goals which are part of the HSN agenda – points one, two and five. The key to successful international governance, maintenance of peace and the reduction of poverty is, according to the Dutch policy agenda, ensuring an effective international legal order, effective conflict prevention and conflict management (particularly peace-keeping and peace-building) and, last but not least, effective and productive support of Millennium Development Goals.

The main driving force in Dutch human security activities is the, General Directorate for International Cooperation (GDIS) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The GDIS is headed by a minister without portfolio, the Minister of International Cooperation. The Netherlands has traditionally engaged in the fight against poverty and funded initiatives supporting marginal sectors of developing countries (ethnic minorities, women, children, immigrants etc.). Between 2000 and 2001 the Dutch approach became more like that of the Irish – the Netherlands now supports human security through trade measures and fiscal and economic reforms (Silva, 2001: 66). The Dutch MFA itself calls this approach “an integrated foreign policy”, with close links between issues of peace and security, good governance and human rights, trade, poverty, the environment and migration (Policy Agenda 2005). During its EU presidency period,

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the Dutch policy continued in the Irish way and emphasized the centrality of conflict prevention, the Mine Ban Treaty, human rights and “the human rights deficit” in EU development policies. The Netherlands promoted a similar policy agenda during its presidency of the OSCE (during 2003) and under its Security Council membership (in the period 1999 – 2000).

The Dutch integrated approach uses all instruments (political, diplomatic, military, civilian and trade and development cooperation) in a coordinated way, by creating the Dutch Stability Fund, which combines Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funds. All mine action assistance was transferred to the Stability Fund91. Since 1999 the Netherlands has been further reforming its development aid policy, in which bilateral lines of cooperation with more than 100 countries were replaced by bilateral cooperation with around 20.

Although the Dutch government has not fully integrated the human security concept into its vocabulary, the Netherlands has always played a leading role in defending human rights and the validity of international humanitarian law (Silva, 2001: 67), eradicating poverty (the Netherlands is the biggest donor among EU/HSN member countries – for a comparison see Table 2) and improving the situation of women and children in armed conflicts. The Netherlands has supported all the HSN’s activities to ban the use of landmines and to demine, and to control the illicit and licit trade in small arms and light weapons.

The Netherlands advocates security as a condition for development and vice versa; the main Dutch human security strategies comprise development cooperation, all-round support for peacekeeping operations, grants for humanitarian non-governmental organizations and initiation of international humanitarian law norms and support of their worldwide acceptance. In comparison to Austria, Greece or Ireland, the Netherlands does not hugely support the UNDP or other UN agencies promoting the “paternal” concept of human security. The major factor in determining the level of the Dutch contribution is the effectiveness of these institutions. The Dutch MFA hardly ever gives aid directly to governments; it often implements its human security projects through grants for humanitarian and development NGOs.

**Slovenia**

The Slovene EU/HSN position is very different from that of all the countries discussed above: Slovenia is a small, newly independent post-Communist country, which for the last 15 years has been confronted with many conflicts in Southeastern Europe. The Slovene historical experience and location on the margins of an unstable region has led the country to develop a special sensitivity for interethnic understanding and multicultural coexistence. The situation in Southeastern Europe also initiated Slovene EU and NATO membership. Slovenia, aware of its smallness and weakness, has been looking since its independence for multilateral recognition and guarantees; its foreign

policy focuses strongly on multilateral action. That is why Slovenia accepted one of the main guidelines of the HSN – support of development, proliferation and internalization of international law norms – very quickly. Slovenia itself was, after gaining its independence, very active in the legislative sector and signed and ratified many acts protecting national minorities, human rights and humanitarian principles. It is even one of the few states which have accepted the possibility of UN-led humanitarian intervention.\(^2\)

Slovene HSN membership is very similar to that of Greece: with the end of the Cold War Slovenia moved from the security periphery to the European security centre. The Slovene security conceptualization is profoundly influenced by the unstable regional environment and negative historical experience, and the foreign and security policy is clearly dominated by the state-centred approach. However, the major sources of national security threats are asymmetric; non-military sources of threats are becoming even more frequent. The appropriate response to asymmetric threats lies, according to the Slovene Ministry of Defence, in the formation of a unified and integrated system covering security as well as development elements. Slovenia emphasizes the interdependence between the security of the state, the individual, society and the international community (Strategic Defence Review, 2004). Development, humanitarian and technological aid contributes to the greater security of Slovenia.

As the smallest EU/HSN member country, Slovenia became a HSN member in 1999. Its main human security strategies comprise aid for children in armed conflicts, including child soldiers, human rights education, control of small arms and light weapons, the fight against HIV/AIDS, the ban on landmines, and demining. Development cooperation remains for the time being on the periphery of Slovene human security strategies. The main reason for this has been the relative poverty of the country and the great costs of comprehensive economic reforms at the beginning of the 1990s. Since Slovenia is an EU member country, the amount of development aid and the level of development cooperation is increasing in accordance with EU demands (The Consequence of Enlargement for Development Policy 2003) (for a comparison see Table 2). The main areas of interest for Slovene human security projects have been, for many years, Southeastern Europe and, more recently, Iraq.

The Slovene partners within human security initiatives are mainly HSN countries (Austria and Jordan) and governmental (UN – especially UNICEF – and the OSCE – chaired by Slovenia in 2005) and non-governmental organizations. In fact, all Slovene human security projects are primarily implemented by Slovene NGOs or NGOs in which the country participates. These NGOs gain their main resources for the carrying out of human security projects from the Slovene MFA or Austrian, American, Irish and

\(^2\) Slovenia shares the perception of the UN General Assembly and supports the UN’s new policies relating to security, which state that in cases such as those related to crime on a large scale against the civilian population, the protection of human life shall be a priority before the sovereignty of the state. … That is why Slovenia strongly supports the concepts of humanitarian intervention (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the UN).
Canadian governments. Therefore, when we speak about specific Slovene initiatives, we have to mention the NGO activities.

Slovenia is not only active in the legislative area, but it also takes on practical actions to further the implementation of the adopted HSN standards. Through joint projects between Slovenia and the Council of Europe, both are contributing within the Stability Pact to the building of democracy and setting up of the mechanisms for human rights protection in the whole of Southeastern Europe. Slovenia is also very active in human rights bodies within the UN.

A concrete instance of carrying out the human security paradigm is Slovenia’s assistance to traumatized children in Southeastern Europe. This assistance is organized by the biggest Slovene NGO, Slovene Philanthropy. First the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF) was established, which assisted war-affected children in the former Yugoslavia and Transcaucaus; later the Regional Centre for the Psychosocial Welfare of Children – TOGETHER – was created. As well as giving aid to children, Slovene Philanthropy and TOGETHER concentrate their activities on refugees and asylum seekers and on human rights education. Both institutions organize psychosocial programmes for school staff, health service workers, parents, and others.

A contemporary Slovene-led activity, which is supported by Austria and Jordan, is a project assisting Iraqi children. The initiative, which is carried out by TOGETHER, aims to alleviate the suffering of children, prevent long-term psychosocial trauma, and introduce activities to improve mental health, as well as develop activities for the rehabilitation of children. Jordan also cooperates with Slovene-run ITF to start demining operations in Iraq. Furthermore, Slovenia is fully supporting the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, the protection of sustainable development, establishment of the International Criminal Court and, last but not least, combating the illegal trade in small arms.

Conclusion

This article analysed the conceptualization of human security in EU/HSN countries and their strategies for increasing and strengthening human security, in order to show how these states could influence EU policies and security conceptualization in the future. Some of the findings of the research are really surprising and show the human security policies in a different light than they were previously seen. The research also affirms the deep difference between the UN’s and the HSN’s human security conceptualization.

EU/HSN countries have based their human security conceptualization on strong developmental and humanitarian elements, and all of them have accepted security-development interdependence. However, the human security paradigm is

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94 www.together.si. 4 May 2005.
not anything, what is in EU/HSN states’ policies embedded; these states have been accepting and using human security only as far as their national security strategy makes it possible. Human security seems in many cases to be a mere annex of national security because increasing and strengthening of the former is one of many strategies states use to ensuring their own national security. Contemporary national security is mainly understood as the security of a state and its citizens, who are threatened not only by military, but also by many non-military and asymmetric threats. Humanitarian, development and technological aid should stabilize target states or societies, increase their level of development, decrease the probability of an outbreak of violence, and thus minimize the insecurity spillover effect. It follows that the security-development nexus in EU/HSN countries means something different from the UN human security conceptualization.

In the approach of EU/HSN countries, the security-development nexus unambiguously means: the development of a target state/society strengthens its stability (i.e. reaching a state of non-violence or of negative peace), which increases the security of EU/HSN countries and their inhabitants. In the UN’s approach, the security-development nexus means: the development of target for a society strengthens its stability and builds a safe environment for everyday life of its inhabitants, which allows further development aid or investments. In the long-term perspective, this approach brings positive peace; it means not only freedom from fear, but also freedom from want. The self-interested motive of EU/HSN countries is indicated also by the territorial orientation of human security projects and the territorial distribution of humanitarian, development and technological aid. Although living conditions in Rwanda, Somalia or Cambodia are poorer and more miserable than in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea Region or Transcaucasus, most Austrian, Slovene and Greek development or humanitarian resources go to the latter three regions. Despite the slightly different Irish and Dutch cases – Ireland is an island and the Netherlands a maritime country surrounded by peaceful, highly developed Western European nations – neither country helps the poorest and most needy people.

Another finding of the present research is the influence of Europeanization and of the integration of the CFSP and ESDP into EU and national policies in the human security conceptualization and the practical politics of EU/HSN countries. As shown, humanitarian and development cooperation has a long tradition in the Netherlands, Ireland and Austria. The evolution of the CFSP and ESDP as state- and military-oriented policies and the beginning of the “war on terror” have disrupted or at least slowed down the progress of humanitarian and development cooperation within these three countries. We can even say that EU membership has had a negative impact on embedding human security into Dutch, Irish and Austrian policy. Ireland and also the Netherlands tried to overcome, during their EU presidency, this military orientation, emphasizing the security-development nexus. The strengthening of cooperation and of coordination of development and humanitarian activities among EU member countries (and also among EU member countries and NGOs) and the commitment
to increase the amount of Official Development Aid in the next decades demonstrate that the Irish and Dutch efforts have shown results. Austria will be the next country to have the opportunity to integrate human security elements into EU policies in the first half of 2006.

Greece and Slovenia are very different cases. Regional conditions and historical heritage are reasons why both states have had a state-centred and military-oriented security conceptualization and why human security has been entirely new for them. Both states also do not have any historical experience with humanitarian, development and technological cooperation. While in the case of Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands EU membership has actually slowed down the progress of the human security paradigm, in the case of Greece and Slovenia EU membership has played a completely different role. Europeanization of Greek and Slovene politics and society has been changing the value-orientation and organizing principles of their foreign and security policy. EU membership (in the case of Slovenia, preparation for EU membership) has thus had an unambiguously positive impact on the embedding of human security into Greek and Slovene policy.

We need not be as pessimistic as some aspects of this analysis might lead us to be. Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Greece and Slovenia have many times supported multilateral rule-based international order and human security issues like the ICC, the ban on landmines, help for children and human rights, which did not result in direct (political, economical or security) gains. This gives us hope that human security will one day be an inherent part of international relations practice.

**Table 1: Ratification of international rights/child protection treaties by HSN members (State as at May 2005)**

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R = ratified; S = signed
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- Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2000); entry into force: 12 February 2002
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- Geneva Convention (III) relating to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949); entry into force: 21 October 1950
- Geneva Convention (IV) relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949); entry into force: 21 October 1950
- Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I and II) (1977); entry into force: 7 December 1978
- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (“Ottawa Convention”, 1997); entry into force: 1 March 1999
- Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951); entry into force: 22 April 1954
- Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998); entry into force: 1 July 2002

Table 2: Official development assistance per capita: EU/HSN member states (in USD; 2002)

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Source: EU Donor Atlas 2004: 59
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A Small Power’s Strategy: 
Poland and the Ukrainian Crisis of 2004

Jerzy J. Wiatr

Abstract: Political scientists discussed the role of the smaller states in several studies published in the 1960s and 70s. They focused on policy choices a small power faced when joining multinational alliances and within them. Recently, attention has focused on how many a small powers can influence political developments both within the alliances they belong to and outside them.

Poland’s involvement in the negotiated solution of the Ukrainian political crisis of 2004 shows that a smaller power can use its assets to influence events. When the political scene in Ukraine polarized between two camps (respectively represented by Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych and the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko) Russia tried to influence the outcome by giving support to Yanukovych. The United States and the European Union remained neutral in the crisis, mostly due to their unwillingness to damage their relations with Russia. When the run-off election had been rigged and Yushchenko’s supporters began street protests, Polish public opinion solidly sided with the Ukrainian opposition. Poland’s President Aleksander Kwasniewski, in a series of visits to Kiev, helped both sides of the Ukrainian crisis to reach a negotiated compromise. The run-off results were declared void by the Supreme Court and in the repeated vote Yushchenko won the presidency. Poland was able to help her neighbour to chose a democratic solution to the crisis and continues to support Ukraine’s efforts to join the European Union. In the long run such policy serves Poland’s interests but its immediate consequence has been a deterioration in Polish-Russian relations.

Key words: small powers, international strategy, presidential election, orange revolution, Ukraine, Poland, Russia, European Union

Introduction

After the Second World War and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, political scientists began to investigate the role played by smaller states in international relations. Their interest in the strategies chosen by smaller powers reflected partly the reality of the world in which so much depended on the few great powers who decided on war and peace. Not ignoring the decisive role of the great powers, political scientists tried to enlarge the picture by presenting the policies of the smaller states. In her pioneering study Annette Baker Fox (1959) made a strong case for the thesis that small states’ diplomacy in the Second World War had some impact on the behaviour of the great powers and on the final outcome. Conflicts between small and great powers have been studied comparatively by David Vital (Vital, 1967, Vital 1971) and their role in the multinational alliances has been discussed by Robert Rothstein (1968).
the early 1970s a group of Belgian political scientists from the Catholic University of Leuven produced a comparative study of the policies of seven smaller NATO members (Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Denmark, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg), focusing on their motives to join the alliance (Raeymaeker et al., 1974). The position of the small powers – members of the Soviet dominated Warsaw Pact – has been analysed by Robin A. Remington, who pointed to the limited but real possibilities of smaller states’ strategies within the fundamentally unequal relationships (Remington, 1971).

The end of the Cold War, followed by the enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and of the European Union, changed the conditions in which small powers conduct their foreign policies. The world situation is no longer dominated by the rivalry between two superpowers. The danger of the Third World War, at least in the way it was feared for almost fifty years, no longer exists. European nations have enjoyed security unknown in their history. Twenty-five of them belong to the European Union, which has the potential to act as one of the main actors in international relations. Within the European Union, most member states are “small powers” in the terminology of authors who have introduced this concept to the study of international relations. Their impact on the policies of the EU remains to be seen. In spite of the technically equal status of all members in the decision-making process within the EU, there is strong evidence suggesting that France and Germany, when acting together, are by far more influential than other members.

In global relations the United States of America became the only super-power. America’s military might, based on a strong economy, modern technology and the sustained effort to build up the defence potential, allows the USA to intervene militarily even without her allies. After 11 September, American foreign policy took a new direction. Military intervention in Iraq, while supported by some of the NATO members, has been strongly opposed by many others, including such allies as France and Germany. The split within the Alliance resulted in the unprecedented cooperation between two NATO powers opposed to the US policy and their former adversary Russia.

Small powers in the alliance are now confronted with a new question. Should they follow the lead of the by far most powerful member even if such a policy may jeopardize their relations with the other powerful members of the European Union? Could they find a relatively independent role for themselves within the alliance, which no longer speaks the same language? Or should they accept the advice of the French President Jacques Chirac to keep their mouth shut?

The Dilemmas of Poland’s Strategy in the Alliance

From the beginning of the democratic transformation, Poland has opted for close association with and ultimately membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union. In 1992 the government of Poland officially declared membership of NATO as the priority goal of defence policy, and in 1994 Poland applied
for membership in the European Union. The first goal was reached in March 1999, when Poland – along with the Czech Republic and Hungary – became a member of NATO and the second – on 1 May, 2004, when ten new members joined the European Union. In the last years of the 20th century, when Poland joined NATO, international perspectives looked simple and optimistic. Close Polish-American relations were seen as the foundation of Poland’s security, while the prospect of becoming a new member of the European Union was considered an important element of the strategy aimed at the modernization of the country.

The time to choose came in 2003 when Poland decided to actively support the US policy of military intervention in Iraq, risking a deterioration of her relations with France and Germany, whose opposition to President George W. Bush’s strategy was well known. Originally, the choice made by the Polish government had strong support in the country, including the main parties of the parliamentary opposition. Critics, including myself, predicted an intervention fiasco and objected to taking military action without a UN mandate. With the passing of time the mood of the people has changed, largely due to the casualties suffered by the Polish forces in Iraq, the lack of progress in the policy of “stabilization” and the news of the brutalities committed by the American forces in Iraq. The official policy remained, however, firmly loyal to the Polish-American cooperation in Iraq.

Such a strategic option has been combined with firm commitment to the strengthening of the European Union. Regardless of their different political colouring, all Polish Cabinets have advocated strong commitment to the European Union. In 2003 Poles voted in a nationwide referendum on the ratification of the treaty of admission, which resulted in a clear victory of the supporters of Poland’s accession. In the campaign which preceded the referendum differences within the Union and within NATO were deliberately played down as unfortunate misunderstandings between allies. Following her admission, Poland has tried not to make a choice between the USA and the European Union, but rather to work for the improvement of transatlantic relations.

Poland has also a strong interest in the way in which both NATO and the European Union define their policies towards the Eastern part of Europe – Russia and the former republics of the USSR. Geographic proximity and history make Poland particularly sensitive to the Eastern policies of NATO and EU. Poland very strongly supported the Baltic republics in their efforts to become members of both organizations in 1991. Poland was the first state to recognize the independence of Ukraine. Relations between Russia and Poland have been affected by Russia’s prolonged opposition to the eastward enlargement of NATO, particularly to Poland’s membership in the Alliance. Fortunately, Russian efforts were ignored, and this controversy belongs to the past.

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95 In my early criticism of the plans to invade Iraq (Wiatr, 2002) I made two points. First, invading Iraq without UN mandate would violate international law and, therefore, would lead to the weakening of the foundations of post-Cold War international relations. Second, while defeating the Iraqi army would be relatively easy, establishing peace and order would encounter serious difficulties. I also presented this criticism in a public lecture delivered at the UCLA Russian and European Studies Centre in February 2003.
Nonetheless, Poland is aware of the potential danger of renewed Russian hegemonic policy toward her neighbours. While membership in NATO gives Poland the necessary security guarantees, many Poles are afraid that close cooperation between NATO and Russia might be considered by some members of the Alliance as more important than the interests of Poland. The memories of World War Two are still very much alive and are pointed to by those who do not fully trust Poland’s current allies in Europe. This is probably the main reason for the way in which most Poles perceive the value of close collaboration with the United States. American hegemony is perceived as preferable – from a Polish perspective – than the power game played by the strongest states in the EU. Not everybody shares such feelings, but to ignore them would make understanding of Poland’s policies within the Alliance impossible.

In 2004 the internal political conflict in Ukraine put Poland’s policy to the test. Polish public opinion was strongly in favour of the Ukrainian democratic opposition. Thousands of Poles manifested their support for the “orange revolution” and many, including former President Lech Walesa, went to Kiev to express their solidarity. The media, with very few exceptions, commented on the Ukrainian events in a way which showed their sympathy for the Ukrainian opposition. More important, however, was the political mission undertaken by President Aleksander Kwasniewski, who made a successful effort to persuade both sides in the Ukrainian conflict to reach a negotiated agreement. The story of this policy provides an insight in the possibilities of a small power’s strategy within and outside the alliance.

The historical background

The recent role of Poland in the solution of the Ukrainian political conflict can only be understood if the complex Polish-Ukrainian relations are taken into account.

When the Polish-Lithuanian state was established in the 15th century, Ukraine became its very special component. The dominant religion of the Ukrainian masses was Orthodox, but the aristocracy and nobility converted to Catholicism and amalgamated with the Polish nobility. Polonized nobility became the main foundation of the Polish rule over Ukraine.

In the 17th century several uprisings of the Ukrainian Kozaks weakened Polish rule over Ukraine. The biggest of them, led by Bohdan Khmelnicky (1648) led to the de facto independence of Ukraine. In 1654, however, the Kozak Council turned to the tsar of Moscow Aleksey Mihailovich for protection against Poland. After more than 13 years of war, Poland and Russia signed a treaty under which Ukraine was divided. Territories to the east of Dnepr (including Kiev) went to Russia, and Polish rule was re-established on the rest of Ukraine. The partitions of Poland in the 18th century divided Ukraine into two parts. The larger was taken by Russia, while the western part, with Lviv (Lwów in Polish) as its centre, became part of the Austrian empire. In late 19th century western Ukraine became the centre of the Ukrainian national movement. After the First World War Ukrainians under the leadership of Semen Petlura made an
unsuccessful effort to establish their state in Western Ukraine. Brief fighting between Polish and Ukrainian forces over the control of Lviv in the fall of 1918 ended in Polish victory. Soon however, the former adversaries joined hands against the common enemy – Soviet Russia.

There were two main reasons for the Polish-Soviet war of 1919–1920. The first was the Soviet dream of bringing the communist revolution to Central Europe, particularly to Germany. This goal could not have been achieved without defeating the newly independent Poland. The second reason was Poland’s readiness to help Ukrainians in their struggle for independence. The pact of mutual assistance, signed by the Polish head of state Józef Piłsudski and the Ukrainian leader Petlura reflected Poland’s strategy of building a bloc of independent states, freed from Russian rule and capable of common defence. Piłsudski did not aim at the conquest of Ukraine but hoped that an independent Ukrainian state allied with Poland would constitute the basis for building a broad coalition, or perhaps even a federation, of newly independent states in East-Central Europe (Dziewanowski, 1969). The fortunes of war varied. In April 1920 the Poles captured Kiev but after a few weeks were forced to retreat. In August of the same year the Soviet forces arrived at the outskirts of Warsaw but were defeated in the battle which the British ambassador Lord d’Abernon (1931) called it “the eighteenth decisive battle of the world”.

The war ended in the Peace Treaty of Riga (1921). Poland defended her independence but most of Ukraine remained under Soviet control. Western Ukraine became part of Poland for the next 18 years. Ukrainian nationalists, outraged by the change in Poland’s policy, continued their struggle for independence using terrorist tactics. Polish security apparatus responded with repression. Relations between the two nations deteriorated. In September 1939 Germany attacked Poland. After 17 days of fighting the Soviet Union, acting in agreement with the secret German-Soviet treaty, invaded Poland and incorporated the country’s eastern parts. Lviv for the first time in its history came under Russian rule. When Germany invaded the USSR and occupied Western Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists, some of whom collaborated with Nazi Germany, organized bloody ethnic cleansing directed against Poles, particularly in the province of Wolyn. The memory of the massacres, in which about one hundred thousand Poles lost their lives, was the main reason for the anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Post-War Poland, deliberately exploited by communist propaganda. At the end of the war, the Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945) summits recognized the Soviet conquests as permanent. Most of the Polish population from Western Ukraine (as well as from Western Belarus and from Lithuania) was resettled to Poland. On the Polish side of the new frontier several hundred thousand ethnic Ukrainians remained. Some of them continued their hopeless guerrilla struggle. In 1947 the Polish authorities forcibly resettled all Ukrainians to various localities in the formerly German territories in the west and north of the country. Recently, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, apologized publicly for this action as a violation of human rights.

During communist rule Polish-Ukrainian relations were largely ignored. The official policy of Poland treated Ukraine as part of the USSR. The Polish government
in exile (in London) remained firmly committed to the pre-war frontiers and demanded that the former eastern territories of Poland be returned. This, inevitably, led to conflict with the Ukrainian national movement, opposed to the Soviet rule but unwilling to give back lands considered integral parts of historic Ukraine.

Only a small group of Polish emigrants offered a new strategy. In 1974 the main political commentator of the monthly *Kultura* (published in Paris under the editorship of Jerzy Giedroyc), Juliusz Mieroszewski, called for the recognition of the new borders and for the Polish-Ukrainian cooperation after both nations regain their independence. He accused Poles, who expected Poland’s return to the territories lost in the East, of unwillingly serving the interests of Soviet imperialism (Mieroszewski, 1974)\(^96\). In the following years *Kultura* served as the main centre for collaboration between Polish and Ukrainian opponents of the Soviet régime. Its approach to Polish-Ukrainian relations has gradually been adopted by a growing number of Poles and after 1989 became the intellectual base for democratic Poland’s strategy vis-à-vis Ukraine.

### The “Orange Revolution” and Poland’s Strategy

What came to be called “the orange revolution” was a mass protest staged in Kiev and some other Ukrainian cities in protest of the great irregularities that had taken place during the second round of the presidential election (21 November 2004). Contrary to the results of exits polls, which had predicted the victory of the opposition leader Victor Yushchenko, the electoral commission declared the victory of Prime Minister Victor Yanukovych. Foreign observers (from the Council of Europe, the European Parliament and OSCE) expressed their objections because of numerous irregularities during the voting, the most flagrant of which was the multiple voting of Yanukovych’s supporters, who were transported from one polling station to the other by means of transport provided by the state.

The conflict had an international dimension. Prime Minister Yanukovych represented the ruling bloc supporting the incumbent President Leonid Kuchma (who, after having served two terms, was no longer eligible). His election would have meant the continuation of the political status quo, both internally and in Ukraine’s foreign policy.

Internally, Kuchma’s presidency evolved gradually toward mild authoritarianism. Harassment of the opposition and of the independent media increased over time, with the kidnapping and assassination of the journalist Georgij Gongadze as the most brutal case, for which high-ranking officers of the State Security and even the President himself were considered responsible. Corruption and nepotism were flagrant. Economic reforms were slowed down and the economy stagnated.

In foreign policy, Kuchma skilfully combined good relations with Russia and the membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States with supporting the United

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\(^96\) This, however, for them was not a new idea. In the spring of 1957, I had an opportunity to talk to Juliusz Mieroszewski in London and Jerzy Giedroyc in Paris. Both made it clear that they hoped for a new Polish-Ukrainian relationship after the end of the Soviet hegemony.
States in its intervention in Iraq. Kuchma, however, was lukewarm in his position towards the European Union. While under his rule Ukraine was willing to cooperate with the Union, she was not eager to adjust her internal legal and economic system to the requirements of the EU. From Russia’s point of view the continuation of such policy was preferable to a clear turn to the West, postulated by most of the opposition. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin openly supported the continuation of the status quo and even came to Ukraine to give Yanukovych his support.

The opposition, previously badly divided between numerous parties (from Socialists on the Left to nationalists on the Right), united behind a popular former Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko, who promised honesty in office, economic reforms and closer links to the European Union. The incumbent administration used variety of means, including an assassination attempt, to prevent Yushchenko from launching an effective campaign. This has not worked and most likely contributed to the strengthening of support for the opposition. In the first round of the presidential election (31 October 2004) Yushchenko won in the western and central regions (including Kiev) but lost in the East and in the South (Crimea), where the Russian-speaking population is dominant. The two leading candidates – Yushchenko and Yanukovych – advanced to the run-off.97

When the results of the run-off had been announced (giving Yanukovych 49 per cent and Yushchenko 46 per cent of votes), Yushchenko’s supporters took to the streets demanding a recount, threatening a general strike and civil disobedience. Wearing orange symbols, they for all practical reasons controlled the streets of the capital. From Western Ukraine thousands of Yushchenko’s supporters arrived in Kiev. In the East, however, Yanukovych’s forces were firmly in control. Coal miners from Eastern Ukraine belonged to the most active supporters of the Prime Minister. They were ready to march on the capital. In the armed forces and in the security police Yanukovych had many supporters but it was far from obvious that they would be ready for a civil war.

Almost instantly the conflict became internationalized. Not waiting for the official declaration of the results, President Putin congratulated Yanukovych and recognized him as the new President. This was a premature action, which – seen from the perspective of future developments – seriously jeopardized Russia’s position in her relations with Ukraine. The most likely interpretation of President Putin’s action is that he hoped for the creation of an international momentum in favour of the candidate who, from Russia’s point of view, was preferable.

Putin’s strategy could have worked. The great powers were unwilling to risk damage in their relations with Russia over an issue not considered to be of crucial importance for them. After the 11 September attacks, American-Russian

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97 Ukraine (like Poland and many other states where the president is elected by the people) has adopted the French-style system of electing the president. If no candidate wins an absolute majority, two leading candidates advance to the run-off, in which a simple majority is required for victory. Such system very rarely results in electing the president in the first round. It never happened in France and in Poland only once (2000) a candidate won in the first round (Aleksander Kwasniewski seeking re-election).
relations visibly improved because of strong support Putin gave to President George W. Bush’s “war on terrorism”. For a different reason, France and Germany were eager to cultivate close collaboration with Russia in which they saw an instrument of counter-balancing the American world hegemony. Generally speaking, the great powers of NATO and the European Union were willing to tacitly accept the special position of Russia within the CIS. They were not inclined to get involved in the internal Ukrainian conflict.

Poland was in a different position. Internally, there was a strong solidarity feeling with the Ukrainian democratic opposition, seen by many as a replication of the Polish one twenty years before. Lech Walesa’s appearance in Kiev and his emotional speech in support of free and honest elections symbolized this aspect of the Polish reaction. It would have been difficult for the Polish government to ignore the sentiment of the Polish people. Moreover, indifference towards the Ukrainian crisis would have been contrary to Poland’s long-standing commitment to support Ukraine’s democratic transformation and her closer links to the West. When President Kwasniewski decided to take a political initiative in the Ukrainian crisis, he acted out of the conviction expressed 30 years earlier in the Kultura article, that an independent Ukraine would also be vitally important for Poland’s security.

Diplomatically, Poland has very few assets to make use of. As member of the European Union she made an effort to mobilize support for an international mediation in the Ukrainian conflict, but reaction from most of the member states was not particularly supportive. The foreign policy spokesman of the EU Javier Solana arrived in Kiev, but only after the mediation undertaken by President Kwasniewski had begun to bring results.

Doing nothing would have been easy, but would have caused two negative consequences. Domestically, a lack of action would have been interpreted as a sign of weakness and would have negatively affected the position of the Polish President. Since, however, he is serving his second and last term; such a consideration was not of the greatest importance. Internationally, accepting the Russian strategy in the Ukraine would have destroyed Poland’s hopes for closer cooperation with Ukraine and for her future accession to the European Union, an option firmly supported by Poland.

The decision to become involved called for a delicate diplomatic game. President Kwasniewski has not committed himself to any of the competing candidates but came to Kiev as a neutral broker. His main asset was a good personal relationship with all major players, including President Leonid Kuchma and both contenders. Realizing the danger of an armed confrontation, Kuchma was ready to seek a compromise. Since his own position had been weakened by the support he had given to Victor Yanukovych and by the wrongdoings of his administration, he looked for somebody who could open the door to a compromise solution. Aleksander Kwasniewski was an ideal candidate for such a role. Not only was he highly respected in all major quarters of the Ukranian political scene, he had been also one of the architects of the Polish Round Table agreement of 1989, which was seen as a prototype for negotiated reform.
in the formerly communist states\textsuperscript{98}. He was able to communicate without interpretation and often used informal language to lower tensions between Ukrainian contenders. At some point, the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus joined the negotiations, but the main role belonged to Aleksander Kwasniewski.

The beginning of the talks was not very promising. Yanukovych insisted on the recognition of his victory and found encouragement in Russia’s clearly worded support. On the other side, Yushchenko demanded that the electoral commission change its original ruling and declare him the winner. Supported by the demonstrators, he even entered the hall of the Parliament and delivered something that sounded like the presidential oath. Kuchma demanded that the demonstrators leave the streets before any solution would be negotiated. This was unacceptable for Yushchenko’s supporters, who knew that their strength was in their determination.

The critical point came when information reached President Kwasniewski that units of the army loyal to President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych were approaching Kiev. An armed confrontation with the crowds would have resulted in civil war and most likely in the split between Eastern Ukraine, controlled by forces loyal to Yanukovych, and the rest of the country. Ukraine could have easily experienced a repeat of the Yugoslav tragedy.

There were several reasons why such a disaster was avoided. The courageous stand of the demonstrators sent a clear message that military intervention would not be without cost. Elements of the security police, probably better understanding the situation, were ready to oppose the approaching military, and the cohesion of the armed forces could not have been taken for granted. And there was the Polish President, who in a series of desperate last minute calls, persuaded Kuchma and Yanukovych to abandon their plans.

What happened later was a complex process of reaching an agreement. The “zero option” suggested originally by Kuchma (annulment of the whole election and organizing a new one) was rejected as – according to Ukrainian law – it would have prevented both Yanukovych and Yushchenko from running again. The negotiators agreed to refer the matter to the Supreme Court, which ruled that the verdict of the Electoral Commission was based on partly falsified results and declared it void. This opened the door to the replication of the run-off. Since both candidates claimed victory, Kwasniewski was able to argue that they should accept the new run-off in which they would be able to prove their case. The Supreme Court’s ruling weakened the position of Prime Minister Yanukovych, since it was obvious to everybody that the head of the government was responsible for falsification of electoral results showing

\textsuperscript{98} In 1989 Aleksander Kwasniewski was the minister without portfolio and chairman of the political committee in the Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski. Together with future Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki he co-chaired the sub-committee on trade unions of the Round Table and was one of the principal negotiators from the government side. He had proposed several specific agreements, which the Round Table conference eventually included in the final accord. Elected President of Poland in 1995, he was able to include prominent people from the former democratic opposition in his administration.
in his favour. Yanukovych submitted his resignation, but President Kuchma decided to keep the cabinet in the caretaker capacity.

On 26 December 2004 Ukrainians elected Yushchenko their new President. The pattern of the voting was as it was before, with Yanukovych winning in the East and South and Yushchenko in the Centre and West. This time, however, there were no irregularities and the will of the majority found its expression in the official results. The “orange revolution” has won.

**Conclusion**

Following the inauguration of President Yushchenko relations between Ukraine and Russia normalized. The new president declared his willingness to cooperate with Russia but he also made it clear that under his leadership Ukraine would seek closer ties with and eventually membership in the European Union. Risking Russia’s displeasure, he appointed Julia Timoshenko, an outspoken critic of President Putin’s policy, as new Prime Minister. Ukraine is looking for solutions which would make the Commonwealth less dependent on Russia. It is cooperating with Georgia and Moldova who, like Ukraine, are members of the CIS. Such a policy cannot be welcome in Moscow, but President Putin tried to reduce damage done by his previous involvement in the Ukrainian election and declared his readiness to maintain good relations with the second biggest nation of the former USSR.

Poland, on the other hand, has been singled out for Russian displeasure. In diplomatically rare personal attack, President Putin criticized President Kwasniewski for involving himself in matters which did not relate to him. There have been comments about Poland in the Russian media, as there were critical comments on Russia’s policy in Polish equivalents. At the level of public diplomacy relations between two states have deteriorated to the lowest level since the beginning of democratic transformation.

This puts Poland in a difficult position. Conflict with Russia is the last thing Poland needs in her present position as a member of NATO and of the European Union. Both organizations seek cooperation in Russia and would not be happy if a small power like Poland complicates this cooperation. The strategy followed by Poland in the Ukrainian crisis can work, however, if it is followed by sustained action in favour of building closer links between Ukraine and the European Union. Poland has already declared herself in favour of admitting Ukraine to the EU in the shortest possible time. Such a decision would not only be in Poland’s interest (and, what is more important, in the interest of Ukraine) but also in the interest of the European Union. The great potential of Ukraine would in the long run make Europe stronger, and bringing Ukraine to the Union would definitely preclude any possibility of renewed Russian hegemony. This, by the way, would also be in the best interest of Russia. Unfortunately, it probably will take time for the Russian leaders and general public to recognize that as a great regional power Russia can serve her national interest best not by trying to rebuild
the empire but by building cooperative relations with the transatlantic community as a whole. This would mean cooperating not only with the USA and with the great European powers, but also with small powers in the alliance.

References


BOOK REVIEWS
Comparative Politics in Slovenia – New books

Jerzy J. Wiatr

Contemporary Parliaments in a comparative perspective

In 2004 a new book on contemporary parliamentarism was published by Drago Zajc, professor of political science at the University of Ljubljana and President of the Slovene Political Science Association. It is a unique study, combining three approaches: the analysis of the history of political ideas concerning the role of parliaments in modern democracy, a legal analysis of the ways in which the role of parliaments is defined in constitutions of modern democratic states, and an empirical study of the functioning of parliaments today. The study is comparative in its purpose. While Drago Zajc presents a rich picture of the functioning of the Slovene Parliament, he offers also several very interesting cross-national comparisons, based mostly (but not exclusively) on the experience of “new democracies” in East Central Europe.

The book is divided into four parts. In the first part, the author discusses the development of the theory and practice of parliamentarism. He considers parliamentarism as a “dynamic process” in which both the institutional framework and the functions of parliaments evolved. The growth of the role of parliaments in the second half of the 19th century and in the first decades of the 20th century defined the direction in which democracy in Europe evolved. Drago Zajc points to the interrelation between the European parliamentarism and the evolution of modern political parties. While this analysis is most valuable, one can regret that the author decided not to compare the European pattern of parliamentary democracy and the American model of presidentialism. The obvious differences between the two types of democracy have been discussed at length by Fred Riggs, whose writings could have been discussed.

In the second part, the author discusses the way in which parliamentarism has been treated by the most influential ideologies of the 20th century. The discussion focuses on Marxist-Leninist critique of parliamentary democracy, German, Austrian and British socialist ideas, corporativism (as well as “neocorporativism”), fascism and Nazism. A special chapter deals with the experience of the Yugoslav model of “socialist self-government”, criticized by Zajc for its “utopian” belief in the possibility of direct representation of social interests.

In the third part, the author presents an analysis of the process of democratisation of formerly communist states in East Central Europe as well as of formerly authoritarian states in the Southern part of the continent (Spain, Greece, Turkey, Portugal) from the perspective of the new role of parliaments. It is a very interesting chapter in which the reader receives a well-informed concise analysis of the process of democratic transformation. Drago Zajc stresses the fact that in all these processes democratisation
made parliaments the central institutions of the new system. An interesting question, deserving a further analysis, concerns the role played by the parliaments in the take-off stage of democratisation. Were they mostly the beneficiaries of the process, which had its roots elsewhere, or did they make their own meaningful contribution? Cross-national comparisons could allow us to understand better the mechanism of democratic transformation and the role of pre-democratic parliaments in this process. David M. Olson, the American specialist in parliamentary studies, in his studies of parliament in Poland during the communist period introduced the concept of “minimal parliaments” to indicate a special position of parliaments in some authoritarian states where parliaments, while not democratically elected, were more than just rubber stamp bodies.

More than half of the book (Part Four) is devoted to the systematic analysis of the functioning of contemporary parliaments. Drago Zajc offers here a rich palette of information concerning the main functions of the parliaments: legitimisation of the democratic system, representation of social interests, rationalisation and resolution of conflicts of interests, legislation, creating and supervising the state budgets, creation of the governments and control over them, socialisation of parliamentarians as new political élite, informing and mobilizing citizens. In all these aspects, the experience of newly democratic states has been discussed on the basis of rich, comparative material.

In general, it is a very important book, the first such comprehensive comparative analysis of contemporary parliamentarism in new democracies. It gives a good summary of the theoretical and empirical knowledge about parliamentarism in new democracies and indicates directions in which comparative studies of parliamentarism should go in the future.


Ladislav Cabada
Politics in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia

Comparative analysis of important political events in the states and countries originating in the former “Tito’s” Yugoslavia is one of the topics that was and is not well developed in European political science. Naturally, many books and scientific articles focused on political development in the Western Balkans, but the majority of them are rooted in security studies, political anthropology or political geography and geopolitics. Analysis of political systems in the territory of former Yugoslavia is indeed one of the themes that significantly enrich the comparative politics as part of political science research focusing on system analysis and constitutional engineering.
One of the newest contributions focusing on politics in former Yugoslavia presents the book *Politika na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije* (Politics in the territory of former Yugoslavia) prepared by three Slovene political scientist from the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana – Danica Fink Hafner, Damjan Lajh, and Alenka Krašovec.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia presented a unique polity based on the constitutional engineering inspired especially by the Marxist idea of the withdrawing state. The Yugoslav constitutions and especially the constitution adopted in the year 1974 created an interesting system based on so-called socialist self-governance, unity of powers concentrated in a multi-cameral federal parliament and a mixture of federal and confederal elements distributing the decision competences among the federation, republics and autonomous regions, corporate, societal and political institutions and also nations and ethnic groups. Such a constitutional order created an extremely complicated polity, but political system was overruled by the known three pillars – Tito, the Union of Yugoslav Communists, and the Yugoslav People’s Army.

The process of democratic transition started at least in the so-called northern republics – especially in Slovenia – in the 1980s, showed that the constitutional order is unclear and the main political actors could understand it in a very different way. The most important issue became the questions of the right to self-determination, used primarily by the Slovenes and Croats, later also by other nations and ethnic groups in former Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia created five new states, but even more new polities (internal split in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, the independent politics of Montenegro and the ”special case” of Kosovo) that are very different. This issue is the basis for one of the questions asked by the authors of the current book, namely how the similar or even equal polities/constitutional orders were changed into very different ones.

In the first chapter written by Danica Fink Hafner other analytical questions and hypothesis are also presented. As one of important factors the authors define the attitudes hidden behind the creation of the party system in every successor country (ethnic versus liberal approach), civil society development, and influence of Europeanization on the structure and dynamics of national party systems. As D. Fink Hafner mentioned at the end of the first chapter, the territory of former Yugoslavia represents a ”natural laboratory” for political science research, for the political representations then the space for societal experiment/constitutional and political engineering.

In the second chapter D. Fink Hafner presents the theoretical framework for the analytical part of the book. Besides the different theoretical works on transition the new institutionalism approach is presented as important theoretical concept and basis for the comparative research. Many (old-) new institutions were created in post-Yugoslav countries and the results are very different when comparing all new polities established in the Western Balkans. As one of the very important issues, the discussion on parliamentarism versus presidentialism is naturally presented, which is also in mentioned the third chapter, written by Damjan Lajh. Another important
element of transition represents the chosen electoral system and the first winner in the plural parliamentary elections in 1990, because he has the best position in the creation of a new scheme of polity and political institutions.

The electoral engineering is analysed in the fourth chapter written by D. Fink Hafner and D. Lajh. The authors are showing how unstable the electoral rules were in all post-Yugoslav republics (with the partial exception of Slovenia). Especially in Croatia and Macedonia we could observe the almost permanent change of important elements of electoral systems; both countries tried proportional, majority and also mixed electoral systems. As the author writes that the main reason for changes was not ”to be educated from the mistakes”, but to increase the (pre)domination of leading political party.

The fifth chapter, written by Alenka Krašovec and D. Lajh, is oriented towards selected issues connected with politics in post-Yugoslav area. The authors stressed the importance of party system development, because political parties became the main political actors in all the analysed countries. The comparison is oriented especially to the normative element of a political party’s life (laws about political parties, the legal framework for fund rising etc.). The democratic development is analysed in the chapter too and the degree of corruption in the selected countries.

The last chapter was prepared by D. Fink Hafner and represents a synthesis of previous chapters but also a comparison with the countries of the so-called Visegrad Four (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). With the decision to include also these countries the comparison was given another interesting dimension. On the other side, we could understand it also as methodological complication, because we do not have the same valid information (at least not from the present book) about the countries of Visegrad Four as we had about the post-Yugoslav countries. One could have the feeling that one of the reasons is to show that Slovenia is post-Yugoslav country, but in all aspects it is comparable with the Central European countries. Nevertheless, I appreciate that at least one part of a Slovene political scientist is denying the attempts of Slovene political élite in the 1990s to show that Slovenia does not have any common institutional or political background with other post-Yugoslav countries. The (pre-)dominant position of the lowest chamber of the Slovene parliament (Državni zbor) or specific issue of Slovene communes (občina) is fully comparable with the institutional and constitutional development in other post-Yugoslav countries and cannot be separated from the polity development in former Yugoslavia.

An important and very useful part of the book is the Appendix, where the reader can find 64 pages with tables and diagrams presenting the politics in the territory of former Yugoslavia in numbers, data and graphs. These include all results of presidential and parliamentary elections.

The book Politika na območju nekdanje Jugoslavije (Politics in the Territory of former Yugoslavia) represents comparative analysis understands the post-Yugoslav polities as ”normal” and comparable. The only exception to this concept is the absence of any analysis of the political events and development in Kosovo; this question is
indeed too complicated for a comparative analysis. Nevertheless, in general we could understand the current book as important part of scientific analysis oriented towards the issues connected with democratisation and stabilisation of countries in the Western Balkans.

Readers are informed about the aim of the book in the introductory chapter: “Our volume explores how such neighbouring states with a comparable earlier history contested or changed national identities in close connection with eminently European political or religious ideologies“ (p. 2).

The first chapter, written by Constantin Iordachi, is devoted to the development of the Legion of the Archangel Michael in interwar Romania. Iordachi describes the origins of the movement in the early post-war period in scattered student movements, and the Văcăreșteni group. He then outlines the Legion’s history up to the Second World War. The author describes the main characteristics of the Legion and states that the group is an ”unusual variety of Fascism“ (p. 19). Special attention is paid to the charismatic leadership of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. In the Legion’s ideology and practice ”the concept of charisma shows the relationship between religion, politics, and violence. The Legion originated in Romanian student groups who vented their frustration against ethnic minorities and the international community for its policy of affirmative action in favour of other nationalities, particularly Jews, in post-war Romania. The Legion, led by Codreanu, had many features similar to other Fascist movements: charismatic nationalism; mysticism; religious ritualism; a Messianic mission; cultural purification and anti-Semitism. Codreanu’s emphasis on salvation (of the Romanian nation) separates the Legion from both Italian Fascism and German Nazism (p. 28). Iordachi concludes that one of the main reasons for the success of charismatic nationalism in interwar Romania stems from ”charismatic hunger“ and an identity vacuum, within society. There were two main reasons for these conditions: socio-political changes after First World War, decline of traditional religiosity, and fear and anxiety across society (p. 31).

In the second chapter Mark Biondich focuses on the Croatian collective memory in relation to national identity through the 20th century. The topic is relevant and up-to-date because after the fall of Communism in ex-Yugoslavia discussion arose about new historical interpretations. In the successor states memory and nationalist mythology “have been intimately intertwined and seem hopelessly inseparable“ (p. 54). During the transition period the Croatian experience of “independent“ statehood between 1941 and 1945 has re-appeared as one of the main issues of collective memory, but the state policy pursued against Jews, Serbs and Romanies remained undiscussed.

Biondich goes back to discuss medieval Croatian statehood, the origin of the Croatian national awakening, divided into ”pure“ Croatianism and southern Pan-Slavism. However, after the First World War Croatian nationalism turned against Serbs, who played the role of “others“, as the Hungarians had done before the war. Part of the text

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is devoted to the Croatian Ustaša State. The Ustaša movement was not perceived as Fascist but as an ideology aimed at statehood. More interestingly, the author depicts the Ustaša State in the post-war era from the perspective of Croatian émigrés: "Croats are not to blame for the fate of the Jews“, There was no "Jewish question“ etc. The Ustaša movement in exile was aimed at an independent Croatia at any cost and created a myth of Croats being victimized by the Serbs (p. 70). Croatian nationalists complied with the dismantlement of official Yugoslav historiography in the post-Communist period and historical revisionism. "Much of the historical profession participated in this articulation“ (p. 52). The democratization process in Croatia and a hunger for democracy in the country could cause the collective memory attached to the memories of Communism and recent conflicts to fade away.

The third chapter, written by Sandra Prlenda, goes back to the interwar period to describe the development of Croatian Catholic Youth Organizations: the Croatian Eagle Union (Hrvatski Orlovski Savez) of 1923–1929 (and the Crusaders /Križarska organizacija/), which existed from 1930 to 1945 oversizing the Second World War. She includes these Croatian groups within a framework of Catholicism, which was one of the three main competing ideologies in interwar Croatia (p.82). Both organizations claimed to be outside of politics, but in fact their anti-Communist and anti-Liberal orientation pushed them directly into the political realm.

Why did Croatian Catholics turn to public engagement? The Papal Encyclicals of Leo XIII and Pius X influenced some intellectual clergy, and among them, the Bishop of Krk, Anton Mahnič, organized young Catholic students’ organizations (p. 84). Another reason for this activity was in the ongoing process of liberation and progress in the Croatian territory of the monarchy. The Eagles were often perceived as being too close to the church by the Serbs and even non-Catholic intellectuals. Along with the Eagles, the Croatian Falcon Movement (Sokoli), and the Peasant Party of Radić must be also added to the list of nationalist organizations. The Eagles and later, when they were banned, the Crusaders, followed up with a similar programme which, apart from their "name and gymnastics“, did not abandon idea of Greater Croatia and the re-Catholicization of society. The "merging of religious and national identity with particular efforts … its cultural and social consequences survived the twentieth century“ (p. 97).

The fourth part of the book, the "IMRO" between Macedonia and Bulgaria, written by James Frusetta, deals with the shared heritage of Bulgarian and Macedonian national identity. Frusetta starts with the question: "Who owns history?“ (p. 110) and continues: "Rival claims undermine the legitimacy of national identity“. This has been a sensitive issue regarding the national identity of Bulgarians and Macedonians. The text focuses on Bulgarian-Macedonian disputes over the national identity of heroes such as Gotse Delchev and Yane Sandanski.

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99 IMRO – The "Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization“ was founded in Thessaloniki (1893) and was aimed at the liberation of Macedonia according to the Macedonians, or served for irredentist claims, according to Bulgarians.
The author describes Bulgarian and Macedonian-sponsored histories where “national heroes were called upon to serve as symbols for the new socialist ideologies” (p. 111). Skopje’s policy was aimed at national identity reinforcement through the standardization of the Macedonian language, the creation of the Macedonian Orthodox Church and interpreting the IMRO as ethnically Macedonian. On the other hand, in Bulgarian political and academic circles national identity was being increasingly reinforced from the 1960s. In 1981 “Macedonian heroes were openly identified as historical symbols of the Bulgarian state“. Macedonian history and its symbols became part of Bulgarian national ideology. Post-Communism in Macedonia led even to new theories such as the ancient Macedonian people of Alexander the Great, which was not broadly accepted. The IMRO appeared as symbols in post-Communist Macedonia, not only on stamps and banknotes. Macedonian historiography faced Bulgarian and Greek critics who disputed the Macedonians right to own their history. The disputed claims and rival traditions led to the fact that unlike “objective history“ its interpretation is important.

The fifth chapter, written by Andrew B. Wachtel, is directed at writer Petrović Njegoš, who was born 1813 in Montenegro. In every country citizens are mobilized by élites, who use ”the person and the work of the national poet as a source of pride and a rallying point for future cultural and political development“ (p. 131). Petar Petrović Njegoš appeared in Montenegro with the same goal for élites. However, unlike Petöfi, Mickiewicz or Pushkin, it was not clear with which nation Njegoš is identified. In different interpretations he was a Serb, Yugoslav or Montenegrin. Wachtel describes the interpretation of Njegoš during the 19th and 20th centuries. Originally he was considered as a major South Slavic Romantic writer (p. 135). Along with the rise of Yugoslavism, Njegoš became a symbol of the ”Yugoslav nation“, regardless of the fact that anti-Muslim attitudes appear in his writings . Despite rejecting much of the interwar Yugoslav legacy, the post-war Communist government proclaimed Njegoš as Yugoslavia’s national poet. At that time he was called Montenegrin, but this was not as controversial as the main division between Serbs and Croats and secondly, small Montenegro could hardly be accused of a hegemonic or expansionist policy (p. 141). After Yugoslavia disappeared there was no longer a need for maintaining Njegoš’s Yugoslav identity. With the rise of Montenegrin consciousness there was serious discussion about Njegoš in Podgorica. However, among Montenegrins disputes arose about whether he was of Serbian or Montenegrin identity (p. 147).

The sixth chapter, written by Ildiko Erdei, examines Yugoslav’s Pioneer Organization. As in other Communist countries, the Yugoslav Pioneer Organization came into being after 1945. The Pioneers were subordinated to the Communist party. Full acculturation into the socialist community was the main goal of the organization from the time the child was admitted into the Pioneer group. The Yugoslav Pioneers were bound by membership and united by the slogan ”Brotherhood and Unity“, taken in 1922 from the already existing Soviet model. The first Pioneers were active combatants during the Second World War. In the post-war period every Pioneer was
trained to become a "new socialist man\(^1\), and a happy childhood was connected with social improvement. Erdei gives some examples of the Pioneer’s everyday life, which would create an "ideology of the happy child" in Yugoslavia.

The next part is also dedicated to communist ideology in Yugoslavia. Maja Brkljačić’s contribution is about folk epics in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Why epics? Singers of epics are custodians of memory and tradition, and thus of the identity of the group\(^2\). The main function of the epic poem is to uphold the group cultural memory and identity (p. 181). Literature serves, as medieval chronicles, for fostering cultural memory. How could cultural memory be functional? "It has to be objectified, stored, reactivated and circulated in the group"\(^3\). If there is no cultural memory to be preserved in written form then the human memory fulfils that function, very often in poetic form for easier remembrance, and reactivation comes usually through singing, dancing, playing etc. Oral epic poetry plays a significant role in an illiterate society. The author describes the history of epic poems in Yugoslav territory since 1557, when the first epic poem reportedly appeared on the island of Hvar (p.184). Special attention is focused on communist epic songs. Partisan folk songs were acceptable (p. 191), and songs about war heroes were common and soon canonized. But in general, deep changes caused by heavy industrialization and urbanisation, along with communist conformity, led to the natural decline of epic songs. While old songs were considered as valuable, new songs were condemned. Songs referring to contemporary life were generally not accepted. "While old folk tunes often began with 'Dear God, what a miracle!', new songs began with words more like ‘Dear Comrade’, what a miracle!’“ (p. 196).

Maja Brkljačić concludes that the Yugoslav Communist’s legitimacy was based upon the victory in the Second World War. In the uneasy period of industrialization and the construction of a working class régime the desired community was created by simplistic stories about adjusting ”good us“ and ”bad them“ narratives to contemporary reality; in other words: ”good Partisans“. “The Bad” were Germans and Italians. In spite of industrialization, peasants still constituted a significant section of the working class. Therefore, the Communists presented themselves as pursuing the same law for everyone, and claimed the end of exploitation. “The Bad” was a feudal master.

In chapter eight Rossitza Guentcheva presents “sounds in socialist Bulgaria“ (p. 211) as a phenomenon of everyday life. Although there was heavy industrialization in the 1950s, Bulgaria and even Sofia were still very rural. As industrialization was forced and the main goal of the Communist élite, the "sounds associated with rural life acquired a pejorative connotations“ (p.212), and silence was associated with the capitalist enemy. Apart from rural sounds, a host of other noises were considered as unwanted. Some previous noises, such as the operetta Deliana, were perceived as an “attack against our new cooperative village“ (p. 213). Music could be made noisy and harmful. Some Bulgarian musicians, who followed Schönberg, Hindemitt and Debussy, such as Konstantin Iliev and Lazar Nikolov, were labelled as "imitators of decadent bourgeois music“ (p.213), According to the Stalinist line, even Shostakovich, Stravinsky and Prokofiev were considered as decadent propaganda. The same criticism
was directed against American jazz. A new category of sounds emerged in the 1960s, when heavy industrialization started and urbanization followed with the construction of multi-storey buildings for the public. Urban noises were connected with the rise of factories, cars, buses, trams, and the concentration of residents in multi-storey buildings and the ownership of radios, televisions and even record players. However, in the 1960s industrial sounds began to acquire negative connotations. While factories were forced to increase productivity, rising noise had a negative impact on the productivity and health of factory workers, and noise became the "public enemy of contemporary life" (p. 216). Along with factory noise, two other types of private noises were distinguished: of public and private origin (cars, motorcycles, family arguments, and playing television and radios loudly). Officials in the Bulgarian Communist Party launched a strong anti-noise policy in the 1970s. "Peace and quiet were reintroduced into the life of Bulgarian citizens" (p. 226). The new sensitivity was reflected in factory transformation too, and even in architecture and internal design. The reinvention of silence was launched because noise was harmful to a worker’s productivity. The aim was also to keep his body healthy and protect leisure time.

In the next chapter Robert C. Austin tackled the Greater Albania problem in relation to the Kosovo question, and the intention of the author is to describe official state policy and its attitude towards ethnic Albanians. In this respect there are two milestones to be sought – the rule of King Zog and the Ultra-Stalinist period of Enver Hoxha. Albanian national awakening prior to the First World War and relations during the Second World War are also mentioned as the issue of "ethnic Albania" arose and in the latter case fulfilled. It is not possible to speak about a single Albanian nationalism; Kosovo did not play a significant role in Albania’s foreign policy, and the Kosovo problem arose in the issue of the Albanian border drawn in 1913. Delimitation was an issue of geopolitical bargaining (p. 239). Albanian demands in Paris for border extension after the war was a reaction to irredentist claims of Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia. In the interwar period the main concern was to maintain the stability and sustainability of the Albanian state and politics focused on preservation of existing borders instead (p. 240). There was actually very weak – if any – "grassroots" activism. The Albanian population was by and large poor and illiterate, and the impulse for the unification of Albanians came from Kosovan political activists in first years after the war. The Second World War did not resolve the divisions between both Albanian communities, and Kosovo became the main dispute between Balli Kombetar, who wanted a Greater, and Tito’s Communist-sponsored National Liberation Front, who supported Kosovo as two separate entities instead. After the Second World War Hoxha’s governments were predominantly controlled by the Tosk community in the south and did not push for unification. After the fall of Communism, and with a new leadership in Tirane and Priština, the Pan-Albanian question arose again. Originally Sali Berisha’s policy was aimed at unification, but he softened his stance during this time because he realized that he would not receive much support from within the Albanian society nor the international community. After a policy change in 1997, when the Socialists came to
power, the idea of Greater Albania was rejected completely. There are some signs that an "ethnic Albania" is being revived, in time of interference in "is reactivated, in time of interference in Yugoslavia before and during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, and Greater Albania was discussed during 2001 internal ethnic conflict in Macedonia. There are still forces in Albania calling for a Greater Albania, but they remain insignificant. Moreover, Albania is a weak and poor state, and it did not have the ability "to influence events outside the country“ (p. 248).

Marko Bulatović’s article "Struggling with Yugoslavism“ looks at interwar Serbian political thought, national identity and the Serbian struggle with Yugoslavism. Despite a sense of cooperation, the idea of a common South Slav nationality did not play a significant role among the Serbian intelligentsia in the 19th century. Serbs concerned with strengthening their national identity in the 19th century and during the Balkan wars showed that potential cooperation would be subordinated to Serbian goals circling around an ethnic focus. The First World War brought a dramatic shift due to the "struggle for liberation and unification of all our fettered brothers, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (p. 256)“. War propaganda moved towards a unification policy, and in the first post-war decade it was hard to elaborate a further policy of Yugoslavism. However, the royal dictatorship after the putsch of King Alexander Karadjordjević changed the awkward position of the state. He proclaimed the Yugoslav nation as the only constitutive country in the state and pursued a policy of strengthening the state and national unification (p. 260). However, after several years it was clear that Yugoslavism failed. An economic crisis, the rise of Croatian opposition and the re-opening of the Serbian question were clear signs that his policy was far from successful. The era of King Alexander culminated in his assassination in Marseilles by Macedonian and Croatian terrorists. Yugoslavism was a nominally untouched ideal but in fact driven to acknowledging national diversity under the rule of Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović (1935–1939), which is a period called ” dictatorship without a dictator“ (p. 263). The Croatian, Slovene and Serbian questions were again re-opened. "Integral Yugoslavism had already been proven bankrupt as a national identity by the mid-1930s“ (p. 264).

The closing chapter about "Communist Yugoslavia“ and others written by Dejan Jović focuses on official post-war identity in Yugoslavia (1945–1991), with particular attention to the construction of "we“ and "others“. In Communism the definition of "others“ was of great importance and the author searches for a proper definition of Socialism. The Yugoslav Communists, despite anti-Sovietism, did not abandon Communist and Marxist ideology, and the "Yugoslav way to Socialism“ was paved with criticism of Soviet revisionism. Yugoslav identity was therefore built against a Soviet misinterpretation of Marx’s vision. The Yugoslav policy was aimed at decentralization, a self-management concept and non-alignment. There was recognition of smaller nations and nationalities in the country to avoid the hegemonic policy of the larger nations, the Serbs and Croats. In time, liberal democracy was not as dangerous as the Soviet Stalinist style of government, and the Soviet model was declared as the only
major threat. Yugoslavism served as an alternative way, and Liberal and Nationalist forces were heavily underestimated by the Yugoslav Communists.

As seen in the list of contributors, the book is a collection of texts written by researchers who are highly regarded specialists on particular topics. The contributions presented in the book spring in many cases from their dissertation theses. This guarantees texts of a high quality and with an in-depth focus. Another aspect is that each chapter is followed by documents and pictures about national symbols and heroes, which always relate to the texts.

In the books there are four texts oriented towards Yugoslav identity issue (Bulatović, Jović, Brkljačić, Erdei). Interwar Yugoslavism is analysed even twice (Bulatović, Jović), but several hot identity issues are completely ignored: For instance, there are no papers focused on identities within Albania, regarding Ghegs and Tosks, or on complex identities in Macedonia and/or its national identity formation. Greece was not included at all, although at least the editors regret this (p.10). Another major problem is the fragmentation and therefore disproportionate nature of selected topics. Montenegro is presented only partly and through a "minor" topic – the writer Petrović Njegoš. On the other hand, "the major" issue of Greater Albania is explored only through its relations with Kosovo, and neither Montenegro nor Macedonia are included. While some chapters are just introductions to the problems, other texts are concerned with very specific issues only.

Regarding the contents of the texts, mainly positive remarks can be made. For example, Robert C. Austin hesitates to stress the importance of the Albanian League as a nationalist organization (p.238). Being more focused on postwar era, he underestimated the anti-Slavic claims of Albanians during the Albanian national awakening. Andrew B. Wachtel could include more samples from Njegoš’s literature both in text and in documents, as did Maja Brkljačić did with folk epics, for illustration. In Mark Biondich’s text on Croatia, more research on conflict and post-conflict development in the 1990s should have been carried out. The content of the book – though precise and comprehensive – does not comply with the name of the article nor correspond to the year of the book’s publication. Despite some criticism, Ideologies and National Identities is another suitable contribution to the ongoing discussion about the problem of identity in the contemporary world.

The so-called People’s Democracy of the Third Czechoslovak Republic (1945–1948) has not received the level of attention from Czech and Slovak social scientists as other parts of the post-war period in Czechoslovak history. Thus, Bradley F. Abrams’s *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* is a welcome contribution to the study of the period between 1945 and 1948 in Czech history. The book is concerned with the rapid transition of Czechoslovak society to socialism and with the conditions that allowed the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSČ – Komunistická strana Československa) to take over Czechoslovak politics and society. Abrams argues, contrary to the widely held view, that Czechoslovak society did not “fall” into communism because there were NKVD advisors and Soviet armed forces on Czechoslovak territory, but because there was nationwide support for and acceptance of the development of Communism.

Abrams focuses on the most important intellectual streams in Czech politics and journalism after the Second World War and identifies and describes four groups: communists; democratic socialists; Protestants, and Roman Catholics. When discussing communist intellectuals Abrams focuses on the activities of Zdeněk Nejedlý and Václav Kopecký, both Communist ministers who strongly influenced the thinking of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, as well as the writings of communist intellectuals such as Ladislav Štoll, Gustav Bureš and Jiří Hájek. Abrams agrees with F. Marek that: “the struggle for the future (and for the soul of the nation) manifests itself among us above all as a struggle over the past” (p. 97). He successfully shows how the Communist Party attempted to present itself as a patriotic party that protected the interests of the Czech (and Slovak) nation. Abrams shows clearly how the Communists usurped the teachings of Jan Hus: “today Jan Hus would be the leader of the political party which would be close to a Communist party”, and also T. G. Masaryk. “V. Kopecký took Masaryk into the Communist Pantheon when he said that Masaryk’s fight against the Agrarian-Nationalist coalition made him a natural ally of the Czechoslovak Communist Party” (p. 90 and 127–128). Masaryk’s name was used similarly by other radical socialist groups, including former President Edvard Beneš. Beneš argued that “no one here should think that what we are doing today means any kind of departure from Masaryk. It is rather a continuation and completion of his programme ... the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans ..., the first wave of nationalizations ..., and the Communist-dominated system of national committees are measures of which Masaryk would approve” (p. 131).

Other intellectual streams saw Czechoslovakia through the lens of the Slavic idea. President Beneš, for example, claimed that the “Soviet Union ... and the Red Army ... fought not only for the Soviet Union but also for the rest of the Slavic nations” (p. 159). According to the communist L. Štoll, the Russian nation was the forbearer of Western culture, because Russia saved Europe from Hitler. Similarly, Lev Sychrava
claimed: “The Russian Revolution ... was built on the ideas of the British and French Revolutions” (p. 161). Abrams understands the pronounced Slavism in the post-war period as compensation for the “small Czech national feeling.” One must remember that many Czech intellectuals understood the French and British politics of appeasement as anti-Slavic, because they opened the door for Hitler and his politics of Slavic subjugation. According to Zdeněk Nejedlý, the Russian Revolution was the instrument of emancipation for the Slavic people. President Edvard Beneš stated that “the struggle for the freedom of the Slavic nations was always and above all the struggle of the Slavic people in the widest sense of the word ... All Slavic nations are by their nature exceedingly democratic and naturally exhibit stronger egalitarian tendencies than the other European nations” (p. 164). Slavic people are thus predestined (according to Beneš) to build People’s Democratic regimes as the highest form of political arrangement. Similar ideas were also advanced by Protestants. Jaroslav Pravda argued, for example, that “Europe and Asia have served Satan over the centuries in his war of extermination against Slavic world whose calling is to establish the Kingdom of God and social justice on Earth” (p. 166).

Abrams considers an interesting idea advanced by Czech intellectuals of the period, namely that Czech Communists were different from Communists in other countries. Czech Communists were held up as a patriotic group that would go a different way than that of Soviet communism. The problem of how to harmonize Communist internationalism and Czech patriotism was solved by formulating a special “Czech” way for socialism. Discussion of the Czech path was part of a wider discussion about the position of Czech society and the Czechoslovak state in the European and international context. The question was whether Czechoslovakia belonged to the East or the West. Interestingly, the only that clearly placed Czechoslovakia in the West was an association of Catholic intellectuals (Pavel Tigrid, Ivo Ducháček, Helena Koželuhová and Bohdan Chudoba) centred around the magazine Obzory.

Indeed, according to Abrams, the only people who doubted Czech Communism were Roman Catholic intellectuals. He draws a picture of post-war Czechoslovakia as a playground. There were communists, socialists and Protestants, who promoted revolution, on the one hand, and on the other hand were Catholics, who declared that “revolution has no place in a democratic system” (People’s Party leader Adolf Procházka, p. 241). This clear division of politics and society is, in my opinion, the weakest point of the book. Abrams shows clearly that there was a very strong radicalization of intellectuals in post-war Czechoslovakia; but I do not think it is possible to view the period between 1945 and 1948 as a dichotomy between Communists and Catholics. Without a doubt, taken as a group, Catholic intellectuals were the only ones to maintain “common sense,” but we can hardly count people such as F. Peroutka or V. Černý as Communist intellectuals.

Last but not least, I should mention one interesting and important idea in Abrams’s book concerning the role of young people between 15 and 25 years of age. In 1947 people in this age group comprised about 17 per cent of the Czech population.
According to Abrams it was a strong, radical group, and one that grew up during the interwar economic crisis and then the Second World War. These young people were hungry for ideas of national revolution and the special role of their nation. When the Communists won over these young people and the working class, their path to take over power was clear.

To sum up, I should say that despite some of my negative remarks and comments, *The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism* is a very valuable historical, sociological and political analysis of the Czechoslovak post-war situation. It can be regarded as one of the best to be published on its subject.

Europea"nalisation of National Political Parties

The proceedings of a conference entitled The Europeanisation of National Political Parties form a very recent publication which is concerned with the process of Europeanization in Central Europe, especially in the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The publication deals with a range of academic texts that regard Europeanization as an actual phenomenon.

This valuable publication was written on the basis of the contributions of participants in the aforementioned international conference, which was organized by the Department for Political Science and International Relations of University of West Bohemia in Plzeň and held there on 17 – 18 June 2004. In addition to the editors/authors, Ladislav Cabada of the Faculty of Philosophy and Arts of the University of West Bohemia in Plzeň, Czech Republic and Alenka Krašovec of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, 19 others participated in the proceedings. As the editors have written “the publication presented only limited answers to the limited scope of questions” (p. 253). Nevertheless, the conference brought a fairly good range of information about the Europeanization of political parties at the European and national levels.

The book is systematically divided into five main sections: 1) “Introduction”; 2) “General Overview”; 3) “The Czech Perspective”; 4) ”The Slovene Perspective”; and 5) Conclusions. There is a short introduction written by one of the editors, Alenka Krašovec that deals with the European Union and political parties in general. Krašovec briefly describes the evolution of the Europeanization research and suggests that until now more interest has been shown in the European Parliament (EP) party groupings – the most developed party organization at the EU level, but in the last decade there has been growing attention paid to the under-researched area of European party federations (p. 8). This duality of European political parties – on the one hand European party federations and on the other hand the EP party groupings – is perceived very sensitively and is presented many times in this book. Krašovec and some of the other authors argue that the Europeanization of parties in Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) generally started in the early 1990s, through the contacts and connections between these parties and European party federations. It can be said that in terms of the parties Europeanization came more from European party federations than from EP party groups. So far some of the national political parties – not only from Central Eastern European Countries – prefer cooperation on the basis of European party federations rather than EP party groups. One reason for this might be that the unclear decision – incorporated in the Maastricht and later in the Amsterdam Treaty – to financially and technically support the development of both types of European "political parties“ did not basically connect the existence of European "political

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parties“ with the life and work of the EP (p. 251). Evidence of this fact is shown in the section “The Europeanization of the Civic Democratic Party“ (ODS), written by Jan Směkal, Pavel Štrunc and Jakub Zykmund. The authors describe the ODS as a national party that prefers the cooperation of liberal-conservative political parties in the European Democratic Union (and internationally), while its position in the EP – including the EP party group membership of MEPs from the Civic Democratic Party – is not very clear (pp. 126–127, p. 251).

Four chapters make up the second section of this book, the “General Overview”. One of its authors, Danica Fink Hafner, asks whether a European party exist. She points out that political parties at the European level differ in many respects from the theoretical definitions of a political party. The next chapter, written by Jakub Dürr, Dan Marek and Pavel Šaradin, is based on the question: “Is the theory of Europeanization relevant for Central European countries?” The answer is positive. The authors think that Europeanization theory could and should be applied to the countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 because they are already essentially subject to the same pressures of adoption of EU policies as current member states (p. 38). European political culture, national political parties and their orientation, European politics and the Europeanization of political parties are the main issues of the chapter written by Peter Nitschke. Among other things, his text states that political ideology is still a very important basis for a political party’s life, even at the supranational level. *The Belgian party system: a break from Europeanization*, by Klara Weger, brings an interesting contribution to the whole Overview, which comes before the two other main sections – the “Czech Perspective” and the “Slovene Perspective”. Klara Weger agrees with Robert Ladrech´s framework, suggesting that even though there are some formal links and interactions between the Belgian parties and the European level, the process of Europeanization, and thus the adaptation of the national level to the transnational and the mutual influence of both the levels have not yet reached a truly significant level (p. 65).

The “Czech Perspective” section begins with the contribution by Jaroslav Čmejrek, who deals with a dispute about European integration among Czech parliamentary parties. He concludes his article with the statement that the parliamentary elections in June 2002 have shown that both wings of the Czech parliamentary spectrum (Euro-sceptics and Euro-optimists) are almost of the same strength (p. 81). Čmejrek’s contribution is a valuable survey of the stances and programmes of Czech parliamentary parties in relation to the EU. Ladislav Cabada and Šárka Waisová analyse Czech political parties and their attitude to the institutions of the European Union regarding the debate before the first European Parliament election. In the introduction to their contribution the authors state that in the Czech Republic the election to the European Parliament cannot be separated from the internal political situation in the country and that the result of the elections could also be perceived as a reference point before the two national elections in 2004. (p. 83). The results of these elections bear witness to the authors’ idea. They authors deal with the theoretical framework of the Europeanization of national parties
and describe the most important elements of the electoral campaign for the Czech political parties, in the EP elections. Instead of a conclusion they pose a question: “Are the Czech political parties prepared for work in the European Parliament”? They mention that the Civic Democratic Party and especially the Communist Party are not very active in the process of Europeanization of their politics. The authors also state that in the non-parliamentary parties only the Czech Green Party is continually cooperating with some of the European party federations.

The other four contributions deal with the process of Europeanization of different Czech political parties. The first, written by Lucie Tunkrová, describes the Europeanization of the Czech Social Democratic Party and compares its Europeanization process with that of the Social Democratic Parties in Sweden and Finland. She argues that there are no important differences between social democratic parties from the “old” and “new” EU-member states. In another section Jan Smékal, Pavel Štrunc and Jakub Zykmund write about the Europeanization of the Civic Democratic Party, and Pavla Dočekalová deals with the cooperation of extreme right parties in the European Parliament with their counterparts in the Czech Republic. “The Czech Perspective” in this book concludes with a chapter, written by Eva Holubová, about the Europeanization of one of the Czech non-parliamentary parties – the European Democrats.

Five contributions describe the process of Europeanization in Slovenia. “The Slovene Perspective” begins with the contribution of Damjan Lajh and Alenka Krašovec. It analyses cooperation between Slovene parliamentary parties and European party federations. The authors found three key elements that potentially influence the level of integration and cooperation between national and European party federations. The elements are: 1) the level of integration of the respective European party federation; 2) the extent to which the respective European party federation has already become a “true” party; and 3) the number of members from each EU-member state in the respective European party federation (p. 175). The same authors describe Slovene parliamentary parties and candidate selection for elections to the EP in the second chapter of the Slovene Perspective section.

The next contribution, written by Tomaž Deželan, is an empirical study of Slovene parliamentary political parties in the EP. The author has tried to outline the behaviour of Slovene MEPs and concludes his text with the statement that MEPs in Brussels and Strasbourg will be influenced by national political parties, the national electorate and the political groups of the EP. According to him, the strongest mechanism for national political parties to control their MEPs involves candidate selection, because in order to be re-elected, MEPs have to obey their party’s delegated preferences (p. 215). The main themes of the final contribution about Europeanization in Slovenia, by Milan Zver, are values as a part of political ideologies, value revival, political polarization and the ideology differences among the Social Democrats and People’s Democrats in Slovenia. He argues that political values are becoming the core of the political programmes with which parties appear on the political “market”. These values are
also moving into the forefront of political marketing, and because values are part of political ideologies, we can speak about the revival of political ideologies, which is a normal phenomenon of political supply. In this sense, there are, according to the author, two dominant supplies: social-democratic and people-democratic. The guiding value of the former is “equality”, of the latter “freedom” (p. 245). Milan Zver further maintains that both value patterns have their supporting values, mostly of the same name, but with different meaning in different political ideologies.

Conclusion forms the last section of the book. Ladislav Cabada (one of the editors) reiterates the main findings and the empirical evidence of the conferences. He refers again to the main goal of the book, which is to contribute to a European discourse on Europeanization on the basis of Czech and Slovene examples and the shift of the term “Europeanization” beyond the “old” EU.

*The Europeanization of National Parties* is synoptic collection of interesting and valuable information about the process called Europeanization that influences political parties, their policies, structures and whole party systems in the Czech Republic and Slovenia and also in both groupings at the European level – European political parties federations and party groups in the European Parliament.

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